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The massive destructive consequences of the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami,have called attention to the phenomenal failure of the international community to provide early warning before the disaster,and the chaotic disaster relief efforts after the extent of the catastrphy became evident.These lessons have made the need for the establishment of an institutionalized disaseter warning and disaster relief regime a matter of great urgency.This paper offers a well structured agenda ,detailed outline of the fundamentals ,and the parameters pertaining to the main issues such a regim would have to address.Due to the enormity of the task,the paper makes an argument for an Asia first approach due to the experience acquired since 2004 in that region.If it will be successful there, the regime buildig policy process can be extended to other regions.These incremental expansion would eventually lead to the establisment of a politically integrated and coordinated global early warning and disaster relief regime. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As China faces a rising tide of separatist movements and terrorist activities within its own borders, Beijing has sought closer cooperation with the governments of the Central Asian republics. In June 2001, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan declared the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with anti-terrorism, extremism, and separatism being its central task. The September 11 terrorist attacks against the US further enhance the need for close collaboration among these countries. Indeed, the SCO will a critical part of Chinese efforts to stem and eradicate external links to domestic separatist and terrorist cells. While the immediate focus of the SCO would be to fight terrorism, the larger issue for the longer term would whether the organization could evolve into a sub-regional arrangement that would contribute to peace, stability, and prosperity. Beijing has already suggested the organization’s uniqueness in promoting common goals and indeed has great interest in seeing it succeed as a counter model to US-led military alliances. However, the path to success may not be smooth and problem-free as is hoped. This paper will seek to examine both the prospects for and the potential obstacles in achieving key objectives sought by SCO member states: management of ethnic and religious unrest, including the fight against terrorism and separatism; maintenance of stable borders; development of energy resources; nuclear nonproliferation; and promotion of economic prosperity. Within this broader context, the paper will examine whether or not China can extend its influence to Central Asia using SCO as a vehicle and the implications for US interests in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

U.S. economic interests emerged as one of the central themes of the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis. Many analysts offered what I call a strong American power interpretation of the crisis, in which U.S. actors initiated, guided and ultimately benefited from the economic liberalization of developing Asia. A competing resistant domestic political economy approach responded that developing Asia largely resisted international pressure during the late 1990s because of the resilience of domestic political and economic systems. Nearly all analyses of the Asian crisis and its aftermath, therefore, favoured explanations emphasizing either U.S. structural power or particular mediating characteristics of Asian political economy. This paper looks beyond these positions and advances an alternative perspective on the consequences of the Asian crisis. The paper argues that the structure of American economic interests?specifically the different interests of foreign policy-makers and business?holds more explanatory power in understanding the Asian crisis than models of coherent American power or domestic political obstructions in Asia. The paper advances the conceptual proposition that the interests of American policy-makers and American firms must be separated. Liberalization can be implemented in crisis economies because of strong U.S. pressure without the reforms necessarily being advantageous to U.S. business than to other foreign or domestic actors. In practice, a disjunction has emerged since the financial crisis between aggressive U.S. government actions and beliefs and cautious steps taken by the U.S. business sector. Reform in developing Asia has been led and supervised, above all, by the American government and a supporting set of U.S. accounting, consulting and financial firms. Korea and Thailand, as two countries subject to intensive demands for economic reform and with strong foreign commercial interest in their markets, are particularly relevant cases for assessing how U.S. interests fared in developing Asia. To varying degrees, Korea and Thailand have accepted an American-style accounting system, competition and tax policies and technical standards, as well as overhauling almost all of their national regulations dealing with foreign investment. Yet the winners in the investment sector have not been principally American-owned firms; rather, U.S. firms have trailed other foreign firms and national firms in direct investment and merger and acquisition activity. The paper argues that two factors are particularly important explanations for diverging U.S. economic interests in the post-crisis period. First, U.S. firms have adapted their business models in developing Asia. Both in manufacturing and finance, traditional ownership-based investment in Asian assets has been replaced as the dominant U.S. corporate strategy by new forms of foreign investment, such as outsourcing and non-retail banking. Korea and Thailand are relatively insignificant to this form of U.S. economic activity in Asia. Second, U.S. policy-makers hold an outdated conception of U.S. investment in Asian markets and incorrectly assume that economic opening privileges U.S. firms. U.S. policy-makers expected American business to increase their direct investments in Asia. The policy community failed to recognize new forms of U.S. foreign investment and their implication during the Asian crisis. The paper will proceed in four parts. The first section will synthesize scholarship on U.S. interests and the Asian crisis into the aforementioned two-fold typology (the strong American power and resistant domestic political economy models). The second section will establish an analytical framework to understand how a disjunction between U.S. foreign policy and corporate interests is a theoretically possible outcome to the Asian crisis. The third section will document empirically the depth of market reform and the level of U.S. firm penetration in Korea and Thailand from 1997 to 2003. The fourth section will explain the crisis outcome on the basis of new forms of American international business activity and on U.S. policy-makers misconceiving the nature of U.S. private sector interests in developing Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses an emerging interaction between bilateral and multilateral security arrangements for conflict resolution in Asia since the 1990s by emphasizing the correlation of Asian hegemony management with foreign policy strategies of the US, China and Japan. As protracted conflicts of the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits have threatened regional prosperity and stability, regional security institutions have become an important policy concern in the post-Cold War era. Detecting nascent multilateral institution-building in Asian regional security, this paper asks how and why US-led bilateral alliances interact with multilateral security arrangements such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN-Plus-Three. In order to examine this puzzle, the paper focuses on three points: (1) foreign policy strategies of three countries, (2) domestic interests concerning the feasibility and legitimacy of supplementing bilateralism with multilateralism in Asian security, and (3) impacts of Asian hegemony management on establishing regional security institutions. The paper compares the three countries’ preferences to regional security by focusing on the relationship between bilateralism of the US-led alliances and multilateralism. It then tries to demonstrate that both the dynamics of Asian hegemony management and the policy preferences concerning bilateralism and multilateralism are essential in understanding regional security arrangements in Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States