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This paper identifies and examines a number of long-term trends reshaping the security environment in the Taiwan Strait in ways that might produce a military conflict. Focusing on long-term trends is a useful analytical approach that highlights the possibility that political leaders may knowingly take risky actions in response to perceptions that adverse trends are eroding their security. Taiwan?s democratic transition and growing sense of a separate Taiwan identity have changed the political considerations governing Taiwan?s policy toward the mainland. China worries about growing pro-independence sentiment in Taiwan, but lacks the political tools to build support for unification. As a result, China has sought to deter movement toward Taiwan independence while developing the military capabilities to deter U.S. intervention in support of Taiwan. China?s goal is to force the United States to choose between continuing its support for Taiwan or sacrificing Chinese cooperation on economic and security issues. The perceived Chinese military threat to Taiwan has caused the United States to increase its support for Taiwan, included increased security cooperation. These trends are gradually undercutting the basis for the ?one China? framework that has served U.S. interests effectively for the past thirty years. The paper examines these long-term trends and assesses their implications for the stability of the security environment in the Taiwan Strait. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to understand how and why China has been portrayed as the primary military threat in Taiwanese security discourse through an examination of offence-defence theory. It is based on the premise that those events or factors that one identifies as dangerous come to be ascribed as such only through an interpretation of their various dimensions of dangerousness. The paper first introduces the protracted debate among the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government, the 'Pan-Blue' opposition parties and US officials and analysts over the 2004 Special Defence Budget controversy. In defence of its arms procurement program, the Chen Shui-bian administration resorted to a particular mode of interpreting danger, that is, the military balance across the Taiwan Strait has been shifting in China's favour and thus it is imperative to correct the imbalance through fielding the weapons systems provided by Washington. The paper then explores the underlying assumption of that pervasive interpretation in the official articulation of Chinese military threat in Taiwan and the United States, which holds that offensive advantages make war more likelyâ??a principal hypothesis of offence-defence theory. Rather than questioning the methodological ambiguities about how to define and measure the 'offence-defence balance', the paper argues that it is precisely these ambiguities that make China's threat image in Taiwan possible. The special budget case is indicative as to how Taiwan's defence policy is better understood as a political practice central to the constitution, production, and maintenance of a peace-loving Taiwanese identity contrary to the belligerent Chinese than as an instrument to build and maintain a capable defence posture against potential attacks from the mainland. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's rise as an economic and political power constitutes both an opportunity to promote regional stability as well as a threat to derail regional stability in Asia. One of the major factors effecting China's international role in the coming years will be the management of the so-called Taiwan question. Taiwan's unresolved future, as well as Sino-Japanese relations will, in turn, become increasingly significant issues within Chinese domestic politics. At present, China is doing its best to reassure its neighbors of its peaceful rise to the role of regional power. China wants to be seen as the pragmatic promoter of multilateralism to ensure regional stability, opposed to the China of previous decades, which created instability in numerous Southeast Asian countries by pursuing ideological objectives. On the other hand, when dealing with what Beijing calls a domestic affair, the so-called Taiwan question, China's stance threatens to destabilize the region, a cause of great concern throughout Asia. Increasingly, as Chinese society becomes more pluralistic, the leaders of China could conceivably come under intense pressure from factions within several domestic constituencies to adopt an even tougher stance toward Taiwan, to ensure that the goal of reunification is not nullified forever. Moreover, in the event of economic stagnation, a domestic crisis could propel the Chinese leaders to force a settlement in the Taiwan Strait in an attempt to divert public opinion away from problems at home. This paper will focus on Chinese policies in Asia, describing the development of these policies as they become more accommodating, on the one hand, while simultaneously, due to domestic constraints, more uncompromising and hard-line in the Taiwan Strait and vis-à-vis Japan. The paper will attempt to analyze the effect that the diversification of Chinese politics as well as the emphasis on China's century of humiliation have on China's dual-track Asia policy and its effects on stability in Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Working mainly from historical and sociological version of new institutionalism (NI) divergent from the mainstream IR regime theory and secondarily in line with Gramsci?s idea of hegemony, this paper explores the global dominance of the "one China" order and its discontents. It is argued that the hegemonic ?one China? order in favor of Beijing?s interest, created in a specific historical condition, has been established through the extensive and intensive institutionalization of rules concerned in both fundamental level and detailed policy realms. It is demonstrated that the ?one China? institution functions as a filter that forecloses other possibilities of historical development which were relatively open in the past, that limits Taiwan’s freedom of policy action and marginalize its diplomatic space, and that legitimates the PRC’s action in interfering in Taiwan’s international relations. Meanwhile, Beijing’s interests are embedded and entrenched in the "one China" hegemonic order. Moreover, while the institution shape agents’ organization of interests in a divergent way, its persistence hinges upon continuing practices and reproduction by the PRC or countries concerned. Finally, the state of the "one China" institutionalization was argued to be more influential than its predecessor in light of the coherence of its cultural-cognitive, normative and regulative elements and their consolidation within the hands of the PRC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the primacy of unification in China's strategic thinking. Sinocentric wisdom upholds China's "great unity." Unification is regarded as the guarantor of stability and prosperity while division the recipe for chaos and sufferings. I highlight that the Chinese term for China, zhongguo, originally meant "central states" in plurality. I develop a rigorous definition of unification and show that zhongguo was more often divided than unified. I also demonstrate that the drive to achieve and maintain unification produced wars of annihilation, wars of repression, and wars of conquest. Moreover, unification did not necessarily contribute to human welfare. Singular zhongguo tended to repress dissent, stifle trade, and dominate its neighbors. In contrast, plural zhongguo was favorable to the development of state-society bargains, commercial activities, and diplomatic relations. Paradoxically, it was unification that brought about "great disorder under heaven," and division that had the potential to realize "great unity under heaven." This contrast is more pronounced if we extend the analysis from the Chinese heartland to the periphery. