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Some foreign policy votes in Congress are partisan while others are bipartisan. This paper argues that apart from electoral connections and party ideology, international political situations drive partisanship in congressional foreign policy voting. American foreign policy towards India if analyzed during different periods has generally been policies that are bipartisan in nature. Analyses of various crucial policy decisions relating to India in the US Congress after the Cold War indicate that decisions were mostly taken in a collective manner according to apparent predictions. This paper traces the changing contours of U.S. foreign policy towards India from the latter part of the Clinton administration to 2008, to that of the administration of George W. Bush and Obama by analyzing the interactions between the two parties in the Congress to evaluate the determinants that influence policy. Some of the questions posed are: how much of a say do these actors actually have? What is the significance of a bipartisan consensus in the congress that explains decision making in the US with regard to India? This paper also demonstrates a transformation of views on India within the US Congress. The evolution and passage of the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, illustrates the argument that foreign policy interests and goals especially in the case of India, modifies partisanship which may continue on other issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on the impact of EU membership on national foreign policies is relatively rare and has so-far produced few theoretical insights. This paper aims to fill this gap by proposing a synthetic theoretical framework, which can account for the various aspects of EU impact. At the substantive level Europeanization is manifested either through the articulation of a 'need for adaptation' to specific EU policies (policy adaptation) and/or through the invocation of EU policy 'models' and 'norms' in the process of policy formulation and legitimization (policy framing). At the procedural level it may entail the adjustment of policymaking structures in order to accommodate the requirements of EU membership (institutional adaptation) and/or the entrenchment of national officials in the co-operative diplomatic culture that guides interaction among member-states within the EU (procedural socialization). The utility of the model is illustrated through a study of Greek foreign policy towards Turkey. The paper calls for a more nuanced approach, which is able to take into the creative usage that actors make of Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing primarily on interviews with decision-makers involved in the intervention in Haiti in 1994, this paper demonstrates that despite its perceived opposition to the use of force, public opinion was not only a determining influence on the decision to intervene, but also influenced the resources employed, the legitimization, and the duration of the intervention. The public opinion factor also helps explain why, shortly after the withdrawal from Mogadishu, the Clinton administration decided to intervene in Haiti yet neither in Bosnia nor Rwanda. Because the intervention was shaped partly based on the perception of the best acceptable option (Barbara Farnham, 1997) for the public and the elite, this paper shows that U.S. decisions on war and strategy are better understood as the result of a tension between political considerations (the need for public support being the major one) and the necessities of a war campaign. Based on interviews with decision-makers, this paper tests two propositions: 1) the influence of public opinion depends on the President's willingness to use political capital, and 2) public opinion's influence on the decision to intervene or to escalate depends on the possibility to design the intervention in a way that will lower the political risks associated to the use of force. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to show how a combination of different theoretical models can explain the development of the European financial program for supporting cooperation across the Dutch-German border. Cross-border cooperation in the European Union represents a new system of multi-level and interdependent decision-making. Even though the analytical model of Multi-Level Governance (MLG) does justice to the relevance of the different levels of governance involved - subnational, national and supranational - it lacks a clear understanding of how the interaction between the actors at different levels occurs. Here, the Principal-Agent model (PA) can provide more insight. In this approach, the relationship between two actors - the principal and the agent to which authority is delegated - is characterized by oversight mechanisms by means of which the principal seeks to control the agent. In this paper, I will incorporate both approaches by focusing on the shifts of authority in German-Dutch cross-border cooperation, which created several agents by not only delegating authority from national principals to the European Commission, but also from the European Commission to the subnational Dutch-German cross-border organizations. In addition, and contrary to what is expected on the basis of the assumptions of the MLG approach, national actors were actually able in part to regain decision-making authority on cross-border cooperation rather than losing it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Modern democracy centred on the nation-state has been invariably patriarchal. Men are viewed as the natural leaders of nations and continue to dominate in the political arena. Women's roles are relegated to the private sphere of the home and in supportive roles to men in the process of political decision-making. Thus the question arises how global democracy could and should be grasped as an opportunity to overcome patriarchy and work towards gender equity. Certainly there have been some promising developments to bring women's voices, participation and control into global politics, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Beijing process. Such global initiatives have also furthered struggles for gender democracy in the Caribbean more particularly. However, full incorporation of gender into global democracy has been largely subordinated in global discourses. Instead, prevailing patriarchal methods of negotiation have insufficiently incorporated women into decision-making and treat gender as a marginal aspect of achieving democracy internally. While global imperatives required that Caribbean states ratify global conventions and draft national gender policies for gender equality and equity in all