This research will attempt to explain the phenomenon of state destruction utilizing a synthesis of historical process tracing, cognitive approaches, and classical realist/first image theories. The main theoretical puzzle that this research will address is why statesmen choose to inflict devastating losses to their state's land, labor, and capital by continuing an interstate war when there is no prospect of victory. To examine this puzzle, this research will focus on the cases of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan and the roles that Hitler and Hirohito played in ending WWII in Europe and Asia. Why did Hitler order his forces to resist Allied forces and accept the total destruction of Germany while Hirohito choose to end hostilities comparatively early and to embrace American occupation. To analyze this puzzle, this paper uses a combination of process tracing and rational choice methodology. Ultimately, this research concludes that regime/personal security is the primary motivation for autocratic leadership decisions resulting in state destruction. Because leaders seek security for themselves, they are willing to surrender only when they can ensure their personal safety. Hitler was afraid of retribution from his Soviet adversaries and was thus unwilling to submit peacefully to Allied rule, whereas the Japanese explicitly protected Emperor Hirohito as a condition of surrender and were thus able to terminate the conflict before an American invasion. In effect, Hirohito was provided with an exile option and was able to save himself and his nation from further destruction. Conversely, Hitler was unable to ensure his personal security and chose the total destruction of both his regime and his nation rather than the uncertain prospect of surrender. In an attempt to model this behavior, this research proposes the "Louis XIV Theory" which is an extension of classical realist and cognitive theories regarding human nature and the survival imperative. In these cases, aggressive/revisionist leaders radically revise their preferences to provide for the prolongation of their own regime even at the expense of their nations and thus echo the sentiment of Louis XIV who famously said, "I am the state." This theory posits that autocratic leaders will rule their nations based on ideological preferences and the desire to attain greater power but will subvert these preferences for their own personal safety. Using this theory, this work will conclude with a brief discussion of similar cases such as Cetshwayo, Hussein, Lopez, Bonaparte, Khomeini, and Wilhelm and will attempt to generalize these findings for policy prescriptions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]