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This paper provides a theoretical argument for conducting inter-regional comparisons of social mobilisation in Eastern Europe and Latin America within the broader scope of democratization theory. Theoretically, the paper examines how two schools: one of Transitology and the other of Democtratisation or Democratic Development have assigned themselves regional boundaries (the first Post-Soviet Eastern Europe and the second Post Authoritarian Latin America).‘Transitologists’ such as V.Bunce (1995,1997) have fiercely defended the isolation of their study of ‘transition’ in EE from the study of democratic development or democratization in LA basing their theory in the perceived explanatory power of 'legacies' (communist or colonial). More a game of intellectual wordplay then empirical substance, the two schools used different terms and frameworks to discuss the same processes..x000d.Based on initial empirical research, I find that there are similar types, trajectories and developments of social movements in LA and EE, and thus that historical legacies (cultural, political or economic) are not sufficient explanatory variables in predicting participation and mobilization (both understood to be necessary for democracy). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to explore the overall role of the U.S. Foreign Policy's consequences for democratization in Latin America, in an era when Latin America has democratically elected left presidencies, and when new-born democracies (in most cases at least) are supposed to become consolidated. After a historical overview of the U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America during the 20th century; showing that doubts consistently could be raised on the issue of U.S. democratic assistance and Latin America; the paper moves into three main parts. In the first part cases when the United States promoted democratic development and liberal democracy with capitalism is explored. In the second, cases when the United States defeated democratic left-wing rule with strong anti-capitalism is explored. Finally, the third part deals with the question that this paper conclusively attempts to address - what implications the U.S. historical democratic record toward Latin America might have for democratic development and democratic setbacks when the region once more is facing the reality of democratically elected left presidents? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to develop a deeper understanding of the dynamics and possible consequences of this leftist trend in Latin American politics considering the interplay between democratic transitions and market policies implementation.Latin American politiesâ??political parties, social movements or networksâ??have in recent times moved towards different forms of leftist options, whether in discourse or in policy making. Although the initial transitions from authoritarian to democratic régimes were coupled by more center-to-right régimes, the present leftist trend should come as no surprise. Democracy was reestablished almost at the same time as pro-market policies following the then dominant Washington consensus were implemented. Almost two decades after these policies were launched, their basic promise of increased welfare for all citizens has not been fulfilled. Although social, economic and cultural inequalities are deeply rooted in Latin American societies and were already notorious well before the Washington Consensus, it is more or less a generalized impression that neoliberal policies have aggravated these inequalities. Even if there is still debate on their precise impacts on inequality, poverty and economic growth, what can be said beyond contestation is that strengthening democracy has made social inequalities more apparent, public policy responses more transparent, and hence political representation more accountable. Secondly, expectations concerning high rates of economic growth have not been met in any country in the region, except for Chile. The public's impression of policies largely failing to respond to increasingly visible social inequalities has triggered a shift of political preferences towards the left, which is evidenced by recent elections as well as the general discourse in the political debates throughout the region. The purpose of this paper is to develop a deeper understanding of the underlying logic and possible consequences of this leftist trend in Latin American politics. In doing so, I address the current debate on populism and the extent to which it poses a threat to democracy. This debate has been obscured by extreme views that either condemn all forms of policies that seek to confront inequalities or hail such policy efforts blindly. I argue that this debate needs a more nuanced examination of the specific institutional characteristics of populism in contemporary Latin American democracies. As Alexis Tocqueville works remind us, during times of changeâ??even radical onesâ??there are important strings of continuity that ought to be considered because they are crucial determinants of potential restorations. The de facto governance structures in modern Latin America are often shaped by traditional relationships between members of the oligarchy rather than by recent political reforms. Culture and its norms continue to shape interactions in contemporary Latin American politics. Various paths are being pursued to overcome the crises related to governance structures, the vulnerability of governing coalitions, and mechanisms of representation in Latin America. However, success in pursuing these paths requires addressing the major issue of inequality. This takes us back to another of Tocqueville's main concerns. As Vincent Ostrom put it, "Tocqueville's task in Democracy in America was to understand the American efforts to organize a republican system of government and to determine whether it offered a promise of maintaining liberty under conditions of equality." ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the collapse of Soviet power in the Eastern bloc and the upheaval of the debt crisis in Latin America, the political agenda in both regions was dominated by struggles over creating free market economic systems. Just as striking, those economic experiments were accompanied by a wave of political opening in both parts of the world. Such simultaneous transitions naturally spawned investigations into how these processes might be causally related. Scholars, however, have encountered a number of difficulties in exploring that link. First, many studies, especially the more common small-N analyses, have had trouble distinguishing between the effects of economic liberalization and other, often collinear, potential influences on political outcomes. Second, large-N studies of a cross-sectional nature are unable to evaluate the expectation of many scholars that the short- and long-term effects of economic liberalization on politics are quite distinct. Finally, studies focused on a single geopolitical region cannot say which of their findings will travel to other parts of the world. In this paper we seek to overcome these challenges in two ways. First, we use a time-series/cross-sectional framework, which allows us both to evaluate the short- and medium-term effects of economic liberalization on democratization and to hold constant the influence of international pressures, the weight of the agrarian sector, and the level of socioeconomic development. Second, we evaluate the generality of our findings by conducting parallel analyses in two distinct geopolitical regions: Latin America and the formerly communist countries of the Soviet bloc. Our approach yields four preliminary findings. First, we find that the establishment of free markets has little to do with the consolidation of democracy. We find no relation between the two in the short run, and we argue that the positive medium-run relationship in Latin America is a function of the way that free-market reforms undermine the ability of material losers from liberalization to organize. Second, we find that a large agrarian sector impedes democratization in both regions, even controlling for other factors. Third, on questions of international influence, we find that generic linkages between a developing country and industrialized democracies have no discernible effect on democratization. By contrast, the explicit and consistent democratic conditionality attached to EU accession appears to have a very strong (and positive) influence on political liberalization. Finally, while our analysis is not aimed at evaluating the much-debated modernization thesis linking socio-economic development and democracy, our results are consistent with recent work that has called into question a causal link between these two phenomena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research closely examines 220 pro-democracy contentious political challenges that occurred between 1981 and 1995 in seven Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. The data show that pro-democracy challenges tend to be large, nonviolent (especially using demonstrations), and organized by political parties. The main question addressed in this paper is the effect of pro-democracy protest on democratization processes. The clearest type of potential effect would be what I call the "democracy now" effect, in which pro-democracy challenges lead to regime change, but it is difficult to find clear evidence of this. Another way of looking at the effect of pro-democracy contentious challenges on democratization is to look for smaller reforms. There were twenty cases in which governments did grant concessions to pro-democracy contentious challenges, including loosening certain repressive measures, annulling controversial state and local elections, or reforming electoral procedures. A quantitative analysis showed that less authoritarian regimes were more likely to grant such concessions, as were governments that were weaker and more dependent on foreign aid and investment. Furthermore, challengers could increase the likelihood of gaining concessions by organizing contentious challenges that are longer, have larger participation, and utilize nonviolent yet disruptive tactics. One of the strongest factors was focusing demands on more concrete subnational issues, such as questionable local and state elections, rather than demanding "democracy now." ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The quantitative studies of social spending in OECD (Organization for Economic and Cooperation and Development) and Latin American countries (LACs) have produced conflicting results. In this paper I will test a synthesized model of social spending in East Asia to see if the findings of studies on OECD and Latin American countries mach with findings in East Asia. This work will be different from previous works on social spending in three respects; firstly, it will be the only comprehensive study of the link between social spending and globalization in East Asia; secondly, it is the first and the only study of link between democratization and social spending; finally, unlike previous studies this work includes data from communist countries. Previous studies have not comprehensively tested social spending theories on East Asia and they have only focused on the link between democracy and social spending, but not that of democratization and social spending. As none of the OECD or Latin American countries was communist, previous studies do not provide any insight about their behavior. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we analyze transitions to democracy (and semi-democracy) and democratic breakdowns in 20 Latin American countries between 1945 and 2005. We argue that domestic conditions cannot explain the region-wide wave of democratization that took place in 1978-95. Our transition models control for standard socio-economic predictors as well as for domestic institutional conditions (including the nature of the authoritarian regime in transition models, and the type of party system in breakdown models). We include a battery of additional predictors to capture the impact of international factors, including measures of diffusion (using spatial lags, and distinguishing short-term and long-term effects) and an original indicator of US support for democracy. Our results indicate that political leaders tend to emulate transitions in neighboring countries in the short-run, even though there is no evidence of a long-term equilibrium effect at the regional level. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the “third wave of democratization” expectations regarding democratic strength and electoral dynamism were high among scholars. Particularly, in Latin America by 2000 most of the countries in the region were under democratic rule. Yet, enthusiasm quickly vanished as trust in government eroded and electoral participation started declining..x000d.Some have argued that trust in government is a key ingredient of a healthy democracy. Nonetheless, the relationship between democracy and trust is complex and even paradoxical. The legitimacy of political actors and institutions relies heavily on trust. Yet an intrinsic feature of any democratic regime is a “healthy distrust” or skepticism towards those who detain power on their behalf..x000d.The goal of this paper is to examine the impact that declining trust in government and public institutions has had on turnout throughout Latin America. Using the Latinobarometer 2005 survey we found that interpersonal trust does not influence people’s decision to vote. Trust in government and the institutional setting positively affects turnout. Interestingly, whenever voters have a pessimistic assessment of current political and economic events, the likelihood of voting also increases. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrary to recent research, we find an "anti-political" budget cycle in a panel of fifteen Latin American democracies from 1973 to 2000. During the period in which Latin America underwent the most lasting and widespread wave of democratization, elections worked to limit the degree to which incumbents manipulate fiscal policies for electoral advantage. We show that governments undertook fiscal adjustment by reducing spending in the election year and in the inaugural year of the newly elected government. Though the capacity to enact austerity is moderated by the transition to democracy, new Latin American democracies also adhere to fiscal restraint. This paper shows that, at most, the period of democratic transition in Latin America may postpone bitter fiscal adjustments to periods when democratic regimes are stable. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the United Nations, among the fourteen most unequal countries in the world, half are in Latin America and the other half in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nine of them, including the top three, have been considered democratic for at least the past fourteen years. In this paper I propose a theory to understand the circumstances that are likely to make policies that promote higher equality difficult to arise in new democracies. I develop a theoretical model linking voters' preferences to representatives' policy choices where the ideological position of newly formed parties is not known to the public. This entails a learning process for voters that can slow down the adoption of effective inequality reducing policies. This includes the often observed pattern of poor voters electing non-left wing representatives. The model's implications for the evolution of different candidates' constituencies are empirically tested using individual level data for presidential elections in Brazil since democratization. Results suggest that the sorting out of voters into constituencies for specific incumbents is indeed a gradual process most likely shaped by the retrospective evaluation of policies adopted in practice. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to offer insight into the potential and limits of civil society as a vehicle for deepening democratic values in newer democracies. I analyze a large cross-national survey of Latin American citizens in 18 countries to examine the question: Is civil society in Latin America nurturing democratic values or breeding authoritarian sentiments? A multidimensional analysis of civil society brings nuance to our understanding of the relationship between civil society and democratic values. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper posits that contrary to modernization theory, economic progress does not lead to democratization, rather it leads to a process of de-democratization. A Latin American case study is used demomstrating this thesis. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we build on the insights offered by Hirschman nearly thirty years ago and offer evidence for the proposition that the current rise in emigration rates in Latin America is in part a product of the region's flawed political systems. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper presents evidence that protest drives democracy, confirming the supply and demand theory of democratization while calling the dominant modernization approach into question. Modernization theory has remained the centerpiece of comparative research on democratization over the previous decade, amassing an impressive body of empirical research linking democracy to economic development. Drawing from an established cultural tradition in comparative politics, this paper challenges the dominant modernization approach and advances a theory that does not rely upon economic development to explain democratization. The supply and demand theory of democratization posits that the institutional supply of democracy flows naturally from the societal demand for democratization. Accordingly, countries cannot simply buy democracy with economic development, but rather, democracy must be actively pursued at the societal level. Using protest as an indicator of societal demand for democracy, cross-national evidence from Latin America confirms the new theory, providing robust evidence that societal demand drives democratization in the third wave. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines how the recent surge in protest against economic liberalization has affected the quality of democracy in the Latin American region. Existing research on the consequences of economic liberalization does not expect societal mobilization to take place, much less waves of mobilization to contribute to the deepening of democracy. Moreover, protest and conflict are seen largely as anathema to democracy. Using cross-sectional time-series data from 17 Latin American countries for the 1970-2003 period, this paper provides strong evidence that economic liberalization deepens democracy because of increasing levels of mobilization. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For decades, it was widely assumed that the reasons behind the poor performance of Latin American governments were the absence of democratic elections or the problems of an overgrown state. Yet, recent experience in Latin American democracies suggest that it is plainly wrong to assume that regime change or market reforms lead automatically to improved governance, and therefore it is necessary to understand the determinants of the quality of government. This paper is an attempt to move forward the discussion by analyzing two of the most relevant variables identified in this literature with time-series, cross-sectional data for the Latin American region, and employing data on quality of government that includes three dimensions of the quality of government (professional bureaucracy, lack of corruption and law enforcement). The empirical analysis shows that we can have a richer understanding of how democracy and structural adjustment improve the quality of government if we look at how their components affect our dependent variable. We now know that regime change or economic reform involve different mechanisms, and that each of these mechanisms behave differently, and it should not be assumed that they will follow the same dynamics.Thus, the main argument of this paper is that, behind those broad aggregate indicators, there are specific components at work. In