spheres, there is no commitment on the part of governments to accept and implement the policies that are drafted. This is highly regrettable, as the persistence of gender inequities undermine democracy in relation to global circumstances as women's voices and the ideas that they propose for change are viewed as incidental to growth and development of nations. What could be done to correct this situation? Perhaps recent experiences with national gender policies could offer important suggestions. In particular this analysis assesses the possible implications for global democracy that might be drawn from the formulation of national gender policies in the Cayman Islands, Dominica, and Trinidad and Tobago between 1999 and 2006. The value of gender policies might be that they stimulate change and initiate a democratic process of engaging women's and men's voices at the national and local levels without yet finding its way to feed back directly into global democracy. The paper has four main sections. The first section explores theoretically the existing relationship and future possibilities for enhancing gender democracy through global democracy. The second section reviews the experiences of the three national gender policies in the Caribbean, assessing how they have and have not advanced democracy in these contexts. The third section indicates how global circumstances have both furthered and frustrated strivings for gender democracy in the three societies of Trinidad and Tobago, Dominica and the Cayman Islands. The fourth and final section of the paper identifies and elaborates the key implications of the Caribbean experiences for ideas of global democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper conceptualizes global democracy around the traditional Chinese thinking of Minben ('people-oriented governance', or 'governance for the people') and Hehe ('cooperativeharmonious thoughts'). Minben highlights the distributive justice that should lie at the heart of global democracy. Globalization should not only serve the interests of a few elites or rich countries, but also should benefit marginalized groups. Hehe provides a basis for dealing with diversity in the era of globalization. Its core premises include: (a) that respect for diversity is a prerequisite of co-existence; (b) that diversity does not necessarily lead to conflicts; and (c) that a constant process of mutual construction among key stakeholders will transform potential conflicts into harmony, where different parties find common ground to complement each other. To be specific, "parties" could be representatives from nation states, international organizations, international non-governmental organizations, or individual citizens; it depends on the specific issue to be resolved in a concrete context. From this conceptual perspective, we propose that global democracy can be concretely enacted through a pragmatic process of institutional innovation involving the cooperative efforts of all stakeholders in a global society that seeks equitable and sustainable human development. Thus the proposed framework rests on three main pillars. First, stakeholders in the global society approach one another as 'different but harmonious'. Second, the stakeholders engage in a constant process of evolving new institutional mechanisms for their cooperation. Third, this cooperation is geared towards a common goal of equitable and sustainable human development. This approach, developed from Chinese traditions, differs in important respects from prevailing mainstream ideas of global democracy. This version of cosmopolitanism, fashionable especially in the West, thinks of global democracy in terms of (a) a clear and compelling set of universal principles and (b) a fixed set political institutions that (c) yield positive practical consequences. Yet this approach blindly mixes up procedural, normative and substantive dimensions of democracy. With its premise of universalism, mainstream cosmopolitanism has ruled out the possibilities of alternative democratic institutions and ignores the need for intercultural dialogue. Admittedly, a viable conception of global democracy should embrace the three key dimensions. However, it does not mean that certain institutional procedures in limitedly temporal and spatial boundaries, based on mono-culturally normative principles, could definitely lead to the substantially positive outcome. Instead, to avoid the above pitfall, the researchers should detach themselves from their original normative and procedural assumptions which are unavoidably confined by their own cultural and empirical biases and open their mind to cross-cultural learning. In this way, the hegemonic prescription of global democracy ideal and practice can give way to the constantly cross-cultural investigation of potential forms of global democracy for the effective solutions of existing and emerging global challenges. Our proposed definition of global democracy seeks to overcome these limitations. In respect of democratic principles, it emphasizes the significance of cross-cultural exchange, rather than taking for granted the validity of any preordained democratic principle. Such dialogue might reveal, for instance, that neither 'liberal democracy' nor 'authoritative democracy' deserves priority over the other, because both fail to resolve the tension between individual liberty and collective interests. Intercultural deliberation reminds each party to be self-reflective of its own values in order to avoid advocating them as universal standards and aspirations. With regard to democratic institutions, the concept of global democracy developed here highlights the necessity of institutional innovations and refuses to accept the legitimacy of any fixed arrangement. Faced with unprecedented new problems in the era of globalization, it is of paramount importance to enhance institutional innovations through collaborative efforts of all stakeholders in order to go beyond the zero-sum thinking to provide global public goods. With regard to practice, the approach to global democracy taken here goes beyond a state-centred analytical framework which blinds us to the other stakeholders in global society. This approach avoids stale disputes about the withering away of the nation-state and instead focuses on whatever array of actors is relevant to a specific governance issue. It guides us to identify the potentially conflictive perceptions and interests among different stakeholders and to unravel their interaction. In order to illustrate the fruits of this proposed approach, we tentatively apply it to an analysis of World Bank development assistance in China. Development assistance is a pertinent case, because the aid relationship is a