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Are federalism and decentralization similar phenomena? Do they necessarily correlate? Do they have an “elective affinity”? Or can they work in opposition to one another? Specifically, does decentralization to any level of subnational government favor all levels of subnational government, or do municipalities differ from higher levels of subnational government (usually “federal” entities such as states or provinces) in meaningful ways? In this paper, I argue that central governments often use the rhetoric and practice of municipal decentralization as a way to weaken federal units at the intermediate level of government. In a “three-level game”, central governments decentralize to the local level in order to strengthen the center’s position in negotiations with the states/regions/provinces. I demonstrate this by examining three case studies: Brazil, South Africa, and Peru. The causes of such occurrences are eminently political: increases in the electoral strength of opposition parties at the intermediate level are the triggers for municipalization. The paper focuses on an important political point too often overlooked in the literature on intergovernmental relations: most countries of interest have not two, but three interacting levels of government. The salience of each of the three levels of government – central, local, and an intermediate tier alternately called state, provincial, or regional – varies from country to country. Most academic studies of intergovernmental relations, federalism, and decentralization focus on dynamics between two layers of government, a dyadic set of political interactions. These approaches, however much they may simplify certain issues and make certain questions more tractable, often miss out on the crucial ways in which the three levels of government can interact. In particular, scholars have a tendency to lump local governments together with other subnational governments. Implicit assumptions are that what is good for one level of subnational government is good for the other. In fact, however, the preferences of municipalities may conflict with those of intermediate levels of government. Central governments, in many circumstances, find allies in the form of local governments. Decentralization to municipalities may actually run counter to some of the central principles of federalism. This paper will examine this possibility, using three quite different polities as case studies. In examining federal Brazil, quasi-federal South Africa, and unitary Peru, I will show that center-local political links can lead to an “hourglass” structure of government with a missing middle (as argued by Junaid Ahmad), reinforcing the center and localities at the expense of the intermediate layer of government. This case selection demonstrates that the strategic choices made by the center can have effects that are robust across different points on the federal-unitary spectrum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper suggests that it is fallacious to see democracies as exclusively characterized by either programmatic/ideological, or clientelistic/charismatic linkages (or a combination of both). It is vital to deepen the discipline’s theoretical efforts to conceptualize other forms of party-voter connections. We hypothesize that in democracies with weak state infrastructure, experiences of praetorian politics, powerful veto players and low institutionalized party systems, governability appeals become a crucial variable in voters’ decision making functions. Governability appeals are distinctive because the emphasis is put on the possibility of the candidate in question being able to govern, ensuring certain levels of social peace and public policy effectiveness, and not on the likelihood that s/he will promote X or Y policy if elected. Governability appeals are a type of performance based voting in the sense that voters evaluate past or prospective performance, but they do so at a very general level, focusing on the prospects for stability and minimum standards of governance. We use survey data from Argentina and Peru, two countries that experienced severe governability crises, to test this hypothesis. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is about the indigenous people who lived in the rural towns surrounding the Viceroyalty capitals of New Spain and Peru, and how they dealt with the new local political institutions that the Constitutional Monarchy tried to establish across its territories. It was during this time that the wars of independence were taking place with different intensities in Spanish America. The explanation for the adoption and rejection of the new forms of vote and representation lies in the cognitive force of indigenous political traditions. The central argument is that in New Spain, many of the values, beliefs and representations made the transition easier, while in Peru it was not the case. This was due to cultural differences that arose from the density and frequency of local commercial interactions between Indians, low rank Spaniards and Mestizos. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The weakness of political parties and party systems has been identified as a major source of instability in new democracies. In particular, failures of representation are considered to play an important role in instigating social conflict, as groups adopt extra-electoral strategies to manifest their discontent with the political system. However, there is a need for more research that tests these hypotheses rigorously and identifies the concrete causal mechanisms that link representational failure and social conflict. Since its transition to democracy, Peru has emerged as an exemplary instance of party system collapse and political instability, at both national and sub-national levels. Over the last five years, the country has also experienced growing popular discontent, often manifested as violent popular protest. Combining large-N statistical analysis and detailed case studies, this paper will empirically examine the link between local party system fragmentation and outbreaks of popular violence using original data drawn from reports on social conflict collected by the Peruvian Ombudsman. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many Latin Americanist scholars have described large scale protests, in which indigenous people have been noticeably present, as part of the larger phenomena of indigenous social movements which started in the late 1960s and have grown in prominence with governmental attempts to adopt new liberal economic reforms (Brysk 2000, Lucero 2008, Postero and Zamosc 2004, Yasher 1998, Van Cott 2003). However, while many of the protests described by these authors did have a large number of indigenous participants and were organized by self-proclaimed indigenous organizations, these organizations chose to frame their struggles against neo-liberal economics in two different and sometimes contradictory ways. For example, The Confederation of Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), began as an indigenous organization dedicated to protecting indigenous culture, and first gained national prominence by protesting for cultural rights, such as the right to bilingual education. However, when the President entered into serious negotiations with the IMF in 1999, CONAIE once again took to the street, but this time the organization's platform held no mention of cultural rights. Instead of being framed as a protest for indigenous rights, the CONAIE framed the 1999/2000 protests as struggles for the rights of workers against neoliberal economic reforms imposed by the working class. The framing of the protests as a protest for workers' rights is particularly striking given the history of racism and discrimination that indigenous peoples have historically suffered at the hands of the working mestizo class. On the other hand, AIDESEP, a regional indigenous rights organization in the Peruvian Amazon, has continued to emphasize indigenous cultural rights even in the face of neoliberal economic land reforms. This paper will therefore look at case studies from Ecuador and Peru to determine why some indigenous organizations framed protests against the adoption of neoliberal economic reforms in terms of workers' rights, while others were framed in terms of indigenous cultural and land rights. In the end I find that the Peruvian organizations had weaker domestic networks than the Ecuadorian movements, and therefore relied heavily on the internationally salient frames of indigenous rights and environmental protection, while the Ecuadorian organization CONAIE was free to adopt more nationally salient frames. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I argue that the creation of an independent human rights ombudsman office--by a Congress dominated by a notoriously non-accountable executive--was an unexpected consequence of international pressure on Fujimori after his 1992 self-coup. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the reasons for the participation of indigenous groups in the class based Maoist insurgencies? What are its consequences? Have ethnic participation fuelled the growth of the communist insurgencies after the end of Cold War? This paper explores the questions by looking at three well known Maoist insurgencies in Nepal, Peru, and India that began during democracies with significant participation of the indigenous groups. Peru's insurgency terminated despite reaching a significant height, the Nepali insurgents joined the government, and India's insurgency did not grow as much as in Peru and India but has persisted since the 1960s. The paper analyzes the attitudes and policies of the state and insurgents toward the indigenous groups and the affect of indigenous participation, or the lack of it, on the varied trajectories of the insurgencies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the impact of local civil society organizations on the trajectory of social conflicts under conditions of weak rule of law. Both civil society and rule of law have been presented as potentially key elements for improving governance and facilitating democratic consolidation. However, there is little empirical research on how the two interact in scenarios that are very different from those of the affluent liberal-democratic countries in which the concepts were developed. The case of Peru offers a valuable opportunity for evaluating this relationship, as accounts of 173 social conflicts collected by the Peruvian Ombudsman over the last three years shed light on both the shortcomings of the rule of law and the type of actors involved in articulating popular discontent. The paper finds that the presence of civil society organizations increases the likelihood that complainants will attempt to use legal mechanisms and peaceful demonstrations. However, it also argues that due to the weakness of the rule of law, legal mechanisms usually prove ineffective. For this reason, the presence of civil society organizations is insufficient to curb the recurrent use of violence to solve disputes. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal (CT) is currently an independent institutional actor in Peru’s politics. By comparing and contrasting the recent history of the CT and two ‘cases’ of ‘failed’ constitutional courts -the CT’s role during the Fujimori regime and the case of its predecessor, the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees- I test several theories that aim to explain the emergence of independent courts in democracies. My cases provide evidence in support of theories that highlight the importance of political pluralism as a necessary condition for the emergence of independent courts, but the cases also show that an institutional design that ‘mirrors’ this pluralism is crucial for this outcome. The importance of these political and institutional factors suggests that it is too soon to be optimistic about the likelihood that the CT can maintain its independence in the future. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Models of mediation condition their results upon the assumption that informational asymmetries are relieved through a mediator. However, there exists no mechanism through which this relief occurs. Bargaining models show that parties in conflict have the incentive to bluff. The addition of a mediator does not alter this incentive: disputants still prefer to exaggerate their demands, strength, or resolve to obtain their best outcome. I use a series of models, each isolating one of three mechanisms -- information transmission, side payments, and audience costs -- to identify whether and how each mechanism can lead to success. I show that the confidentiality of mediation behind closed doors allows leaders to avoid audience costs that would be paid if diplomatic concessions were made publicly. I use a split population model in which the latent dimension is audience costs on conflicts from 1950-2000 using the Archigos and Berkovitch data. I show that a selection process exists in which the domestic political situation makes certain conflicts amenable to mediation, and within those, certain factors enhance the likelihood of success. I also draw support from interviews regarding the mediation of the Peru-Ecuador border conflict. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brazil (1964-1985) and Peru (1992-2000) maintained a uniqueness in Latin America in terms of the structuring of authoritarian regimes which allowed the presence of formal institutions of democracy (political parties, legislative, electoral system), however The process of finalizing the authoritarian differed in that the processes that defined the nature of the political transition, were characterized by the extensive and predictable political transition in Brazil, in contrast to the swift and precipitous political transition in Peru. .x000d..x000d.In that sense, this essay aims to contribute to the understanding of the role that developed the legislative institution in the process of political transition in Peru (1995 - 2001) and in the political transition in Brazil (1974 - 1990), from where a comparative analysis highlights the influence of political institutions, placing greater emphasis on the centrality with which the legislature, in a joint, tensions, progress, and restrictions under the rules of authoritarianism preserved, contributed to defining the nature of the transition and in the process of democratic consolidation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the conditions that enable an insurgent organization to consolidate in a region and to fragment sovereignty, with reference to the experience of Peru from 1980 through 1996. In the analysis, four explanations are considered: relative deprivation, availability of financing, counterinsurgent capabilities, and political pluralism. The analysis suggests three conclusions. First, rebels are unlikely to consolidate in areas where counterinsurgent forces are strong. Second, insurgents are also unlikely to control regions where the level of political pluralism is high. Third, rebels are likely to consolidate in regions where counterinsurgent forces are weak and the level of political pluralism is low. These conclusions have two implications. First, neither relative deprivation nor access to financing is a useful tool for anticipating the consolidation of insurgents. Second, the much discussed "greed versus grievances" debate is not relevant for explaining why rebels control some parts of a country but not others.

Several Latin American countries have experienced the recent emergence of neopopulist political candidates who eschew ties to traditional parties and orient their campaigns toward the atomized poor. In this article I examine the role of television in the electoral success of these politicians. Using survey data, I assess the impact of television in three cases of anti-party neopopulism: the 1989 election of Fernando Collor in Brazil, the 2000 election of Alberto Fujimori in Peru, and the 2001 election of Alejandro Toledo in Peru. Statistical analysis confirms our theoretical expectations about media effects in the first two elections (where coverage of the campaign was biased in favor of the winner) but not in the third (where coverage was balanced). These findings suggest that control of the media is the most reliable predictor of television?s impact in Latin American elections, rather than the presence of a neopopulist candidate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through the adoption in June 1991 of the Santiago Commitment to democracy, the Organization of American States (OAS) renewed its pledge to protect democracy in the region and established the institutional mechanisms for doing so. Despite reasonably successful responses to coups and democratic crises in the early 1990s (Haiti 1991, Peru 1992, Guatemala 1993), however, the last ten years (1993-2003) have presented the OAS with more pernicious obstacles to democratic stability in the region, whether among the smaller countries of the region (e.g., the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, and Paraguay) or the intermediate powers (e.g., Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela). To discern how deep and consequential the organization’s normative commitment to democracy is, this essay examines OAS action (and inaction) to democratic crises in Latin America from 1991 to the present. Utilizing both qualitative and quantitative data, the essay generalizes about when the OAS is most likely to intervene on behalf of democracy and assesses the impact intervention has had on democratic quality and sustainability in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how crime prevention and public safety policies that profess “inclusion” in public governance through civil participation have effectively institutionalized local politics of exclusion and inequality in highland Peru. Judgments and prejudices that equate particular “deviant” behaviors with certain social sectors have substantial bearing on the interpretations of urban safety as a whole, as well as on corresponding alignments between causal responsibility and political obligation. I present ethnographic data from urban highland Peru to illustrate how perceptions of urban crime and ideas of social responsibility correlate ideologically and tangibly to divergent expectations over civil participation, whereby unequal demands and expectations are placed on neighborhood organizations from different social sectors. I use this example to illustrate how urban crime, social deviance, and public safety are not only interpreted through semiotic ideologies of social difference, but also managed through policies and practices that further ingrain social differentiation and inequality. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2001/2002, after a decade of exile, Peruvian political parties seemed to re-emerge in the political arena. Nevertheless, this comeback was short-lived. The results of the 2006 sub-national elections were disastrous for political parties compared with those in the 2002 elections. This article states that these results are explained by the implementation of several institutional reforms, particularly state decentralization and a law to regulate political parties. Those reforms sought to establish a political regime opposed to the previous Fujimori regime. I suggest that the unforeseen lack of harmony between these reforms led to an unexpected outcome: the weakening of the national parties at the sub-national level. Without denying a structural dimension to the party crisis in Peru, this perspective emphasizes an institutional approach that partly explains the poor electoral results of parties due to the combination of these reforms. The paper concludes by assessing the Peruvian experience in light of the current experience of other Andean countries. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Explanations for voter decision-making during the process of party-system collapse in Peru (during the1980s) and Venezuela (during the 1980s and 1990s) raise two major questions about party organizationaldynamics. Why did traditional parties fail to shift their ideological appeals in such a way as to end apattern of ideological under-representation that drove voters to embrace outsider parties? Why weremany of the traditional parties in Peru and Venezuela unable to prevent corruption perceptions fromeroding party identification?This paper uses evidence from a new survey of local political party leaders in Argentina, Peru,and Venezuela to argue that the answers to these two questions lie in patterns of party organization.Electorally suboptimal ideological positioning can be explained by the relatively high intra-party powerof often ideologically extremist local leaders in the collapsed parties. Differences in the vulnerability ofparties' identifiers to corruption concerns, in turn, are explained by whether the party channels patronageprimarily through the state apparatus or through the party organization. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the role of non-state actors - mainly the media, the academia, and think tanks - as promoters of market-oriented policy ideas, and whether their influence on the wider public facilitated economic policy change in Peru. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the class-based left, ethnicity has come to define political difference within the Andean region. While Bolivia and Peru are home to significant indigenous populations, both countries have taken diverse trajectories in the development, and definition of, their national identities. Bolivia has developed an indígena discourse that does little to de-emphasize ethnic differences, while in Peru an indigenista discourse seeks incorporation of Peruvian indios into a mestizo society. Using a historical institutionalism approach, this paper explains the development of a politicized ethnic discourse in Bolivia and a similar lack of ethnic discourse in Peru. It focuses on the effort of the state and its institutions to transform societal groups into a single and unitary national identity, and the ability or desire of those groups to legitimize state re-definition of their identity. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on a variety of non-standard approaches, the paper seeks to explain why in Peru, unlike in its Andean neighbor states, no significant indigenous movement has emerged. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Organized leadership has been historically marginalized as a vital agent to the directions taken and strategies used in social movements. There is a need to examine the effects of a movement’s leadership on the direction, tactics, and ultimate degree of success of social movements..x000d.By drawing from the strengths of existing theories and studies, a more solid understanding can be developed about the influences of both internal and external dynamics on a social movement. This understanding can be further refined when the role of the leadership is integrated into the study. In using these theories we can begin to answer the why and when a movement decides to act, however it is the how a movement decides to act, when it does, that is the piece of the puzzle that, I believe, needs more investigation..x000d.I posit that an effective and organized leadership is a necessary resource in the success and sustainability of a movement. To examine this hypothesis, I will compare and contrast the leadership characteristics and behaviors of the successful Cuban Revolution and the struggling Sendero Luminoso in Peru. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most scholars of civil-military relations believe that the presence of domestic security threats increases the role of the military in politics. However, observational data show that domestic security threats do not always increase the political involvement of the armed forces. And when they do, the effects vary across time and space. What are the causes of this variation? Why do similar levels and types of internal security threats have divergent effects on the nature of civilian control over the militaries?In order to provide an answer to my research question, I conduct a comparative case study by focusing on counterinsurgency policy making in Turkey and Peru, which have fought against Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Shining Path (SL) insurgents, respectively, from the 1980s onwards. I choose Turkey and Peru as my cases because these two countries witnessed varying degrees of civilian control over the armed forces throughout their long-lasting counterinsurgency campaigns. Thus, their experiences allow me to explore the causes of this variation under comparable degrees of threat perception. With this project, I intend to show that structural variables, such as the presence or degree of threat, are not sufficient to explain the military's role in politics. Instead, I discuss how military's organizational interests about political involvement are combined with the extent of civilian capacity and account for the changing nature of civilian control over the military in counterinsurgency policy making. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2006 Peruvian election was another illustration of the weakness of the country's party system. Nevertheless, the comeback of the traditional parties, which had begun in 2001, continued in 2006. In particular, widespread fear of the anti-system candidate, Ollanta Humala, enabled Alan Garcia to reclaim the presidency despite memories of his disastrous first administration. Garcia did a masterful job of staking out the center ground in the runoff, moving somewhat to the left on domestic issues while using polemical exchanges with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez to appeal to conservative voters. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to explain the most recent transitions, particularly the Peruvian in 2000, it is necessary to revise the current literature in order to include issues of institutionalization and legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]