Search

The “theory” of preventive war predicts that states are most likely to undertake military action in response to a rising challenger if they expect that the adversary will surpass them in military strength and then engage in hostile behavior, so that a future war with the challenger is likely. The biggest apparent anomaly for this theory is the Western rejection of a strategy of prevention based on better-now-than-later logic in favor of the strategy of appeasement in the 1930s. In our previous work on the Rhineland Crisis of 1936 and the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1938, we demonstrated that the British and French non-response is not at odds with preventive war theory because British leaders believed that the transition had already occurred prior to 1936, leaving France and Britain with few options, and because French leaders would not take a firm stand against Germany without British support. This interpretation begs the question of why Britain and France did not respond more firmly to the rise of Hitler and to German rearmament before 1936, either through military buildups of their own, a containment strategy based on alliances, or perhaps through coercive threats or preventive military action. In this paper, we address this important question with an analysis of British and French government documents and private papers. We conclude with a discussion of the limits of preventive war theory. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper will evaluate the process leading to a British decision to maintain its nuclear weapons capability and its consequences for British foreign policy with a view to arguing that a decision to not renew or to reverse a decision to renew could open up new and positive opportunities for British foreign policy. The paper will examine the nuclear decision in the context not just of the unilateral British position but also in relation to Britain's place in the foreign and defence policy process of the European Union. Particular attention will be paid to the role of Britain's European and Transatlantic partners in the framing of the British decision to maintain or not an ongoing nuclear capability. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many explanations have been advanced in the face of the obvious failures of the official British and U.S. explanations to account for the war being waged on Iraq. In the U.K., discussion has tended to focus almost exclusively on the United States, with British involvement treated as tangential or at most supplemental, and explained largely with reference to aspects of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s personality or some broadly conceived U.K. national interest in maintaining close political relations with the United States. Missing from the discussion is recognition of recurrent features of U.K. foreign policy towards the Middle East and their relation to fundamental aspects of British political-economy, the increasing integration of British and U.S. capital, and the largely Anglo-American-led project of global economic re-structuring currently taking place. This paper focuses on British and U.S. interests in Iraq and larger Anglo-American ambitions that divide the U.K. and U.S. from France, Germany, and other EU and non-EU countries. Part I of the paper briefly reviews the history of British and U.S. foreign policies towards Iraq and the culmination of these policies in the invasion and take-over of the country. Part II places these events in the context of the political-economy of U.K.-U.S. relations and an on-going Anglo-American project of global reconstruction. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 1997 New Labour government set about modernising British foreign policy by devising new ways of conceptualising, making and talking about Britain’s role in the world. First, in May 1997 Foreign Secretary Robin Cook famously announced that he wanted to give British foreign policy an ‘ethical dimension’. Second, in April 1999 the Prime Minister set out his ‘doctrine of the international community’ in which he spelt out the multifarious security challenges posed to individual nation states by global interdependence and the ‘circumstances in which we should get actively involved in other people’s conflicts’. Finally, Chancellor Gordon Brown has returned time and again to the potential gains to be had from exploiting what he calls the ‘British genius’ on the world stage.New ways of representing foreign policy, together with a sophisticated communications strategy on the part of the government since 1997 demands new ways of researching British foreign policy. In this paper I consider two questions arising from this challenge: first of all, what can discourse analysis contribute to political research in general? Second, how can we design a workable research programme into New Labour’s European policy that has discourse analysis at its very centre? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper "The Eyes of Kesteven: How the Worldviews of the Margaret Thatcher and Her Cabinet Influenced British Foreign Policy" presented at the "2005 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association" held from March 2 to 5, 2005 in Honolulu, Hawaii. It examines the policies advocated by British leaders in 1988 and 1989 in relation to the role of the country in an integrated Europe.