global-local interface involving different values, interests, knowledges and powers. From the normative perspective of global democracy, we seek to investigate what kind of aid relationship between donors and recipients helps to enhance aid effectiveness. Based on the case study, we come to the conclusion that (a) the aid relationship between World Bank and China has undergone a transformative process from suspicion to trust, which helps both actors identify their different ideas, perceptions and interests and ultimately make such differences complementary with each other; (b) such equal and mutual trust aid relationship is based on institutionalized cooperative mechanism, such as information sharing, capacity building, and so on; (c) the democratic aid relationship between World Bank and China helps to reduce poverty and to enhance development in China. This case sheds new light on the conceptualization of global democracy. Firstly, global democracy involves diverse stakeholders on the global-local interface on which an abstract debate on nation states and global market has not even touched. Secondly, global democracy entails a self-consciously persistent institutional innovation. The point here is not to argue which specific form of institutional innovation is superior or inferior, but to highlight the fitness of any existing arrangement when transferred to an alien context. Finally, global democracy should not be an endless debate among theoretical paradigms, but a pragmatic endeavor to the solution of human. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers an analysis of Eurojust's contributions to the European Union counterterrorism policy and questions whether all EU Member States fully support the strengthening of Eurojust's role in the fight against terrorism. The allegations concerning the existence of an inter-agency rivalry between Europol and Eurojust in the area of counterterrorism are also analyzed. Finally, the article provides an assessment of the possible impacts of the 2008 Council Decision on the Strengthening of Eurojust and the Lisbon Treaty provisions for possible establishment of a European Public Prosecutor's Office from Eurojust when it comes to EU's counterterrorism efforts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the events of 9/11 the terms 'threat' and 'risk' have entered the daily lexicon to a greater extent than ever before. News media report on changes to national threat assessments, commenting when the threat level rises from 'Moderate' to 'Substantial', in the case of the United Kingdom. The British Government recently released a document that provided details of the issues that pose the highest risk to the national infrastructure. All of these are based, so we are told, on the work of the national intelligence agencies. But what are these indicators actually telling us and what is the relationship between threat assessments and risk assessments? These are both important questions because important decisions are made as a result of changes in these assessments. National defence and security planning is based upon perceived threats and risks. An entire risk management industry has grown up in the business world that covers everything from health and safety to financial risk. It is not only governments and businesses that base decisions on these indicators, but individuals as well. Tourists planning holidays in Europe were alarmed when the British, French and German governments increased their threat levels in response to intelligence that suggested that an attack against tourist sites in their respective capitals was imminent. Some will have changed their plans and travelled elsewhere, to the detriment of the tourist industry, while others will have chosen to defy the terrorists and travel anyway - potentially placing themselves in harm's way. With so much at stake, both nationally and individually, it is therefore important that we understand the difference between a 'threat' and a 'risk' and, as scholars of intelligence, the role that intelligence plays in assessing them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The poliheurisitic theory of foreign policy decision-making would benefit from being clearer in spelling out the conditions under which it holds more or less analytic promise. The paper makes the case that the concept of issue salience can help the theory address its shortcomings in this respect. In particular, the explanatory power of poliheuristic theory's two-stage model largely depends on the non-compensatory principle of major domestic political loss avoidance on the first stage of the model to simplify the choice set to be considered on the second stage. This is more likely to happen, however, in the case of issues that are highly salient to a government's selectorate than in the case of issues that are of low salience in the domestic arena. The poliheuristic theory should thus be more powerful if it is applied to domestic high-salience rather than low-salience decisions. These theoretical contentions are illustrated in a case study on the decision-making of the British Labour government under Tony Blair in the fields of European security and defence policy and the single European currency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to enhance the explanatory power of the governmental politics model (GPM) and contribute to the theoretical dialogue in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). Specifically, the article addresses the GPM's lack of clarity concerning the selection of policy options by political decision makers. It argues that the GPM's core proposition in this respect, which is neatly, albeit imperfectly, summarized in the aphorism "Where you stand depends on where you sit," can be operationalized by integrating the substantive claims of the proposition into the two-stage process of the poliheuristic theory of decision making (PH). This is accomplished through the introduction of a "noncompensatory organizational loss aversion variable" in the first stage of PH, according to which decision makers reject all options that are unacceptable for their organization irrespective of their benefits in other decision making dimensions. In the second stage, the decision makers scrutinize the remaining options more thoroughly with respect to several decision dimensions, including organizational interests. This article uses Germany's decision to participate in EUFOR RD Congo, a military operation of the European Union (EU) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), to probe the plausibility of the revised GPM. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While devoting much attention to explaining how leaders evaluate options, poliheuristic (PH) theory does not focus on (a) how these options are generated prior to the stage one noncompensatory screening process or (b) how they acquire their relative attractiveness on key dimensions in the more "rational" second stage. We believe that the PH framework can be extended to account for the pre-stage one generation and the stage two attractiveness of decision options by incorporating elements of the research programs on foreign policy problem representation (PR) and image theory. PR research has shown that the way in which leaders frame the decision problem determines which policy options are generated as viable solutions and which options are not even considered. Image theory sheds light on the perceived likelihood of success and the costs and benefits associated with viable options. In this paper we develop a hybrid PR-PH framework and produce hypotheses about how specific elements of leaders' problem representations and strategic judgments related to their adversaries will affect the generation and perceived attractiveness of different types of policy options. We then test these hypotheses empirically using experimental methods and report our findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We conduct the first direct experimental study of rationalist explanations for war based on private information and the commitment problem (Fearon 1995). The two factors are foundational in rational-choice theories of interstate and substate conflict. But despite their theoretical importance, little is known empirically about the actual and specific behavioral effects of private information and the commitment problem on the decision for conflict. We use incentivized laboratory experiments on a 2x2 factorial design to isolate these factors in their simplest and purest form. We find that the commitment problem has a decisive effect on the decision for conflict that is robust over repeated periods in both sequential and simultaneous-moves interactions. The results are informative as there appears to be no published experiment in economics or political science that specifically isolates the effect of the commitment problem on conflict. The effect of private information, however, is less clear. A high-resolution case study extends the empirical insights and tests for theoretical omissions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Participatory development and rational choice theories suggest that while shared governance mechanisms may improve policy outcomes and empower previously excluded groups, such structures may face collection action dilemmas and replicate unequal power dynamics both across and within subpopulations. Despite growing enthusiasm for wider participation in decision-making at all levels, little is known about how multi-sector coalitions address governance challenges not previously confronted by state-governed systems. Based on 46 in-depth interviews with government officials, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society groups, we use the case of Peru's National Multi-sector Health Coordinating Body (CONAMUSA) to identify such challenges and institutional strategies to address them. Comprised of nine government ministries, NGOs, academia, Anglican and Catholic churches and international cooperation agencies, CONAMUSA has faced challenges of collective action, role definition, role conflict among NGOs and civil society representatives serving in multiple capacities, and representation concerns regarding the perceived homogenization of subpopulations, and dominance of the health sector, established civil society groups and representatives from the capitol. In response, CONAMUSA has created a paid Executive Secretariat, conflict of interest guide, formal voting process to elect civil society representatives, and regional multi-sector bodies, offering strategies for other national and international shared governance systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will explore the dilemmas that Albania has been experiencing in consolidating democracy during the past two decades with particular attention to the political institutional obstacles, including the difficulties of establishing the rule of law, the lack of independence of the judiciary and the pervasiveness of corruption, the lack of transparency in the legislature and more broadly in the political decision-making process, and the divisive and leader-dominated political party system. It will also examine other institutional weaknesses which have plagued Albania since its first post-communist election in 1991, mainly that of the inability of Albania to conduct legitimate elections that meet international standards. One of the most fundamental roles of political parties in democratic societies is to act as legitimate actors representing the interests of citizens within the political decision-making process. But when a society is experiencing internal political struggles, as Albania has in consolidating a democratic form of government, party politics often mirror the types of relationships found within the socio-cultural environment more generally. Thus to fully grasp the institutional dilemmas Albania is facing in consolidating democracy, one also needs to examine the political and cultural environment where these political institutions operate and from which they have been constructed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Changes in the science and technology sectors of Central and East European states since the 1980s have resulted in enormous changes to the composition, access, and influence of the scientific community upon environmental policy. Such changes were drastic enough during the transition from communist rule, but when combined with subsequent accession into the European Union, the influence of the science community upon the environmental debate has become even more complicated and less well understood. This paper examines the role that the scientific community of the new EU member states plays in legitimating the EU's environmental discourse of risk and the precautionary principle, and argues that the accession process has posed severe challenges to the ability of the science and technology communities to positively influence larger environmental debates. By comparing the experience of the United States in increasingly centralized decision-making processes, the EU risks marginalizing vital criticism in the same manner as has occurred in the US and Canada. The consequences of this may include a move from the precautionary principle to NIMBY-ism in CEE states, and loss of international environmental leadership on the part of the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper criticizes the popular method for analyzing foreign