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In this paper, I examine state legislative attempts to increase the independence of state high court judges. The extant research posits numerous theories for why legislators would increase judicial independence including the role of political uncertainty and interest groups advocating reform, to name a few. However, there is very little systematic effort to test these theories on a large scale data set. Unlike previous research, which relies on either single state or country studies, and usually employs only qualitative methods, I test theories of judicial reform using a unique data set of state legislative roll call votes on proposals to increase judicial independence in the American States. The data are from 1850 to 2000 and include numerous legislative votes. These votes encompass three waves of reform. The first wave was from mainly appointive methods to elected methods. The second was from mainly partisan elections to nonpartisan elections. The third was to merit selection and retention of judges. The results will speak to scholars of both American and Comparative interested in judicial politics and those interested in the development of American Courts and judicial independence. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I examine how political uncertainty and larger political reform efforts affect legislative decisions to alter the rules governing the selection, retention, and terms of state high court judges between 1850 and 2000. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I examine the motivations behind states' decision to change how judges are selected and retained. I focus on change from appointive systems to elective systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]