has a long-standing interest in the political events of South Asia. This paper focuses on the continuity and change in the nature of U.S. hegemony in this region after the end of Cold War, and more particularly after September 11. Having witnessed the collapse of the state in Afghanistan and the potential for state failure in a nuclear Pakistan, the concerns relating to this region are extensive. Religious fundamentalism, social and political instability, cross-border terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and environmental crisis are just few of the problems addressed in the paper. The variety of potential dangers emanating from this region makes this region and U.S. policy towards it a paramount concern for both theory and practice of international relations. At the theoretical level, the purpose of this paper is to examine whether the continued use of the neo-realist theory is justified, based on its record of past policy successes and failures. One of the core arguments against neo-realism is that its level of analysis is too rigid, thus failing to recognize internal constraints in state affairs, particularly the social and cultural factors. After examining the foundation and application of the neo-realist policies of the U.S. toward the region, this paper evaluates the success or failure of U.S. policy in terms of addressing the important concerns of the region. This evaluation is based on an analysis of the stated goals compared to the results of policy actions. The paper concludes with suggestions for a more realistic understanding of the problems in South Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research on unregulated population movements suggests that illegal migration and undocumented migration for labor and other purposes is on the rise in Northeast Asia, and is demanding the attention of regional policy-makers. The last decade has also witnessed an increase in the criminalization of migration in the lucrative form of human trafficking, often related women and girls for prostitution. This paper reviews the scholarly debate on the linkages between security and migration, including how illegal migration has been incorporated into the discussion on traditional and non-traditional security, and human security. The emergence of illegal migration as a security issue in the European Union is discussed before a consideration of whether, and how, illegal migration has been defined as a "security" issue among politicians and policy-makers in Northeast Asia. The so-called Copenhagen School?s framework of "securitization" is discussed in relation to how securitization could be applied to specific cases of illegal migration and unregulated population flows within and from Northeast Asia. Finally, the paper draws some conclusions regarding the implications and lessons for regional cooperation on illegal migration in Northeast Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of this paper is, will it be possible for other regions to achieve a full monetary integration, like the EU did, by introducing a single common regional currency? What factors will shape the future of East Asian currency integration? The major issue discussed in this paper is whether the creation of an East Asian Central Bank (EACB) as an institution for a single currency management is possible and what are the necessary conditions to achieve this goal. This article applies a constructivist approach to regional monetary integration. I argue that sharing a common knowledge about monetary cooperation is a necessary condition for the achievement of monetary integration. In particular, the role of the committee of governor of national central banks is especially important. The task of this independent committee is to offer a plan of regional monetary policy. A region will achieve a high level of international monetary cooperation when a group of specialists working on monetary policy propose a blueprint of monetary integration and several ministers in the region agree with the plan. Regional members? attitude toward monetary integration is defined by the restricting structure on the regional level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Obama Administration's national security strategy after the Iraq War is turning toward Northeast Asia, where are rising variable challenges to screw up regional security environment in danger. Even though Japan has conducted its main taskforce as the U.S. military headquarter in Asia since World War II, it recently required equal balance to upgrade its position in the military relations with the U.S. Japan's challenge has motivated the U.S. seriously rethinks its fundamental military strategy in Northeast Asia. In addition, the sinking of a South Korean warship by North Korea would revive China and Russia's military strategy to support North Korea in a very suspicious gesture whether North Korea actually attacked. It might be another symptom that China and Russia exploit this case to consider military expansion and take military actions to challenge the U.S. They criticize military drills and reinforcement between South Korea and the U.S. which will increase regional tension. North Korea even declares "Sacred War" in a reckless response signing additional provocations and China shows military strength with naval exercises off its eastern coast ahead of the U.S. drills with South Korea. Therefore, this paper investigates national security strategy of the U.S. how the Obama Administration should set up new military security line in Northeast Asia and rebuild the relationship with major powers based on regional security. It analyzes each step with detailed methodologies and offers effective strategy that the Obama Administration can take it in policy making process in advance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the current subprime crisis in the light of the lessons learned (and not learned) from the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. In spite of the fact that the two crises are very different in character, in the aftermath of each crisis, financial leaders focused on some similar issues: problems in the banking system, excessive leverage, the growth of off-balance sheet investments, a property bubble and, underlying much of these problems, a failure of risk assessment. In the aftermath of the two crises, many of the suggested solutions are also similarâ??above all the constant refrain of the need for better information, more disclosure and greater transparency. However, these similarities also mask a very important difference: after the Asian crisis, it was assumed that these issues were largely a problem for emerging market economies and their governments and were not a serious threat to western financial systems.I suggest in this paper that while the international financial community has avoided repeating the first major error that they made after the Asian crisisâ??by recognizing that the problems now lie as much at home as than abroadâ??they continue to make a second and more profound error in their response to the subprime crisis: they continue to believe that the solution is to be found in greater transparency, more accurate risk assessment models, better due diligenceâ??in short, that the principal solution is to provide the markets with a truly comprehensive picture of the financial instruments that are being traded. I will argue that there are two crucial problems with this assumption. The first is that it is highly unlikely that it will ever be possible to truly calculate and quantify the indeterminaciesâ??the risks, uncertainties and ambiguitiesâ??that are at the heart of the process of securitization and the originate to distribute model. Even while advocating better risk management, much of the analysis by international financial institutions and mainstream commentators actually reveals the limits of the category of risk as an adequate means of capturing the indeterminacies involved, raising significant questions about the possibility of achieving the goals of transparency. The second problem is that even if it were possible to develop such a comprehensive picture of the indeterminacies involved in securities markets, it is not at all clear that financial markets will have the capacity or the interest in making effective use of that information. The failure of the major post-Asian financial crisis strategy, the standards and codes initiative, to gain the interest of the financial markets raises significant questions about current assumptions about the potential stabilizing role of better informed financial markets. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The international actorness of the European Union (EU) might be difficult to capture by exploring the past. Observers have emphasised EU's sui generis character and largely studied its internal processes giving rise to an increasing international presence and common foreign policy. However, the EU's international role has been increasingly important in anticipating the future. Accordingly, scholars have focused on EU's impact and role(s) in world politics. The key aim of this paper is to elucidate how the theoretical concept of Europeanization - as developed within the EU studies - might help us understand EU's international actorness. It is suggested that it enables us to account for (i) how the EU produces international action and (ii) how the EU's external engagements and interaction with other regions and actors feed back to its politics. The emphasis of this paper is on the latter. EU's relations with Asia are used as an exemplar. Since the mid 1990s, the EU has developed and adopted common strategies and policies towards Asia and its key actors. Its engagements have taken several forms including inter-regional dialogue as well as multi- and bilateral arrangements. Subsequently, the paper will examine what impact, if any, Asia has had on the EU. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU's relations with Asia enjoyed a renaissance in the early to mid-1990s. After the renewed focus on the Asian region by leading EU member states and the publication of the European Commission's Asia Strategy in 1994, the idea of a "partnership in a spirit of equality" crystallized, resulting in the launch of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996. In addition to bilateral and multilateral interaction, EU-Asia relations are marked by "new interregionalism", which emerged as a post-Cold War product and entails the encounter of two regions as distinct and equal actors in a dialogue going beyond trade and economy and including political, security-related, and cultural issues. This approach to relations with Asia is partly driven by the EU's predilection to deal with regions as dialogue partners and urge to promote regionalism elsewhere. Taking the Asia-Europe Meeting as a case study, is the aim of my paper to reflect on over a decade of EU-Asia interregional relations and assess the boundaries of region-to-region interaction. The absence of a coherent and institutionalized Asian grouping and the heterogeneity of the Asian partner countries have certainly posed limitations to EU-Asia interregionalism, but the EU's internal disposition, its international "actorness" and capability to speak with one voice are also topics for scrutiny. My paper will focus on the EU's stance and policy towards some of the key elements of Europe-Asia interregionalism, namely the promotion of regional integration, the friction between group-to-group interaction and intergovernmental cooperation, and the informal, uninstitutionalized approach. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'Architecture' has become the latest buzzword in Asia-Pacific security politics. The staggering growth in regional multilateralism which began during the 1990s has given rise to a burgeoning scholarship employing this terminology. Policymakers too have embraced the architectural metaphor. Yet despite this ubiquitous usage, little effort seems to have been expended to define explicitly what 'security architecture' actually means. As a consequence, various scholars and practitioners of Asia-Pacific security have ended up employing one and the same descriptor, but often with reference to quite different forms, dimensions and configurations of cooperative activity. This paper seeks to redress that shortcoming. It begins by reviewing the ways in which various scholars have employed 'security architecture' and by highlighting the contradictions that their often imprecise applications have created. It also examines the differing manner in which the region's incumbent 'security architects' - the United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) - have constructed and utilized the term. The paper then proposes a definition of 'security architecture' that is sufficiently ecumenical to appeal to scholars and practitioners alike, while at the same time rigorous and nuanced enough to exhibit genuine conceptual substance and regional specificity. A concluding section discusses the benefits of employing this new definition. It is proposed that this new definition will contribute to the advancement of knowledge by allowing scholars to communicate more effectively with one another; that it will help to bridge the gap between the so-called academic and policy worlds by facilitating meaningful dialogue between them; and, most importantly, that it will assist in establishing clear criteria for ascertaining what 'security architecture' actually exists in the Asia-Pacific region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though a free trade area in the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) is now being advocated, the prospects are doubtful. In fact, the region-wide FTA-buildings which were proposed twice in the past were at a standstill. Why is the region-wide FTA-building so difficult in the Asia Pacific? This paper addresses this question from the variables that have contributed to APEC’s evolution. Briefly speaking, “consensus” that has kept APEC stable and developed can be explained as an obstruction simultaneously. In order to explain why consensus may boost up and impede the regional governance, this paper deploys two factors that can make the opposite effects on consensus. One is the pending decision and another is the information gap. It will argue that consensus can impede the FTA-building through the examination of the past experiences. It will also suggest that the negative sites of consensus encourage creating bilateral FTAs. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a preliminary conceptualization of a theory of nonhegemonic international orders (NHIO). To varying degrees, IR theories, including realism, liberalism, constructivism, and Gramscian critical theory have privileged hegemonic power and socialization in international order-building. Nonhegemonic international order theory (NHIOT) holds that international order is not simply a function of the power and preferences of hegemonic actors (or powerful states). A nonhegemonic order may be defined as a relative stable pattern of interactions without the individual or collective hegemony of great powers. NHIOT makes the following assumptions: (a) the main actors/agents in international relations are states, social groups, and international organizations; (b) the international system is an anarchy but hegemony is not a natural or inevitable solution to anarchy; resistance to hegemony may be a more a natural tendency; (c) the structure of the international system is both material and ideational and hence resistance to hegemony can be both material and ideational; (d) international cooperation is possible not only to organize resistance to, but also the socialization of, hegemony-seeking actors; and (e) nonhegemonic actors are not just passive recipients of universal ideas or collective goods, but active borrowers and exporters. The paper offers some examples of nonhegemonic international orders such as the diffusion of Indian political ideas in precolonial Asia, the Chinese tributary system, European Union’s security community, and Indonesia’s postcolonial role within Southeast Asia. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is the ninth in a series in which the political careers of civilizations/world systems receive snapshot codings of their overall power structures at feasible intervals. The narratives are produced by collating histories with large frames of reference. The codings are done using a nominal variable, polarity, with seven available values. Previous articles in the series have examined the Indic system 550 BC--AD 1800, the Far Eastern 1025 BC--AD 1850, the Southwest Asian c. 2700--1500 BC, the Northeast African c. 2625--1500 BC. The Northeast African and Southwest Asian systems and sequences merged c. 1500 BC to form the Central system. Previous papers have coded this system from 1500 BC to 200 BC. The current paper narrates and codes the century from 200 BC to 100 BC at 10-year intervals. During this century, the Central system moved from unipolarity to hegemony and back; the polar state/hyperpower and hegemon was Rome. The century ended with Rome's economic and military capabilities increased, but with its strategic position in the Central system relatively weakened, because the core areas of its new potential main enemies (Parthia and Pontus) now lay farther from its military reach than those of its former potential main opponents (Macedonia and Syria). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is intended to set the framework for the entire panel by tracing in broad strokes the place of Asian studies in the field of (post)communist studies and in comparative politics writ large. During the first two decades after World War II studies of China and Japan were commonly carried out within the unifying theoretical framework of modernization theory. The decline of modernization theory in the 1970s, however, led to a more attenuated relationship between specialists of Asian countries and the broader field of comparative politics. In the post-Cold War era, in spite of the common challenges faced by reformers in (post)communist Asia and Europe, there have been even fewer lines of intellectual communication and integration across Asian studies, the study of postcommunist Europe, and the field of comparative politics writ large. A handful of noteworthy exceptions notwithstanding, students analyzing transitions in postcommunist Europe have not taken advantage of the rich empirical analysis coming out of scholarship on Asian countries embarking on reform. Similarly, Asian studies remains comparatively insular, ignoring potentially insightful analyses coming out of transitional settings that emerged out of the former Soviet bloc. This paper argues that a broader, more refined field of comparative (post)communism needs to do a better job of comparing the experiences of Asian and East European reforms, and that this will also help reinvigorate the lines of communication between both fields and comparative politics writ large. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the rise of networks of transnational non-governmental organisations (NGOs) within Asia and by Asia-based NGOs and counterparts in the West. The very terms ‘civil society’ and ‘NGO’ have different connotations within various Asian countries, which provide very different legal and political environments for non-state actors. Despite these barriers, some transnational cooperation has developed in response to specific issues and in response to an international growth of social movements. Four main types of cooperation can be identified: cooperation of individual local NGOs with international organisations; bilateral or multilateral cooperation between specific NGOs within a sub-region of Asia; region-wide organisations to address particular issues; and advocacy within the framework of broader civil society groupings. This paper maps these emerging forms of transnational NGO cooperation; examines the impact which such cooperation has had in strengthening the capacity of NGOs; considers the prospects for the further development of NGO cooperation; and assess the implications of these developments for debates about the potential of transnational civil society as a vehicle for social change and the idea of civil society in Asia. It examines two case studies. The first case involves the Asia-Europe People’s Forum, a parallel summit which has been created on the margins of the Asia-Europe Meeting, and which brings together disparate non-state groups to address collectively a wide range of state-sponsored agenda. The second case examines the development of inter-NGO networks around mine action in Southeast Asia, focusing in particular on the impact of external actors on local NGO activities. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to test a theory of collective security alliances against evidence of Asia-Pacific states' alliance formation behaviors in the early Cold War period. Specifically, I attempt to study why a multilateral alliance in the Asia-Pacific, namely a Pacific Pact did not materialize despite the fact many of Asia-Pacific states including the United States considered seriously and took initiative in developing such a pact. This puzzle is particularly interesting given the Western European states successfully developed a multilateral alliance, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Why did a Pacific Pact failed, while NATO succeeded?The paper analyzes a case of decision-making and behaviors of potential allies and major stakeholders for forming a multilateral alliance in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly those of the United States, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) and the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) of the period from March 1949 to September 1951. This timeframe was chosen, because some of Asia-Pacific states developed their interest in building a multilateral alliance in their region after the North Atlantic Treat was signed in April 1949, and a possibility of building multilateral security alliance was abandoned but instead, two bilateral and one trilateral alliances were signed in August and September 1951.Before going into further discussion, note that this paper is interested not in a multilateral alliance with three or more member sates, but a multilateral alliance that possesses the feature of indivisible security. From now on, this paper merely calls the former type of alliance a multilateral alliance but names the latter type as a collective security alliance. Specifically, NATO is a multilateral alliance as well as a collective security alliance, while ANZUS or SEATO is a multilateral alliance but not a collective security alliance according to this paper's definition. In fact, this conception of a multilateral and collective security alliance is not new. For instance, Hemmer and Katzenstein does not treat the SEATO as a multilateral alliance, although more than five states constituted the alliance, because they consider that SEATO is more like a series of bilateral alliances . For the same reason, this paper regards ANZUS as a multilateral alliance but not as a collective security alliance.In general, the existence of a threat or hostile power is a necessary condition for developing a collective security alliance, since a collective security is one type of alliances. However, the balance of threat theory does not predict what type of alliances such as bilateral, multilateral or collective security alliances will be formed. A collective security alliance would be likely to develop if two or more great powers are willing to bear an extra burden of providing security to other states and regions as well as to its own territory, and also if they are willing to restrain their freedom of action in order to balance against external threats. Empirical Evidence shows that the Department of States and Defense started drafting a Pacific Pact with features of a collective security alliance at the end of 1950 when the U.S. government found the Communist expansion most threatening at the end of 1950. Also, the United States started discussing this Pacific Pact proposal with relevant Asia-Pacific states at the beginning of 1951. The heightened perception of threat surely drove a state to form an alliance. However, historical evidence shows that perceived threat is necessary, but not sufficient for forming a collective security alliance as a conclusion... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper investigates if it is possible that the long ASEAN Peace since 1967 is a part of the East Asian Peace, which started elsewhere 12 years later. Instead of claiming causal relationship the paper suggests that the approaches that gave rise to ASEAN were also the genesis of East Asian Peace. The argument is that it is possible that East Asian peace, just as the ASEAN Peace, has originated in collectively adopted subjective approaches and orientations based on common constructions of the factual and normative reality of world politics. These approaches and orientations were first born in Southeast Asia after the regionally disastrous conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia, which involved the not-yet formally independent entities of Brunei and Singapore, and the regional states the Philippines (as Indonesia's ally), and Thailand. It is possible that the origin of East Asian Peace is the approach and orientation called, the ASEAN Way. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines the evolving security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region in an effort toward constructing a conceptually based taxonomy of alignment systems. The paper identifies three primary systems of alignment: alliances, security communities and strategic partnerships. First, it considers how alliances, traditionally analyzed in reference to the Cold War models of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, need re-conceptualizing to reflect the state of the current twenty first century security environment. Second, it critically considers security communities to determine the continued tenability of this concept. Thirdly, it aims to promote some conceptual clarity with respect to the widely employed but poorly understood notion of ‘strategic partnerships’ as a form of alignment. In order to empirically test and reinforce the conceptual base of the paper, the following Asia-Pacific alignments are examined as representative archetypes of these three alignment systems: the US hub/spoke ‘alliance’ network, the ASEAN ‘security community’ and the Sino-Russian ‘strategic partnership’. Through this composite conceptual-empirical process the paper seeks to advance a better conceptual understanding of the dynamic security architecture of the Asia Pacific region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a growing consensus that economic development alone will not result in democratization, universal values, and just societies. Investments in global governance seem necessary. But the discussion about global governance has often falsely featured the idea that there can be obvious joint solutions for obvious common problems. In fact, different actors pursue strikingly different, and often conflicting, versions of global governance. This paper explores the ongoing struggle for the governance of the global economy, featuring the competing proposals of transnational corporations and unions. This controversy has recently been transnationalized. The well-known activities of nationally based actors regarding their own governments, and the lobbying activities of international umbrella organizations regarding international organizations, are now complemented by transnational activities of nationally based actors. It is those new transnational actions that the paper focuses on, using recent conflicts between U.S.-based unions and Transnational Enterprises in the Americas, Asia, and Europe as the backdrop for a discussion of the contribution of such actions to the development of international values and norms. The paper argues that such contribution is necessarily limited because of the highly voluntaristic quality of both the corporations' and the unions' actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are there relevant lessons from the Nunn Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction case that can inform counterproliferation policy versus the nuclear weapons threats presented by North Korea? During the 1990s, there were various attempts by the Clinton Administration to innovate in national security policymaking. Innovations were attempted in peace operations, the interagency process, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Were the 1990s Clinton policy leadership efforts in stopping the threats of WMD proliferation in North Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq all policy failures that could have been prevented? Could more effective Clinton Administration policy leadership have made US counterproliferation efforts more successful? This paper focuses on the Clinton Administration's Counterproliferation Policy Initiative in the development and implementation of the Nunn Lugar programs for Cooperative Threat Reduction with Russia and the Former Soviet Republics. This case study uses institutionalist theory to explore using a cooperative strategy approach for building a counterproliferation regime in Northeast Asia. The analytical framework includes an examination of the Nunn Lugar, or Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs, from policy relevance and instrumental relevance perspectives. Overall, this paper's findings suggest the significance of institution and organization-building approaches for improving counterproliferation policymaking. The option suggested here is to nurture a small group of like-minded states and statesmen (the six parties), focused around one specific functional area (counterproliferation), to build effective rules, organizations and enforcement mechanisms for developing an effective Northeast Asian security regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Millions of people crossing previously tightly controlled national borders in Northeast Asia each year are becoming an important element of international relations in the region, changing the economic, social, cultural, and even political landscape of the border regions of China, Japan, Mongolia, and Russia. The paper examines recent trends, current issues, and future prospects of cross-border migration and its role in promoting or threatening the development of regionalism in Northeast Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how economic crises create dislocations affecting social reproduction and provisioning of basic needs. It seeks to go beyond economistic understandings of financial crises by focusing on their social dimensions and consequences for human security in recent Asian and Latin American crises. While many writers have sought to explain recent financial crises from a macroeconomic standpoint -- chiefly concerned with why and how fixed exchange rate regimes collapse, here an alternative approach focuses on how financial crises create massive social upheavals that impact the daily lives of the most vulnerable members of society, as well as simultaneously generating strategies for cultural and moral resistance to hegemonic/supremacist power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Extra-regional hegemons such as France in West Africa, the United States in the Middle East, and Russia in Central Asia have been playing increasingly important roles in the politics of international rivers to which they are not riparian states. A general objective of the paper is to provide an analysis and explanation of the positive and negative effects that extra-regional hegemons have on riparian state relations in water scarce regions of the world. However, the paper’s central thesis is that extra-regional hegemons have a strong negative (and sometimes benign) rather than positive effect on riparian state relations. More specifically, I argue that the political economic involvement of such hegemons in water scarce regions of the world inhibits interstate cooperation over shared rivers. The thesis is supported by an empirical examination of rivers in three water scarce regions: Amu Darya River in Central Asia, Jordan River in the Middle East, and the Senegal River in West Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post-Asian Financial Crisis context there remains doubt over the importance of state structures in an era dominated by global finance. The restructuring experiences of the Crisis-affected countries in 1997-1998 highlighted the increasing importance of international financial guidelines in the development and evaluation of financial sectors in developing countries. Although the debates as to the importance of these international guidelines have not focused explicitly on the apparent ?retreat of the state?, the terms of this debate, so dominant in the International Political Economy literature, and the assumptions on which it is premised, continue to inform the evaluation of the relative positions and influence of states in the global economy. Through the adoption of Colin Hay?s ?moments of stateness? this paper evaluates the efforts made by the Indonesian governments in the restructuring of the banking sectors. I argue that instead of leading to a diminution in the role of the state in a globalised financial market, the international guidelines actually require governments to strengthen, extend and broaden the remit of the state structures. This undermines the neo-liberal economic assumptions that privatisation and reform after a crisis should, and will, result in greater market-centred activity and stronger market discipline accompanied by the withdrawal of the state. Underlying the ongoing importance of the state within the banking sectors is the extent to which political decisions and political will provide essential support and direction for private actors in developing countries if these banking systems are to retain any degree of international creditworthiness. An underlying tension within the retreat of the state debate is the expectation that change to a state structure will result in a neo-liberal state, and that this is the result of a decrease in the functions of the state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The sea - change in the US strategic agenda ushered in by the