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mainstream discourse on cross-strait relations tends to reproduce the "crisis" than transform it. Analysts in Taiwan are complicit by loyally following US concepts, prescriptions, and strategies for the region. Some, however, are beginning to contest this traditional subjugation of Taiwan's interests and identity to US and Chinese hegemony. Nonetheless, they still abide by the US paradigm of triangular relations. This paper notes a third, emerging discourse that reframes US-China-Taiwan relations through a postcolonial understanding of sovereignty, cross-strait relations, and Taiwanese subjectivity. We characterize these three options, in reverse order, in Hirschman's terms of "exit," "voice, and "loyalty." But we amend these with Ling's differentiation of "formal" and "substantive" mimicry for "loyalty" and "voice," respectively. Both reflect conditions of postcolonial hybridity that mature, eventually, into a paradigmatic breakthrough or "exit." ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In previous work I argue for a connection between different military doctrinal cultures and the failure of coercive diplomacy. Different military cultures in the United States and China affected signaling, communication, perception, and assessments of the balance of power. This led to failures of deterrence and coercion during the Korean War. In this paper, I extend this idea into two additional naval cases: the deterrence of conflict in the Taiwan Strait in 1950 and today. I argue that Chinese naval doctrine today is, for cultural and organizational reasons, distinct from that of the United States. I assess the potential dangers this poses to the conduct of military diplomacy in the Taiwan Strait, and offer proposals to overcome or limit these challenges. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In April 2005, the Kuomintang (KMT) leader, Mr. Lian Zhan, made his initial visit to the Mainland China and met with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Secretary General, Mr. Hu Jin-Tao, at the Cross-Strait Party Summit, which had been the first historical meeting between KMT and CCP leaders after 60 years since 1945. In 2006, the KMT and CCP jointly held “The Cross-Strait Economic Forum,” “The Cross-Strait Agriculture Forum, and “The Cross-Strait Youth Forum,” during which extensive cross-strait measures beneficial to Taiwan’s agriculture, fishery, medicine, education, and culture were reached to draw Taiwanese people’s feelings. This paper examines and analyzes the dynamic interactions between the KMT and the CCP since KMT’s ice-breaking visit to Beijing in 2005. It concludes that, with the formally established contact and exchange between the two parties, the KMT’s push for the KMT-CCP forums was aimed to show that the party was more capable and competent than the incumbent Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in dealing with cross-strait relations, while the CCP intended to deter the Taiwan-independence forces through the KMT-CCP cooperation. Unfortunately, such exchange mechanism has been unable to affect the incumbent DPP power structure, thus making it difficult to receive DPP government’s support for achieving any concrete implementation outcomes. On the other hand, once CCP’s “playing softer-and-softer” beneficial strategy fails to draw Taiwanese people’s feelings or to facilitate the Pan-blue’s victory in the 2008 presidential election in Taiwan, the cross-strait relations would very possibly evolve into a more insecure and dangerous situation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How best to avoid a possible crisis over Taiwan, which might escalate into the most unwanted war of this century? Traditional studies of Taiwan crises focus mainly on a rational choice theory of deterrence. However, they fail to account for risk-taking behavior that seems irrational but can be well explained by prospect theory. This paper employs prospect theory to explain China's different policies toward Taiwan under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. By using regime security as a reference point to define the domains of action, we suggest that Chinese leaders are more likely to use military coercion, a more risky policy, against Taiwan's pro-independence movements when they are in a domain of losses, i.e., when their regime security faces serious domestic and international challenges. On the contrary, Chinese leaders are more likely to employ political pressure, a less risky policy, to oppose Taiwan's pro-independence forces, if their decision making takes place in a domain of gains, i.e., when their regime security is insured. We conclude that maintaining a good U.S.-China relationship is the best strategy for the United States to avoid military crises in the Taiwan Strait. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan. I begin with an examination of Cold War foreign policy across the various presidential administrations. I then move to an examination of post-Cold War foreign policy concentrating on the Clinton and Bush presidencies. I focus on comparing various administration approaches to the Taiwan crisis and how and why policies varied within and between administrations. I discuss the numerous international and domestic factors that have contributed to U.S. policy toward Taiwan and China. Throughout, I attempt to capture the competing interests involved and how these actors and events have complicated both foreign policy processes and outcomes. I conclude with a discussion of policy implications for the present and future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role of the United States in Sino-Japanese relations since the end of World War II. Special emphasis is placed on three major debates between China and Japan where the American role appears to have been critical: (1) the history issue; (2) the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute; and (3) the Taiwan issue. The central argument is that a series of institutional innovations, in Sino-Japanese relations introduced by the United States after the end of World War II, reinforced the U.S. alliance with Japan, and often rather indirectly accounts for the continuing tense relations between China and Japan. These developments, including the Tokyo War Crime Trials, the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, the Okinawa reversion treaty in 1971, and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, have had a major influence on Sino-Japanese relations that endures today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Being one of the international "hot spot", the cross-strait relation could not