Introduces a set of guidelines and specific proposals for a progressive alternative to current UK foreign policy and geopolitical strategies, as part of a reconceptualization of social democracy that internalizes geopolitics and foreign affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past ten years, humanitarian intervention has been justified in British foreign policy discourse as a matter of saving people and preventing suffering. The archetypal example of this was the Kosovo intervention of 1999. Equally, in most international relations literature on the topic, both from cosmopolitans and the English School (e.g. Richard Falk and Nicholas Wheeler) the human is at the heart of ethical justifications for war. Yet, in both cases, it is a specific and limited conception of the 'human' that is treated with such care: a human that must be protected on their own soil, but not transferred to a different territory. Perhaps the most obvious ethical solution (cheaper, easier and less violent) to the Kosovo conflict, if protecting the human was key, would have been to airlift refugees into NATO countries. However, such a policy of hospitality was explicitly rejected in British foreign policy - in fact the British government was generally hostile to more refugees. Similarly, humanitarian intervention literature barely touched upon it, despite the importance of cosmopolitan 'hospitality'. Given this, it cannot be a concept of the human stripped of all its political content (what Agamben would call 'bare life') that is key to the ethics of war. Rather, it is a 'human' that must be kept distant, tied to a territorial identity, and separated from the subject that does the saving. It is argued that interveners and cosmopolitans alike need to differentiate their conception of the human, especially in its relation to a territorial 'home'. A more complex conception of the 'human' would be much more difficult to place simplistically at the centre of an ethics of war. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do democracies sometimes select into tough fights? Why do they win some of these wars and lose others? In this paper, I begin to answer these questions. As has been widely noted, democracies are more likely than non-democracies to win their wars, especially those they initiate. Reiter and Stam credit this outcome to a "selection effect," whereby democracies are more likely than non-democracies to start wars that they can win quickly and decisively. On occasion, however, this "selection effect" breaks down. Specifically, the United Kingdom and the United States have selected into a number of wars where an easy victory was anything but assured. This follows from the fact that they are offshore balancers, charged with upholding the balance of power in critical regions when a potential hegemon threatens to overturn it. Despite the considerable risks they have incurred, the United Kingdom and the United States have ultimately prevailed in such wars when they have exploited the advantages that come from their geographical insularity. They have fared poorly when the nature of the conflict renders those advantages moot. The bulk of the paper develops these points theoretically. I reserve empirical testing for future work. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

?Dans un débat comme celui-ci, n'oublions pas que nous avons comme auditeurs tous les pays civilisés,' [In such a debate, let us not forget that we have all civilised countries as audience] President of the French Chambre des députés, 15.12.1922.Before electronic mass media, parliamentary debate and reporting of it played a central role in political communication and the development of national democratic public spheres. However, to what extent did parliamentary debates inter connect on a European wide level?This paper explores foreign policy parliamentary debating and speaking as means of transnational elite communication and to what extent foreign policy decision makers used national parliamentary debates and speeches consciously to communicate with a wider, European audience. It focuses on communication between foreign policy decision makers in governments, parliaments, diplomacy and military in Britain, France and to some extent Germany.This is done through a comparative study of four British and French statesmen, Aristide Briand, Austen Chamberlain, Winston Churchill and Raymond Poincaré for the first three to four decades of the 20th century. The paper discusses the search for coordination and good or bad faith concerning Anglo-French alliance policy and Franco-German rapprochement and reconciliation. It examines to what extent these elite foreign policy decision makers were aware of parliamentary debates in allied and adversary countries and influenced by the content of these debates. Equally it investigates whether the case persons sought to communicate with outside governments and parliaments from their own platform. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We are used to thinking about the public sphere as spreading much more easily in the Netherlands and Great Britain than in typically Continental European powers like France and Germany. While this was true with respect to the early and somewhat elitist brand of the public sphere arising and spreading in the century preceding the French Revolution, this is not equally true if we shift the focus to the mid-to-late 19th century. Instead, during this period, early runners like Great Britain and latecomers like Germany exhibit major similarities. Thus, the paper argues that the introduction of mass politics in Western Europe through franchise extensions in Britain and the gradual introduction of parliamentary features to the German system, had significant effects on the institution of popular legitimacy, manifesting itself through a considerable deterioration of the public sphere, which lasted for several decades in all three countries. The paper aims to show this through data collected from parliamentary debates, election campaigns, newspaper articles, and not the least foreign policy rhetoric by influential state and non-state actors. One important consequence of the deterioration of the public sphere was a recourse to political demagoguery from the ruling elites, seeking to preserve popular legitimacy by using foreign politics to attract the masses. Hence, the late 19th century saw imperialism and foreign policy strife between major European powers, as the introduction of mass politics meant an end to the relative calm of the elitist consensus of the Concert of Europe and the introduction of a foreign policy paradigm where mass politics and nationalism created a far more volatile foreign policy environment. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines what I term the ?second face of security.? Specifically, a state?s unilateral choice of arms, allies, or appeasement can strengthen the political power of some societal and economic actors in foreign states while others will be weakened politically and economically. The domestic winners will then apply pressure on the government to support their preferred grand strategy. In contrast, the more traditional ?first face of security? entails direct attempts to create security by influencing other governments to change their foreign policy. This is accomplished through military or economic statecraft such as the threat or use of military force, economic sanctions, foreign aid, or tariffs. In this paper I examine the intent of Britain?s appeasement policy towards Germany and Japan in the late 1930s. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

British overseas posts are a frequently forgotten part of the British state, yet they play an important role in domestic British politics and foreign policy. This paper, while providing analysis of the current overall role and structure of HM Diplomatic Service, will concentrate mainly upon the work outside London in High Commissions, Embassies and Consulates. The paper will explore the role performed by these posts detailing their contribution to British politics and policy making. In doing so the paper will outline how posts are typically run and provide a critique of how they are coping with three broad challenges. The first being ?Europeanisation? with increased co-operation between EU member state posts, competition from a growing EU diplomatic presence and questions over the role of UK diplomatic posts within EU member states. Secondly, domestic changes within Britain such as devolution, reform of Whitehall, growing financial constraints, management reforms, visa and immigration issues, accountability to Parliament, and the growing role of Downing Street in foreign policy. Finally, global challenges such as state failure, the war on terror, new security threats, public diplomacy and technological changes. The paper will conclude with further discussion about the possibility of increased EU cooperation and the need for improved links between overseas posts and the wider Whitehall beyond the Foreign Office. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using genealogy as a point of entry, this paper will argue that the study of IR in South Africa has been imbued with a cult of Empire. First the British Empire: its mid-period in which the Cape state was formed, and late Empire during which the formation of the state of South Africa was finalised. The tributaries of this period run through the imperial metropole and through powerful networks. During the Cold War, International Relations drew initial sustenance from a coterie of British writers, but were gradually overtaken by the work of American ideologues. In the globalisation era, International Relations in South Africa have been saturated with the numbing discourses of globalization theory.What does all this tell us about South Africa? And, more importantly, about the North-South nexus in the discipline? Intellectual history and historical sociology offer many clues. This paper will tease them out by drawing on entirely new empirical data. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers whether could write a history of British international thought. It begins by asking whether the idea of a history of British international thought is an intelligible one, and with the related question of whether there is a distinctively British tradition of thinking about international relations and if so how that tradition might be defined and explained. It examines debates over national traditions of political thought, the apparent anomaly of a national tradition of inter-national thought, and Churchill’s suggestion that there is a distinctive Anglo-American political tradition supporting a distinctive Anglo-American tradition in foreign affairs. It suggests that although limited themes or periodsâ€"such as Atlantic republicanism, Victorian international law, Edwardian liberalism, or a mid-twentieth century “English School”â€"might be suitable objects of historical inquiry, one must be skeptical of the idea of a national tradition extending from Bacon or Hobbes to Namier or Bull. In the course of this inquiry, the key terms in these debatesâ€"tradition, history, thought, and internationalâ€"are considered. The advantage of studying British international thought is to focus attention on neglected thinkers and themes, and on their context, but there may also be value in looking back at the international thought of a nation in (what might be) its moment of European or global dusk, which isâ€"as Hegel remarkedâ€"when the historian properly enters the scene. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the UK government's response to the armed conflict in Darfur, Sudan. It focuses on understanding why the UK decided not to use its military power to help protect the civilian victims of the crisis in Darfur in spite of its long-standing claims to support humanitarian intervention (as both a moral obligation and a legal right) and the "responsibility to protect" principle. To do so it proceeds in three parts. The first section provides an overview of the UK's position on humanitarian intervention after the Cold War paying particular attention to the cases of Iraq and Kosovo as well as the government's recent endorsement of the "responsibility to protect" principle. The second section summarises the UK's recent engagement with Sudan's various civil wars focusing on its policies towards the war between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the more recent rebellion in Darfur. The final section discusses the main political factors that account for the UK government's decision not to use its military power to protect the civilian victims of Darfur's crisis, namely, the failure of its previous arguments about the legality of humanitarian intervention, the geopolitical realities of the situation, and the local complexities thrown-up by Darfur's crisis. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After New Labour won the British election in 1997 Tony Blair became the least prepared Prime Minister in the field of foreign affairs in many decades. Blair had vey little experience of government, and none at all in the field of international politics. His earlier membership of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament was clearly an instrumental and temporary association with the devil, as the necessary price to pay for gaining selection as a parliamentary candidate for the Labour Party at that time. Yet this relatively young and inexperienced leader very quickly took Britain to war in four different theatres (Kosovo, Sierra Leonne, Afghanistan and Iraq). As a good "friend of Bill's"(former President Bill Clinton)it also appeared odd that Blair should become the staunchest ally of the Republican President George W. Bush, especially in taking the 'global war on terrorism' to Iraq. This paper will assess Tony Blair's war making policies, and the impact Blair has had in redefining and reconceptualising foreign and security policies in the era of global terrorism. It will be demonstrated how Blair, through a quick process of 'learning' on the job, came to make a major impact on thinking and policies relating to warfare in the post-Cold War era, and with what consequences for Britain and the world. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What accounts for the different outcomes in British decisions in Vietnam (not commit forces), and Iraq (commit forces), despite the similarities in the situations? In both Vietnam and Iraq a U.S. President pressed a Labour Party Prime Minister to commit forces to a war that was unpopular in the U.K. Yet, while Harold Wilson resisted repeated attempts by Lyndon Johnson to secure a commitment of troops, Tony Blair went out of his way to support George W. Bush, despite the domestic political cost. In seeking to account for these differing outcomes, I consider four explanatory variables: structural realism, alliance dynamics, domestic politics, individual characteristics of the Prime Minister.Method: Structured, focused case comparison methodology is used to compare the two episodes in a systematic fashion. These cases are in many ways an ideal pairing given the similarities between the situations yet the divergent outcomes. In order to measure the individual characteristics of the Prime Minister, I employ automated content analysis techniques that process an individual?s verbal output to reveal personality traits.Results: Structural realism fails to account for the difference in outcome between the two cases, as both responses (commit troops, don?t commit troops) can be deduced from a structural perspective. Alliance dynamics explanations are also unsatisfactory. Harold Wilson?s behaviour is contrary to what we would expect from a junior partner, and, while Blair?s choice is more consistent with this approach, the evidence shows that Blair reached the decision on grounds other than a pure calculation of alliance maintenance necessity. Domestic politics, on the other hand, is part of the explanation for the difference in outcome. Wilson was in a much more precarious position than Blair, and hence had to give more attention to the left-wing, anti-war part of the Labour Party than did Blair. However, this is not the whole story, and I find that a convincing account of the different outcomes in these cases requires a consideration of the differences between the Prime Ministers. Blair was a much more ?black and white? thinker than Harold Wilson, making Blair more amenable to the ?good and evil? framing of the situation by the U.S. than the less Manichean Wilson. In addition, Blair had fashioned a closed advisory system which insulated him from the opposition of most of the foreign policy bureaucracy to the war, whereas the Wilson administration operated through more open procedures. Consequently, my conclusion is that a combination of domestic politics and leadership style best accounts for the difference in outcomes in British decision making on Vietnam and Iraq. The paper will be of interest to those working in foreign policy analysis and decision making, the U.S. - U.K. relationship, and alliance dynamics generally. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will view the evolving US-Australian relationship from the point of view of the literature on Anglosphere. Several authors associated with this concept have argued either that the US would be wise to accord priority to cooperation with english-speaking liberal democracies (see, for example, Conquest) or that this relationship already exists and is likely to continue to develop (see, for example, Bennett). The author will survey this literature and then consider specific indicators which support or challenge the above-mentioned arguments. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies of British strategic foreign policy in the long nineteenth century (1815-1914) tend to look at their subject through the wrong end of the telescope. They project backwards into the period before 1914 the concerns and preoccupations of the era of t ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The British Government has in recent months dedicated a fair portion of its rhetoric on foreign policy towards Africa. Chancellor Gordon Brown has declared that 2005 will be a milestone in the campaign to meet the UN Millennium Development Goals, whilst the Commission for Africa report has staked out London?s stance on how to deal with Africa?s myriad problems. Due to Britain?s chairmanship of both the G-8 and the European Union this year, the Government seems to believe that an opportunity to place Africa central in world politics has presented itself. However, I argue that much of the assumptions regarding the continent?s malaises, and the solution proposed, need rethinking. Indeed, I argue that British foreign policy towards Africa currently seems to be based on partial information and misunderstands much of the situation. I suggest that London needs to rethink its stance if it wishes to make any real difference. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]