Search

After fifty years of Cold War division, East Asia has gained greater coherence and substance as an emerging economic, even political, entity. This paper examines the role of hegemony in East Asia’s ongoing post-Cold War reorganization. In particular, where the US and Japan once claimed much of East Asia?s economic and political attention, long-term trends suggest an ongoing reorientation on the part of East Asian states around China?s growing economic and political presence and that China will increasingly become the center of gravity for East Asia I focus on the US, Japan, and China as the three powers that have or are most likely to assume the hegemonic organizing role detailed in international relations theory. The paper examines these major powers, with a particular focus on their shifting relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Though a coalition of weaker powers, ASEAN has played an important, if not unusual, role in defining and at times, leading regional processes. This was especially the case for much of the 1990s; however, financial crises, as well as ASEAN?s political and economic limitations, have also forced the organization to look outside itself for additional economic and political leadership. The paper begins with a brief discussion of the 1990-1997 period, a period characterized by much uncertainty about the post-Cold War priorities and policies of major powers. In particular, I describe how the United States as retrenching hegemon, Japan as reluctant hegemon, and China as rising hegemon set the stage for new thinking about intra-East Asian relations. Their shifting relations underscore political and economic interdependencies between Northeast and Southeast Asia that had been less apparent during much of the Cold War. It is during this period that we find ASEAN playing the important role of facilitator in negotiating changing relations. The second part of the paper then turns to a discussion of developments since 1997, addressing the roles played by 1) the 1997-9 financial crisis and 2) the US war on terrorism in shaping East Asia’s reorganization. This period is characterized by notable Chinese activity and Beijing?s intensified engagement of Southeast Asian states, individually and collectively. Taken together, the paper shows that major powers have shaped in critical ways the contours and organization of an evolving East Asia. East Asia has become more organized ? formally and informally, politically and economically ? but thus far, that process has been defined more by market forces and competitive dynamics between the major powers. In other words, if East Asia is becoming more coherent and organized, it is becoming so more by accident than necessarily by hegemonic design. Recent Chinese policies suggest that China may wish to assume a larger leadership role; however, the question remains whether the United States or Japan would accept China in such a role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My paper will analyze the ways that Japan has approached nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation in recent years. More specifically, in addition to the diverse approaches that have been taken by Tokyo and Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations, my paper will examine the extent to which U.S. policies influence the disarmament and nonproliferation initiatives of the Japanese government in the international arena. Preliminary research suggests that Tokyo is placing more emphasis on nonproliferation than on nuclear disarmament, creating two major reasons for concern. First, the government of Japan, despite its continuing public campaign to promote nuclear disarmament while seeking the assistance of civil society organizations, would be especially sensitive to the policy concerns of Washington, which, as many critics argue, has developed hegemonic global interests. Second, Tokyo would be alienating itself from Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations that in recent years have increased their international efforts to promote nuclear disarmament. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During Prime Minister Koizumi’s recent visit to the States, Prime Minister Koizumi had been invited to join CIA’s intelligence brief with President Bush for the first time among the Japanese prime ministers. The invitation had been recognized as President Bush’s way of thanking Koizumi for his timely staunchly statement to indicate Japan’s support for U.S. and British actions against Iraq without the U.N. resolutions. Between Bush and Koizumi, they seem to be enjoying the hey day of the alliance, but in reality, what is happening between two countries can be explained that Japan has been much more deeply placed in American Grand Strategy while Japan has not realized that it does not have its own. In this sense, the U.S.-Japan alliance has not the product of American and Japan’s grand strategies. It is a part of the American grand strategy, and Japan happens to be in the strategy. In the aftermath of 911, the United States changed its military policy from the threat based one to the capability based one. Under the circumstances, not having its grand strategy, Japan will soon face the problem of rationally deciding what Japan should do for the sake of Japan’s national interest whenever the United States calls for contribution. In this paper, I would argue that it will be high time to recognize the gap of the image and reality of the alliance between Washington and Tokyo. For the States, it might not become the issue as long as Japan has been following Washington’s order blindly, but for Japan, it means that Japan has missed another prime opportunity to establish its grand strategy after 911 and the swift victory of American and British war against Iraq. In this paper, I will trace back how the expectation and reality of the alliance has shifted since its establishment to the present. Then, I will point out the gap of the image and reality of the alliance between policy makers in Washington and Tokyo and its impact on the future U.S.-Japan security relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The assumption that the balance of material costs and benefits of nuclear armament for Japan is sensitive to small changes in the scope and credibility of U.S. extended deterrence supports the current role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security and military strategy. This paper scrutinizes this assumption in terms of a constraint that is especially difficult to change: what kind of deterrent strategy can Japan implement against nuclear weapon states? I start with pessimistic assumptions about the need for an independent nuclear deterrent, and optimistic assumptions about the feasibility of building nuclear weapons, both of which are crucial for prediction and advocacy of nuclear armament. The first set of assumptions, in which the United States no longer extends deterrence, and China values victory in nuclear war against Japan, rules out a small force de frappe for Japan. Instead, Japan will need a large retaliatory force, even with an asymmetric counter-recovery strategy against energy resources, transportation, and sea power. This deterrent is not likely to become operational without a decade of investment. In short, a claim that a small nuclear deterrent is necessary and sufficient for Japan contradicts itself. Japan needs either a large nuclear deterrent, or none of its own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States and Japan have maintained their strategic alignment for nearly an half century. This is the longest alliance ever for Japan and the second longest one for the United States besides NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). However, theoretical understanding of this bilateral relashionship is relatively poor. In particular, existense of the alliance after the Cold War generated further explanative disturbance. This paper attempts to grapes U.S.-Japan alliance as an "security community," modeled by Karl Deutsch in the 1950s, that is more convincing theoretical framework than neorealism, neoliberalism and constructivism. Although his model was created upon "transatlantic" relationship between the United States and Western Europe, the author considers the model is largely applicable to "transpacific" alignment. This paper argues a mechanism of peaceful change on multilateralism, military planning, and common definition of threats by examining institutions, norms and identity between the two countries in the 1990s. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Growing demand for natural resources has become an issue of primary importance in China's foreign policy, and has led many observers to argue that conflict with the United States and other states in Asia is growing more likely. This paper evaluates the historical record on that question: under what circumstances have the resource needs of previous rising powers led to conflict with other states? I propose two independent variables: the ability to extract natural resources at home and the openness of the international trade system. In cases where the rising power has a large domestic resource base, and can supplement domestic production with easy access to foreign resources through trade, rising powers are less likely to generate conflict. In situations where the rising power has a limited resource base at home and the international trade system is closed, on the other hand, are more likely to lead to war. The paper evaluates three cases. For the United States in the late 19th century, massive domestic reserves and the first great era of globalization led to a "peaceful" rise. For Japan in the 1930s, an extremely poor resource base and rising trade barriers contributed to conflict. Finally, the paper turns its attention to China and argues that this important contemporary case more closely resembles the rise of the United States than that of Japan. China's domestic resource base remains quite large, and the international trade system is unprecedented in its level of openness. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On December 7, 1941 Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. The government responded to American advances in the Pacific by selecting policies of war rather than policies of peace. Why did Japanese decision-makers choose the path of military confrontation rather than the path of diplomacy? What prompted them to confront the United States at Pearl Harbor? Was it the configuration of the international system, or the capabilities and resources of nation-states that compelled them all to choose war? Or were structural circumstances fluid enough for people to disagree, and for differences among decision-makers to reflect variations in the cognitive costs of making judgments?This paper will review Japanese decision-making dynamics in 1941, and investigate whether structural conditions or the cognitive calculus theory of decision-making best accounts for the foreign policy preferences of individual actors. It will draw attention to deliberations at several levels of government, including within the military services themselves, and consider whether the transparency of American provocations forced all decision-makers to routinely choose force, or if the ambiguity of American actions prompted some people to prefer diplomatic initiatives while others preferred military solutions. In particular, it will explore the proposition that because all individuals are cognitive misers or cognitive processing cost-minimizers who unconsciously prefer judgments that are mentally cheap to those that are mentally dear, differences between civilian and military actors predictably reflect the influence of three different cognitive cost-cutting cues: decision stage (problem definition or solution definition), decision role assignment (leader or advisor), and a decision-maker’s level of substantive knowledge (novice to expert).By examining the evolution of Japanese foreign policy over the course of several months, this paper will not only assess whether and when the cognitive calculus theory of decision-making can offer a most useful explanation for this case, it will address whether the actions of Japanese officials in 1941, like those of British decision-makers in 1938 and American decision-makers in the Cuban missile crisis, the turn toward peace in Vietnam, and the 9/11 responses of 2001 (four cases already investigated), reinforce and extend the power of the theory. It will consider whether the cognitive calculus explanation can account for the preferences of different individual actors, in different states, facing different national conditions, and different international circumstances. This paper will conclude with a discussion of the implications of this work for future scholarly and policy efforts. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Immediately after liberation from Japanese occupation, numerous experts were deployed from the United States to survey the postwar landscape of the Philippines. They were sent to collect images of and collect statistical information on the extent of damages to Philippine agricultural and manufacturing industry, transportation and shipping facilities, urban and village structures, and natural resources. This collection of information urgently framed the Philippine Islands as "utterly devastated." Within the U.S. congress, immediate calls were made not for short term relief, as originally thought, but rather for long term plans of rehabilitation and reconstruction in the Philippines. From 1945 to 1946 discussions of a Rehabilitation Act were steadily pursued. By 1946 the "original Rehabilitation Bill had been expanded, the kinds and amounts of claimants had been extended and definitions broadened, the amounts appropriated had been multiplied over five times." Bundled along with the disappointing Bell-Trade Act of 1946, the Rehabilitation Act still ushered in a sense of optimism in the immediate postwar Philippines. By the sheer amount of money it provided, numerous projects and institutions were planned to aid in gaining the newly independent Republic the international recognition it deserved. Yet at the same time, inhabiting the shadows of optimism was the anxiety of mismanagement of money. In 1947, one particular group, the Joint Philippine American Finance Commission made up of both Philippine and American members reported their findings and recommendations. Their findings conclude that the initial years of Philippine independence was of critical importance in the "economic development" and stable future of the nation. Chief in their concerns was the potential mishandling of rehabilitation loan money entering the young nation. In response the joint commission makes several recommendations. Of utmost importance is the principle proposal of a Central Bank. The establishment of the Central Bank of the Philippines, as the chief authority on national currency, can ensure that all of their other recommendations are followed. This paper thus proposes to look at the emergence of the Central Bank as an object produced out of the uncanny postwar discourses of economists. These postwar discourses center on the anxiety over the twofold possibilities of misrecognition of money as well as a collapse into a non-modern economy. In the imaginary of economists, the existence of a Central Bank guided by techno-knowledge and sound management, acts as the bulwark against such devastating possibilities. Furthermore, the potential success of the Central Bank is demonstrative of the potential success of a sovereign Philippine political economy. Yet in order to legitimate the existence of a Central Bank, this paper asserts that through disciplined economic research, a recurring non-modern economic world is created by economists. This non-modern economic world is then historically presented as inhabiting the present postwar space of the Philippines. Furthermore, it also threatens to subsume it. It does so in two interrelated ways. The first is the potential misrecognition of money as speaking a language other than the value of capital. The second is the discourse created by economists in order to produce uncanny effects through the economy. These two methods intertwine in order to combine, what they imagine as a chaotic and fragmented space of islands: peasants, rebellions, decrepit banks, atrophied agricultural industries, and other non-modern elements, into a unitary and coherent whole. The name of this object is the Philippine national economy. And like any object, once solid and tangible, it can be continuously manipulated, managed, and exploited by both state and international banking institutions... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Historically, nuclear debates in the United States have centered on the “unspeakability” of nuclear war drawing this silence from the apocalyptic power of nuclear technology. This “unspeakability” is mirrored institutionally and, ultimately, this silence leads to depoliticized and sanitized policy paths and political realities. This can manifest itself in greater secrecy in policy decisions concerning nuclear technology and the phenomenon of “nuclear reclusion” in the public realm. Given the undisputed destructive power of nuclear weapons, the US tendency toward depolitization and secrecy short circuits democratic accountability. I will examine two cases toward this end: This paper compares the memorialization of nuclear weapons in Japan and the US. How do our collective memories differ? Can methods of remembering history lead us toward different policies or aid us in creating memories of the future that include open debate and de-sanitized nuclear policy? This paper seeks to analyze how nuclear memory operates within the democratic state, and how we bridge the apparent incongruity with global nuclear realities and the (re)creation of democratically accountable nation-states. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study on Japan's informal political actors and networks will not only provide a foundation for us to further understand Japanese politics and foreign policy but will also enable us to get a better idea of how networks function in a larger context, namely between Tokyo, Beijing and Washington. Social network is not only an important part of Japanese policy making but also a crucial factor in the China-Japan-U.S. triangular relationship. Instead of providing equal attention to each parties of this triangle, this paper will focus on Japan's informal political actors and networks by examining the process of normalization in its relations with China. In addition to detailed analysis of political actors in Japanese politics and society, it also provides an account of Beijing's reaction in this significant process. In the concluding part, this paper also provides some preliminary analysis in making international comparisons particularly with the United States. Thus, it will also assist us in understanding the networks between the three powers in the Asia-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper titled "The Impact of War and Successful Reconstruction: Evaluating the Bush Administration's Germany-Japan-Iraq Analogy" prepared for the "International Studies Association Convention" held in Honolulu, Hawaii. It examines the legitimacy of the analogical reasoning by the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush in the Iraq war based upon on an assessment of the commonalities across Japan, Italy and Germany. The paper mentions different meanings of path dependence theory according to several authors.