only influence the future of China, but the stability of East Asia area and even the global system. To majority of researchers, what they pay the main attention should not be the past of the cross-strait relations, that is, why Mainland and Taiwan begin to fight each other, but how could they solve these problems in the future. From the perspective of liberalists, they think the so-called "Democratic Peace" or "Peaceful Transformation" maybe the key answers, it means when Mainland China finish the economic reforms and therefore lead to the political transformation, the problem of cross-strait relations would be solved in the same time. Nonetheless, to the realists who believe the concept of "Power Politics", before we construct an appropriate international regime to deal the conflict effectively, they are afraid that the cross-strait relations should be decided by power contrast between Mainland and Taiwan. In this paper, I will review the standpoint of liberalism and realism first, and then try to analyze and realize which one would be the possible choice to resolve the deadlock of cross-strait relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

States, as institutions, need good leadership to govern effectively. However, the power of charismatic leadership, historically perceived as a positive quality sought by institutions to achieve their objectives, has been weakening in the past decade. And traditional perceptions on the effectiveness of charismatic leadership in public institutions have thus gradually shifted from focusing on one-man (charismatic leader) focusing on group or community that collaboratively exercise leadership power. Whether it is a trend or emergence, the power of collaborative leadership has been displacing that of charismatic leadership since the end of the twentieth century. Yet, more research still exists on positive aspects of charismatic leadership that brings efficiency or effectiveness to institutional development, but less effort is made on charismatic leadership that results in ineffective or even destructive institutional practices. In general, the study of charismatic leadership has not resulted in profound understanding of the impacts of charismatic leadership, and the lack of comprehensive theories on such leadership is evidenced in a variety of definitions furnished by various scholars and practitioners. This paper intends to reveal the downside impact charismatic leadership in the state governance of both China and Taiwan based on critical reassessment of existing charismatic leadership theories and search for strategies that might help avoid or mitigate negative consequences of charismatic leadership to modern institutions. By employing the descriptive-inductive method, it aims to achieve a comprehensive analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of negative charismatic leadership practices mostly found in China and Taiwan. And it further attempts to enrich charismatic leadership theory as well as facilitate future research and understanding of charismatic leadership impacts on institutional development on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper titled "Modeling Cross-Strait Relations and Taiwan's Linkage Politics: Foreign Policy Implications for China-Taiwan-U.S. Relations" prepared for presentation at the "International Studies Association 2005 Annual Convention" in Honolulu, Hawaii. It emphasizes that China and the U.S. should avoid getting connected into any issues related to the Taiwan election.

The article presents a conference paper titled "Idea and Authority: The Roles of Intellectuals in Environmental Justice Campaigns in China and Taiwan" prepared for the "2005 International Studies Association (ISA) Convention" in Honolulu, Hawaii. It discusses the evolution of environmental justice campaigns in Taiwan and China and the factors that affect the destiny of these campaigns. It offers a review of literature on social movements and highlights the importance of epistemic communities in both countries.

The article presents the conference paper "Environmental Governance for Peace? Environmental Peacemaking on Cases of China and Taiwan" that was prepared for 2005 ISA Convention. It discusses the three traditional peacemaking approaches, namely the hegemonic leadership/ intervention, confidence-building measures (CBM) and interdependence. It examines the factors on how environmental peacemaking will work between China and Taiwan.

The dominant issue in Taiwan's politics concerns the island's relationship with China. Since 1949, Taiwan has resisted the control of the government on the mainland, tranforming itself into a more economically advanced and politically democratic society than the one on the mainland. But whether or not it should become an independent nation or seek to rejoin the mainland is the central issue cleavage in Taiwan's politics. In this paper, I will examine the role of this issue in Taiwan's politics by going beyond traditional measures of attitudes on this question to include consideration of conditional preferences toward national identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Central Asia occupies a growing role in Chinese security policy. However, an examination of China?s Central Asian policies reveals that they are essentially external projections of Beijing?s vital interest of internal security in neighboring Xinjiang. Accordingly this article examines Xinjiang?s importance for China?s overall security policies. Through this examination it becomes clear that the Xinjiang problem very much resembles that of other discontented provinces within a multinational state with a continuing imperial vocation. Therefore China?s problems in Xinjiang will continue and have important repercussions for its domestic and foreign policies , and other key issues like Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Study will determine the external and internal influences on the Eisenhower adminstration in its making of U.S. policy toward Tibet. Using the Kegley-Wittkopf model, research will focus on foreign influence from external sources such as China, India, Taiwan and the Tibetans themselves. Internally, the study will determine which governmental, societal, role and individual sources influenced Eisenhower in determining policy outcomes. It is hoped that the study will further illuminate U.S. foreign policy deliberations and implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Broadly speaking, the research project focuses on the relationship between economics and national security; specifically how states can successfully use economic power to achieve their security objectives. This paper examines the use of private sector actors to achieve national foreign policy objectives in the context of the Taiwan-China FDI relationship from 1987-2004. The case identifies a framework for analyzing the factors driving private sector behavior. The paper argues that states seeking to use economics to pursue their strategic goals begin by fostering economic interaction then leveraging the security externalities generated by the behavior of private sector actors. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the formation and evolution of the worldview of the Republic of China (Taiwan), whose government is being controlled by the party favoring Taiwan independence and denying the Chinese root of its past. This paper explores the formation of the ruling party's worldview, and accesses the transformation of such a worldview since May 2001. This paper indicates that there is a dual development in Taiwan's worldview: "realist" in security and "pluralist" in economics (and the former seems to win over the latter in practice). In the last section how Taiwan adjusted and carried out its East Asia foreign policy through the lens of worldviews is presented. It will be risky if Taiwan continues to conduct its foreign policy under such a seemingly dyadic worldview. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper focuses on Chinese foreign policies towards Taiwan, Japan and the Korean peninsula and the consequences of these policies for Asia-Pacific security. Northeast Asia is a strong-hold of the US alliance system and China's near abroad, thus affecting China's influence on global security. If China cannot accommodate the region into its overall foreign policy strategy, its suggestions for a post-Cold War security order are likely to appear unconvincing to the international community. The paper emphasizes the weaknesses inherent in China's contemporary foreign policy strategy, thereby pointing to the possibility that China might fall into the rank of secondary powers. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The episode of Chen Shui-bian transit diplomacy bypassing the United States and his earlier decision to put the National Unification Council and Guideline into abeyance in 2006 had put Beijing-Taipei-Washington relationship into serious tests. It remains to be seen if Taipei's most recent steps of renaming some state-owned enterprises may escalate into tensions as before. While Chen's New Year address and state visit to Nicaragua via US homeland in 2007 caused little problem for the State Department, the PRC's discontent remained evident. It was against this backdrop that the paper was proposed.This paper examined the role the US played in the institutionalization of the status quo across the Strait from a sociological new institutionalist perspective. My research questions are: In what way did the United States help institutionalize the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait? And in the process, how did the US act through "cross-Strait peaceful co-development" institution to shape the interest or identity of Beijing and Taipei?It was maintained that there existed an ongoing institutionalization process through which the US constructed the status quo that was supported with varying degree by Beijing and Taipei. The three joint communiqués and the TRA could be seen as setting the first stage of institutionalization through formal codification which emphasized the peaceful process in any attempt for final resolution by both sides. Since the late 1990s, the construction and reproduction of the CSPCD institution by the Americans, which generally follows a pattern of "neither use of force nor de jure independence," has been undertaken primarily through policy statements or actions. They normally uphold such core values as "prosperity," "stability" or "peace," and help sustain the regulative, normative or cognitive elements of the CSPCD institution. The main purpose is to shape the policy discourses, preferences, interests or identity of Beijing and Taipei. It was also argued that although the detailed record of what the institution has achieved was certainly mixed, there appears to be an overall tendency for Beijing and Taipei not to incessantly challenge the status quo. As such, it might be concluded that the institutionalization of status quo was considerably effective, though not completely successful. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the One Country Two Systems concept, China, keeping its socialist system (with Chinese characteristics), allows Hong Kong?s capitalistic system and way of life to continue. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) is to exercise a ?high degree of autonomy?, with ?fifty years no change?. Deng Xiaoping, China?s paramount leader, who heralded China?s opening to the world in 1979, held that this could be a model to resolve international relations problems left over by history. In early 2005, HK once again topped the Heritage Foundation?s annual index of economic freedom, for the eleventh year. Yet HKSAR has seen tensions, with mass demonstrations. The State Department?s Country Report on Human Rights Practices ? 2004 suggested it ?has been tested severely this year?. And Amnesty International?s 2005 Report noted ?a mainland ruling in April restricting Hong Kong?s freedom to push ahead with political reform heightened concerns about an erosion of human rights in Hong Kong.? Clearly the 1C2S concept as practised in HK is under challenge. It raises the question: has China managed HK?s return well or not? The nine years of experience offers a glimpse into China?s foreign policy and how HK fits into China?s scheme of things as a rising global power. Much as China guards jealously its sovereignty over HK and fears HK is being used as a base of subversion by foreign interests, notably the United States, HK is a matter of international concern. Since HK has been running an open economy, and as China is increasingly integrated into the international community, the interactions among the three levels ? the sub-state actor, the sovereign and the international community ? present opportunities as well as dilemmas. Specifically, the paper seeks to elucidate the origins of the 1C2S concept, to examine its application in HK thus far, and to identify the factors affecting its success (or failure). In fact, the 1C2S concept was designed in the first instance by China to re-unify the ?renegade? province of Taiwan. HK is supposed to demonstrate to Taiwan that all would be well under Chinese sovereignty. Yet, President Chen Siu-bian categorically stated that Taiwan is not HK. Beijing?s passage of the anti-succession law has rattled cross-straits relations, yet the visits by Lien and Soong, the opposition leaders, to the Mainland represented a class united front play of Beijing to isolate Chen and raised hope for some kind of accommodation between Taiwan and the Mainland. The paper will conclude with a discussion on the implications of the HK experience for Taiwan. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the evolution of domestic Taiwanese politics came a corresponding internationalization of the Taiwanese independence movement. The importance of Taiwanese independence not only impinges on the lives of 21 million or so Taiwanese living on the island, but also affects the strategic environment of the Asia Pacific region as China has declared that it would not hesitate to resort to force should circumstances dictate that it becomes necessary to do so. Taiwan is often cited to be one of the two potential flashpoints in the Asia Pacific, and a conflict between the PRC and Taiwan may more worrying for many countries evolve into one between PRC and the United States. While Taiwan’s role in Sino-US relations have been widely studied, the importance of Taiwan in affecting Chinese bilateral relations beyond its relations with US is a relatively unexplored field. This paper attempts an exploratory study of the evolving role Taiwan plays in Sino-Japanese relations. It attempts to under how the historical role of Taiwan in Sino-Japanese relations affect the island’s contemporary diplomatic dynamics with China and Japan. The role of Taiwan in Chinese and Japanese national security strategy will also be scrutinized to understand the possible divergence or convergence of China and Japan over the Taiwan issue. This is crucial as Japan’s stance is important as Japan is considered one of US allies within region but may not necessarily deem it in its best interests to go along with the US against China. This difficulty presents it with an extremely tricky choice. A slip either way will affect the regional stability and prosperity of the Asia Pacific as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