Bush Administration, augmented by the American responses to the events of September 11, 2001, have changed the political and military landscape for most of the world’s nations. International diplomacy and the national policy of many nation have yet to formulate a fully - nuanced response to, inter alia, the US 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the 2002 National Security Strategy, President Bush’s Axis of Evil Speech, and the aftermath of the rapid American victories in Afghanistan and Iraq. Recent important changes in American strategic doctrine and new weapons deployments may have critical impacts on the East Asian region. Plans to develop and deploy Ballistic Missile Defenses and a new generation of tactical nuclear weapons combined with the American doctrine of preventive military action against perceived threats have the potential to upset a number of evolving dyadic relationships in the region. In this paper, we focus on the impact of changing American strategy on three of East Asian regional dyads. All three could be described as enduring rivalries stabilized by tacit strategic balances and close economic relations. These are: 1) The rivalry between the ROK and DPRK. Will the US doctrine reverse the progress toward normalization, and possibly provoke a disastrous war? 2) The Chinese - Japanese strategic rivalry. Will American (or American / Japanese) BMD, and the apparent possibility of a nuclear Japan drive China to accelerate the pace of its strategic modernization, possibly provoking a new arms race? 3) The Taiwan Straits rivalry. Will deployment of advanced TMD on the island and a US tilt in the direction of the ROC provoke more aggressive behaviour by the PRC? We conclude by suggesting some ways in which these regional dyads can act to prevent future regional destabilization arising from new US policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While comparison of initial conditions for institution-building in Europe and Asia would lead us to a pessimistic and defeatist view with regard to the prospect for economic integration in East Asia, the move to integration in this region is now gaining momentum any way. The driving force of regional cooperation in East Asia may come from sources that are different from the Europe?s case. Once integration process starts up, however, it is possible that the process resembles the European experience more and more, because it is the logic of market that works at the core. Drawing on the analysis of Europe?s experience, this paper focuses on possible problems that could arise as a result of economic integration in East Asia. As integration of economies of East Asia proceeds, the market force unleashed in the process will propel economic growth in this region, but it will also possibly worsen inequality problem as well. Such market failures could in turn engender strong anti-integration sentiments in quarters of participating countries that question the legitimacy of the whole integration project, throwing all enterprise of economic integration into disarray. Such negative sentiments also can be mobilized for electoral purposes, further making it hard to sustain cooperative framework among states. The point here is that Europe shows the significance of being attentive to the consequences of economic integration: distributional problems and resulting erosion of legitimacy. In this regard, Europe?s experience is valuable for East Asia in delineating a roadmap for future steps toward regional integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will examine four fundamental questions concerning US allies and partners in Asia: How is the United States perceived by elites/public opinion? Why does this matter -- how do these countries figure in US interests? How can consequences for the United States be measured? What can/should the United States do to influence the impact on US interests? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the stern admonishments of the prominent Extractive Industry Review in 2003, the World Bank Group (WBG) has continued to promote the expansion of large-scale mining activities in resource rich client-countries, notably in Asia. While keeping in line with its traditional mantra on the economic benefits of the sector in cash-strapped countries, poverty reduction and environmental sustainability have become in recent years, the new porte-étandard to justify the need for the WBG to remain actively involved in the sector. Building on the cases of the Philippines, this paper analyses the rise of this new social and environmental narrative in conjunction with the highly political nature of the role played by the WBG in the mining sector of its country-clients. It is argued that in practice, these new regimes, which comprises multilateral social and environmental safeguards, circumscribes the risks faced by industry, rather than by local populations. While successful in stimulating foreign direct investments in the sector, these regimes might also prove to be ineffective in taming local and national resentment against mining activities. Crucially, the engineering of mining regimes and norm-settings in multilateral arenas brings forth concerns relating to the legitimacy of the transformations of the roles and responsibilities assigned to local mining stakeholders, as well as the possible subsequent contraction of local political spaces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper quantifies the impact of terrorism and conflicts on income per capita growth in Asia for 1970-2004. Our panel estimations show that transnational terrorist attacks had a significant growth-limiting effect. An additional terrorist incident per ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a comparative analysis of the level of regionalism that is developing in Europe and the Asia-Pacific. It builds on Bjorn Hettne’s ‘New Regionalism Theory’ to assess the level and direction of regionalisation that has occurred in these ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is the ninth in a series in which the political careers of civilizations/world systems receive snapshot codings of their overall power structures at feasible intervals. The narratives are produced by collating histories with large frames of ref ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The diffusion of norms in the international sphere is usually described as a process at the interface directly between countries or via international organizations which are engaged in the legitimation of particular norms. This paper looks at the role of ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an increasingly globalized world, international cooperation is fundamental to controlling communicable diseases. Nevertheless, recent trans-national public health crises have shown that states continue to use national sovereignty to justify non-compliance with rapidly emerging international health norms pertaining to the timely sharing of information, transparency of process, and the need to address social and environmental determinants of health. There is for example, compelling albeit limited epidemiological evidence that despite its' political isolation, Burma's incidence and prevalence rates of HIV, multi-drug resistant tuberculosis and malaria are among the highest in Asia, and stronger evidence that the governing regime lacks both the capacity and political will to address determinants of disease spread as its response to Cyclone Nargis dramatically shows. Other key cases of this dynamic in Asia are China's initial failing to alert the international community to the SARS outbreak and Indonesia's temporary refusal to continue to provide samples of avian influenza virus to the WHO's Global Influenza Surveillance Network. Using these cases, this paper examines to what degree communicable disease control is impeded by state sovereignty, and how states, international organizations and other non-state actors are interacting and/or partnering to overcome this impediment and better address global public health threats created by the fluid movement of pathogens across borders. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the relaunch of the EU’s Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs, Europe’s knowledge strategy hasbecome critically entwined with its regionalising objectives and global outlook. This paper examinesthe effects of the European Union’s policies directed towards Asia in higher education, specifically through the EU’s Erasmus Mundus ‘Asian Window’. The ‘Erasmus Mundus’ programme, launched in 2004, marks a shift in policy direction, from development aid and cooperation with non-European universities to drawing in global talent in order to bolster the European knowledge-economy project. The Erasmus Mundus Asian Window initiative targets "the best and brightest" in the Asia region, providing funding for graduate students to study specially-designed transnational Masters courses in Europe. The Erasmus Mundus instrument, because it both conceptually and structurally incorporates some of the EU’s foreign affairs and development objectives under an educational umbrella, is a powerful new mechanism in the Europe-Asia relationship. This “flagship” EU programme attempts to synchronise, and indeed integrate, the EU’s bilateral and regional approaches to relations with Asian countries. This is placing the EU in direct competition with other regional projects in higher education, both within Asia and from Australia and the United States. However, the mixed objectives in the EU's approach make it tension-ridden and therefore unstable, complicating the EU’s developing ‘strategic dialogues’ with India and China in particular. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently the relation between the Regional Cooperation in the world developed countries and its wave reaches to the Asian region. Continuing to the EU and NAFTA, APEC, AFTA, ARF, EAEC (ASEAN+3), CER, developed quickly, and during these years, ASEAN+6 and furthermore Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO) raised swiftly in the Asian region. In this paper we would like to concentrate on the Shanghai Cooperative Organization, which was built as the biggest Regional Cooperation by the 1.5 billion population in 2001, now if the observers are included (like India, Mongolia and Iran), the population will be 2.8, the huge mega-region with Asian big countries, which have nuclear weapon, energy, power, ideology, and skepticism towards Euro-Atlantic Democracy.. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mainstream IR theories have difficulty explaining the regional politics patterns that emerged in the post-cold war. The ‘distribution of power’ cannot explain how a state’s perception of external threats generates different policy outcomes. In the post-cold war era, regional powers’ perception of external threats is not convergent, unlike during the cold-war era. The U.S. military posture has undergone a major shift since 9/11. The concept of a ‘war on terror’, a ‘long war’, non-proliferation, and the ‘China threat’ now dominate U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. relies less on a static alliance system. Meanwhile, North Korea has been identified as a member of the ‘axis of evil’ with its WMD programs and nuclear ambition. In Northeast Asia, the regional powers’ (the members of the Six-Party Talks-South Korea, North Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and the U.S.) perceptions of the North Korean nuclear threat differ because their state identities produce different understandings of North Korea. In focusing on the U.S., South Korea and North Korea in the Six-Party Talks, this paper traces the relationship between state identity and the perception of threats, and examines how changes in state identity generate different perceptions of external threats and different foreign policy outcomes. Keywords: Perception of Threat, State Identity, Regional Security Dynamics ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the field of quantitative studies of the causal relations between ethnic constellations, cultural value patterns, and internal (i.e. intra-state) conflicts several lacunae exist. One particularly important concerns the methodical linking of empirical conflict data with modern conflict theories. On the one hand, empirical analysis is often not guided by theory. If theories play a part, they represent rather inductive ad hoc explanations or solutions to empirical puzzles. A research approach which has been deductively deduced from and systematically integrated into a sociological macro theory would therefore be desirable.On the other hand, theories of internal conflicts are frequently adherent to the rational choice paradigm. In order to complement the dominant, actor-centered approach, it therefore seems appropriate to search for a radically systemic theory of conflict. Existing approaches in this respect, however, either assume conflicts to be a sign of dysfunctionality - as Talcott Parsons did - or they are not useful for empirical analysis - like Niklas Luhmann's notion of conflict. The proposed paper will try to resolve some of the extant deficits by developing a theoretical model of conflict in societal systems, followed by an exemplary application of this model to the empirical situation in Asia and Oceania.On the basis of the concept of autopoietic, self-referential social systems according to Luhmann, it is possible to tie in other system-theoretical approaches into our considerations. First to be mentioned (1) is a combination of the classical principle of holarchic structures, involving suprasystems and subsystems, with the principle of holonomic structures according to David Bohm and Karl Pribram, dealing with implicate order. In addition to establishing political and socioeconomic subsystems, this procedure also allows for an entirely new approach regarding the conception of culture as the whole of the societal system being implicitly present in its parts, and thus for a well-defined localization of ethnic, religio-linguistic factors, as well.Furthermore (2), transferring the notion of dissipative systems into the context of social systems has turned out to be of considerable value for the model, which we developed to ascertain the causal links between a country's strain due to conflict and structural context factors. Dissipative systems are those which maintain their self-organized structures by emitting into their environments their inner entropy - i.e. the "mess of disorder" that has been accumulated due to the increase of their self-complexity. We assume that in societal systems this self-complexity increases because of the occurrence of conflicts. What we understand by the term of conflict is a potential state of the societal system, involving a divergence from political, socioeconomic or cultural norms inherent in the societal system. The entropy being produced by this can be exported from the emergent societal system to the underlying systems of interpersonal communication. In these social systems, then, is the approaching "low-grade" energy being autopoietically constituted in the form of physical violence as a mode of communication.Finally (3), the term of "attractor" deriving from the natural sciences, is very central for the model advanced here. An attractor is an "attractive" state for a system. Applied to conflict as a system's state this means that a conflict attractor is a location in the state space where the occurrence of conflict is probable. The dimensions of the societal state space are shaped by ethnic, political, and socioeconomic factors.The model outlined here is intended to be a frame of analysis for empirical explorations. For this purpose, the quantitative data on political conflicts from the Heidelberg database of the Conflict Information System (CONIS) have been available... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the aftermath of WWII, and once again at the end of the Cold War, Europeans created order and thereby enhanced their stability. As the following discussion will make clear, they did so by transcending historical legacies, including former enemies into security structures, tying the US to the European continent and thus, over time, promoting principles, norms and rules that built trust and redefined identities. Or, put differently, Europeans promoted peace and stability by giving rise to what Webber et. al. (2004) and Kirchner (2006) characterize as "security governance." Security provisions in the Asia-Pacific region look very different. History there is still a "neuralgic point" (Berger 2006) and a "hub and spokes network" consisting of five bilateral alliances, along with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (a "security regime" which is gradually moving toward a "security community") and the ASEAN Regional Forum were created over time to stabilize the region. Recognizing that Asia is not Europe, the paper argues that the process of European security provisions, nevertheless, provides useful lessons for the Asia-Pacific region, particularly when it comes to the institutionalization of trust on multiple levels--a development that appears inevitable to assure regional stability in the long-run. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does ASEAN respond to East Asia integration? This paper first examines the mixed responses of ASEAN members to two competing proposals for East Asian integration, ASEAN+3 versus ASEAN+6. Then, I will argue that ASEAN is rejuvenating itself through institution building, so that it can maintain centrality and remain relevant to the process of East Asia integration. Such endeavors stem primarily from the fear that ASEAN would be eclipsed by extra-regional powers, namely China and Japan, both of which are increasingly exerting leadership in East Asian regionalism. In fact, ASEAN has proceeded its institution building for some time through ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the ASEAN+3 framework, and FTAs. The most significant attempt is the ASEAN Charter recently agreed upon in November 2007, which should transform ASEAN towards a more rules-based organization. Over all, East Asia integration poses both challenges and opportunities to ASEAN. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

