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The “theory” of preventive war predicts that states are most likely to undertake military action in response to a rising challenger if they expect that the adversary will surpass them in military strength and then engage in hostile behavior, so that a future war with the challenger is likely. The biggest apparent anomaly for this theory is the Western rejection of a strategy of prevention based on better-now-than-later logic in favor of the strategy of appeasement in the 1930s. In our previous work on the Rhineland Crisis of 1936 and the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1938, we demonstrated that the British and French non-response is not at odds with preventive war theory because British leaders believed that the transition had already occurred prior to 1936, leaving France and Britain with few options, and because French leaders would not take a firm stand against Germany without British support. This interpretation begs the question of why Britain and France did not respond more firmly to the rise of Hitler and to German rearmament before 1936, either through military buildups of their own, a containment strategy based on alliances, or perhaps through coercive threats or preventive military action. In this paper, we address this important question with an analysis of British and French government documents and private papers. We conclude with a discussion of the limits of preventive war theory. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the anomalies in the theory of preventive war by looking at the case involving Great Britain, France and Germany in the 1930s. It cites that preventive war refers a war driven by the perception of a rising adversary, the fear of the consequences of an adverse shift in power and by the temptation to use military force to hamper the further growth of the adversary. It cites that France and Great Britain pursued a policy of appeasement rather than preventive war when Germany obtained a rise in military potential and power.

This paper criticises the traditional realist distinction between high politics (sovereignty and security matters) and low politics (economics and other less important state activities) on several grounds. First, it ignores the economic underpinnings of military power and national security. Second, it overestimates the independence states have both from the international economy and from domestic political opposition when mobilizing economic resources in support of security objectives. Finally, it glosses over the potential for states to achieve national security objectives in an interdependent world economy by using economic instruments, such as economic sanctions and economic incentives. This article, therefore, makes the case for treating the political economy of national security as a distinct subfield of security studies for both teaching and research purposes. It identifies a unique set of political economy issues that have a direct bearing on national security calculations. It reviews both the classical geopolitics literature and a growing literature by contemporary international relations scholars that address these issues in an effort to bridge the chasm between political economy and security. Finally, it suggests avenues of further research to flesh out the conditions under which domestic and international economic factors affect the pursuit of national security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do international political tensions chase away foreign investment? Do governments avoid tensions in order to preserve foreign investment? In this paper, we will investigate the first question with a large-N study of the relationship between the level of political tensions and foreign direct investment inflows into the country (lagged one year). In addition we will conduct a detailed qualitative case study of a country that experienced both periods of heightened conflict and conflict resolution to see if a) foreign investment into the country decreased during heightened tensions and increased during periods of conflict resolution; and b) whether investment levels affected national security decisions during the period (i.e., whether it motivated conflict resolution). To this end, we will conduct a multi-year case study of Israeli national security policy from 1992 until 2002. This is an appropriate test-case because this period witnessed both significant periods of conflict resolution, especially the 1993 Oslo Agreement and the 1994 peace treaty with Jordan, as well as intense periods of conflict, most notably the al-Aksa intifada that began in September 2000. Moreover, Israel?s economy is closely integrated into the global economy and heavily dependent on foreign investment, which leads us to believe that if a reciprocal conflict-investment relationship does exist, it would be apparent in this case. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]