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This paper examines India’s and Pakistan’s experiences with democratic transition and consolidation. The main questions are: 1) How do India and Pakistan differ in terms of democracy both historically and currently and why? 2) What can be said of the future prospects for democracy and what factors will continue to play a role in aiding or inhibiting it? To answer these questions, Freedom House Surveys available from the 1970’s onward are used to analyze historical trends and the current context. Also utilized are Purdue Political Terror Scales to assess levels of violence. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the U.S. State Department provide data on political and personal freedom. Government documents and court rulings shed light on basic rights. To ascertain income inequality, the United Nations Development Program’s Gini Index data is analyzed. All data go back as far as possible through the most recent year available. Findings suggest that Pakistan and India, though once part of the same system, have divergent democratic histories and futures. India is a consolidated but illiberal democracy. Indian elites and citizens have a philosophical commitment to democracy and politics are generally governed by democratic rules and procedures. However, citizens’ civil liberties are continually encroached upon by the state and even democratic procedures are prone to periodic lapses. Pakistan is currently an authoritarian military state and historically has not adhered to basic democratic procedures. Prospects for democracy are grim in Pakistan because of the entrenchment of Islamic rule, the pervasive military influence, a weak civil society, and lack of democratic cultural norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I will attempt to explain the decision by General Pervaiz Musharraf to start peace negotiations with India in January 2004. This understanding was reached between the leaders of India and Pakistan at the sidelines of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit in Islamabad after a period of extreme tension between the two sides. During the last decade, relations between the two sides have been very unstable in the wake of nuclearization and limited war in Kargil.General Musharraf is widely credited to be responsible for the Kargil adventure. India blamed Musharraf government for attack on its parliament on December 13, 2001 and moved its forces to forward positions on the border. This stand-off was eventually defused with the initiation of official dialogue between the two governments in 2004. Thus, I seek to analyze the decision by Gen. Musharraf to begin peace negotiations with India. Beyond this, I want to explain the larger process of foreign policy decision-making in Pakistan. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both war and natural disaster are well-studied international phenomena. However, although there has been substantial work done on the relationship between such disasters and intrastate war, there is much less research within the field of international relations on the possible effects of natural disaster on conflict between states. Building on existing conflict literature, this paper will explore four hypotheses regarding this relationship: three predicting an increased likelihood of interstate conflict and one predicting a relationship in the opposite direction. A qualitative examination of all significant natural disasters occurring since 1950 will be used to initially explore these hypotheses, and a case study of four Chinese disasters will focus in depth on the possibility that natural disasters will induce states undergoing crises of legitimacy to initiate an attack on a rival state. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines the recent role of Supreme Courts in Pakistan and Nepal in terms of their impact on the the independence of judiciary as well as on democratic transition process. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pakistan is an integral part of South Asia in geographic, cultural, linguistic and historic terms but its rulers have emphasized the country's relations with the Middle East since independence in 1947. The desire to simultaneously find national cohesion and a significant role on the world stage has shaped Pakistan's history as that of a state in search of a national identity. The emphasis on ideology led to a foreign policy that rested on Islam and Islamic unity as its principal drivers. Just as Islamic ideology was to be a substitute for nationalism and the basis for a distinct Pakistani personality, Pakistan's foreign policy highlighted closer ties with Muslim Middle Eastern nations at the expense of normal relations with India. This paper is an analysis of this aspect of Pakistan's Foreign Policy since 1947 onwards. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examination of the impact of nuclear weapons programs in India and Pakistan on regional security. The paper will explore nuclear proliferation and its impact on development, political stability, and terrorism in the region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Islam continues to play a major role and exerts a major influence on the majority of the Muslim population. However, a significant number of Muslims believe in the intrinsic worth of modern western developed concepts. The fate of the Muslim world and its future interactions within the political and economical realm depends on this conflict. As we enter a new century, Islamic thoughts and practices are being challenged to acclimatize to modern ideas, methods and principles. However, democracy is not foreign to Islam. All groups whether Islamic or secular that are seeking greater democratization must decide upon the most effective means for achieving their goals. Two