In the post-Cold War world Japanese security policy has grasped at nationalistic elements within Japanese society in attempts to "securitize" itself by means of a foreign policy independent of the United States. Working from International Security: A New Framework for Analysis by Buzan et al., this paper examines Japanese security policy in light of Japan’s attempts to securitize itself in non traditional ways that impact traditional security, while focusing on the policy implications of Japan’s ongoing failure to securitize its economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, free trade agreements concluded between developing and developed countries have proliferated rapidly. By including rules for investment and services, these recent FTAs comprise much more than tariff elimination. Why the sudden proliferation of these agreements, when most-favoured-nation tariffs are at a historically low level? This paper identifies the interests behind these agreements, arguing that they are a reaction to the liberalization taking place in advanced developing countries, conditioned by specific institutional features of the global trade regime. Motivated by an accelerating competition over markets and access to foreign direct investment, countries conclude more and more bilateral agreements out of fear of being left behind. The central finding is greatly increased role of interests around foreign direct investment, a factor that has been overlooked in previous analyses. The study is based on comparative case studies of FTAs concluded by Japan, the US, and the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The American scholars might argue that Gaiatsu still plays an important role in the U.S.-Japan alliance in the aftermath of 911. However, the Constructivist’s analysis will show Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s trauma and his complacency are the key factors and weigh more than Gaiatsu in the current U.S.-Japan alliance. It will also mean that what the U.S. and Japan seem to enjoy might not be there once Prime Minister Koizumi stepping down and Japan will not be able to deliver what the U.S. expects. In the aftermath of 911, the U.S.-Japan alliance immediately faced the problem of show the flag incident, but it did not become too big a stumbling block between Washington and Tokyo after all. Washington owed big to Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi. His trauma concerning the Gulf War and his guts against Hashimoto, his enemy in the LDP, paved a way for Washington’s Gaiatsu (outside pressure) strategy to work. In face of the U.S. and British actions against Iraq, Prime Minister Koizumi staunchly supported their actions even without the U.N. Security Council’s resolutions. On the surface, his decision signaled Japan’s departure from its postwar diplomacy, was welcomed by President George W. Bush, Jr. As a token of appreciation, during the recent bilateral summit, President Bush invited Prime Minister Koizumi for the first time to sit in on a secret meeting of the CIA. On the surface, as Shinzo Abe, Japan’s Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan, secretary of the cabinet stated, In the century and a half since (Commodore Matthew) Perry came to Japan, Japan-U.S. relations have probably never been better. However, in reality, to the constructivists, Japan’s attitude toward the alliance has not changed at all; a dependent and blind follower. Otherwise, Japan should have made its position clearly and opted to turn the cold shoulder to the United States when the U.S. and Britain decided to act without the U.N. security resolutions. What Japan has done since 1945 is to go with the flow of the United States. Washington has no intention to comment on Japan’s action as long as Japan is in her side. However, as a result, Japan has not made an effort to develop an independent spirit and historical understanding. Dependence does not lead to mutual trust and respect. It is high time for Japan to have a realistic look at history to derive lessons that look to the future. For Japan to develop its own perspective, it is important to understand that the nature of the alliance has not changed a bit from the outset for Japan. In this paper, using the Constructivist’s approach, I will trace back Japan’s problem to the beginning of the U.S.-Japan alliance and explain why the problem remains intact more than a half century. By doing so, I will point out the way for Japan to develop an independent spirit to win stronger mutual trust and respect from the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Fuji-Kodak photo film, port business, and NTT interconnection charge disputes, which developed between the U.S. and Japan around and after the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), significantly increased the importance of multilateral trade rules. The Japanese government?s response to U.S. pressure varied in each of these disputes; it was more conciliatory in the NTT interconnection charge dispute than the other two. To explain this variation, this paper presents an argument: the timing of a trade dispute in the development of multilateral rules is an important determinant of the response, because the timing determines the gap between multilateral rules and Japanese domestic government and business practices. The case analyses of the three disputes demonstrate that, since a smaller gap exists in the early and late stages of multilateral-rule development than in the intermediate stage, the Japanese government resisted U.S. pressure more effectively in the former than in the latter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the increasing economic and strategic clout of China and the vulnerability of the American power in the Gulf, the US policy makers are searching for a new strategy in the Asia Pacific region. Their ultimate purpose is to neutralize the preeminence of China.Pentagon is trying to forge a new alliance of three well-established democracies-US,India and Japan. On April 16,2007 all the three nations began a joint military drill in the Pacific. More or less at the same time, the first India-US Defence Joint Working Group met in New Delhi.These two develpments have certainly raised the temperature in Beizing.Recently China has raised its defence budget by 17.8 percent and successfully tested its antisatellite ballistic missile.No doubt the Pacific military exercise by US, India and Japan has been taken as an alarming signal by China.The proposed paper will try to explore the evolving strategy of the US in the Asia Pacific region.One has to explore as to what extent such a three nation joint exercise is addressing the unprecedented rise of China in the politico-economic and strategic affaires of the region. We will also examine as to how far the existing American policy of strategic engagement with China is being reexamined. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trilateral security cooperation among Japan, Australia and the United States has accelerated over the last few years, with the first foreign ministerial meeting held in early 2006. Not unexpectedly, the new cooperation between Canberra, Tokyo, and Washington is often characterized as a revival of Containment (against China, this time) or a mini-NATO in Asia. The paper will examine this latest development in East Asia’s security relations, with a specific focus on Japanese policymaking. The concept of a democratic state as one form of state identity will be given particular attention for understanding Tokyo’s attitude toward trilateral security cooperation, as well as the new security order in Asia. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores contemporary multilayered processes and the gradual development of shared norms, principles, and targets with regard to energy security among China, Japan and the United States, at both the bilateral and multilateral level, behind a seemingly worsening energy rivalry. It examines the degree to which the three powers have acquired knowledge of multiple aspects of energy security, yet still found common interests―for instance the diversification of energy sources and energy conservation―, and its implication for the future regional cooperation, regardless of their independent national energy strategies.Against the backdrop of widespread “resource nationalism” in major supplying countries and growing global concerns about the availability of hydrocarbon resources and volatile energy markets, it can be hypothesized that China, Japan, and the United States―three big energy consumers― would increasingly find grounds for cooperation simultaneously while they compete for energy equities in some cases. For example, technology transfers in the fields of energy conservation and environmentally-friendly use of energy have become one of mushrooming industries in Sino-Japanese business despite the virtually deadlocked East China Sea dispute. The United States and China have begun talks on the promotion of ethanol production, clean use of coal for power generation, technological assistance for nuclear power plant, etc. Energy dialogues among the three countries have also been bolstered by various multilateral frameworks, including the Asia-Pacific Partnership since June 2004 and the annual meeting of five energy ministers, involving India and South Korea since December 2006.Policymakers and scholars have debated whether the rise of China will pose a threat and destabilize the power configurations of the Asia-Pacific. (Neo-)realists assume that the increase in material capabilities would enable Beijing to seek hegemonic power more vigorously: a geopolitical zero-sum game would be likely to escalate between China on the one hand and Japan and the United States on the other. Neoliberal institutionalists suppose that establishing some form of institutional structure would ameliorate conflicts of material interests, leading to a positive-sum game.The author sheds light on the social construction process of ideas at both diplomatic and energy experts’ levels in the three countries, implying that reckless competition over energy resources would lead only to the advantage of supplying countries and cooperation would more effectively serve energy security as a whole. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over forty countries have provided military, economic, and moral support for the 2003 U.S- led war with Iraq and the earlier U.S. led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The United States has solicited cooperation from Japan and other key allies that are part of the industrialized world, as well as support from developing countries. Among the group of industrialized country allies, Japan’s direct contributions to the “coalition of the willing” and OEF have been minimal. A long standing hypothesis, however, is that Japan responds to U.S. pressure in the allocation of Japanese official development assistance (ODA). In this paper we examine the determinants of Japanese ODA since the U.S. led actions began. Our primary goal is to determine whether gaiatsu (outside pressure) from the United States has affected the distribution of Japanese ODA since 2001 to developing countries that are part of the U.S. coalition in Iraq and OEF. If gaiatsu is present we expect Japanese ODA to members of the coalition of the willing and OEF, on average, to have increased since 2001. We will examine this hypothesis using a pooled cross-sectional time-series (that is cross-sectionally dominant) data set. The model will include covariates to control for the possible influence of other factors, e.g., recipient wealth, trade with Japan, etc. The model will be estimated using ordinary least squares with panel corrected standard errors, and will include tests to control for unit effects. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the early 1980’s, the Soviet threat in Asia was publicized and Tokyo’s need to increase contribution to the U.S.-Japan alliance was emphasized. At that time, Japanese universities rushed to establishing International Relations departments. System level had an impact on the focus of teaching and research in Japanese universities. Even tough the field of International Relations holds both “low facilities” and “higher facilities” perspectives, what stands out lately in the study of International Relations in Japan is the one close to “higher facilities.” While 2007 marks 60th anniversary of atomic bombs devastated Horoshima and Nagasaki, “lower facilities” aspect of International Relations has not yet prevailed and been suppressed by “higher facilities” aspect. To make a situation worse, Japanese politics is about to give “higher facilities” aspect of International Relations another big push. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe recently set up an advisory panel which will study the issue of Japan’s right to collective self-defense. At the same time, he is moving toward revising Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. The panel gathered by Prime Minister Abe consists of 13 members, mainly of people who support the concepts. It appears to be a rigged race with a foregone conclusion. Majority of the members is university professors. Generally professors believe that being chosen as a member of the government, it gives them prestige outside the universities and in turn gain more respect in the universities. Consciously or unconsciously, these professors are serving to make Abe’s wish come true. However, eventually they might regret what they had done was a political act which delimited political imagination and political transformation. By using Prime Minister Abe’s group as a case study, this paper sheds a light on the crisis of the Japanese universities today. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In postwar Japan, idealism and realism have developed within the framework of Japanese Constitution and the US-Japan security system. At first glance, the current Japanese Constitution seems unrealistic whereas the drafting reveals it was not only influenced by GHQ’s unilateral compulsion. This paper examines the circumstances where the constitutional thought was formed based on the political thought of modern Japanese political thought. And it examines how their idealism has been transformed while conflicting with realism in the Cold War and the reality of the US-Japan security system. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a global economy, regulatory costs spill over beyond domestic markets. This presents a particular dilemma this presents for the European Union. While the major industrial competitors of the EU, the United States and Japan, face a tension between regulatory objectives such as environmental protection and the costs imposed on industry, the European Union confronts the challenge of triangulating such regulation with the objectives of competitiveness AND European integration. For policy makers in the EU, the scope and approach to regulation can not simply be the product of a weighing of costs to industry and benefits to the environment; regulation also serves the larger purpose of advancing European integration. How does the EU accommodate this tension between economic integration and international economic competitiveness? One response is noncompliance of industry with EU regulation. A second response to the single market-external competitiveness tension is for the EU executive, the European Commission, to seek to “soften” proposed regulation so that it responds to the cost concerns of industry. This paper examines the conditions under which these first two responses occur in order to illuminate the conditions for a third response to the dilemma of creating a single, competitive market withinin a global marketplace: efforts by the European Commission to internationalize its regulatory regime. Under what conditions does the European Commission seek to establish EU regulation as the global regulatory standard? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role of the United States in Sino-Japanese relations since the end of World War II. Special emphasis is placed on three major debates between China and Japan where the American role appears to have been critical: (1) the history issue; (2) the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute; and (3) the Taiwan issue. The central argument is that a series of institutional innovations, in Sino-Japanese relations introduced by the United States after the end of World War II, reinforced the U.S. alliance with Japan, and often rather indirectly accounts for the continuing tense relations between China and Japan. These developments, including the Tokyo War Crime Trials, the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, the Okinawa reversion treaty in 1971, and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, have had a major influence on Sino-Japanese relations that endures today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents an examination of the dynamics of multilateral military alliances or 'coalitions'. Framed within the wider debate over the future security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region, it has the dual objective of both enriching the academic debate and offering guidance to policy-makers by investigating the theory and practice of coalition behaviour. The article expounds the case for the American-Japanese-Australian combination and analyses the issues that confront such an alliance-coalition using two competing theoretical perspectives of allied behaviour: 'balance of power' and 'intra-alliance politics'. The main propositions of these perspectives are empirically tested against policy statements based on American, Japanese and Australian foreign and defence policies and associated academic writings. The paper demonstrates the continued validity of realist-conceived approaches to security provision and concludes that both theoretical perspectives are useful tools of analysis in this case. Focusing on separate levels and therefore different aspects of allied behaviour, they can in fact be viewed as complementary, rather than competing, and clearly exhibit strong potential for further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines the meaning and significance of four key concepts heavily used to characterize the nature and essence and to reveal the core structural properties through Japanese diplomatic discourse for the last four centuries. They are anarchy, hierarchy, community and civilization. Some American theories of international relations are referred to in my discussion of how Japanese used these concepts in their understanding and discussion of international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper titled "Explaining Allied Attitudes Toward U.S. Missile Defenses: Canada, Japan, and Britain," prepared for the "Annual Conference of the International Studies Association" in Honolulu, Hawaii. It offers to help fill part of the gap in the literature with respect to the attitudes of U.S. allies. It investigates such developments in a comparative manner with special focus to Canada, Japan, and Great Britain. It also probes the central factors in the national debates of the countries.

The Yoshida Doctrine is perhaps the most important concept in the study of Japanese foreign policy covering the Cold War period. Yet, its conceptual structure has received little systematic analysis. This paper reports that even among mainstream writers, the content of the Yoshida Doctrine as a concept is far less consistent, coherent, or complete than we have long assumed. The conceptual weakness has two specific dimensions. First, the constituent principles of the concept, as well as their mutual relationships, vary widely among key writers, to the extent that some empirical cases cannot be properly diagnosed whether they violate or corroborate the Yoshida Doctrine. Second, while the Yoshida Doctrine is commonly characterized as a national strategy, the goal of such a strategy is either unclear or contested in the literature. Consequently, empirical analysts cannot properly identify the change of the Yoshida Doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post-Cold War world Japanese security policy has grasped at nationalistic elements within Japanese society in attempts to "securitize" itself by means of a foreign policy independent of the United States. The role of absolute and relative gains in the making of Japanese foreign and security policy will be examined in light of alternative security issues. Working from International Security: A New Framework for Analysis by Buzan et al., this paper will examine Japanese security policy in light of Japan's attempts to securitize itself in non traditional ways that impact traditional security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Military rule, military occupation, and land grabs for military bases (even if sanctioned by international executive agreements or legislatively ratified treaties) vitiate and undermine democratization. On the one hand, democratic theorists from John Locke to Robert Dahl contrast pluralist theory with rationales for authoritarian governance. On the other hand, historical pluralism evinces elitist practices. A focus on the diversity of power sharing is missing or underdeveloped. To what extent do anti-militarist social movements demonstrate the ability of popular activity from below to outstrip elitist liabilities embedded in much pluralist theory? And how effectively have civil society organizations in Asia opposed the continued, expanded and renewed presence of the U.S. Armed Forces? This paper focuses on civil society organizations (CSOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the larger anti-militarist social movements within which they have contended in the Philippines and Japan (especially, Okinawa). The paper further distinguishes among DJANGOs (Development, Justice and Advocacy Nongovernmental Organizations) and POs (People's Organizations) with only passing attention to QUANGOs (Quasi Nongovernmental Organizations) supported by government funding and sponsorship. Amplifying a preferred future for a totally demilitarized Okinawa, trend analysis and focused structured comparisons identify likely and unlikely obstacles and opportunities to a totally demilitarized Okinawa by 2025. Similarities and differences between the two cases appear policy-relevant! In turn, that identification generates prescriptions useful in guiding practical activities of organizations advocating removal of foreign military bases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

US, South Korean, and Japanese interests in coping with North Korea’s nuclear agenda overlap, but there also are substantial differences. Each country’s policies shall be assessed in terms of its bilateral objectives versus North Korea. Based on that assessment, the historical record of trilateral cooperation vis-à-vis North Korea and the prospects for future cooperation shall be evaluated. In addition, North Korea’s responses to each category and its options shall be analyzed. In each of these instances salient domestic and international factors shall be taken into account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines public and elite attitudes toward security policy in Japan. While focusing on the US-Japan security alliance, Japan's relations with East Asian countries, and Japan's role in the United Nations, the paper addresses three questions: (1) How have public and elite views evolved since the 1990s?; (2) what is the relationship between mass and elite opinion?; and (3) how do mass and elite opinion relate to security policy? The paper argues that a particular group within the security elite has shaped national security policy and that the public has generally followed that group’s leadership. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1952 Japan's sole guarantor for national security was the United States-Japan Security Treaty. Against strong public opposition after many compromises with opposition as as well as government coalition parties , the widely popular Japanese prime minister Koizumi was able to deploy about 600 Ground Self Defense Forces for the reconstruction of Iraq. This paper analyzes the way public opinion changed before and after deployment, and what the long term effects for Japanese security and alliance arrangements will be. The paper takes advantage of a opinion survey conducted by the author in Japan and the US, which was innovative because it focued on foreign and defense policy questions, as well as public risk perceptions. The paper will also include context analysis of Japanese mass media and official government statement. This papers argues, that increased threat perception in Japan does have very little effect on support for more activist foreign policies, but that 9/11 and he Iraq War has triggered a public debate about Japan's international role. This indicates that the bi-lateral US-Japan security cooperation might eventually be weakened because of an increase in public support for additional bi-lateral (such as the recent agreement with Australia) and regional security arrangements. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 1960s, many American observers expected Japan to go nuclear, but their expectations have not come true even four decades later. In fact, not only did Japan not acquire nuclear weapons, it actually became a pillar of support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Why?This paper argues that the forecasters were wrong because they placed too much weight on the impact of constraints on Japan's nuclear freedom of action--notably, the opions of its U.S. ally and of its "nuclear-allergic" mass public--constraints that they judged to be dangerously loosening. But in fact, for a variety of strategic and identity motivies the majority of Japanese elites themselves strongly favored the overall contours of the nuclear weapons stance that emerged in the 1960s and early 1970s. Morever, even those elites who had serious objections to the majority position did not actually want nuclear weapons. Relying in large measure on Japanese-language source material, this paper offers a systematic look at the elite politics of nuclear weapons in Japan, paying special attention to delineating the cleavages in elite opinion during the crucial decade of decision from 1966-1976. It explains the deep sources of those cleavages with reference to elites' diverging domestic political interests and basic understandings of Japan's history and national identify.This paper will have significant implications for contemporary proliferation forecasts on Japan, which often eerily resemble the analyses of 1960 observers. It also will have significant implications for forecasting beyond the Japanese case, by offering tools for the analysis of domestica politics of nuclear choices. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In line with Pentagon’s policy to streamline the US forces in the ‘Arc of Instability’, East Asian outposts of the US military are going through drastic reorganisation. This paper focuses on the social processes of upgrading and reorganising US bases in Okinawa, in particular, replacement of the controversial and infamously dangerous U.S. Marine Corps Air Station in Futenma (central Okinawa). It attempts to shed light on the socio-economic dynamics of opposition and acceptance of the new replacement marine base construction in Henoko, beyond government-to government diplomatic processes. On one hand, it discusses the activities of oppositional groups based in Okinawa and Japan, and their transnational environmentalist network and allies. On the other hand, the paper examines the activities and rationales of non-government organisations that accept and promote the new base construction, including possible transnational co-operation. It is argued that the actual processes of base relocation in Okinawa are best understood as the negotiating and bridging of these two opposing social forces. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A shift from active pursuit of multilateral security framework in East Asia to enhancement of the U.S.-Japan alliance has characterized Japanese security policy during the last decade. Despite this shift, Japan has continued to diversify its security partners in East Asia. This paper will describe a broad range of Japan’s security cooperation with ASEAN countries and analyze the drivers of such cooperation. In doing so, the paper intends to seek a nuanced and empirically grounded explanation of Japanese security policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The revised US-Japan Defense Guidelines of 1997, the subsequent War on Terrorism and other recent developments have significantly expanded the scope of the bilateral alliance and increased the role of Japan?s military beyond its own shores. This expansion directly affects the security of other Asian states. Deriving predictions from balance of power theory and a modified version of balance of threat theory, this paper tests both theories and attempts to explain Asian reactions. It tests two variables: the presence (or absence) of a military alignment relationship with the US, and wartime experience with the Japanese Empire. Asian reactions are evaluated according to whether they focus on the implications for power aggregation (i.e., the potential for changes to strengthen the aggregated military capabilities of the alliance) versus the implications for the containment function of the alliance (i.e., degrading the constraints on Japan?s reemergence as an independent military power). This paper finds that alignment with the US is less important than wartime experience. Regarding states with a brutal wartime experience, even US allies worry about the potential for expansion to degrade the alliance?s containment function rather than welcoming the power aggregation benefits of an expanded alliance. On the other hand, states that did not have a brutal wartime experience did not express concern about the degrading of the containment function regardless of alignment, and were likely to welcome the power aggregation benefits of the expanded alliance if they were allies or at least loosely aligned with the US. These reactions suggest that an alliance can have an important third-party reassurance effect by appearing to contain the military independence of an apparently threatening power. Finally, this paper assesses the implications of these findings for balance of power and balance of threat theories, and for East Asian regional security. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Germany represents the model penitent in international affairs. Arguably more than any other nation, it has been willing to confront the dark sides of its history and apologize to its former victims. As a result, it is commonly maintained, the Federal Republic has been able to reap a wide variety of benefits. By reconciling itself with its neighbors, Germany has been able to put an end to the rivalries that historically have plagued central Europe while at the same time laying the foundations for Europe's unparalleled success in building a liberal regional order. Constructivists in particular have often held up German example as a model that others should emulate, including Japan, Russia, Austria and even the United States. Realist and other critics of this narrative have argued that in reality, German efforts to come clean about the past were far as clear cut as is often supposed. Moreover, there is a considerable body of evidence that suggests that German motives were far from pure. Calculations of national interest clearly influenced decisions to when and with whom Germany pursued reconciliation over the past. This paper will analyze the Federal Republic's efforts to deal with the past and compare it with other countries that have faced or face similar problems: Austria, France, Japan and Russia. Whereas once Germany was seen a more or less unique example of a country that has had to deal with the burdens of a troubled past, today there is a host of countries that are confronted with similar issues. This allows the application of the case study method to control for structural variables that may influence the decisions countries chose to take in dealing with the past including the nature of the crimes involved, the degree of regional integration, regime type and the balance of power. The paper will try to stake out a position between the naïve Constructivist and narrow Realist positions. While calculations of national interest undoubtedly influence countries' decisions to pursue historical justice issues, embedded historical narratives help or hinder such decisions, and the failure to harmonize historical narratives may have far reaching impact on a countries position in the international system. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper looks to American-Japanese relations as exemplified in a cycle of technological exchange. In the move from American comics to Japanese anime and to Japanamerican cinema, hybrid stylistics are imagined as the terminus of this cycle of exchange. On the one hand, perspective is de-centred in an American style rapid flow of images; as such Japanamerican cinema is scripted as a triumph of the appropriative powers of western imperialism. On the other hand, sensations bubble up in a Japanese style pause; a sense emerges that Japanamerican cinema manifests the refined assimilative powers of eastern imperialism. Looking to exemplary Japanamerican cinema, this paper will gesture beyond the terminus of western and eastern imperialisms. It will demonstrate that American-Japanese relations that are marked by meaningful revolution are actually absorbed into a wash of continuous aesthetic transformation (i.e. of trauma and healing). ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"I was shocked to the point that I was blinded by sheer disbelief ? In the end, [the U.S.] completely disregarded the years of sacrifice made by Japan, forcing us to forgo the great nation status that we had striven so hard to establish in the Far East. But to do so for Japan was none other than committing suicide. We now had no choice but to rise." (Jidai no Ichimen [An Aspect of Time], 2 vols, Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1985.) According to the memoirs of Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, these were his immediate reactions upon reading the cable that had just arrived from the Japanese Ambassador to the United States, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura. Included in the cable was a note from Secretary of State Cordell Hull that contained an explicit rejection of Japan's proposal to resolve the current U.S.-Japan crisis. The message of the so-called "Hull Note" was clear: Japan needed to first withdraw from China before the U.S. would consider any Japanese demands. It was the same unequivocal position that the U.S. had maintained since early 1941. Unquestionably, Washington was unwilling to make even the slightest compromise towards Tokyo; appeasement was clearly out of the question.If there ever did exist a point-of-no-return on the road to Pearl Harbor, it was certainly on this day of November 26, 1941, when Togo - the leading advocate for peace in the cabinet - gave away all hope. Of course, Togo was no pacifist. However, he also was cognizant of the fact that war with the U.S. was futile and would only spell disaster for Japan. If so, then what pushed Togo to the brink that he felt Japan had "no choice but to rise"? Was it, as most Japanese historians claim, because the "Hull Note" was so uncompromising in its stance that it basically amounted to an ultimatum? Moreover, why was Togo so utterly dismayed? His emotionally charged words reveal that the foreign minister was so taken aback by the note that he felt a overpowering sense of betrayal. Could it be that Togo had been expecting an altogether different reply from the U.S.? Was he privy to any intelligence that would suggest otherwise? In light of the new evidence on prewar Japanese sigint recently discovered at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, and the Diplomatic Record Office (DRO) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, Japan, the purpose of this paper will be the following: First, to illuminate the history of the hitherto highly obscure Japanese Black Chamber (Section 18),and two, to set forth a more logical and coherent explanation to Togo's volte-face in his policy towards the United States that ruptured all hope for peace. In conclusion, the paper will incorporate the new knowledge gained concerning Japanese prewar sigint and reveal how intelligence analysis had a detrimental impact on policy decisions a critical juncture. Through this undertaking, this paper will refute the longstanding understanding that the so-called "Hull Note" was the final straw that led to Pearl Harbor. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the end of the Cold War, the Japanese Government started the dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) for overseas missions that do not require the use of force. I argue that collective identity formation in the U.S.-Japan Alliance is an important factor to comprehend the transformation of Japan’s security policy in the post-Cold War Period. In this paper, collective identity is defined as “identification with other states on the basis of mutual trust in terms of non-violence and mutual aid.” My main method is the content analysis of public documents such as join communique, joint declaration, joint statement and Japan’s Defense White Papers, partially by using a computer program. In the case of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, I analyze its behavioral component – cooperative interaction in policy consultation, joint exercises, joint research, and cost sharing; and the attitudinal component – the consensus among group members about basic values, external threats, strategic goals, and strategic means. In addition, I attempt to trace chronological change in the description of Japan by Japanese policymakers. The evidence shows that since the end of the Cold War, collective identity has become stronger between Japanese and American policymakers in the national security field. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1995 Japan has been taking a very proactive role in using WTO law to challenge its dominant trade partners, the United States. But its emphasis on a rule-based approach is not only relegated to the United States. In fact, it promises also to spill over into trade disputes with key partners in Asia where, for historical, reasons Japan has had trouble taking confrontational stances. This is particularly true for the case for China, which is widely perceived as the rising economic power that poses a direct challenge to Japan across a number of critical and sensitive economic issues. This paper focuses specifically on the interplay between WTO law and politics as Japan seeks to deal with China across a number of trade issues and disputes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post- World War II period, Japan put heavy emphasis on the relations with the United States and was hesitant to participate in regional arrangements in its foreign economic policy. However, in the 1990s and early 2000s, Japan continues to put emphasis on regional framework. Two challenges Japan faced in the 1990s; burst of bubble economy in Japan and Asian financial crisis, accelerated Japan’s positive attitude towards regional economic framework. The paper shows how these two challenges changed the existing conditions of Japan’s foreign economic policy and how Japan’s foreign economic policy changed in the post 9/11 world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the evolution of domestic Taiwanese politics came a corresponding internationalization of the Taiwanese independence movement. The importance of Taiwanese independence not only impinges on the lives of 21 million or so Taiwanese living on the island, but also affects the strategic environment of the Asia Pacific region as China has declared that it would not hesitate to resort to force should circumstances dictate that it becomes necessary to do so. Taiwan is often cited to be one of the two potential flashpoints in the Asia Pacific, and a conflict between the PRC and Taiwan may more worrying for many countries evolve into one between PRC and the United States. While Taiwan’s role in Sino-US relations have been widely studied, the importance of Taiwan in affecting Chinese bilateral relations beyond its relations with US is a relatively unexplored field. This paper attempts an exploratory study of the evolving role Taiwan plays in Sino-Japanese relations. It attempts to under how the historical role of Taiwan in Sino-Japanese relations affect the island’s contemporary diplomatic dynamics with China and Japan. The role of Taiwan in Chinese and Japanese national security strategy will also be scrutinized to understand the possible divergence or convergence of China and Japan over the Taiwan issue. This is crucial as Japan’s stance is important as Japan is considered one of US allies within region but may not necessarily deem it in its best interests to go along with the US against China. This difficulty presents it with an extremely tricky choice. A slip either way will affect the regional stability and prosperity of the Asia Pacific as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The global prohibition regime against human trafficking has taken a significant step forward since 2003 with the coming into force of the U.N. Palermo Protocol and the intensification of the U.S. Trafficking in Persons Report process. However, recent scholarship, as well as a 2006 U.S. General Accountability Office assessment of the TIP mechanism, reveals flaws in the conceptualization and implementation of the regime. In responding to its critics the U.S. Department of State has pointed to the effectiveness of its approach, especially the role of “name and shame” strategies in bringing countries such as Japan to task in meeting minimum standards of compliance in anti-trafficking efforts. Although anti-trafficking efforts have increased world-wide since 2003, the causal linkage between the extent of state compliance and the use of name and shame strategies remain underexplored. This paper draws on international law and international relations scholarship on the power and practice of normative sanction to begin to address the gap. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the course of the first-half of the 20th century, Japan transformed itself from a minor ally of the reigning British hegemony to a powerful ally of the German hegemonic challenger. Over the course of the second-half of the 20th century, Japan was increasingly heralded as the most likely hegemonic successor to the United States. But now, less than a decade into the 21st century, the idea of Japan as a possible hegemonic contender to the United States has been entirely eclipsed by a more likely Chinese scenario. This paper seeks to identify the structural conditions responsible for deflating Japanese influence in the global political economy, as well as analyze the possible role that these same structural conditions may play in future hegemonic coalition building. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lost in the recent debates about Japan's new nationalisms and its consequences for Tokyo's relations with East Asian nations have been occasional flare-ups with both Australia, over the treatment of POWs during the war, and the United States, over a House resolution demanding a Japanese apology for the "comfort women" issue. In particular, American representations of the past have added fuel to a long simmering fire among Japanese nationalists regarding the history that Japan has ostensibly been forced to remember, whether in the explicit critiques by the late Iris Chang or in the more supportive, if still controversial, vision of Clint Eastwood. In this paper, I evaluate how the Japanese Right -- which had long held the US-Japan alliance in necessarily high regard as a crucial bulwark against China -- has now references American claims about the war in their demands for greater "autonomy" expressed both in constitutional revision and foreign policy independence. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 1980s New York and London struggled with reforms in their efforts to prevent the seemingly unstoppable Tokyo from dominating international finance. With the bursting of the asset bubble in Japan and the ensuing financial and deflationary problems, however, Tokyo’s standing as a major financial center took a tremendous beating. As a result, the new Global Financial Centers Index (Mar 2007) ranks Tokyo ninth and describes it as “unlikely” to become a global financial center. Yet, the Japanese government has recently unleashed a range of proposals intended to attract financial market actors and their business back to Tokyo. Even the Index leaders, London and New York, have recently initiated studies and other efforts to bolster their financial market competitiveness relative to one another, and the anticipated rise of Shanghai. This paper compares these pursuits of competitiveness, noting in particular how the politics of reform today differ from those that gave birth to the internationalization of finance in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as how these competitiveness plans are so much more dependent on associated reforms in the not only the economic, but also the administrative, political and social structures of these cities. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will focus on how five nations-Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain, the United States, and Japan-achieved trade dominance by devising technologies, social and financial institutions, and markets to enhance their access to raw materials.Through ecological and economic explanation of resource extraction and production, the author reveals globalization as the result of the progressive extension of systematically integrated material processes across cumulatively greater space. Drawing from extensive historical research into how economic and environmental dynamics interacted in the extraction of different materials in the Amazon, especially in the development of the iron mine of Carajas, the author also illustrates the profound connection between global dominance and control of natural resources. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a rising, regional, and very influential power, China is in the process of buttressing its military forces in the Pacific rim. Realist theory predicts a growing regional and international power, such as China, will more likely be propelled to attain regional hegemony. As the only superpower today, however, the United States will hardly relinquish its naval dominance in the Pacific. The balancing act Washington must pursue?in order to create a successful counterbalance against potential Chinese naval hostility?is to strengthen ties with United States allies in the Pacific region who may not feel comfortable with Beijing?s military presence expanding throughout the Pacific rim. Washington has recently begun to strengthen its military ties with Tokyo, and has started to encourage Japan to invest more in its military infrastructure. Japan, leery of its uneasy relationship with China, has made overtures to Washington as well. The difficulty for the White House, however, lies in crafting a relationship with Japan that is not simply seen to be some sort of anti-Chinese bloc. While it may be tempting for some in the Pentagon to forge a military relationship with Japan built on the premise that China?s military rise is harmful to both U.S. and Japanese interests in the Pacific rim, this paper will argue that a stronger Washington?Tokyo bond should attempt to establish a more cooperative relationship with Beijing rather than try to contain China?s influence throughout the region, which, for all intents and purposes, is inevitable. Although establishing a cooperative relationship will not be easy among the United States, Japan, and China, it is certainly a crucial project that will require great perseverance in order to lay the foundations for a more prosperous relationship advantageous to all three nations, as well as to the rest of the world. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Korea?s international position is a complex mix of pressures. Focused overwhelmingly on the last vestige of the Cold War ? its unresolved division of the peninsula into North and South ? South Korea must also manage its alliance with the United States, devise a modus vivendi with a massive and dynamic China, and resolve its relationship with Japan. To that end, over the past decade, a fairly clear South Korean grand strategy has emerged, one that emphasizes economic over military issues, accommodation rather than confrontation of China, and a slowly evolving alliance with the United States. The centerpiece of this grand strategy has been a strategy of engaging North Korea economically while downplaying the nuclear issue. This paper will make three main points. First, in terms of overall national security strategy, South Korea has committed itself to a strategy of interdependence and engagement with North Korea. As a result, South Korea?s engagement strategy will continue to have consequences for regional policy toward North Korea, for the U.S. role in the region, and for China?s influence. Second, South Korea?s development has depended on being deeply engaged in the regional and global economy, and this orientation has actually increased in the wake of the Asian financial crisis a decade ago. Indeed, South Korea ? as with many East Asian states ? has increasingly begun to look regionally for its economic partners, especially to China, and away from the United States. Third, South Korea firmly desires to continue its close relationship with the United States. However, South Korea?s national priorities are regional, and differ from Washington?s global priorities. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]