IR is in search of a newer and more visionary methodological toolkit. Scenario building based on expert knowledge of historical trends and theoretically informed analysis appears to offer insights for IR scholars as well as policy-makers. This paper aims ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the major power relationship in Northeast Asia has undergone some significant transition and reconfiguration. Among other things, Sino-South Korean relations began to show some new momentum that has the potential to reshape the geopolitical environment in the region. On a series of important political and security issues, Beijing and Seoul share more common interests than their respective relations with the other two major powers in the region: Japan and the United States. On the war history issue, China and South Korea formed a united front against Japan. On the North Korean nuclear issue, the six-party talks have clearly demonstrated that China and South Korea have more in common in terms of approaches and tactics than they do with both the United States and Japan. On the core issue of China’s national interestâ€"Taiwan, Seoul’s position is much closer to Beijing than both the U.S. and Japan. On the issue of Korea’s reunification, China and South Korea are also more likely to find common ground. In additional, both China and South Korea have territorial disputes with Japan. Both China and South Korea have strong anti-Japanese and to less extent anti-American sentiment in the public. By examining the new dynamics and developments in Sino-South Korean relations, this paper tries to argue that with Japan moving closer to the status of a normal power and China’s sustainable rise, a strategic realignment in the region is inevitable in which a potential China-ROK “strategic partnership” is emerging and will be pivotal to a possible regional security framework in Northeast Asia. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite of the fact that China and Japan are becomingthe biggest trade partner with each other in recent years, politicalrelations between both countries have deteriorated. Many people in Chinastill concern over potential Japanese military resurgence, while more andmore people in Japan worry about China's military modernization and growingnationalism. The tension is unlikely to improve in the near future.The role of Taiwan in this China-Japan dispute is worth attention. WhileTaiwan has enjoyed de facto independence since 1949, it is still regarded byChinese leaders as a renegade province, and the recovery of the island wasconsidered in China as the sacred and ultimate goal. In recent years, Taiwanhas increasingly attempted to act as a truly independent state, adevelopment that could be attributed to political democratization on theisland since the late 1980s. The question is whether the leaders in Taiwanwill continue to push the envelope to a point short of de jure independencethat will be intolerable to the leaders in Beijing. On the other hand, bothTaiwan and Japan have shown strong intention in improving politicalrelations between both sides. Creation of a Japan-Taiwan alliance isbecoming a popular view in Taiwan's strategic circle, and Japanese publichave shown more sympathy to Taiwan's international isolation. Japanesegovernment even adjusted its policy toward the island state by including theTaiwan Strait into the sphere of concern in Japan-US Security Treaty. Thesedevelopments have been unthinkable in the past, because both China and Japanhave committed to the One China policy and because the Taiwan issueused to be excluded from China-Japan relations.This paper will examine the Taiwanese perspective of China-Japan relations.The author will outline the developments of Taiwan-Japan relations, identifythe strategies Taiwanese government have utilized to strengthen therelations with Japan, and to assess the Taiwan factor in future Japan-Chinarelations. In addition to analyses of secondary data, the author will alsointerview strategic scholars and even government officials to gain firsthand information. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite of the fact that China and Japan are becoming the biggest trade partner with each other in recent years, political relations between both countries have deteriorated. Many people in China still concern over potential Japanese military resurgence, while more and more people in Japan worry about China?s military modernization and growing nationalism. The tension is unlikely to improve in the near future.The role of Taiwan in this China-Japan dispute is worth attention. While Taiwan has enjoyed de facto independence since 1949, it is still regarded by Chinese leaders as a renegade province, and the recovery of the island was considered in China as the sacred and ultimate goal. In recent years, Taiwan has increasingly attempted to act as a truly independent state, a development that could be attributed to political democratization on the island since the late 1980s. The question is whether the leaders in Taiwan will continue to push the envelope to a point short of de jure independence that will be intolerable to the leaders in Beijing. On the other hand, both Taiwan and Japan have shown strong intention in improving political relations between both sides. Creation of a Japan-Taiwan alliance is becoming a popular view in Taiwan?s strategic circle, and Japanese public have shown more sympathy to Taiwan?s international isolation. Japanese government even adjusted its policy toward the island state by including the Taiwan Strait into the sphere of concern in Japan-US Security Threty. These developments have been unthinkable in the past, because both China and Japan have committed to the ?One China? policy and because the Taiwan issue used to be excluded from China-Japan relations. This paper will examine the Taiwanese perspective of China-Japan relations. The author will outline the developments of Taiwan-Japan relations, identify the strategies Taiwanese government have utilized to strengthen the relations with Japan, and to assess the Taiwan factor in future Japan-China relations. In addition to analyses of secondary data, the author will also interview strategic scholars and even government officials to gain first hand information. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The state-centeredness of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) reinforces the prevailing Westphalian international system. International organizations privilege cooperation among nation-states so as to ameliorate anarchy. However, events like the establishment of international human rights regimes and the advancement of globalization since the second half of the twentieth century have called into question whether this hegemonic form still represents the best route to global governance. When national governments lack accountability, serious inadequacies may develop. What happens when governments, through which the rights bestowed on individuals by international human rights covenants, are themselves violators of human rights, especially against those of ethnopolitical minorities? What happens when governments, which are entrusted to provide the best care to the well-being of their people, hide information and obstruct international assistance? These glaring gaps are in plain view in the way China initially responded to the crisis of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) of 2003. The World Health Organization (WHO) and China both went through a learning curve.In the era of globalization, the traditional state-centered approach is further inadequate when disputes over sovereignty hinder the rights to which a significant population is entitled under international law. A well-known anomaly in conventional international law and organization is the contest over Taiwan?s (or formally, Republic of China?s) international legal status and its consequent impact on the rights of the people of Taiwan and the benefits that the international community might have enjoyed with the participation of a significant player in global trade, technology, and democracy.This paper seeks to break some new ground in this theoretical and policy lacuna by presenting a sui generis model for Taiwan?s IGO participation that might simultaneously assure China?s concerns, enable Taiwan to play a part commensurate with its global importance, and permit the international society to benefit from the contribution of a key player and improved cross-strait relations. This model is grounded on the recognition that global governance in the era of globalization mandates the inclusion of all functional competent entities and will require adjustments in mindsets and practices. Its key elements are: (1) decoupling the issues of Taiwan?s IGO membership and diplomatic recognition; (2) amending charters or constitutions of those IGOs that allegedly only admit sovereign states so that they can also admit a functionally competent entity (for a particular issue area); (3) stating on Taiwan?s accession documents that admission into a given IGO does not have any impact on that body?s position on China representation or imply sovereignty for Taiwan; and (4) stipulating that Taiwan will automatically lose membership if it declares independence after its entry into the IGOs. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper overviews sophisticated triangular relations among Taipei, Beijing and Washington after 2000. Then, it scrutinizes the development of US mediation as a form of third-party intervention in such complicated dynamics in the Taiwan Strait. The pattern of contemporary US mediation is studied in an analytical way. Then, it analyzes the role and approaches (strategies) of the US in mediating between the ROC and the PRC, as well as evaluates preliminarily the future of US mediation. Some key findings include, for example: the US is gradually moving towards the role of real mediator in the cross-strait dispute, the characteristics of the US itself and the environment are positive forces driving further effective US mediation, as well as the US will continue to play a mediating role throughout the George W. BushÂ’s presidency but has to be cautious of the effectiveness of its mediation and the differences between Taipei and Beijing in order to find a useful way to enhance the understandability and acceptability of its official position on the peaceful resolution of the cross-strait sovereignty dispute. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In East Asia, Taiwan and North Korea had been two most striking sources of Sino-American security contention. In Taiwan Strait, the key issue is whether Taiwan would go independence, despite China?s flagrant threat of using military forces to deter it. In case of North Korea, whether the North gives up its nuclear program and adopts reform and open door policy or it finally faces internal/external collapse serves as an incessant debating menu. But in both cases, the US and China pose contending positions. In Taiwan, the US at least supports status quo in the Taiwan Strait, if not Taiwan?s independence; while China believes the case as the last thing that they can accept. The US expects North Korea?s Kim Jong-il regime to collapse in the end, while China struggles to help surviving moribund Kim?s regime.Although these two security issues had thus far been two major security issues relating to the Sino-American relations, these had strangely been analyzed and studied in separate fashion. In other words, many pundits, scholars, and politicians had widely dealt with the Taiwan issue and North Korean issue per se, but this study attempts to link both issues in causal relations and to evaluate its influence over the Sino-American diplomatic relations. Based on this assumption, this paper plans to review the Sino-American relations regarding Taiwan and North Korea, and then to find out any meaningful co-relationship between the two cases. In order to produce consequential research outcomes, this study will apply game-theoretic model and event data analysis. Also, this study will cover the period from 1990 to now. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why is China friendly towards Taiwan in the realm of trade but hostile in the political and diplomatic arenas? Objectives. This paper is to examine the significance of TaiwanÂ’s economic development to ChinaÂ’s economy, and to explore the extent to which the economic interdependence of the two sides affects the level of tension across the Taiwan Strait. My arguments are that China does not use economic means to sanction or attack Taiwan because TaiwanÂ’s economic development, based on a large amount of trade and investment in China, has great implications for ChinaÂ’s economic growth. The increase of ChinaÂ’s economic growth because of the salient economic interactions between Taiwan and China contributes to lowering the level of tension between the two sides. Methods. Using data derived from Monthly Statistics of Exports and Imports, Ministry of Finance, Taiwan, the Republic of China (ROC), I test my hypotheses using one multivariate regression model and an ordered logistic model with twenty-five observations for each variable, which are based on a time series analysis ranging from 1979 to 2003. Results. For the regression model, the findings, based on GDP indicators, demonstrate that TaiwanÂ’s economic growth has positively significant influence on ChinaÂ’s economic growth. The findings of the ordered logistic model show that ChinaÂ’s GDP and GDP ratio are negatively significant to the tension level, meaning that the increase of ChinaÂ’s GDP and GDP ratio respectively decrease the level of tension between the two sides. However, TaiwanÂ’s regime change to democracy has positive effect on the increase of tension. The statistical results support the long-standing liberal hypothesis that trade ties facilitate interstate peace. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite repeated U.S. claims that its policy toward relations across the Taiwan Strait is ?consistent? and ?clear,? in actuality its policy has long been one of ?strategic ambiguity.? It is widely recognized by scholars and policy-makers alike that the so-called Taiwan question is the most potentially explosive issue in U.S.-P.R.C relations.What is the strategic ambiguity policy all about? What role has it played in influencing the equilibrium outcomes of cross-Strait relations in the past three decades? How are the dynamics of the ?strategic triangle? consisting of the United States, Mainland China and Taiwan to be understood? How effective in preserving peace across the Taiwan Strait is U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity likely to be in the future? Few studies, if any, have provided theoretical answers to these questions. This paper tries to develop a game theoretic model which may provide tentative answers to these interesting, unresolved questions. Supporters of the ?strategic ambiguity? policy argue that it has successfully kept the Strait free of conflict: on the one hand, Mainland China always has to take into account the possibility that the United States might intervene if it were to attack Taiwan, and on the other hand, Taiwan always has to think twice before ?going too far? (such as declaring formal independence from the mainland). The policy, it is said, has served U.S. national security interests and has effectively accommodated changes in cross-Strait relations in past decades. There are opposing opinions, however. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have rendered one of the major imperatives for a U.S.-China rapprochement and compromises on Taiwan?the basis of the strategic ambiguity policy?obsolete. Moreover, the democratization of Taiwan and the increasing military threat if faces, such as the deployment of missiles by Mainland China aimed at Taiwan, have brought new variables into the equation. Taiwan?s thriving democracy has added ideological values and moral imperatives to the U.S. commitment of defending the island. The increasing military threat from Mainland China, meanwhile, seems to have strengthened the argument for an increasing commitment to Taiwan?s defense, either in the form of more military sales or coordination between U.S. and Taiwan militaries. A continuing ambiguity in U.S. policy, so the arguments goes, will encourage PRC militancy and frustrate Taiwan?s determination to resisting aggression, and may be prone to disrupt the delicate equilibrium. Above all, it seems to compromise the U.S. moral imperative of defending democratic values.Our model shows that the policy of strategic ambiguity helps preserve the status quo and maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. The strategic ambiguity policy is a defensive strategy in nature, well-suited at deterring both Mainland China and Taiwan from deviating from equilibrium strategies. In the long run, the strategic ambiguity policy, however, needs to be supplemented, if not replaced, by more imaginative policies in order to successfully manage the Taiwan issue. For example, the United States could be more forthright in proposals that help to eliminate potential conflicts of interest, such as proposing that Mainland China renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue in exchange for Taiwan?s pledge not to pursue independence. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The year of 2008 has witnessed the historical and significant moment of the first cross-Strait official interaction between two incumbent parties (the KMT of Taiwan and the CCP of China), which has been frozen for over six decades. Particularly, with Pres ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Beijing and Taipei experienced an uneasy and even turbulent period of bilateral relations after the mid-1990s, particularly during the period 2000-08 when the pro-Taiwan independence party, DPP, was in office. With the KMT, which has a very different perc ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many recent studies find that international political conflictâ€"operationalized in a variety of waysâ€"harms trade. Well-known cases help to underscore these general findings. For example, Cold War tensions helped to undermine East-West trade, and trade between India and Pakistan slowed sharply in the years after partition. On the other hand, however, trade between adversaries also appears to vary substantially across cases. Indeed, trade can sometimes flourish despite intense political rivalry. In the current relationship between mainland China and Taiwan, for example, China has become Taiwan’s largest trading partner despite persistent political tension across the Taiwan Strait.How can we explain variation in the extent to which states trade with their adversaries? Building on existing literature, I develop a framework through which to understand how domestic coalitions concerning trade with an adversary are likely to form. While some actors are likely to favor or oppose trade for purely economic reasons, those without a direct economic stake in the relationship are likely to focus more on the political and security consequences of trade with the adversary. In this framework, two variables emerge as central in determining a country’s trade policy with an adversary: the relative political strength of internationalist versus protectionist economic interests, and whether those concerned primarily with politics believe trade will have positive or negative political and security externalities. I use the framework to develop several testable hypotheses, and evaluate them via short case studies of three contemporary rivalries: China/Taiwan; India/Pakistan; and North Korea/South Korea ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Taiwan, since the early 1990s, Taiwanese identity has rapidly supplanted Chinese identity. This has pushed all the main political parties towards the new identity, and brought the Democratic Progressive Party to power. Rising Taiwanese identity has also affected military strategies. It has accelerated the cross-strait arms race by alarming Beijing and supporting an offsetting build-up in Taiwan. It has also strengthened Taiwan's will to retain her independence, and thereby led to newer, more unconventional defense strategies. One such strategy is to enhance ideological legitimacy in the US and Japan. Another is to embrace economic integration with China--a development hitherto seen as threatening. A third is to deter a Chinese attack by credibly committing to a more dogged fight to preserve independence, even under conditions where such a fight seems hopeless. Last, a strong Taiwanese identity makes it more likely that China's increasing conventional military predominance will ultimately call forth a Taiwanese nuclear deterrent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on economic interdependence and growing Taiwanese identity in cross-strait relations. It notes since the mid-1990s, the cross- strait relationship between the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC) and People's Republic of China (PRC) has been marked with turmoil with periodic crises in which the possibility of an outbreak of armed conflicts appears to have been significant. Also described are the economic and social processes that are increasingly connecting Taiwan to the Chinese Mainland.