important issues relating to religious revival and democracy (political development) for the 21st century are the potential democratic resources of the Islamic tradition and the ability of new Islamic movements to operate effectively to meet the demand for both Islamic authenticity and democratic participation. Religion is a system of beliefs, rituals, and practices, which deal with the sacred, the eternal and the absolute. Religions of course vary in many ways and in many aspects, but they are nearly share many of the same underlying core features. By being sacred and absolute it has made it quite difficult for religions to coexist or tolerate others in the same community. If taken too seriously such boundaries can become bloody. By the same token, by being sacred it makes it difficult for people who take religion too seriously to tolerate another system of ideas that claim similar qualities to it. In other words, there are many facets to religion which one must acknowledge, and that each facet can be strengthened in time of need or down played when necessary among the various groups. Islam also has many varying aspects to it as well, and that groups might emphasize or believe in one tangent more than another. However, through my research I have come up with major core principles of Islam. They are: Tawhid, the Five Pillars of Islam, Ummah, Shariah, Ijma, Ijtihad / Qiyas, and Shura. I will use Pakistan and Bangladesh as case studies to explain my dependent and independent variables. The dependent variable being that of a successful democracy, and the two independent variables that I will use are that of religion (Islam) and divided society. After examining each of the regimes in Pakistan and Bangladesh, the question becomes, why did democracy survive in Bangladesh despite its military regimes but not in Pakistan? But also, what role did Islam play in the democratization process in order for the system to succeed or to fail? Ultimately, I will show that there develops a third critical independent variable which is that of Islam and divided society. There has been research done on divided society and the impact it has on democracy. However, the gap in literature I will address is the interaction or the intersection of divided societies and democracy with that of Islam and democracy. In other words, I will examine if divided society has an impact on religion, which also then has an impact on democracy. This becomes a crucial question as in both of my case studies Islam, being the independent variable, stays constant, and in Bangladesh, democracy has survived. This only shows that Islam is not the issue on why democracies fail (but rather shows that democracy and Islam are compatible) to survive in Islamic societies, but it must be another variable in the equation. Thus, the variable I will examine as mentioned above is that of divided societies and Islam and the impact they have on democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

‘The third wave of democracy’ pushed political scientists to study transition to democracy. It led to democratization as a policy option for Western countries in the context of war against terror. The donor community came up with election assistance programmes on way to deepening democracy in various countries including Pakistan. This paper seeks to analyze the strategy, process and outcome of donors’ financial and technical input in the process of transition from military to civilian rule in Pakistan in 2008. Donors focused on empowerment of electoral management body following a technocratic approach to conducting free and fair elections. They failed to bring the ultimate stakeholders, political parties, on board, ensure the accuracy of electoral rolls and mobilize civil society to that end. International observer missions determined the fairness of elections, bypassing the pre-poll electoral malpractices. In the absence of legal and institutional reform, donor input from outside remained far from satisfactory. This paper argues that donor agenda for democratization is no substitute for internal mobilization based on empowerment of political parties cultivation of democratic ethos in the citizenry. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assesses the proclivity towards refugee-related violence in India, Pakistan,.x000d.and Bangladesh, using an original dataset. I show that the host's attitude towards.x000d.refugees depend on local factors such as how long refugees are expected to stay, the.x000d.rate of inflow, its control of camps, as well as on international factors such as alliances.x000d.with the sending country and the presence of international organizations. If the host.x000d.is aggressive, refugees will retaliate, depending on whether the camps are militarized.x000d.whereby refugees will have access to weapons and arms. Camp militarization, in turn,.x000d.depends on factors such as rebel infiltration and the location of camps. Furthermore,.x000d.the paper finds that alliances between host and sending countries have a pacifying.x000d.effect. On the hand, while international organizations are able to shape host behavior.x000d.to a certain extent, they are unable to prevent camp militarization. Such findings have.x000d.policy implications for hosts, sending states and international organizations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we ask two questions: 1) Why are some religious parties more successful than others in coming to power? 2) Are moderate religious parties more successful than extremist parties? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper evaluates contending explanations for the security policies of de facto nuclear weapons states, Israel, India and Pakistan, by assessing the relative validity of international, domestic, and cultural hypotheses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent judicial-executive confrontations in Egypt (2005-present) and Pakistan (2007-present) are illuminating examples of the dynamism of the relation between the executive and the judicial branches. In 2006, Mubarak tried unsuccessfully to remove two leading reformist justices Meki and al-Bastawisi. A year later, then the President of Pakistan Musharraf declared a state of emergency and dismissed Chief Justice Chaudhry and a many other justices. .x000d.There are striking similarities between the two cases, including the nature of the two regimes and their international alliances. Nonetheless, the outcomes of the executive-judicial encounters have been vastly different. The Pakistani General was able to remove the highest-ranking justice; while, the Egyptian President failed to remove far-less senior judges and had to at least tactically recoil, WHY? .x000d.This paper seeks to explain the variance results in Egypt and Pakistan. It argues that the differences in the structure of the judicial systems, variations in the nature of public opinion support, and different types of regime legitimacy all combined to doom Justice Chaudhry and provide a new lease on life for his Egyptian counterparts. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pakistan’s experience with democracy is puzzling for most theorists. The country has exhibited a cyclical pattern between democratic and military rule. This paper analyzes Pakistan’s transitions arguing that the key explanatory variable is the degree of political and economic centralization. Pakistan is divided along ethnic lines represented by the provinces. However, governments â€" this applies equally to civilian and military â€" have curbed politicization at the provincial level, instead running the federation as a unitary state. Moreover, underdeveloped political institutions force citizens in Pakistan to see the political cleavage as civilian-versus-military rather than left-versus-right. Therefore, they mobilize in favor of the military after years of civilian autocracy and then repeat the dynamic in the opposite direction to usher in the next cycle. The identical behavior of the civilian and military governments in terms of centralization is explained by an extreme institutional decay at the provincial level. Institutional development requires political autonomy but granting it would induce greater economic and political inefficiency in the short-to-medium term. This explains the incumbents’ hesitance for doing so. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2001-02, Pakistan and India were embroiled in the only nuclear crisis in history where both sides intentionally cut-off all direct communication, instead signaling provocatively through indirect means. This paper conducts a content analysis of the bilateral signaling during the stand-off and argues that cutting off direct communication was a conscious decision by both sides, one that will be repeated in future crises. Moreover, contrary to the prevalent theses, we show that India and Pakistan remained indifferent to each other’s verbal signals and that signaling was largely directed at the U.S. â€" both sides wanted Washington to intervene diplomatically on their behalf â€" , a dynamic that both understood clearly. Finally, while on-ground military posturing did see a tit-for-tat response, there was no correlation between tactical maneuvers and verbal signals throughout the crisis. Our findings suggest that absence of direct communication or provocative indirect signaling is irrelevant to crisis instability. Crisis stability then depends largely on ensuring that India and Pakistan abstain from the kind of tactical posturing that raises the security dilemma for the other. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Electoral violence is associated with "landslide" victories typical of 'rigged' elections. This study argues that political actors in non-consolidated democracies resort to violence when faced with more transparent electoral administration and increasing uncertainty. The intensity and nature of electoral violence--tactics, targets, perpetrators, and locations--vary as a function of electoral institutions and competitiveness at the national, constituency, and polling-station levels. This study provides evaluates these arguments with an original dataset of over 500 incidents of electoral violence during the five months surrounding the 2008 election and results from 7,135 randomly-selected polling stations in 241 constituencies collected by the Free and Fair Election Network. Intimidation and violence occurr more frequently in constituencies with close contests, while acts of violence may be associated with high turnout and landslide victories at the polling station level. This paper contributes an understanding of how electoral violenceâ€"implemented locallyâ€"is connected to the strategic environment and actors' calculations about the probability of winning seats when nonviolent cheating becomes difficult and uncertainty increases. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why did democracy consolidate in India and falter in Pakistan? This paper argues that patterns of class incorporation in their respective independence movements had early and enduring consequences for their respective regime outcomes. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines whether decentralized women’s policy machinery (WPM) advances gender equality in Pakistan and Chile, using survey data to examine the policy goals of regional WPM and when they function as effective, feminist offices. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the (1) ability and (2) willingness of domestic audiences to punish leaders for engaging in costly bargaining strategies. I present evidence from two ongoing conflicts - India and Pakistan, and Israel and Egypt. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on evidence from Pakistan and Thailand, this paper seeks to understand why some military authoritarian regimes are more durable than others. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to use new techniques in event and duration modeling to determine why and when Indian-Pakistani conflict occurs. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the impact that the acquisition of ballistic missile defense capabilities by India and Pakistan would have on the international security environment in South Asia. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kargil conflict between Pakistan and India is perhaps the only known anamoly to the Democratic Peace theory. This paper analyzes Pakistan's Conflict behavior since independance and its implications for the Democratic Peace argument. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When military regimes leave office for democratic elections, they claim to have withdrawn from all aspects of civilian life. Yet today the military in many developing countries (such as Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand) is charged with extensive behind the stage involvement in the political and economic spheres of their countries. Nevertheless given the high non-transparency that pervades the military activities, these claims are confined to anecdotal evidence. No scholarly study has taken a statistical approach yet. Using exogenous health shocks to the democratically elected chief executive in Turkey at a time when the military had claimed to withdrawn from civilian life, I estimate if in the face of these shocks stock market returns for military controlled enterprises display abnormal returns relative to those of other state controlled enterprises. I find that military associated companies are immune to changes in the survival probability of the chief executive while state controlled enterprises are not, as indicative of the military’s being insulated from political turmoil. Using matching techniques, I show that this result is not driven by differences between the industries in which the military does and does not participate. I argue that institutional persistence of past military interventions underlie the observed empirical results. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The decrease in interstate warfare since WWII demonstrates that sovereignty norms have acquired a durable, institutional embeddedness insofar as they constrain state behavior. Yet states circumvent these norms through proxy warfare to project power across their borders and achieve a favorable outcome related to domestic security, regional hegemony, or ideological territorial claims. Non-violation of sovereignty occurs because states understand both the material and normative costs of behaving otherwise. Alternatively, varying configurations of sovereignty create a permissive environment for different types of proxy warfare. We examine three contrasting cases. Sudan and Chad's involvement in each other's affairs is restricted by the sovereignty norms on which both countries rely and is driven by regime security imperatives. Pakistan's proxy war in Kashmir is rooted in contested sovereignty claims constrained by India's empirical control of an unsettled territorial boundary. Syria and Iran's support of Hezbollah is driven by ideological opposition to Israel and instrumental interests in establishing regional hegemony, seizing on the juridical ambiguity and empirical interstitiality of Lebanese territory. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India and Pakistan have fought four wars and have had many other smaller disputes in their 60 year history. Contrary to the expectations of democratic peace theory, conflict between India and Pakistan is more likely under a democratic government in Pakistan than an autocratic government. Using process-tracing, I demonstrate that there has always been imperfect civilian control of the military in Pakistan and the military has power over foreign policy formulation. Under a civilian regime, military leaders are motivated solely by the military’s perceptions of national interests; military leaders do not have to consider political reprisal in their calculations of when to engage in conflict. The presence of a nominal civilian leader removes all accountability from the military. However, when a military ruler is directly in power, political costs of failure would be attributed to him and he would be more cautious. Thus I conclude that ultimately it is not the presence or lack of democracy that influences conflict behavior; instead, the independent variable of interest is the extent to which an organization or a leader that makes decisions about foreign policy is held accountable for those decisions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In August 1947, India and Pakistan emerged from British rule with a shared lineage of colonial institutions, including the military. Yet the two states exhibit wildly different patterns of civil-military relations. The Pakistani military has virtually never been under civilian control and has frequently displaced and supplanted civilian authority. In contrast, the Indian military has virtually never challenged civilian control. Why? .x000d.My research suggests that norms are an important part of the story. More specifically, I argue that officer corps norms or shared beliefs about the appropriateness of civilian control powerfully drive its preferences and actions. These “cults of appropriateness” evolved during the formative years after independence as a by-product of the founding elite's conceptions and choices of national security policy driven by each state's identity needs. Once in place, organizational norms have proved 'sticky.' When it comes to civilian control, early success breeds success. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Muslim states such as Turkey and Pakistan face a unique set of challenges in constructing consolidated democratic systems. In order to understand the prospects for democratic deepening in these two states we compare the interaction of liberal and illiberal institutions in each context. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Benazir Bhutto, former PM of Pakistan, damaged her charismatic relationship with her people when she married and had children. With her return to Pakistan, does that charismatic relationship of the past have the possibility of being restored? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why have the political systems of Pakistan (West Pakistan) and Bangladesh (East Pakistan) evolved differently since 1971, despite similar institutional legacies, economic development, and colonial history? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been a steady increase in scholarly interest surrounding notions of Political Islam. Despite this, topics pertaining to the politics of Islamic Economics have remained underreported. Islamic banking and the prohibition of interest account for a large portion of research in the field of Islamic Economics. Nations with large Muslim populations in the Middle East and South Asia consistently exhibit interest in implementing tenets of Islamic Economics, especially the prohibition of interest. Pakistan is the only nation to formally commit to do so. Within the last decade, Pakistan’s High Shariat Court ban riba (interest), by all of its names, and outlined a plan for full elimination. Despite this tough stance, Pakistan's government and banks have both failed to execute the Court’s plan. This project undertakes an investigation of the challenges Pakistan encounters in their attempts to implement the Court’s decision. It closely scrutinizes how politics adjudicate the roles of State and religion in Muslim economic policy. Conclusions of this investigation hold profound implications for the future of Islamic Economics in the Middle East and South Asia. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In August of 2008 former General Pervez Musharraf resigned from his position as Pakistan’s President under calls for his impeachment. Why did Musharraf resign and what does this act signal for the future of democratic and military politics in Pakistan? From its inception in 1947 Pakistan has struggled between the twin impulses of democracy and authoritarianism. While religion may play a role in Pakistan’s political instability I do not believe that Pakistan’s reliance on authoritarianism can simply be explained as an outcome of the country’s religiosity. If Pakistan’s religious character is not the key to its unstable democracy then what is? I argue that a combination of military strength, civil institutional weakness, and international pressure, continues to place undue burden on Pakistan’s attempts to create a democratic state. Though Pakistan’s Islamic nature plays a role in destabilizing the state, through sectarian violence or external conflicts, it is the military that continues to intervene in democratic politics, not religious organizations. Through a historical analysis of political events I tease out the competing institutions within Pakistan that have either helped or hindered the establishment of democratic norms. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At independence from British colonial rule in 1947, Pakistan comprised of two wings: East and West Pakistan, separated by a thousand miles of Indian territory. By 1971, its eastern wing was no more, replaced instead by the independent state of Bangladesh after a brutal civil war between Bengali nationalists and the Pakistani military. While geographical separation clearly hindered the process of national integration between the two wings, so did linguistic, cultural and social structural differences. Given these differences, could Bengali nationalism have been contained and accommodated within a united Pakistan? Inter-wing disparities in Pakistan, I argue, had their roots in British colonial rule in the Indian sub-continent. "Hegemonic" policies of the British colonial administration, which worked to the detriment of the Bengalis and in favor of Punjabis, led to the emergence of a “counter-hegemonic” Bengali ethno-nationalism. The patterns of Punjabi and Mohajir (migrant) domination set in place under colonial rule were carried over into Pakistan and were continued and reinforced after 1947. This created the environment and incentives conducive to the rise and subsequent radicalization of Bengali nationalism. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What explains variation in the political behavior of the military in India and Pakistan? I find that strategic elite decisions during the transition from British rule and military organizational norms explain much of the difference. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The strong family and tribal bonds that exist in Muslim Pakistan have dual functions. They are the bedrock of financial, social, and moral support when all family members are living in accordance with increasingly Islamist attitudes. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Next elections will be held for a non-sovereign parliament under a partisan caretaker set-up. Yet, it will portray the constitutional nature of the state, procedural democracy, army's role, Islamic ascendancy and low salience of issues and policies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why have the political systems of Pakistan (West Pakistan) and Bangladesh (East Pakistan) evolved differently since 1971, despite similar institutional legacies, economic development, and colonial history? ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]