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Presidents across Latin America have alternately been cast as ‘imperial executives’ (see O’Donnell 1994) or sacrificial lambs, subject to the follies of circumstance and unable to act decisively to break stalemates (Linz 1990). The effect of presidential power on the stability of democracy, especially across crisis-prone states, is of utmost theoretical and practical importance. We examine whether strong presidents undermine democratic accountability, by weakening independent oversight agencies. We will look at how institutions and agentsâ€"such as the judicial court systems, ombudsmen office, attorney general, etc…â€"are impacted when states’ constitutions allow the executive certain powers. Since the main purpose of these agencies are to create accountability and check the executive branch, this paper examines executive influence over these institutions as a potential cause of democratic deterioration within Latin American presidential governments. We use data for the region from 1900-2004 and employ event history models to disentangle the effects of presidents on democracy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrary to recent research, we find an "anti-political" budget cycle in a panel of fifteen Latin American democracies from 1973 to 2000. During the period in which Latin America underwent the most lasting and widespread wave of democratization, elections worked to limit the degree to which incumbents manipulate fiscal policies for electoral advantage. We show that governments undertook fiscal adjustment by reducing spending in the election year and in the inaugural year of the newly elected government. Though the capacity to enact austerity is moderated by the transition to democracy, new Latin American democracies also adhere to fiscal restraint. This paper shows that, at most, the period of democratic transition in Latin America may postpone bitter fiscal adjustments to periods when democratic regimes are stable. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary Latin America is experiencing a region-wide violent crime epidemic, the political consequences of which are largely unknown. Many commentators imply that the crime wave bodes ill for democracy in the region, causing disillusionment with government, reducing mass political participation, and increasing popular support for authoritarianism. This paper questions the micro-foundations of that conventional wisdom. Analysis of survey data indicates that crime victimization may cause increased political participation at the individual level. Rather than becoming cynical, disenchanted, or disempowered, Latin American crime victims are actually more politically active than their non-victimized peers. Crime victimization has an ambiguous impact on opinions about democracy and dictatorship; further research will be needed before firm conclusions about this relationship can be drawn. The results are robust to specification checks and multiple different quantitative methods, and they are based on data from multiple years of the LAPOP and Latinobaómetro surveys. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article introduces and develops the concept of party non-systems, defiened as those party universes characterized by a fundamental absence of inter-temporal continuity in the identity of the main parties. It then applies it to Latin America. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to develop a deeper understanding of the dynamics and possible consequences of this leftist trend in Latin American politics considering the interplay between democratic transitions and market policies implementation.Latin American politiesâ??political parties, social movements or networksâ??have in recent times moved towards different forms of leftist options, whether in discourse or in policy making. Although the initial transitions from authoritarian to democratic régimes were coupled by more center-to-right régimes, the present leftist trend should come as no surprise. Democracy was reestablished almost at the same time as pro-market policies following the then dominant Washington consensus were implemented. Almost two decades after these policies were launched, their basic promise of increased welfare for all citizens has not been fulfilled. Although social, economic and cultural inequalities are deeply rooted in Latin American societies and were already notorious well before the Washington Consensus, it is more or less a generalized impression that neoliberal policies have aggravated these inequalities. Even if there is still debate on their precise impacts on inequality, poverty and economic growth, what can be said beyond contestation is that strengthening democracy has made social inequalities more apparent, public policy responses more transparent, and hence political representation more accountable. Secondly, expectations concerning high rates of economic growth have not been met in any country in the region, except for Chile. The public's impression of policies largely failing to respond to increasingly visible social inequalities has triggered a shift of political preferences towards the left, which is evidenced by recent elections as well as the general discourse in the political debates throughout the region. The purpose of this paper is to develop a deeper understanding of the underlying logic and possible consequences of this leftist trend in Latin American politics. In doing so, I address the current debate on populism and the extent to which it poses a threat to democracy. This debate has been obscured by extreme views that either condemn all forms of policies that seek to confront inequalities or hail such policy efforts blindly. I argue that this debate needs a more nuanced examination of the specific institutional characteristics of populism in contemporary Latin American democracies. As Alexis Tocqueville works remind us, during times of changeâ??even radical onesâ??there are important strings of continuity that ought to be considered because they are crucial determinants of potential restorations. The de facto governance structures in modern Latin America are often shaped by traditional relationships between members of the oligarchy rather than by recent political reforms. Culture and its norms continue to shape interactions in contemporary Latin American politics. Various paths are being pursued to overcome the crises related to governance structures, the vulnerability of governing coalitions, and mechanisms of representation in Latin America. However, success in pursuing these paths requires addressing the major issue of inequality. This takes us back to another of Tocqueville's main concerns. As Vincent Ostrom put it, "Tocqueville's task in Democracy in America was to understand the American efforts to organize a republican system of government and to determine whether it offered a promise of maintaining liberty under conditions of equality." ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our paper examines whether electoral competitiveness or politically active societies enhance the connection between citizen interest and government policy in the developing world by examining Latin American electoral and public opinion data. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is focused on how institutionally shaped path dependence mechanisms are interrupted by the political articulation of emerging new social cleavages. This theoretical puzzleis explored through the comparative analysis of the changes experienced by Latin American welfare regimes after the exhaustion and replacement of the import substitution industrialization model. I contend that this change in the development strategy inaugurated a new critical juncture with important new institutional crystallizations in terms of the patterns of social citizenship within welfare regimes. However, I will also hypothesize, cross-national variation regarding both the ways in which these transformations were politically processed and their final outcomes is partially determined by institutional inheritances derived from different patterns of working class incorporation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper derrives from a larger project of surveys in eight Latin American nations. It uses AmericasBarometer data, with samples of 1,500 respondents per country. The focus is on the relationship between negative social capital and legtimacy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper shows that the constructive veto (otherwise known as -partial', Alemán and Schwartz 2006) of most Latin American presidents is a special case of last-offer amendment. As such, this power lets presidents broker vote-trading deals by legislators (cf. Heller 2007, Weingast 1992). In systems lacking a strong committee system like the U.S., the constructive veto mitigates trust problems between legislators. The paper also shows that it brings stability in legislatures where voting is carried with forward-agendas, as the Mexican Congress. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last decade the use of referenda has spread throughout Latin America, with 33 referenda taking place since the early 1990s. According to many observers, referenda have been used mainly by populist Presidents attempting to bypass representative institutions, usually when political parties are isolated and unpopular. Yet, party endorsement has seemed to affect the outcomes of some referenda. This paper analyzes whether party endorsement has an impact on voting patterns using a new dataset that comprises information of voting patterns at the subnational level in 13 referenda. Thus, it is the first attempt to understand more systematically the role of political parties in referenda in Latin America. I find evidence to argue that parties can shape voting outcomes, depending on factors such as literacy levels, party strength, and cleavage structures. I find support to argue that Presidents may manipulate voters when they initiate referenda on institutional aspects, but there is no empirical support to argue that party influence decreases in these situations. On the contrary, results suggest that competitive campaigns, in which parties engage actively, make the concentration of power in the hands of Presidents less likely ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Latin America is experiencing a significant period of economic growth. Annual economic growth has exceeded 3 percent for six consecutive years. In some countries, the growth exceeded 5 percent. Although incomes remain largely stagnant, unemployment is falling, and poverty levels, while still high, are declining. Data show that public opinion is aware of this growth, and that subjective assessments of the economy are gradually changing for the better. But the public remain quite unhappy with their political institutions. Support for democracy is not increasing, and trust in political institutions remains quite low. This paper seeks to explore this combination of growing economies and persistent negative attitudes towards the political system. Why does trust in political institutions remain low in a context of economy growth? Is it that the benefits of this growth have not yet percolated to the majority of the population? Or is it that trust in institutions is driven by new, emerging issues not directly related to the economy? Data for this paper come from three waves of surveys conducted by The AmericasBarometer, and directed by the Latin American Public Opinion Project of Vanderbilt University. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last few decades, the study of federalism and its dynamics in Latin America has regained centrality in the field of comparative politics. Nevertheless, we do not have a systematic knowledge about the factors that shape relations between national and sub-national authorities in these “pos-decentralization” political scenarios. .x000d.Tackling the problem from a comparative approach, and focusing on Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, this paper tries to answer three main analytical questions: 1) Which are the institutional features that encourage or prevent governors to coordinate their actions when negotiating with the national government? 2) Which are the scenarios (conflict or cooperation) that emerge as a result of the strategies adopted by governors when acting in block or by their own? 3) What are expected policy outcomes that will result from those different bargaining scenarios? In order to achieve this goal I propose a new fiscal theory of gubernatorial power that examines the ways in which different fiscal institutions influence intergovernmental relations and provide an explanation for the success or failure in the emergence of governors’ coalitions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrary to the theoretical expectations prevalent at the onset of the Third Wave of democratization, many party systems in Latin America have unraveled rather than move towards consolidation. There is a distinguishable trend towards de-institutionalization. This study aims to elucidate the routes via which party systems become inchoate or even transit to non-system status. Three such avenues are delineated and analyzed. One is the retroactive voter punishment, whereby voters punish established parties that are responsible for massive failures of political and economic performance. A second is that of voter revolt against collusive party arrangements that limit representation, accountability and responsiveness. These over-institutionalized cartel-type party systems more prone to collapse when coupled with economic crises. The third route towards party system de-institutionalization is charted by presidential agency: a president´s deliberate attempt to weaken opposition political parties as an integral part of an agenda to concentrate political power. The study emphasizes this last avenue, which has yet to be fully theorized, using Peru, Venezuela and Ecuador as prominent examples. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why did Latin American powerful political elites be willing to dilute their power and extend the franchise? We develop a political economy model of enfranchise extension where political equilibria is determined by the level of political competition ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the determinants of coalition duration in presidential countries. I use data on the composition of Latin American governments to test the connection between coalition breakdowns and wider aspects of the political system. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is a viable interest group system essential to the consolidation of Latin American democracy? In answer, this paper presents a framework for understanding the development, current role, and future developments of interest groups in the region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on growing literatures regarding the effects of increasing sub-national electoral competition and programmatic party commitments in Latin America, this paper offers an explanation of state-level judicial change in Brazil and Mexico. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The primary research question addressed in this paper is what are the determinants of the reemergence of the left in Latin America? In the first six years of the 21st Century, leftist parties either increased their vote or won presidential elections in Latin America. On this, much speculation about the influence of the Venezuelan President, Hugo Chávez, on the left in the region has been made. This paper undertakes the first systematic analysis on the influence of President Chávez on the new Latin American left. Besides testing Chávez's influence, the paper also explores how a country's levels of poverty, inequality, support for democracy, and external debt may influence the rise in votes for the left, especially when Chávez makes appearances in each Latin American country. We test our hypotheses using at least two presidential elections data from 17 Latin American countries. Findings reveal that Chávez has a positive and significant influence over the leftist vote in the region. A country's economic and political factors alone are not predictors of the leftist vote; however, when interacted with Chávez's appearances, they become influential. Although Chávez's influence is significant, it is relatively small, leading us to suggest that with or without Chávez, the Latin America turn toward the left may continue. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work and Bowling Alone extolled the virtue of social capital and heralded widespread interest in the idea that social networks, civil society, and trust contribute to democracy and good government. After a decade of research on social capital inspired by these important works, scholars have identified certain weaknesses of the social capital "model," including confusion about where trust, a central concept, fits, the role of history and social context in shaping social capital, and a tendency to underspecify the mechanisms by which social capital affects political systems. We propose the concept of "political capital" as a category of variables that may intervene between social capital and the political system. We test this model of social capital, context and political capital on survey data from eight Latin American nations. We find that civil society and community networks affect political capital far more than trust, and that the politico-economic context also influences political capital. The contributions of civil society, networks, and system-level democracy to political participation, democratic norms, and support for national institutions suggest how political capital may be strengthened so as to contribute to democratic consolidation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the link between property rights and democracy. In examining regime type and property rights we explore the relationship that a number of authors suggest exists between democracy and property rights (Cheibub 1994, Hayek 1944, Freidman 1962, Lindbloom 1977, Olson 1993). Here the authors generally contend that democratic policies reduce predatory actions and secure property rights. In contrast, others suggest that democracy does not necessarily protect property rights. Here individuals may influence policymakers to restructure property rights in exchange for political support, often regardless of regime type (Przeworski and Limongi 1992, Haggard 1990, North 1991, Olson 1982 and Huntington and Nelson 1976). In addition, iherent in much of the discussion on regime type and the protection of property rights is an underlying assumption of a link between capitalist economies, democracy and the protection of property. We examine this link as well.In order to test the strength between property rights and regime type we have created a unique data set covering all of Latin America over the last 50 years. We explore not just regime effects on the protection of property rights, but we explore the mechanisms through which regimes may affect property rights by focusing on executive power and the presence of institutions of accountability. We conduct a pooled time series analysis and find that while regime type and economic growth matters, institutional explanations including power of the executive, decree authority and institutional accountability do a much better job of informing our understanding of who will do a better job of protecting property rights. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do political parties adopt primary elections? This study develops a theory of party democratization. It is motivated by the recent proliferation of primary elections in Latin America, which has been well documented but not fully explained. The explanation in this paper consists on making two claims. First that primaries select more electable but less loyal candidates. This claim is made precise with a decision-theoretic model whose predictions are consistent with the main empirical findings of the existing empirical literature. And second that the incentives for party leaders to select electable candidates have increased in the past quarter century. This claim is based on some historical trends in Latin American politics, namely the increased penetration of television, a more investigative journalism, and a decrease in electoral fraud. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Latin American democracies are often referred to as superpresidential systems. Executives dominate the political arena and legislatures are historically weak and unable to act as a consistent check on the executive. In this paper, I argue that unconstrained executives are detrimental to economic growth. I make a contribution to a developing literature in the area of political institutions and economic. Contrary to expectation, I find that less constrained executives are good for the economy; whereas, more constrained executives are not. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is my contention that the neoliberal models that were implemented in Latin America attacked and weakened the state in favor of markets within the polity, but failed to understand that in developing societies the question is not whether or not to h ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines over 1000 contentious challenges that took place in seven Latin American countries to determine what types of challenges and what circumstances tend to result in repression and/or concessions. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is a viable interest group system essential to the consolidation of Latin American democracy?  In answer, this paper presents a framework for understanding the development, current role, and future developments of interest groups in the region. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to understand the dynamics of non-issue specific regional integration in Latin America by modeling the decisions of states to join regional organizations which the United States has been instrumental in forming. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to explain people's evaluation of democracy in Latin America. We use a cross-sectional, cross country analysis, which includes Mexico, Central America, Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the influence of different parliamentary electoral system types on party systems in Latin America in the light of specific contexts, such as cleavages and historical experiences with democracy or the breakdown of democracy. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study analyses the impact of various cultural and rationalist variables on support for different aspects of democracy in selected Latin American countries, using data from the World Values Survey. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Latin American legislatures delegate vastly, exceeding what is common practice in other contexts. The paper presents the conditions determining legislative delegation in the Latin Am. Claims are tested using instances of delegation in four countries. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]