FTA in Asia has wider perspectives than defined in article 24 of GATT, which are usually called as EPA (Economic Partnership Agreement) and include mobility of service activities. FTA thus causes active mobility of human resources particularly in service sector. Based upon the serious experience of Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, several ideas on foreign currency pool and cooperative management which are towards establishing common currency in Asia have discussed among retired politicians (including some active politicians) at their symposia etc. There might be possible to realize common currency in Asia after much less time negotiations than in Europe which reached after 40 years negotiations. However, there are lots of barriers to be overcome which are political willingness, political hegemony etc. In this paper the details of such conditions towards common currency are examined. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A huge worldwide wave of bank acquisitions in developing countries by industrialized countries' banks occurred in the 1990's. Latin America provided the most active game board on which bank acquisitions played out, in terms of value of acquisitions, but Asia, Central Europe and countries in other regions also saw bank sales. Financial economics has traditionally analyzed bank acquisitions from an efficiency perspective, arguing that banks are driven to exploit the efficiency gains obtained through buying other banks. But I argue, with support from recent studies in international politics, economics and banking finance, that these waves of bank privatization and acquisition are driven instead by political dynamics at the national and international levels. I propose a multilevel model, a modified "gravity model" from international economics, to explain the broad variation in cross-border bank acquisitions across developing countries. Through this model, I suggest that "closeness", measured in legal, political economic, cultural and spatial terms, promotes cross-border bank acquisition. I illustrate this model with cases from Northeast Asia and Latin America.The more controversial forms of FDI involve industries of strategic interest, of which banking is one. Banks are at the center of modern economies. Banks are monitored and governed by national and international organizations established for that purpose and they lobby these organizations. Banks are also "privately monitored" by investors and other interested parties. In short, banks and financial systems operate in a complex web of politics. Governmental actors are pulled and pushed toward banks and banks' power. They are pulled by banks' ability to deploy liquidity in productive ways, and pushed by the perceived need to regulate and monitor banking activity. I propose that cross-border bank acquisition can be examined through a multilevel model examining "attraction" between acquirer and target bank by examining national, bilateral and international factors. This paper sketches a preliminary hierarchical linear tobit model using longitudinal datasets. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Once depicted as a formidable driving force for integration in Asia and the Pacific, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) now mostly draws attention of critics who tend to consider it as a failure. This paper aims at bringing careful empirical evidence to a trial that has so far seriously lacked it. We contrast this evidence with the real nature of APEC, one that many have quickly forgotten. Doing so reveals that it may not be APEC that has derailed but those who have observed it over the years. Based on our evidence, it is clearly too soon to say that APEC is a failure and is currently in a chaotic situation. The grouping has experienced an expanding agenda but not without keeping some priorities. Furthermore, leaders' declarations have been reasonably matched by a growing number of collective activities aiming at building a regional community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper asks the following two sets of questions. First, why and how did Asia-Pacific institution-building finally take off in 1989, while previous proposals for multilateral institution-building in the Asia-Pacific had failed to gain support from potential members? Why and how did the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) process emerge, while the earlier proposal for the formation of the East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) failed? Second, why did APEC and APT take the institutional form that they took and why did they evolve in the way they did? I present a framework for analyzing the origins, creation, and form of institutions that incorporates both demand- and supply- conditions in a temporal perspective by combining insights from historical institutionalism, constructivism, and policy network approaches. In each case, I examine a path-dependent nature of institution-building development and the role of a sense of crisis as a trigger to induce institutional creation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are a mix of expectations about how coalition politics affect the policies and decision making processes of coalition cabinets. This paper is an exploratory analysis of these expectations, using cases of foreign policy decision making in India and Turkey. While some of the expectations about decision making processes are met, (particularly in the Turkish case), specific views about the content of foreign policies are not confirmed (particularly in the Indian case). The purpose of this analysis is to build hypotheses on the conditions under which some expectations are realized and the contingency factors that intervene between alternative expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper titled "Civil-Military Relations and Foreign Policy in the United States" prepared for the "International Studies Association Convention." It examines the role of U.S. president as the civilian commander in chief of the U.S. Armed Forces and the U.S. Congress which has a constitutional mandate to both raise and support armies and declare war. It discusses civil-military experiences of the U.S., Japan and China.

Scholars have long appreciated a variety of ways in which relations between civilian political leaders and military commanders, military forces, and military doctrines can affect foreign policy choices and behavior. Only recently, however, have scholars attempted to think about these in general theoretical terms, and for the most part they have focused their attention on civil-military relations in the United States, and primarily in the context of the Cold War. The question arises whether insights from existing work on civil-military relations can help us understand international relations in the Asia Pacific region in a post-Cold War context in which the "War on Terror," nation building, and problems of non-proliferation dominate states' foreign policy agendas. This paper and others on this panel seek to address these issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a paper on political engineering and ethnic politics in the Asia-Pacific region. It examines how the democratizing states of both Asia and the Pacific have responded to ethnic diversity through political engineering and institutional reform. An examination of the record of these reforms were undertaken focusing mainly on the areas of mediating, representative and powersharing institutions. It has been concluded that both societal and institutional factors are important to determine political outcomes.