The article analyzes regional governance perspectives in Greater China. It explores the micro governance among the People's Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan and Hong Kong to show the modes of development shaped by their daily economic, trade, human and knowledge interactions. The author shows the catalyst of changes based on integration, interdependence, indifference and independence. The author argues that the deterioration of relations between Taiwan and the PRC was caused by many political as well as institutional factors.

The article focuses on the military threat facing Taiwan, whose status as a sovereign state is weakly supported in the international community. It cites the threat posed by the determination of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to unite Taiwan with the mainland. It notes that China is determined to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence and to return the island to the mainland's governance. It mentions the significant problems posed by Taiwan Strait for the conduct of amphibious warfare.

The article focuses on a study that attempts to understand American military posture in East Asia within the context of a U.S.-Japan-China-South Korea-Taiwan pyramid, where the U.S. plays the role of benign leader at the apex. It explores some military arrangements contemplated by the U.S. It examines five official documents made to the public since the inauguration of U.S. President George W. Bush including the "Quadrennial Defense Review Report."

The article looks at the future of cross-strait relations after the election of fourth-generation leaders in China in 2002. It cites that China has adopted a cool dealing strategy toward Taiwan after Chen Sui-bian was elected President in 2002 and condemned the defensive referendum proposed by the president. It argues that maintaining status quo in Taiwan Strait is the key to pursue the stability and peace in the strait. It explains the factors that resulted to the conflict in Taiwan Strait and the role played by the U.S. concerning the issue.

While the relationship between economic interdependence and military conflict remains the subject of debate, recent research has begun to focus more on the micro-foundations underlying any such relationship. At least three arguments are commonly used to link economic integration with a reduced likelihood of military conflict: economic ties act as a constraint by raising the costs of conflict; economic ties facilitate communication and hence reduce the likelihood of dangerous miscalculations; and economic integration transforms state goals, making them conflict less with the goals of other states. Because all three causal mechanisms posit a similar outcome--economic interdependence reduces the likelihood of military conflict--testing them against each other is difficult; as such, the use of detailed case studies would seem a promising approach, since this mode of analysis allows for a close examination of the dynamics driving observed policy changes in particular countries. After summarizing the logic of each of the three arguments, I test them against each other using a case study of the relationship between Mainland China and Taiwan. While I do not find unambiguous support for any of the three causal mechanisms, I find the evidence, on balance, to be more consistent with the informational and transformational arguments than it is with the constraint argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers legal perspective on the conflict and compatibility in the cross-strait relations between Mainland China and Taiwan. It notes that the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) was eventually recognized in 1971 by the United Nations General Assembly as the only lawful representative of the entire China in the organization. Also compared and discussed is the legal framework created for both the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) and the Macao SAR.

Most of the contemporary policy debate regarding the interdependence of trade and conflict has been preoccupied with devising responses either in favor of or in opposition to the long prevailing notion that trade is positively and unconditionally correlated with peace because trading partners fear that conflict will result in the loss of welfare gains from trade. The realist response implies that political foes trade willingly only when relative gains are equivalent, and the liberal position implies that trade promotes peace because trade partners prefer gains from trade to conflict. The China-Taiwan security conflict provides a counter-example to each argument. Through the advantages of non-cooperative game theory, we model a trade-conflict interaction to discover the conditions under which trade and conflict will occur between trade partners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post-Cold War era, China, Japan and Taiwan entered the new phase of their relationship and were forced to reconsider their security and political dialogues. Despite of the US presence in East Asia, they are becoming more active players in the regio ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent year, there have been significant developments in the peace and stability in cross-Strait relations, which is critical to the international relations in East Asia. At the same time, economic interdependence links mainland China with the US and T ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China’s resumption of the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong (HK) in 1997 under the One Country Two Systems (1C2S) concept which allowed HK’s capitalistic system and way of life to continue while China would keep its socialist system (with Chinese cha ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]