the case of democracy, it shows that political participation has a negative effect on the quality of government, political constraints on the executive have a significant positive effect, and free press and electoral competition have no significant impact. For structural adjustment, this study suggests that neither government size nor fiscal discipline have an effect on the quality of government once "openness to the world economy" is included in the specification. Is this latter variable what explains variation in the quality of government in the region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Which economic, institutional and cultural factors influence support for democracy in developing countries over the course of democratic transitions? This paper offers an integrated understanding of democratic legitimacy in Latin America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the question of how ordinary people understand democracy. Do contemporary publics display a reasonable understanding of the meaning of democracy, and what are the contents of their definitions? Do people focus on the procedural aspects of democracy-elections, democratic institutions, and processes-which are the main focus of democratization efforts. Alternatively, do they see democracy in economic or social welfare terms? We draw on a wide range of public opinion surveys that have recently been conducted to explore these questions in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America. Our research yields two generalizations about popular conceptions of democracy. First, most citizens of new democracies are cognitively capable of imputing meaning to democracy in their own words. Second, and most important, most of those cognitively capable citizens think of democracy in terms of the freedoms, liberties and rights that it conveys, rather than procedural and institutional conceptions of liberal democracy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do political parties adopt primary elections? This study develops a theory of party democratization. It is motivated by the recent proliferation of primary elections in Latin America, which has been well documented but not fully explained. The explanation in this paper consists on making two claims. First that primaries select more electable but less loyal candidates. This claim is made precise with a decision-theoretic model whose predictions are consistent with the main empirical findings of the existing empirical literature. And second that the incentives for party leaders to select electable candidates have increased in the past quarter century. This claim is based on some historical trends in Latin American politics, namely the increased penetration of television, a more investigative journalism, and a decrease in electoral fraud. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the puzzle of why certain countries alter the mode of accountability for past human rights violations that was adopted following the transition to democracy, evaluating a range of factors in an analysis of 14 Latin American cases. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I develop and test a model which argues that support for democracy matters for transitions toward and away from democracy, as well as for democratic stability. The model identifies three parameters which drive regime outcomes. Net demand, the level of demand for democracy relative to the current supply of democracy, is the most important. It provides a resource for challengers in elite contests for power. Significant positive values of net demand allow a challenger to harness public antipathy toward the regime and channel it into protests and demonstrations in order to displace the incumbent. Thus positive net demand produces democratization, negative values allow incumbent elites to consolidate their control, and neutral values suggest that the regime will be stable. The effects of net demand are however, attenuated by the ability of the regime to engage in repression, and the presence of a "dictator's dilemma": the informational vacuum which surrounds the leadership in authoritarian systems. I test the model using two datasets: Latinobarometer panel data from Latin America and World Values Survey cross-sectional data for a broader group of countries. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When do national electorates abandon institutionalized parties in favor of radical candidates? Beginning with Hugo Chavez’ successful bid for the Venezuelan presidency in 1998, ten Latin American countries have elected left-leaning governments. This left swing has not been a monolithic one, however. Given the emergence of a radical subset of cases within Latin America’s leftist swing, scholars have attempted to explain why some electorates have voted for radical alternatives to neoliberal reform with Venezuela's Chavez, Bolivia's Morales and Ecuador's Correa. I argue that the more fundamental question is why did the electorates of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador choose radical parties to take the helm in the first instance? .x000d..x000d.Evaluating voter-level, institutional and structural explanations for the electoral performance of radical left parties, I find that non-tax revenues such as mineral resources interact with domestic political institutions to increase electoral support for radical left political parties. These findings have significance for electoral, democratization, and rentier state literatures. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrary to the theoretical expectations prevalent at the onset of the Third Wave of democratization, many party systems in Latin America have unraveled rather than move towards consolidation. There is a distinguishable trend towards de-institutionalization. This study aims to elucidate the routes via which party systems become inchoate or even transit to non-system status. Three such avenues are delineated and analyzed. One is the retroactive voter punishment, whereby voters punish established parties that are responsible for massive failures of political and economic performance. A second is that of voter revolt against collusive party arrangements that limit representation, accountability and responsiveness. These over-institutionalized cartel-type party systems more prone to collapse when coupled with economic crises. The third route towards party system de-institutionalization is charted by presidential agency: a president´s deliberate attempt to weaken opposition political parties as an integral part of an agenda to concentrate political power. The study emphasizes this last avenue, which has yet to be fully theorized, using Peru, Venezuela and Ecuador as prominent examples. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]