policy decision-making, termed as the ad-hoc framework. According to this approach a foreign policy decision is a well-defined historical event. It initiates when decision-makers identify a problem that requires attention, and after studying and deliberating the issue a resolution is produced, thereby concluding the decision process. Although international crises and major strategic decisions can be interpreted in such a manner, foreign policy decisions are usually not isolated incidents, but part of a longitudinal stream of events. Therefore the decision process has no distinct beginning or end. Decision-makers are continually confronting on going problems and each decision does not necessarily provide an adequate solution, but is expected to be followed by a new decision in the future. This alternative conceptualization of foreign policy decision-making requires adopting an alternative analytical agenda ? the dynamic decision-making framework. The implications of this approach will be discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sandro Mezzadra notes that movements of migration are social movements motivated by poverty, political devastation and demands for freedom, which offer challenges to modern citizenship. Within this context, this paper considers how citizenship is practiced 'from the margins.' IR scholars note that globalization reconfigures territory and authority within nation-states, transferring governance to new sites, such as globalizing cities, as places where the marginalized can assert claims to citizenship through their presence in the city. The paper reflects on citizenship-making through other 'urban' spaces arising with globalization such as the slum, detention centre and refugee camp, although focuses here specifically on the space of the camp. Designed as temporary and exceptional spaces to the city and state, they have become permanent features of 'settlement' in the global system in which millions live in increasingly ambiguous statuses as neither fully citizens with rights nor refugees with the right to claim rights. From a perspective of citizenship politics, the paper reflects on these new cartographies of exclusion and the innovative ways that those disenfranchised from citizenship find to claim citizenship. It concludes by drawing out the implications that a politics 'from the margins' can have for disrupting traditional distinctions of territory, status and identity upon which citizenship has traditionally been based. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do states attempt to create an additional institution when they are already members of an existing institution that performs similar functions and relies on similar resources as the proposed institution? And why do we observe variation in institutional overlap? I address these questions through an examination of European efforts to create a security institution independent of NATO. The puzzle addresses the creation of multiple centers of authority and possibly power on the international level? also called heterarchy - in the form of diverse cooperative arrangements that overlap. As such, the paper feeds into several strings of IR literature: institution/alliance-building and maintenance, as well as autonomous decision-making. The units of analysis are France, Germany and the UK and the empirical cases include the European Political Cooperation, Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defense Policy. My own explanatory pathway combines International Relations and Comparative Politics literature. The main independent variable is the degree of ideological affinity between political parties on the international level. I intend to show that they account for different international outcomes over time. I argue that the existence and form of institutional overlap depends on the constellation of party ideologies on the international level. If one observes ideological similarities on the international level, new institutions will be developed - assuming these ideologies are consistent with the creation of a new institution. If, however, one observes ideological diversity, then institution building will be inhibited - regardless of the content of the ideologies. New external events/shocks can drive new thinking about institution to be created, but the relative success in creating such an institution depends on the extent to which ideologies in favor of building a new security institution are shared. This hypothesis is contrasted to two sets of hypotheses derived from major schools of thought: realism and neoliberal institutionalism. Through theory testing, I draw insights from elements of these alternative theories with the most explanatory power. I do not treat these explanations necessarily as mutually exclusive, but instead, I expect them to partially complement each other. This argument will be tested with the creation of an index based on the Comparative Manifesto Project dataset. While the Comparative Manifesto Project dataset was used at times to support arguments that party ideologies matter, neither that argument nor this method has found broader application in European Union studies or International Relations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do state leaders sometimes choose risky foreign policy options? Rational leaders are expected to instigate conflict with the anticipation of winning the conflict. However, sometimes leaders enter into conflict when the odds of winning are against them. Prospect theory offers a possible explanation for behavior of leaders who does not follow rational expectations. The past weighs heavily on present decision-making and leaders in a frame of losses may engage in risky foreign policy behavior to recoup what they believe is rightfully theirs. Loss of territory is a particularly salient issue for leaders of sovereign nations. This paper will examine decision-making during the lengthy territorial conflict between Ecuador and Peru in terms of the expectations of rational choice and prospect theory. Since the time of independence both countries have disputed their shared borders with the most recent militarized dispute taking place in 1995. Examination of a dispute lasting over a century provides an opportunity to analyze a case across time and leaders. This investigation will focus on the decision-making process of Ecuadorian and Peruvian leaders during outbreaks of fighting during the lengthy dispute to determine whether rational choice or prospect theory offers a better explanation for the behavior of these leaders under conditions of risk. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While emotional sources of behaviour tend to be contrasted with those traditionally emphasized by rationalists, recent work on the neuroscience of emotions indicates that they are in fact necessary for the type of effective decision-making usually taken for granted by economic theories of choice. Some findings about learned emotional stimuli from neuroscience potentially complement, rather than compete with, the propositions of cognitive psychology, the political sociology of emotions and social constructivism in IR, including their insights into learning, practice and collective actorhood. For IR, these findings about the emotional components of choice and their social and cultural backdrop suggest the need to pay closer attention to what are typically deemed irrational, emotive or pathological international behaviours and to study how differing political and cultural contexts affect and are affected by the emotions ubiquitous in political life.One specific set of emotions to draw the attention of IR scholars has to do with humiliation and shame. Specific examples invoked, but not systematically studied, in IR include the discourses and practices explicitly centred on memorializing humiliation found in the contexts of contemporary Palestinian nationalism and Chinese nationalism. Despite sharing important similarities, these two cases of humiliation remembrance have emerged and grown in vastly different international political contexts and found expression in dissimilar daily practices, discursive forms and formal institutions. In both cases, however, neuroscientific, psychological and sociological research suggests that the effort to keep memories of humiliation salient carries implications for "rational" political decision-making, at individual and potentially collective levels, and thus for conflict resolution. This paper explores whether and how, in the Palestinian and Chinese cases, practices and discourses relating to the memory of humiliation affect the rational choice-making capacities of actors involved in disputes or conflicts. While the focus is on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, propositions about the possibility and limits of comparison with China and other cases are offered. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What makes nations militarily intervene in other states? What ought to make them intervene? The current literature deals with these two key questions of international order separately. Answers to the empirical question are dominated by realism and rational choice. Approaches to the normative question revolve around international norms. Yet as different as empirical and normative perspectives on intervention are, they share the neglect of political judgment in common. Political judgment is a form of what Immanuel Kant labeled reflexive judgment. Agents judge by subsuming a particular under a universal. Yet in politics â€" Hannah Arendt alludes to this â€"subsuming is hardly ever obvious. It is rare that agents pick a particular universal in automatic fashion. Usually, they select a particular universal from a repertoire of possible universals. Sometimes, they even (re-)invent universals in order to make sense of the particular. The purpose of my paper is to explore the salience of political judgment for international interventions. I develop a three-fold argument: First, political judgment is a key ingredient of decision-making. This applies in particular to decisions on international intervention. Such decisions are taken in times of crises. Actors are struggling to cope with an environment that is full of unknowns and risks. Holding on to generally accepted universals is a key coping mechanism in such a situation. Second, judgments to intervene are not made by just one decision-maker. Political judgment is fragmented. Different actors generate different judgments and affect one another in making these judgments. Fragmented judgment, therefore, involves politics. It involves actors trying to influence and persuade one another. Third, fragmented political judgment not only offers a novel empirical approach to study intervention but it also provides interesting clues for normative thought on intervention. These deal with the procedures through which agents make ideas to universals, and how they match particulars to universals. I illustrate this three-fold claim with an analysis of the domestic politics through which the United States came to decide to go to war against Iraq. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International relations analysts have long sought to explain when and why nations choose policies of war rather than policies of peace. Contemporary researchers offer structural accounts, or they offer decision-making accounts. Structural efforts contend that the foreign policy choices of rational actors are fundamentally determined by the configuration of the international system or by the capabilities and resources of nation-states. Decision-making efforts contend that such rational foreign policy choices are sometimes impeded by the dynamics of the organizational or the bureaucratic process, or by the individual cognitive process. Although each perspective provides distinctive types of explanatory approaches, only structural studies currently include clear and causal theories. Decision-making investigations do not yet offer a general theory of foreign policy choice.This paper will present a new theory: the cognitive calculus theory of decision-making. This new theory will combine the central features of an organizational and bureaucratic process perspective and the central features of an individual cognitive process perspective. However, it will overcome the chief limitations now associated with each. It will explain when and why national leaders will choose policies of war rather than policies of peace, and it will offer a clear and causal alternative to rational, structural explanations of foreign policy choice.To establish the significance of the new cognitive calculus theory of decision-making, this paper will begin by briefly reviewing the key differences that separate current structural theories from current decision-making approaches. It will then present a more detailed examination of several of the most important earlier contributions to foreign policy decision-making research. It will highlight work that draws attention to the influence of the organizational and the bureaucratic process, and work that draws attention to the influence of the individual cognitive process. It will claim that each type of decision-making effort has well-known strengths and weaknesses, but that neither type of decision-making approach offers a general theory of foreign policy choice.This paper will then review the central psychological argument presented in the new cognitive calculus theory