Search

This paper examines Ralph Bunche’s mediatory role in the early years of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Drawing from the modalities and strategies used to usher in a period of relative peace and stability in the Middle East, this paper will seek to assess the notions of continuity and change in Middle Eastern crisis management. In particular, attempts will be made to evaluate the conditions that led to the success of those negotiations and to investigate the extent to which the Rhodes Peace process is relevant to the contemporary process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why have suicide bombings in the Middle East become so common and so popular whereas in South Asia they have started to disappear from the political landscape? Are groups that perpetrate this tactic related to one another or learn from each other? What little scholarship exists analyzing suicide bombing conceives of the phenomenon as motivated by non-rational religious beliefs, nationalist ideology, obedience to charismatic and authoritarian leaders, or because of despair but always assume that suicide bombing should be case specific. In Sri Lanka suicide bombing was effective in making both sides war weary, dissuading external donors from continuing their support, moderating both sides’ demands and was a factor in bringing them to the negotiating table. In the Palestinian case, the bombings served as a method of recruitment and mobilization for radical elements within the Palestinian community. They serve at one and the same time to attack the hated enemy (Israel) and give legitimacy to outlier radical groups who compete with the Palestinian Authority (PA) for leadership of the community. Although there is little that connects Sri Lanka to the Middle East, the Sri Lankans learned this tactic from their contacts with the Hezbollah in Lebanon in the early 1980s and imported it to Sri Lanka in 1987. Among Palestinians, groups that previously eschewed suicide terror jumped on the bandwagon after it was successful in increasing Hamas’ popular support. Thus there is a spill over effect of suicide terror from one region to another as well as a diffusion of the tactic within the Palestinian case. Sheikh Yassin and Dr. Abdel Aziz al Rantisi called for the use of suicide terror against the American invaders in Iraq. There were several successful suicide attacks in that conflict. Finally, on April 30, 2003, two British citizens of South Asian descent perpetrated a suicide attack in Tel Aviv. The interconnections between their group, the Al Muhajiroun and the militant groups in the occupied territories, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, serve to provide an interesting case of how terrorism (and suicide terror in particular) has had a contagion effect. The paper will demonstrate that multiple radical organizations are engaged in a competition with one another and use violence to increase their prestige and support. This competition now extends beyond the borders of one single country. This paper seeks to compare the phenomenon of suicide bombing and investigate to what degree there has been contagion to other regions and rival organizations as a result. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proposed paper will examine regional conflict and conflict resolution in the post-Cold War Middle East. Specifically, the focus will be on Iranian policy towards a regional US ally, Saudi Arabia. During the 1990s Iran tried twice to reach an accommodation with its long time rival. The first attempt in 1991 failed, but the second, in 1997, met with considerable success. The two states now have stable diplomatic relations, they cooperate in OPEC and they have consciously tried to play down issues that have proven divisive in the past, such as Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the United States and Iran’s involvement in the Abu Musa dispute. As a rogue state, or a member of the axis of evil, Iran’s policy in this vital region is important in its own right. However, it is also representative of a dynamic that exists in other parts of the Middle East and the developing world. States like Iran, which can be referred to as regional challengers, are involved in three sided conflicts. Not only must they deal with their local rival, they must face the political, economic and military power of US hegemony. Other examples in the region include Syria and the Palestinians in their conflict with Israel. Outside the region China (vis-à-vis Taiwan) and North Korea (vis-à-vis South Korea) can also be included. Despite the pressure that has been placed on regional challengers, these conflicts have generally persisted. This suggests a complex interaction between the global balance of power and factors at the domestic and regional levels. This interaction has important consequences for regional conflict and for the United States as it tries to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to fight the war on terror. This paper will explore these factors and their impact on conflict resolution through a structured, focussed comparison between Iran’s first attempt to accommodate Saudi Arabia under President Rafsanjani and the present policy of President Khatami. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why has suicide terror in the Middle East led to an exacerbation of conflict whereas in Sri Lanka, negotiations and a peace treaty appear to be in the process of being successfully negotiated? The conventional wisdom analyzing Palestinian suicide bombing conceives of the phenomenon as motivated by religious beliefs, nationalist ideology, obedience to charismatic and authoritarian leaders, or because of despair. This paper argues that Palestinian public opinion increasingly supports this tactic against both Israeli civilians and military personnel because of several endogenous factors. Under the present political environment, the bombings are a method of recruitment and mobilization for radical Palestinian organizations. They serve at one and the same time to attack the hated enemy (Israel) and give legitimacy to outlier radical groups who compete with the Palestinian Authority (PA) for leadership. In Sri Lanka, suicide bombing has contributed to an atmosphere of war weariness and the groups who have used this tactic have switched to negotiations in part because Tamil public opinion does not support killing civilians and constrains the kinds of terror operations in which the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) can and cannot engage. The two cases provide an interesting contrast of religious versus secular terror. Based on original field research, interviews with leaders, and analyses of public opinion, this paper explores the comparisons and differences between the two cases and explains how similar structural environments, colonial histories, comparable extended conflicts, and similar tactics have resulted in two very different outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers Arab intellectuals' reactions to President Barack Obama's election and the likely impact of his presidency on America's Middle East policy, drawing on Arabic newspaper editorials published during the new president's first hundred days in office. It reveals that Arab intellectuals seem skeptical of the Obama administration's ability to address what they posit as the major concerns of Arab publics; namely: America's "biased" stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict, which stems from its special relationship with Israel; its proclivity to use excessive force in its dealings with Arab and Muslim countries; and its myopic view of Arab and Muslim societies and of Islam. This deep skepticism is a product of a negative image of the United States that permeates Arab intellectual circles. In addition to demonstrating the resonance of the above three themes in Arab intellectuals' discourse on the Obama presidency, the paper highlights the significance of regional and country specific considerations in Arab intellectuals' reactions to the new administration. The paper concludes that the Obama administration faces an uphill battle in winning over Arab publics, partly because of how Arab intellectuals represent it in their writings and frequent appearances on Arab broadcast media. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholarly and policy interest in the involvement of religion in international relations has increased in recent years, often with a focus on various kinds of transnational religious actors - including the Roman Catholic Church, al Qaeda and Shii networks in the Middle East. Some transnational religious actors affect international order, especially networks of Islamic extremists and terrorists. This paper has several objectives. First, it examines the nature of transnational religious actors. Second, it looks at transnational religious soft power. Third, it discusses how transnational religious soft power can influence international outcomes. Fourth, it focuses on Iran's influence in Iraq in relation to Shii transnational religious networks. To be successful it appears necessary for transnational religious actors to be successful in maintaining and disseminating their global message while adapting to the local. The Roman Catholic Church was able to do this in relation to democratisation and human rights in the 1980s and 1990s and al Qaeda was able to do it for a while following the USSR's ejection from Afghanistan until its brutal methods dramatically undermined popular support. The paper contends that Shii transnational networks involving Iran and Iraq show the relatively limited capacity of Shii transnational religious actors, as they are find it very difficult to forge collective goals. Instead, such collective goals are undermined by resolutely nationalist concerns. This is not to allege that nationalism necessarily trumps religious collective goals although it seems likely that in most cases this will indeed be the case. Further work is needed on religious transnationalism actors to determine whether this is likely to be the case but the very limited evidence presented in this paper suggests that we underestimate the power of nationalism and locality at our peril when seeking to understand what religious transnationalism can accomplish. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates whether European integration, and notably intensified patterns of political cooperation, have led member states of the European Community (EC) - and later the European Union (EU) -- to increasingly 'speak with one voice' in global politics. In order to explore this issue, the paper analyzes member state voting behaviour within the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) between 1952 and 2005, using three different methods to assess the extent of 'cohesion' for EU states as compared to the full UNGA membership. Calculations assessing cohesiveness are first carried out for all UNGA resolutions and subsequently, for resolutions falling within given themes, such as human rights, Middle East policy and security. Our analysis reveals that, in spite of successive rounds of EU enlargement - and the resulting increase in political opinions - EC (and EU) cohesion levels were higher than those measured for the full UNGA membership, with EC cohesion levels notably strengthening from the mid-1980s onwards, when European political cooperation became increasingly effective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What factors make it more likely that an organization uses violence? This paper builds a model that tries to answer this question and validate the model using out of sample testing. The paper draws from a new data based created through collaboration betwe ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contributes to the debate on a 'new Middle East' by challenging two prevalent claims about the nature of the emerging regional constellation. Firstly, that the emerging regional constellation mark a clear and fundamental break from the dynamics of the 'old Middle East' and secondly that the region has become 'post-Arab' in the sense that Arab politics has ceased being distinctly Arab. Thus, the key argument of this paper is that an important but too little acknowledged dimension of the contemporary regional configuration can be described in terms of a New Arab Cold War. By using this term we are deliberately paraphrasing the title of Malcolm Kerr's seminal work on Arab politics in the 1950-60s as we in line with the theme of the conference turns to the past for tools to imagine the present and future. A comparison between that era and the basic features of regional order in the context of the recent regional wars in Lebanon 2006 and Gaza 2008/09 reveals a number of structural similarities between the old Arab Cold War and today's regional politics. It is however only possible to speak of a qualified return as this new Arab Cold War also displays important differences from the previous. While holding a distinct Arab dimension this Arab rivalry now takes place within the context of a new kind of Arab nationalism marked by a 'non-statist Political Arabism' strongly linked to an Arab-Islamic public sphere. The paper therefore concludes that by adapting Kerr's classic notion to the 21st century we have become able to grasp what we consider as a number of basic and important features of the 'new Middle East' ignored in much of the current debate. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper challenges the view that any diplomatic moves of Russia in the Middle East, particularly when supportive of revisionist anti-Western forces in the region, represent evidence of a return to the zero-sum competition of the Cold War. The paper argues that, though it is tempting to view Russian policies through a revived Cold War prism, this is a problematic and ultimately misguided approach. Such an approach ignores the significant sources of discontinuity and rupture between the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia, which have significantly transformed the underlying context for Russian engagement in the Middle East. The paper presents an alternative framework for understanding and conceptualizing Russia's engagement with the Middle East. This has three dimensions and takes an "inside-out" approach. First, there are the domestic drivers for Russian engagement which is linked to the perceived need to counter the threat of secessionism in the North Caucasus and the potential broader radicalization of Russia's Muslim population. Second, there are the more strictly economic interests in the Middle East, which include increasingly important trading relations with moderate pro-Western states in the region. And, third, there are the geopolitical considerations which certainly include potential competition with the West but also incorporate Russian ambitions to promote its credentials as a responsible great power supporting international norms, such as the principle of nonproliferation and a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper assesses how xenophobic and/or anti-immigrant societal attitudes may affect the preferences of political leaders involved in the making of foreign policy. The paper assesses the cases of russophobia and anti-Arabism in Poland. Adopting a second level of analysis (domestic structures approach), it gauges to what extent these phenomena have impacted recent Polish foreign policy behavior towards Russia and the Middle East. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is the ninth in a series in which the political careers of civilizations/world systems receive snapshot codings of their overall power structures at feasible intervals. The narratives are produced by collating histories with large frames of reference. The codings are done using a nominal variable, polarity, with seven available values. Previous articles in the series have examined the Indic system 550 BC--AD 1800, the Far Eastern 1025 BC--AD 1850, the Southwest Asian c. 2700--1500 BC, the Northeast African c. 2625--1500 BC. The Northeast African and Southwest Asian systems and sequences merged c. 1500 BC to form the Central system. Previous papers have coded this system from 1500 BC to 200 BC. The current paper narrates and codes the century from 200 BC to 100 BC at 10-year intervals. During this century, the Central system moved from unipolarity to hegemony and back; the polar state/hyperpower and hegemon was Rome. The century ended with Rome's economic and military capabilities increased, but with its strategic position in the Central system relatively weakened, because the core areas of its new potential main enemies (Parthia and Pontus) now lay farther from its military reach than those of its former potential main opponents (Macedonia and Syria). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the impact of globalization on the international society within the Arab World (inter-state Arab society). The end of the Cold War ended the relative autonomy and ‘protection’ of the Arab states from the pressure of globalization. Since the late 1980s, Arab states have been intensively exposed to the forces of globalization. This paper aims to find changes in and of institutions within inter-state Arab society as a result of globalization. It compares the Inter-state Arab society during the Cold war with the inter-state Arab society in the post-Cold War era. I focus on two institutions: Sovereignty and the market. And how changes in these institutions affect the regional order and security. This paper contributes to our understanding of the contemporary Middle East in a globalized era. It also contributes to the English School academic project by applying the English School to the regional level and to the economic sector. Both are almost neglected by English School scholars. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the apparent tensions and divergence in approach between the United States and the European Union in efforts to promote democratic reform in the Middle East. Since this issue rose to prominence in 2002, the two sides of the Atlantic have often been viewed as taking diametrically opposite views of the relative urgency of Arab democratization, and of how best to achieve progress toward that goal. Yet, in a thorough review of diplomacy, official development assistance, and democracy assistance funding and programs, this paper finds that the divergence is more apparent than real. The paper finds significant similarities in the two actors' strategies and in their mix of democracy promotion activities. Yet both the European Union and the United States find reasons to sustain rhetorical divergence, and an element of strategic competition also colors their respective policies. The paper concludes that -- even if unintentional -- policy convergence between Europe and the United States in promoting democratic reform in the Middle East is not only evident, but may improve further over time. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper concentrates on the interaction of Islam and secular nationalism in the modern Middle East. Although the political power of Islam diminished with the rise of nationalism, it largely remained as a strong social force in the Middle East. While several Muslim political leaders spent efforts to create secular state structures, they still relied on the power of Islam for many practical reasons. From the 1920s on, the Middle East states aimed to take Islam under state control. Islam was taken under control so that secular nationalism could be initiated smoothly. However, based on the political conditions after WWII, the place of Islam in the Middle East was reevaluated by almost every Islamic state so that it could be used to promote the national interests. State control of Islam could be achieved only if Islam was nationalized through state propaganda and public education systems. Throughout the Middle East several Muslim states initiated projects to nationalize Islam. In this paper, I propose that the Muslim states’ desire to use Islam for their political interests paved the way for the rise of political Islam. What were the conditions that forced the political leaders to appeal the socio-political power of Islam? How the projects to nationalize Islam were carried out in the Middle East? Along with answering these questions, I will conclude my paper by answering two crucial questions: Why did the nationalization of Islam fail? Did the failure of these projects cause further Islamization of the Middle East. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to identify and explain the primary incentives and disincentives for Saudi Arabia to increase its steady state level of oil exports in the future. For Saudi elites in particular and those of other major oil exporting states in the Middle East it can be argued that fundamental changes have occurred in the factors underlying their strategies for oil production and exports. With world oil prices relatively stable at substantially higher than historical levels, the escalation of war in Iraq, enhanced Iranian and decreased US influence in certain areas of the Middle East, rapidly growing domestic demand for petroleum products in most main exporting states, and robust growth of world oil demand driven by Chinese, Indian, and US economic growth, it is crucial to reassess major elements of prevailing understandings about future levels of OPEC oil exports. Specifically, this paper asks if Saudi and other elites in major Middle East oil exporting states might already be finding that their fundamental domestic and foreign objectives are most effectively fulfilled by more conservative levels of future oil exports. In other words, the paper asks if it is time to fundamentally reexamine the analytical bases and approaches of most projections about future oil export levels, at least from the main Persian Gulf exporters. Finally, to the extent that this is true, the paper asks if there shifts which can be made in US and other consumer state foreign policies in order to adjust to the new situation and possibly even to influence major exporters' policies? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper will trace two periods of Palestinian Civil Scoeity before and after Oslo Interim Agreements in 1993. Paletinain Civil Society palyed a major role before Oslo in the absence of the state. The phenomenal wide-spread of civil scoiety in the Occupied Palestinian Territory was able to organize the society, activate them and get them involved in the peaceful popular resistance known as the first intifada. Things had changed after Oslo and the introdcution of the Palestinain Authority into the Territory. The paper will trace the major changes that engulfud most if not all Paletinain civil society and left it in a state of disarray. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to lay the foundations for an original and critical approach to political reform in the monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula. It examines the fundamental relationships between the uncertainty and the nature of processes of internal political reform (centered on the role of elites) on the one hand, and the constraints of the regional and international environment, on the other. The study of political and institutional reform in the monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula, is centered on the internal and external incentives (and constraints) which determine the strategic choices of elites in order to set the rules governing the practice of power. The meticulous observation of the constant interplay of internal dynamics and external constraints contributes to clarifying the uncertainty affecting reform processes. It also contributes to assess the consequences of the political reform process in terms of internal social dynamics and modification of the balance of power within the institutional systems of GCC member states. Indeed, a complex pattern emerges in which individual domestic actors - new elites and monarchs - exploit the legitimacy of particular international policies as a « two-level» instrument to increase their influence over the domestic politity. The purpose of this paper is to achieve a better understanding of the relationship between the implementation of a "reform industry" (of democratic marketing), and the emergence of a new type of players in the decision-making field of Arab Gulf states. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides an overview analysis of the political economic causes of the rise and fall of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. It argues that the ebb and flow of Israeli-Palestinian relations should not be understood in agential or narrowly political terms, but rather within the context of structural transformations in global, national and regional political economies. The paper thus offers a historical materialist analysis of Israeli-Palestinian relations. The main sub-theses advanced are (1) that the content of the Oslo peace process was always distinctly limited, and its benefits to some extent fictional; (2) that this 'insubstantial peace' took the form that it did primarily because of (a) the only partial liberalisation of the Israeli political economy; and (b) the political economic marginalisation of the Palestinian diaspora; (3) that the subsequent collapse of the Oslo peace process followed inexorably from these features, as well as from the decline of the internal Palestinian political economy; and (4) that, more broadly still, the dynamics of Israeli-Palestinian relations have been and continue to be structured by the Middle East's status as a dysfunctional region within the global political economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Growing out of their work on the impact of leaders' problem representations on the Israeli-Palestinian and Northern Ireland conflicts, the authors examine the phenomenon of leaders representing intergroup relationships differently to disparate audiences. This paper studies both the patterns and the impact of representations by specific leaders in these complex conflicts. In the initial work on which this paper builds, we found striking results indicating that representations of leaders of each community in both Northern Ireland and the Middle East had clear impacts on behavior initiated by the other side, but little impact on the behavior of their own side. The first project focused on means of problem representation rather than variability-positing that it was what leaders saying and not how much they changed their framing. In this paper the focus is on variability and a search for bellwethers -- individuals or groups whose variations in verbal representations seem to be key to the path of conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Extra-regional hegemons such as France in West Africa, the United States in the Middle East, and Russia in Central Asia have been playing increasingly important roles in the politics of international rivers to which they are not riparian states. A general objective of the paper is to provide an analysis and explanation of the positive and negative effects that extra-regional hegemons have on riparian state relations in water scarce regions of the world. However, the paper’s central thesis is that extra-regional hegemons have a strong negative (and sometimes benign) rather than positive effect on riparian state relations. More specifically, I argue that the political economic involvement of such hegemons in water scarce regions of the world inhibits interstate cooperation over shared rivers. The thesis is supported by an empirical examination of rivers in three water scarce regions: Amu Darya River in Central Asia, Jordan River in the Middle East, and the Senegal River in West Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When the Canadian Government announced that it would not support the United States in its efforts to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi Government, Ottawa forfeited an opportunity to influence U.S. policy in the Middle East. Although Jean Chrétien’s Liberal Government pledged to assist in the reconstruction of a post-Saddam Iraq, Canada seemed far removed from the heady days when Foreign Minister Lester B. Pearson won the Nobel Peace Prize for his diplomacy during the 1956 Suez crisis. As a so-called Middle Power, Canada took advantage of the early Cold War competition between Washington and Moscow to shape political outcomes in the Middle East and elsewhere. Ottawa’s reflexive multilateralism ? its tendency to use international organizations such as the United Nations to resolve global problems ? earned it plaudits, especially from developing countries suspicious of the United States, and credibility as a serious, committed problem-solver. Shifts in the international environment (e.g., the tendency starting in the 1960s for America and the Soviet Union to tackle world problems on their own rather than allowing allies to utilize their diplomatic talents, the end of the Cold War, etc.), however, undercut Canada’s ability to sustain its preferred international role. This paper analyzes Canadian policy vis-à-vis the Middle East since the Second World War and contends that Ottawa’s reflexive multilateralism succeeded only when the global context allowed Canadian diplomats to make significant contributions to conflict resolution. Systemic constraints thus limit what Middle Powers such as Canada can accomplish internationally and force them to resort to so-called niche diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When originally proposed, this paper was to have addressed the lack of regional multilateral security cooperation, focusing on the lack of a U.S. backed regional security institution. An important part of the argument would have examined the longstanding pattern of U.S. relationships with regional states that narrowly focused on specific core security interests while ignoring--and in some cases perhaps depending on--a disconnect between the government policies and popular opinion. As a result, parallel bilateral relationships best advanced U.S. security interests, producing a particular pattern of regional security unlike that of other regions where more multilateral forms predominate. However, the significant changes to the region, starting with the Tunisian Revolution and continuing through Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, and beyond have fundamentally altered certain core assumptions about the prospects for regional security. As a result, I abandoned my original project and am left with a less well-formed argument about the viability of prospects for regional security in the Middle East. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study questions the conclusions of much of the literature on Iran's influence in Latin America that geographic distance and cultural differences limit its effects. It argues that just as Marxism attached itself to Catholicism in the creation of Liberation Theology, so it attached itself to Islam in the creation of Political Islam. In both cases, powerful authoritarian states created a class of university-educated youth and turned the state bureaucracy into a national employment agency to absorb them. In both Latin America and the Middle East this project was unsustainable and some of the educated unemployed channeled their frustrations into creating ideologically driven subversive groups. In the Cold War many of these were Marxist groups but in both regions, a large organizational infrastructure of religious resistance groups were also created. In Latin America Liberation Theology priests who aimed to help Indigenous peoples reclaim land that had been "usurped" by non-Indians since the times of the conquest led these groups. In the Middle East some of the main resistance movements were created to oppose Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories but also southern Lebanon. The paper outlines the cultural influences that facilitate the creation of an Anti-Imperialist front in Latin America that combines the "revolutionary democratic" movements of the countries in the Cuba-Venezuala axis and the radical Islamist movements of the Middle East. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does globalization affect female labor force participation? Why do some countries, particularly those in the Middle East, have consistently low labor participation rates and others do not? Scholars point to the importance of women's labor participation, arguing that it results in more household bargaining power, greater political representation and general progress towards women's equality. However, the actual determinants of female participation in the labor force have received little attention in the political science literature, existing theories have primarily been abstract in nature and have rarely been tested in large-n quantitative analyses. In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap in the literature by focusing on the economic inuences of female labor participation. Using panel data of 142 countries for the period of 1981-2003, we employ time-series cross section analysis with first differences and country fixed effects to test the effects of foreign direct investment and trade openness on female participation in the labor force. Results suggest that, although significant, economic factors alone have difficulty accounting for the causes of female labor participation rates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the soft power of American and French universities in the Middle East in the interface between American and French societies of origin and Middle Eastern host societies. This is studied through looking at the attraction and co-optation ex ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to expand the theoretical concept of a Middle Eastern Regional Security Complex (MERSC) (Buzan and Waever 2004), based on the literature e.g. on security, regional integration, development and global governance towards a Euro-Mediterranea ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The topic of targeting civilians in war has been prominent in the media coverage on current military operations in Afghanistan and the Middle East, but it has recently also experienced more systematic treatment by scholars of International Relations. Two recent major works, Alexander Downes' Targeting Civilians in War and Hugo Slim's Killing Civilians, are major contributions in this respect. The aim of this paper is to provide a critical engagement with Downes' assumption that the perceived identity of the opponent is not a decisive factor in the victimisation of civilians. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The human rights of women in The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have been a subject of unresolved debate among sociologists, economists, and political scientists alike, as this region's gender related human rights performance remains uniquely weaker compared to other geographic regions in the world. Most notably, the human rights of women in the region, as defined by international and transnational standards, have been lagging in the area of domestic law. The following paper assesses gender inequity in the MENA region from a legal perspective, with a focus on family and personal law, and with the intent to shed light on domestic and international legal apparatuses as means of influencing the economic and political status of women, which may be applied in the region and globally. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union has for a long time attempted to be a major player in the Middle East. It was one of the first regions where the (then EC) Member States developed a common foreign policy and made common statements in the 1970s. This paper analyses what ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In much of the academic and policy literature on religious terrorism, religion and nationalism are often treated as roughly dichotomous (exclusive and opposite). Further, religious tendencies are usually thought to trump nationalist characteristics: groups which demonstrate mixed characteristics are generally labeled religious terrorists. Because religious terrorists are presumed to be different in character, labeling a group as such implies that the group is more rigid, violent, and less willing to negotiate.Our paper analyzes groups considered religious terrorists in the Middle East and Muslim world. We recognize that religion and nationalism should be considered separately, and that groups may be motivated by both, or by neither. Thus, instead of asking whether given groups are predominately motivated by religion, we propose a set of criteria which measure the degree to which a given terrorist group utilizes religion. Instead of asking whether or not a group is religious, we attempt to measure how the group uses religion.Having studied ten groups, initial findings suggest that groups for which religion is more important are not less flexible, but they are more violent, and less frequently involved in negotiation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

‘The war on terror has seen the direct military intervention of the United States in the Middle East and it has moved counter-terrorism strategies fully into the military domain. Such a military strategy to combat terrorism has so far failed leading to a rethink of the strategies involved in the struggle against terrorism. In the Middle East and North Africa, the US failure in Iraq has not only served to strengthen the authoritarianism of the regimes in place, but it seems also to have affected the ways such regimes combat the terrorist cells present on the territory. From the Algerian national reconciliation law to the Moroccan authorities reclaiming of the poor shanty towns where suicide bombers come from, the use of military tactics seems to have been abandoned. This paper wishes to explore such issues in detail. In particular, how regimes in the Middle East and North Africa cope with the renewed threat of terrorism and violent opposition to their rule. Countries such as Jordan, Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria and Morocco have all felt the domestic consequences of the revitalization of salafi jihadism and it is important to try to understand the mechanisms regimes have put in place to combat such a phenomenon given the ineffectiveness of purely military means.” ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The greater Middle East region has become an important focus in the post-Cold War politics of energy pipelines coupled with unsettled territorial disputes between the peoples of the regional countries. The emergence of new independent Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, coupled with internal unrest in at least two of these countries, presents new challenges and opportunities for the United States, Russia and the two regional powers Iran and Turkey. Politics of energy pipelines further intensified regional rivalries and present serious challenges for U.S. foreign policy in coming years. In this paper, we apply a power transition analysis to assess the probability of cooperation or conflict between the region's (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran, Israel, Russia, and Turkey) as our first step in identifying potentially dangerous dyadic relationships. We then assess the impact of Turkey's EU membership on regional stability. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ascension of Hugo Chávez to power in 1999 put Venezuela´s foreign policy and it´s international relations on a whole new course. Ever since the onset of his electoral campaign for president in 1997, it became clear through his discourse that his reign will usher in a new era for Venezuela, not only in the domestic arena, but specifically in the foreign policy domain of the country. A region that from the beginning was of a special interest to Chávez was the Middle East, specifically its anti-Western Arab and Persian spheres. The allure of the anti-Western Middle East to the socialist-revolutionary Bolivarian government in Caracas did not only materialize through the OPEC-liaison, but rather through the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iraq-U.S. relations, the Iranian WMD-issue, among other potentially conflictive themes. This paper seeks to examine the core ideological values, geopolitical and geostrategic aspects and other specific and relevant issues that make the Middle East so centrally salient in the current Venezuelan foreign policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Middle East appears rife with violent non-state actors operating outside international norms. The prevailing explanations view these groups through the lens of the state system. States are held responsible for the existence of groups within their borders. Alternatively, in the event that a state actively combats such groups, those non-state groups are attributed to the direction of international terrorists. It is assumed that some actor - state or international outlaw - is in hierarchical control over domestic non-state groups. These analyses ignore the grass-roots nature of non-state actors and their networked authority structure. In reality, even the groups’ own leaders are often unable to control members. Increasing portions of the Middle East are escaping state regulation and services. Through state incapacity, reliance upon private service provision as the state reforms economically, rebellion, insurgency, and displacement due to war, increasing community space is being regulated locally. Effectively, territories are becoming stateless while they remain located within state territory. Unlike Hobbes’ nightmare of all-out competition and violence, institutions arise to govern these spaces internally. Gangs, local religious authorities and religious political parties are currently the main contenders for authority. In this paper I provide an overview and typology of unregulated areas in the Middle East. Unregulated spaces result from either economic or political causes. Economic causes include rural to urban migration, economic structural adjustment and state incapacity to provide services for new migrants and old residents of urban and rural areas alike. Political causes include war-displaced refugees and disputed zones, where non-state groups claim sovereignty against the state. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Secure access to freshwater supplies is poised to be an increasingly consequential bone of contention in interstate relations in the future, especially in the Middle East, where a host of demographic, political, social and economic factors combine to render it an increasingly water-stressed region. The last decade has seen a profusion of monographs and empirical studies dealing with the various dimensions of conflict over interstate freshwater supplies. Systematically absent from these studies, though, is any serious consideration of the impact of leaders’ perceptions on the incidence of cooperation or conflict. Shared ideas and perceptions form a crucible that shapes how states define and interpret their interests in managing common water resources and provide just as much, if not more, traction in accounting for the evolution of inter-state relations than do objective, material factors. My empirical analysis demonstrates that co-riparian states’ perceptions of each other - in the domains of threat perception, trust and responsiveness - yield greater explanatory power over the question of how relations over shared water resources evolve than prominent materialist variables, such as scarcity of the common river resource and power disparity. This paper employs content analysis and process-tracing techniques to trace how the shared ideational understandings of state elites impact prospects for conflict or cooperation over time. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the wake of the War on Terror, there is no doubt that from the Middle East there emanates one of the most potent ‘politics of resistance’ to the prevailing neo-liberal paradigm of world order. Yet, the sources of this politics of resistance and its links with neo-liberalism are poorly understood. Following the research agenda set out in a recently published book that has, at a theoretical level, offered a framework of analysis of these linkages through Robert W. Cox’s and Jeffrey Harrod’s conception of ‘unprotected workers’ (Davies & Ryner, 2006), this paper proposes a pilot study that explores these linkages. This study tests the hypothesis that the European Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), far from contributing to ‘good governance’, is promoting a disposition of consciousness that is conducive to a millennialist variant of Islam that is hostile to liberal democracy. The EMP facilitates the displacing of agrarian-based social relations, without engendering effective industrial capitalism (e.g. Knio, 2006), thus leading to the growth a ‘casual pattern of social relations of production’. This hypothesis is explored with reference to its ‘toughest’ and therefore ‘critical’ case (cf. Eckstein, 1976), namely Tunisia, which is held up as a neo-liberal ‘success-story’. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the aftermath of September 11 2001 the United States has increasingly began to question its diplomatic engagement with authoritarian regimes in the MENA region. As a result of this President Bush has begun institutionalising a forward strategy of freedom for the Middle East. Its central policy aim proposes the spread democracy and free trade as tools to undercut the appeal of Islamic terrorism. Yet much of the academic literature on this policy has focused on the practice of offering ‘sticks and carrots’ to MENA regimes, and has taken essentially contested terms like ‘democracy’ at face value. As a result this paper seeks to return to first order questions and understand the model of democratization that is guiding the policy. Its findings demonstrate that the pluralistic nature of the US democracy promotion bureaucracy has created contending and often incompatible strategies based on alternative definitions of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’. It is apparent that a dichotomy exists between those who propose political reform and those who propose economic reform as a solution to the obstacles of Middle Eastern democracy. The result of this is a confused set of policies that attempt to balance America’s long term economic and security concerns with the desire to spread a form of democracy that reinforces American domination of the region. From this framework it is apparent that much of the American rhetoric about a radical new approach to US-MENA relations is a façade. In reality the forward strategy is a work in progress that promotes the conditions for a gradual reform of MENA allies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If actors tend to innovate within a familiar set of tactics, or repertoire, for a given place and time, as Charles Tilly posits, what causes these actors to adopt new tactics so as to expand their repertoires? Moreover, what happens when a new violent or nonviolent technique is adopted and added to an actor’s repertoire? While Tillly focuses on repertoire changes vis-à-vis the regime, this paper seeks to discuss factors contributing to the expansion of a tactical repertoire at the level of ethnically based organizations by studying the relationships between violent organizational tactics and other factors for more than one hundred ethnopolitical organizations in the Middle East. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ever since the 16th century, Iran has been the Motherland and protector of Shiism within the Muslim World. Many analysts believe that the Islamic Republic is now attempting to take advantage of its religious bounds with the Shia communities spread throughout the Middle East in order to weave a sphere of influence stretching from the Wall of China to the Wailing Wall. Even if the “Shia Crescent theory” discussed by authors such as Vali Nasr is attractive, it is appropriate to question its veracity: what are Iran’s interests in playing the Shia card? To what extent does it really attempt to exploit this source of influence? In the short run and on a small scale, a pan-Shia policy offers certain advantages such as allowing Teheran to create diversion from its nuclear program or to block the Anglo-US projects in Iraq. However, the Iranian leaders are also conscious of the limits and disadvantages attached to this strategy. They are aware that three decades of pan-Shiism in the Caucasus and in Central Asia have only produced meager results. They also know that the emergence of a Shia arc, strongly denounced by Western capitals, has only succeeded to antagonize the Sunni powers and to wedge the Iranian influence. The argument of this paper is that, in the longer-term and on a larger scale, the aim of the Islamic regime is, as it has always been, to overcome the logic of intra-Islamic confrontation to extend its traditional sphere of influence beyond the Shia territory. This thesis will be demonstrated through a historical analysis of the different initiatives taken by Teheran to create a spiritual rapprochement with the “Sunni Brothers” and to become one of the leaders of the Muslim World. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies of regime endurance in the Middle East have sharpened debate about the importance of exogenous rents (oil, mineral concessions, foreign aid, and the like) to a country's domestic politics. A growing number of scholars argue that the emphasis on rents is misplaced favoring instead ontogenetic factors relevant to the particular country or region. Other studies find evidence in support of what is termed rentier state arguments and the broader resource curse literature. This paper charts a third course through an explanation of coalition formation and endurance in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, a regional paragon of regime endurance. The general claim is that exogenous rents are causal in so far as their effects are embedded within specific socio-historical and institutional variables which shaped the nature of political coalitions supporting a given regime. The strategies of the Hashemite monarchy to form and maintain its ruling coalition have been determined by three variables: the properties of a monarchial regime bequeathed through European rule, regionally influenced violent social conflict, and particular access to rents in the form of trade and foreign aid. Shifting analysis away from simply regime endurance to explain coalition endurance may thus be a more promising dependent variable to push the debate in a new direction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The debate on democracy in the Middle East and throughout the whole MuslimWorld has generated many important questions but has, so far, answered few of them satisfactorily. This paper endeavours to understand the prospects and problems for democracy in the region by making visible the connections between this issue and one of the least explored and understood aspects of the contemporary Middle East: how the suppression of communist, socialist, and other leftist and reformist political movements in the region after WorldWar II impacted and, continues to impact, the region's economic and political development. It details the parties and movements of the Left that emerged after WorldWar I in the Arab countries of the region, and were suppressed by local security forces with the help of Britain and France; and how the resurgence of these groups after WorldWar II triggered a campaign in the 1950s and 1960s to eradicate, not only Communists and Socialists, but any element in the region calling for democratic government or for land reform. It shows how, as part of this campaign, elites ("nationalist," "modernising," "Arab Socialist," and "traditional") built up export industries and, within restricted foreign-oriented enclaves, accumulated wealth and enjoyed Western standards and styles of living; purchased masses of weapons from Britain and the U.S. to protect these enclaves; and actively aided the growth of the religious far right as a bulwark against pressures for other kinds of association and activism. The result was to suppress liberal, reformist, and progressive elements in the region that, in Europe and elsewhere, supported and encouraged the democratisation of national politics. Finally it assesses the costs of the Cold War and its legacy in the Middle East, and considers its implications for the emergence of democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing formal models of political behavior have followed the lead of the natural sciences and generally focused on methods that use continuous-variable mathematics. Stephen Wolfram has recently produced an extended critique of that approach in the natural sciences, and suggested that a great deal of natural behavior can be accounted for using rules that involve discrete patterns. This paper reports some initial findings from a new NSF-funded project designed to apply this pattern-based method to political event data. The core of this project is a new, publicly-accessible web-based tool designed for the analysis of event data patterns. Using data on the Israel-Palestine conflict for the period 1979-2004, we first consider some differences between the activities of various sub-state actors. While most prior event data analysis has simply aggregated all activities, we demonstrate that some sub-state actors produce streams of activities that are statistically independent. We continue the analysis by showing there are distinctive--and very plausible-- differences in the patterns found during the tenures of various Israeli prime ministers, and the "interesting" patterns go well beyond the simple variations on tit-for-tat that we found in our earlier work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Palestinians and Israelis have been struggling over a piece of land which is also an ecological system with limited resources, rapid population growth, extensive urbanization, diminished animal habitat, and vulnerable to severe long term degradation from water and soil contamination. The paper presents a broad overview of the ways in which protracted conflict and the local environment have been inter-related. Protracted conflict has meant a constant focus on military tactics and economic strategies. These priorities have led to a common view that environmental protection is a luxury which can be addressed in a less crisis ridden future. This marginalization of environmentalism has had predictable consequences. Efforts to raise environmental consciousness and build an environmental movement in both societies have had to adapt to the culture of continuing conflict. Protracted conflict has not been entirely anti-environmental in its effects. It has encouraged a romantic nationalist environmentalism, in which the traditional way of life as an agricultural people living close to the land is celebrated, even as both societies become overwhelmingly urbanized. Finally, because Palestinians and Israelis share an ecological region, research and policy around the environment have become settings where bilateral contacts have tentatively developed. These bilateral contacts may have the potential to be social spaces where a vision of mutual responsibility for a shared sustainable ecology in the region can emerge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the transformations/distortions that the concept of the ‘rentier state’ has experienced as it has been detached from its context and reworked by the hegemonic epistemological and methodological practices of Political Science. In this paper, I argue that the hegemonic epistemological stance, and methodological practices in Political Science has evacuated this concept’s theoretical and social content by reducing it to a narrow understanding of ‘taxation without representation’. In this paper, I first explore the conceptual history of the ‘rentier state’ from its original usage - where it was the core concept employed to explain the democracy problem in the Middle East by referring to the social formations it perpetuated and the social struggles it shaped - to its contemporary metamorphosed usage by mainsteam Political Science. The form it takes in this mainstream approach is embodied in the idea of ‘taxation without representation’, which itself is utilizaed in a reduced form. After describing the historical development of this concept, I aim to explain the phenomenon. The explanation focuses on two distinct aspects of hegemony in the discipline: first, on the very specific understanding of the western epistemological tradition to which it submits; and second, the particular methodology it implements. Finally, I will demonstrate how this concept - which originated in the Middle East, was mediated by the hegemonic practices of the field, and was exported back to the Middle Eastern - has lost its explanatory capacity in its original context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is oil wealth a blessing or a curse? Only a few oil states outside of the Middle East have been able to successfully ride out the oil booms and busts of the 1970s and 80s without significant damage to their economies, while many comparable states have experienced economic and political instability. But was wealth or lack there of from oil revenues the immediate source of such instability? This paper seeks to continue discussing this question while analyzing all oil dependent states through the boom and bust years mentioned above. This will show if oil was the direct source of political instability, as some scholars stated in previous work, or if there are other causes for the political instability experienced in countries such as Nigeria and Iran, by looking