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This paper explores Hafner-Burton's argument on trade agreements, namely that coercion is more effective than persuasion for influencing state compliance with international human right standards, and test this argument within the context of the Lome Conventions/Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the ACP group of developing nations. The particular evolution of the Lome Conventions/Cotonou Agreement provides an excellent opportunity to test this argument for three important reasons: ACP participation in the Lome Conventions Cotonou is not subject to the selection bias problem; the gradual incorporation of human rights standards into the agreements allows the effects of persuasion versus coercion can be tested independently while controlling for institutional factors; the differentiated treatment of political standards in the Cotonou Agreement allows independent effects of persuasion versus coercion to be determined. Using OLS, a statistical model designed to the essential and fundamental elements of the agreement assesses the level of compliances with these elements for both ACP and non-ACP developing countries (n = 148). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]