of decision-making. It will show how this new theory focuses attention on the individual actor as the fundamental unit of analysis, and how it uses the simple and non-rational assumption that people are cognitive processing cost-minimizers to propose that it is variations in task and variations in knowledge which prompt variations in the price of any inference. This paper will then present a model of the theory that is specifically designed for application in the arena of international politics. This model will address the essential foreign policy choices of war and peace, and it will allow a series of predictions to be made about just when it should be that national leaders and their advisors will prefer the use of force to the use of diplomacy. To test the empirical validity of this model and these predictions in the "real world" of international history, this paper will include a case study of the Johnson administration?s turn toward peace in Vietnam in 1968. Results will confirm the power of the new theory and demonstrate its potential for explaining an even broader array of decisions for war and peace by US leaders and others. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper makes the case for disbanding NATO. Even after the end of the Cold War, NATO serves as an American tool for preventing Europe?s resources from coming under the control of either (1) a single state (Germany or Russia) or (2) a single decision-making authority (an integrated European military). However, this ?aggregation prevention? strategy is no longer necessary: the chances of European military integration are remote and, similarly, the chances that the Europeans will engage in security competition and that a potential hegemon will emerge in the region are also remote. My argument is simple. First, the conditions required for military integration to come about do not exist. Second, European economic integration has ensured that no state has the potential to dominate the region. In other words, if we understand the causes and the consequences of integration then we will also understand that Europe?s resources are unlikely to undergo aggregation in the foreseeable future. NATO therefore no longer serves its primary purpose and ought to be disbanded. The paper ends by considering and rejecting other, secondary, reasons for preserving the alliance. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries states brought into being a new type of neo-colonial regime that can be described as "sham federacy." These are territorial units that have nominally been promised some credible final decision-making powers through constitutional means, but in fact such sovereignty either does not in reality exist (as with the Atlantic Coast [Nicaragua], Chittagong Hill Tracts [Bangladesh], or Tibet [China]) or is not defensible through legal or political means (as with the Palestinian Territories [Israel] or the "Bantustans" [South Africa 1973-93]). Sham federacies are similar to more traditional colonies except they are cloaked in the guise of a partially-sovereign arrangement which does not in fact exist. After introducing the newly apparent governmental form known as "sham federacy" this paper will argue that the colonies that remain in the international system are largely bereft of the exploitation that characterized historic imperialism. Sham federacies are arguably the true successors to the imperial malgovernance of the past rather than modern day colonies, which in many cases have become relatively benign and mutually beneficial arrangements. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper represents one of the first attempts to quantitatively analyze both the decision of a third-party state to intervene in a civil war and the decision of an intervener to alter the level of its support to a civil war combatant. While the literature on the decision to intervene is theoretically rich, there have been few quantitative empirical studies on the topic. What is more, most of the quantitative studies that do exist suffer from flawed research designs. The research design I offer in this paper makes several contributions to the study of intervention initiation. First, and unlike previous studies, I simultaneously address the three questions of when, at what level, and on which side a third-party state is more likely to intervene in a civil war. In so doing, I construct a dependent variable that better captures the decision calculus of a potential intervener and that allows for richer theoretical analysis. Second, I do not model a civil war as an instantaneous event. By opening the black box of civil war, I recognize that a third-party state decides whether to intervene at various points throughout the civil war. From this recognition, I develop new hypotheses that reflect intra-war dynamics. As it concerns the escalatory decisions of those third-party states that do intervene in civil wars, there is very little theoretical work and no quantitative studies. With data drawn from an original dataset of civil wars 1946-2002, an ordered probit analysis identifies military and ethnic ties, the outcome of recent fighting, the balance of external support, and the political stability of the third-party state as the main determinants of intervention and escalation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although it will of course be many years before the official documents detailing the Bush administration's 2003 decision to invade Iraq are made available to researchers, we already have a wealth of books and information by second-hand sources describing the process by which that decision was reached. This paper partially replicates Deborah Welch Larson's now classic study of the origins of Cold War thinking (Larson 1985) by examining what is known at this point about the Iraq decision-making in light of the five perspectives tested in her work --- the Hovland approach, cognitive dissonance theory, attribution theory, self-perception theory and schema theory --- comparing these as well with bureaucratic politics (Allison and Zelikow 1999), groupthink (Janis 1982), prospect theory (McDermott 1998), analogical reasoning (Khong 1992) and explanation-based perspectives (Breuning 1993). While the results of the paper are by necessity tentative and preliminary, they highlight the utility of understanding presidential decision-making through a variety of cognitive as well as organizational/bureaucratic lenses, as well as the complementary nature of many of the hypotheses which these approaches generate. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though the rhetorical face of policy analysis within formal decision-making venues often suggests that issues are resolved by simply weighing the relative costs and benefits of diverse policy tools as applied to a given problem, the policy analysis literature(s) offer a different story: Informal regimes and formal laws and regulation develop on the basis of outcomes of negotiations of multiple kinds. Those who analyze policy, therefore, must deal with diverse nesting problems that also include examination of problem-specific tensions among stakeholders whose interests, values, goals, and working methods diverge; long-term games in which those same stakeholders participate across issues and issue areas; the discourse through which that game unfolds; and frames for that discourse. Examination of the emergent global information policy regime reveals yet one more layer to the policy analysis problem, at least or especially as it manifests itself regarding the development of approaches to the regulation of new technologies at the international level. Because there is no necessary or necessarily natural single venue for decision-making in such areas, there are tensions, as well, among the very processes of policy-making. This paper will introduce the range of decision-making processes that are currently interacting in the course of shaping a global information policy regime. These include processes that take place within and between single nation-states via formal political activity, within and between traditional and new (eg, ICANN) international organizations, within and among regions, within and between private sector entities, within civil society, and in negotiations among civil society, formal governments, and the private sector. Players involved in policy-making for information technologies at the global level manipulate conflicts among decision-making venues and processes themselves as another mode of action. Thus policy for information technologies at the international level that has actual effect results from interactions among these contending processes of decision-making. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unlike other policy areas, the EU foreign policy portrays three main institutional arrangements and rules of governance: economic, political and military. Rather than monolithic actors with fixed preferences, the EU foreign policy demands flexible approaches to understand how the same actors behave differently in the three institutional arrangements aforementioned. In that regard, the paper relies on the agent-structure debate in the construction of the EU foreign policy. In light of the uneven distribution decision-making power among community institutions, three kind of agents in the EU foreign policy making are proposed: principal (the Council), secondary (Commission and Parliament) and interest groups acting at the European level. The interrelation of these three types of agents shapes the structure of the EU, which is reflected in the organizational setting, instruments and practices of the EU foreign policy. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Constitutional Treaty of the EU was designed to resolve three major challenges facing the Union: Eastern enlargement, declining support of the public for the European project and a limited capacity of action, particularly obvious in foreign affairs. In dealing with these challenges, the Convention envisaged significant Treaty regulations aimed at strengthening the institutional structure of the EU and enhancing its procedures of decision making. While these provisions were amended with the final Council decision, their main features remained unchallenged. Although ratification of the Treaty has, to date, failed, it is highly probable, that most of the regulations regarding the institutional structure of the EU and its decision making will sooner or later be included into the existing Treaties. Why are these reforms so important? What is the rationale underlying them? In this paper, it will be argued that the envisaged reforms will significantly transform the systemic structure of the EU by altering the balance between the European and the national level and by restructuring the relationships between member states. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Game theory has been proved to be a powerful theoretical tool to capture the interactive nature of international crises. In this paper, I argue that PH provides a promising perspective to improve the quality of game theoretical model. First, PH presents a promising approach to explain leaders’ off-equilibrium crisis decisions. Second, in the interactive context, game theory provides a powerful instrument for policy analysis at the second stage of decision making. Finally, PH’s cognitive heuristics suggest important means to simplify away from the complexity of the involved equilibria analysis in game theory. This paper is composed of four major sections. First, I introduce a game theoretical design that takes international crises as a process of bargaining between adversaries over the disputed benefits in the shadow of war. In the second section, a general dynamic game of crisis bargaining is presented. In the third and fourth section, I apply two versions of the crisis bargaining game, game with and without perfect as well as complete information, respectively, to PRC’s decision making during the Taiwan Strait Crises. In each version, I show how PH can be used to interpret the “anomalous” observations and simplify the complicated analysis. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Poliheuristic Theory (PH) is an innovative attempt to conceptualize decision-making in a way that recognizes patterns deriving from both cognitive and rational schools of thought about how foreign policy is made. Crisis decision-making, a setting in which the political aspects emphasized by PH can be expected to operate, is the subject of this paper. The study focuses on Turkey and China, two important states that frequently are characterized as sui generis and possibly unsuited to comparative analysis in the context of any overarching theory. As will become apparent, PH is capable of explaining crisis decision-making for China and Turkey and what follows is perhaps only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to cross-national application of the theory within the crisis domain. This study unfolds in six further sections. The next sections consist of an abbreviated account of PH. Case selection follows. Since our previous program of research has covered the literature on Chinese crisis decision-making, the next section emphasizes the Turkish experience. After that we convey data and measurement. The two most basic hypotheses from PH are tested in the following section and a brief conclusion follows. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]