at all of the twenty or so states that experienced similar economic effects from oil. The same methods as used in Terry Karl’s Paradox of Plenty will be applied to the additional cases not studied in that book, where the argument was made that fluxes in oil revenue create political instability, to show not all of the cases are like those analyzed by Karl. Additional levels of quantitative and qualitative analysis will also advocate that oil wealth did not directly cause political instability in oil dependent nations outside of the Middle East during the 1970s and 80s. This paper will advocate that one focus on the level of state capacity to manage the booms and the busts in oil revenues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In view of its current 151 states parties and 25 signatories, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) seems to be on the way to becoming a universal comprehensive and robust security regime. Hence, for the first time the possibility of eliminating chemical weapons (CW) is within the reach of the international community. However, bearing in mind that joining the CWC does mean forgoing CW due to its unprecedented, comprehensive verification regime, while reviewing past lists of probable CW possessor states, one discovers an overwhelming fact: Five of the remaining seven states (states that have been mentioned in those lists and have failed to join the treaty) are located in the Middle East. That is, the Middle East has become almost the last barrier to achieving this important goal, especially in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. Moreover, Iraq’s recent occupation by the US, as well as the recognizable shift in Libyan policy in general and toward the CWC in particular, enables us to focus our attention only on three neighboring states: Egypt, Israel and Syria. Unfortunately, due to the Arab linkage approach between chemical and nuclear weapons disarmament, all efforts to induce these states into the treaty have been to no avail. In an attempt to break this deadlock, the proposed paper analyzes the Arab approach toward the CW issue and suggests that it reflects three profound misperceptions regarding: (a) Israel’s CW capabilities; (b) the military value of CW in general and in refer to Israel in particular; (c) Israel’s current self-perception of nuclear weapons. Then, the paper offers a regional arrangement as a way out of the deadlock, which given these misperceptions, provides all sides with a fair way to retreat from their current position and, more importantly, would create a win-win situation for them. That is, the Arab linkage approach could be used positively: rather than creating a deadlock, it could provide leverage for creating a more secure region, free of Weapons of Mass Destruction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

No area seems to divide the Atlantic alliance more than the Middle East. Despite the famous Le Monde headline in the aftermath of September 11 that ‘we are all Americans,’ transatlantic solidarity soon dissipated as Americans and Europeans continued to diverge on a number of key Middle East questions, most notably Iraq. Although some promising policy convergence emerged, particularly in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) arena, divergence remains the dominating trend in US-European Mideast policy, with Europe posing an increasing challenge?at least politically?to US dominance in the region. US-European divergence today is more prominent and damaging than has historically been the case because of the altered international environment and open question of global governance. But given that the US and Europe ultimately share common values and goals and view the instability emanating from the Middle East as the most critical security challenge of the 21st century, why is divergence so prominent? This paper will draw on the case of the Middle East to explore this question. The paper will consider arguments based on structural power, domestic politics, economic factors, and identity/role based models, arguing that identity politics and US-European perceptions of global roles is a necessary variable in understanding the nature of transatlantic division in the Middle East. This helps explain why the US-European division over Iraq was less about the problem of Iraq or weapons of mass destruction than about the role of American power in the region. The paper will conclude by offering prescriptions for how to manage transatlantic divergence given the common stakes in Middle East stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last decade, there has been mounting interest in the uses of Information Communication Technologies - ICTs - [satellites, computers, telephones, faxes, and the Internet] in human rights and developmental movements and campaigns around the world. The Internet is the quintessence of this new ICT technology, with its speed, lack of centralization, and citizen-to-citizen connectivity. According to some analysts, the Internet has shifted power to access and present information from governments to people, which gave rise to the hope, and fuel to the claim, that it is indeed a possible democratizing force. While there is truth to those claims, one must not lose sight of the problems and challenges that impede such progress. After all, the Internet continues to be an elitist tool whose access, cost, and skills make it prohibitive to many in the Global South. It is specifically controversial in the area of development ? should we use development in a much narrower sense - where the rate of illiteracy is high in some poor countries, not to mention the rate of computer literacy and technical skills. Moreover, since the mid-1990s, a number of governments and international institutions have sought to control the Internet through laws and regulations. They have been quite successful. The campaign against terrorism and the security excesses it produces have speeded up the trend. One year after the tragic events in New York and Washington, the Internet can be added to the list of collateral damage caused by the general spate of security measures. As a result, basic cyber-freedoms have been cut back. This paper deals mainly with the Internet as a communication medium, and its impact on human rights and development campaigns in the Middle East. I argue that while it is too early to assess the impact of the Internet on the Middle East, there is enough evidence to suggest that unlike other media, it has exceptional potential because of, among other things, its interactive nature. While it is true that to-date it has not been used effectively by civil society, given a comprehensive strategy, it could be a source of unimaginable strength and progress. I also claim that currently the obstacles that impede the democratic progress in the Middle East, are not easy to overcome, especially in the short run; not least among them is the clear evidence of global arrogance, demonstrated in English language hegemony on the Internet. This paper is divided into four sections. The first section provides a background on Internet usage in the Middle East and compares it with international trends and statistics. The second analyzes the human rights movement in the Middle East, and shows how the Internet has been used to-date by civil society. The third will discuss the potential of the Internet in the Middle East as an enabling medium, and will highlight the challenges facing such a potential. The last section highlights specific case studies from Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, and how the Internet has been used in those countries to promote human rights issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ralph Bunche is rightfully reknowned for his diplomatic achievements in the Middle East and Africa. His success in bringing about the armistice between Egypt and Israel in 1949 came, nevertheless, after a number of mediation failures. In Congo, Bunche was unable to draw the forces of nationalism into alignment with the international peacekeeping efforts for which he was responsible. Yet this was something for which he was uniquely qualified. The sad history of Congo thereafter is a legacy of which he would not be proud. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]