Search

Signing of Dayton Peace Agreement of November 21, 1995 not only meant the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina but it also represented the beginning of a new trend in international relations. This trend is characterized by collapsing of traditional realist distinctions between security concerns on the one side, and state and nation-building policies, on the other. If the previous wisdom of the day demanded the primacy of the security agenda over institution and nation-building policies, the current understanding is that the international community (IC) plays a crucial role in fostering democratization and nation-building in the context of failed, multiethnic states. In other words, an active international engagement in ?rebuilding the ship at sea? is nowadays perceived as a security issue in its own right ? a necessary precondition for a more stable and peaceful international environment. This, however, begs the question as to what does the international toolkit of democracy and nation-building contain? Also, is there a gap between the international rhetoric of human rights, democracy and minority protection, on the one side, and the ways these principles are being perceived and acted upon by local elites and public in general in internationally run states? In dealing with theses questions, the paper?s focus will be primarily on the Southeast European experiences with the twin process of democratization and nation-building. First, the international blueprint of democratization will be presented. Then, the international toolkit of democratization will be evaluated from the perspective of the (in)compatibility between the processes of democratization and nation-building. Third section will offer a comparative evaluation of nation-building and power sharing arrangements in the region. Finally, I will critically evaluate why some of the most cherished techniques of power sharing yielded the unanticipated results that challenge the very project of internationally sponsored democratization. For the copy of the paper, please send request to dguzina@wlu.ca [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the emergence and evolution of international norms on reparations for repatriating refugees. While there is widespread and growing support amongst national and international actors for displaced persons' right to redress, particularly in the form of real property restitution, international law does not yet provide a definitive backstop for this view. Furthermore, although reparations efforts in regions such as the Balkans have garnered extensive attention and praise from refugees, researchers and policy-makers alike, international norms on reparations for returnees are still not evenly implemented in major repatriation operations. Although the tools of redress have been honed remarkably since the end of the Second World War, this paper argues that reparation is still a clumsy tool in the hands of states and international actors, and must be further sharpened in order to ensure that return processes are fair and sustainable. The paper concludes by reflecting on the risks associated with overstating the current strength of international norms on redress for refugees. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents the EU commitment to the stabilization and the future integration of the Western Balkans as moving beyond the ethics of statebuilding as it is proposed by the so-called "sovereignty paradox literature". Scholars who contribute to this strand agree that multilateral settings involved in statebuilding inevitably produce a sovereignty paradox: the outside-in promotion of good governance generates constraints on sovereignty; indeed, external actors compromise crucial aspects of sovereignty in order to rehabilitate domestic political authorities to a full exercise of their legitimate prerogatives. However, it has been quite overlooked that being a post-nation state organization that "educates" target states to membership, the EU complicates this paradox: Brussels monitors/facilitates institutional reorganization in view of integration, thus, while containing dispersions of sovereignty and bridling centripetal forces, it seeks to prepare autochthon institutions to give up sovereign prerogatives when the time to join the Union arrives. The paper mainly focuses on the achievements and the failures of the EU experience in BiH and concludes with the elaboration of some lessons-learned that could apply to the installation of the EU-driven statebuilding in Kosovo. By looking at the attitude of the EU vis-à-vis the Bosnian constitution-making process, the paper sheds light on the peculiarities of a, so to say, EU hands-off statebuilding. While keeping its feet in Bosnia, the strategic thinking in Brussels reflects something beyond a subtle and indirect denial of responsibilities: an ex-ante 'denial/refusal of interference' that is totally incongruent with the massive field presence. The ambiguity of the hands-off attitude allows Brussels to escape two crucial dilemmas of statebuilding: bottom-up vs. top-down, and technical presence vs. complex post-war stabilization. Moreover, this particular attitude has allowed Brussels to escape operational confrontation with the residual statebuilding influence of the US. Has the EU made a step back from Chandler's implicit Empire in Denial towards an explicit but even more incoherent denial of having the right to action? Is the EU denying its responsibilities vis-à-vis the Bosnian reconciliation project? Based on extensive interviews and archival research in both Brussels and Sarajevo, the paper shows that the attitude of most EU actors towards Bosnian elites is based on the claim of 'a quasi-sacred respect for sovereignty' that hides a substantial inefficiency: the EU is currently unable to provide clear directions/stimuli to the Bosnian constitution-making process. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The legality of depleted uranium munitions, used in tank-killing projectiles and protective armour, has been hotly debated for more than a decade. Exposure to depleted uranium by peacekeepers in the Balkans reignited accusations that the use of DU creates health and environmental harm inconsistent with prevailing laws of armed conflict. At present, there is no international treaty that specifically prohibits or regulates the use of depleted uranium munitions. Scientific studies undertaken to determine the health and environmental threats posed by depleted uranium have provided both advocates and critics of DU munitions with ample reason to remain steadfast in their positions. This paper examines the debate revolving around depleted uranium munitions from the perspective of international humanitarian law. The aim of this paper is to provide a basis for the regulation of DU that neither bans nor endorses the materials use in arsenals. The proposed treaty principles would, however, provide greater protections for unintended victims of depleted uranium exposure and would establish a basis from which to continue the discussion of the legal status of DU munitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the European Union?s self-image in relation to its engagement with conflict management institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. Taking as my case studies the EU?s involvement in the implementation of the Dayton Agreement and constitutional reform in Bosnia and the negotiation and implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement in Macedonia, I argue that EU actors have attempted to construct an image of the Union as a „union of minorities?. Not only does this self-image seek to present the EU as a force for good in the Western Balkans, it also, I suggest, plays the role of legitimising the EU?s preference for broadly consociational mechanisms of ethnic conflict management. Without a conflict management norm within the Union - let alone a consociational one - EU actors have instead made reference to the nature of the Union itself, portraying it as a kind of transnational consociation, in order to lend legitimacy to their approach in Bosnia and Macedonia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper, the fourth from our Unholy Alliances project, examines the relationship between armed conflict and market opportunities as shaped by the politics of the post-communist state and the reemergence of nationalism in the Balkans. A case study of Bulgaria shows how a state in transition from Communism to democracy, situated in proximity to armed conflicts, contributed to the emergence of illicit market opportunities for international trade. We conclude that the Bulgarian state shaped illicit market opportunities by its own criminalization, i.e., by the alliance forged between former state security structures, state officials, and criminals, all of whom profited from the contraband trade in embargoed commodities, and later also from trafficking of drugs, humans, etc. Second, unlike the national liberation movements in our previous case studies of Albanian nationalists, Bosnian Islamists, and the PKK, driven jointly by political and illicit business motivations, criminal networks are exclusively shaped and motivated by the interaction of market opportunities and constraints. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the changing policies and policy discourse of the EU towards the Western Balkans. In the wake of the Balkan wars of the 1990s, the European Union adopted a new and comprehensive regional policy approach towards the Western Balkans (the ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues for a shift in the European Union enlargement policy for the Western Balkans from liberal blindness to cautious realism. Only through such a change the European Union could evolve into a political pole of prosperity and peace for the cou ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the peacebuilding practices in the Western Balkans as undertaken in Kosovo and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). It draws on Dominik Zaum's concept of 'sovereignty paradox', which explores the tension between sovereignty and self-determination embedded in modern peacebuilding, and tries tp answer the question what should be the healthy balance between international partnership and local ownership in the Western Balkans. The constructed peacebuilding paradox thus identifies a tension between macro and micro approaches to peacebuilding and tries to mould a successful partnership in ownership approach for future peacebuilding undertakings. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research has largely ignored the implications of the special conditions of a post-war society for the functioning of democracy. I argue that democracy promotion after inter-group conflict may exacerbate the risk of violent conflict. The increased propensity for violence derives from three sources: democracy itself, the transition process, and the design and implementation of assistance to this process. To evaluate democratisation efforts, I develop an assessment instrument with indicators of institutional as well as normative aspects of democratisation. In addition, the paper summarises an analysis of the developments pertaining to democratisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia. My main conclusion on democratisation efforts in the Balkans, is that local ownership is vital for long-term democratisation. After inter-group conflict, where people are organized along ethnic lines, there is no short cut to escape nationalist politics. International intervention to remove nationalists, run the risk of increasing support for extremism and ethnochauvinism. For this reason, democracy promoters are well advised to embrace the principle that the voters, not international actors, should hold the politicians accountable. This is true also for the prospects of long-term democratisation in Iraq. So far, several opportunities to ensure a legitimate process towards democracy have been missed in the course of U.S. led intervention. However, legitimacy can be ensured, by allowing the Iraqis themselves to work out the rules for political cooperation and to craft their future constitution through a public dialogue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Balkan region is an important hub in global sex trafficking networks involved in the trafficking of women for the purposes of forced or voluntary prostitution. The sex trafficking trade, like trade in other illegal goods, thrives on widespread corruption, porous borders, instability, and weak state institutions. Yet concentrating on domestic factors often obscures how structural factors ? namely the extent of international involvement in the region and its proximity to the EU ? contributes to its expansion. The emergence of lucrative sex industry markets in the Balkans is inextricably linked to international military presence in the region. International peacekeeping personnel not only create increased demand for sex workers; in some cases they also serve as important actors in the organizational structures of sex trafficking chains. As the EU assumes a more active role in the region, it has pursued a policy of tightening external borders, imposing stricter visa regimes, and strengthening state law enforcement capacity. These efforts do little to diminish the trafficking trade; such law enforcement strategies have the adverse effect of making trafficking even more profitable. Viewing anti-trafficking as a criminal matter fosters a political dynamic whereby the border between law-enforcement exporting states, namely the EU, is increasingly fortified against the perceived crime-exporting Balkan states. Understanding Balkan sex trafficking as part of larger global and regional processes, and more specifically considering the role of UN forces and private military contractors such as DynCorp as important nodes in the trafficking trade, I argue that the relationship between global and local factors is more continuous than the dichotomy between law exporting and crime-exporting states suggests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The promotion of order in the Balkans (within the context of a larger European context) has been the central policy concern of states and international organizations since the early 1990s. The existence and the persistence of the conflict seemed to challenge the new possibilities for security and stability in Europe. It is very much in response to the Balkan crises that the EU had to develop its order-promotion identity. In the wake of the Kosovo crisis this identity was transformed into committed policy-making both towards the region as well as its larger external relations. This was reflected in the understanding that the countries of the Balkans no longer represented a distant abroad but potential candidates. This shift of policy suggests that the accession, association and partnership activities of the Southeast European states can extend the EU’s order to the region by initiating the development of a nascent security community in the region. The justification for such supposition derives from the history of trust-promotion among the member states of the EU. The establishment of order in the region is made out in the promotion of security community practices in Southeastern Europe through the socialization by and in EU-initiated activities. It is significant that at the current stage, the EU involvement in the Balkans is actively engaging regional state elites in activities that intend to bring their decision-making in line with promoted standards. Therefore, the current state of affairs in Southeastern Europe can be described as the establishment of an elite security community. It is a type of a nascent security community that promotes a framework for strategic interaction between the EU and Balkan state elites, through which the EU advances its interests and values, while building regional consensus on the objectives of policy-making. The EU’s power of attraction (i.e. coercion) maintains a broad agreement on the fundamental rules of such contractual relations. The interaction among elites within this context promotes the transfer of Euro-Atlantic standards to their policy-making. In such pattern of relations, Balkan state elites are bounded by the norms of prescribed behavior (which includes regional cooperation) or risk punishment. Thus, the experiences from following prescribed patterns of behavior inform the decision-making process and modify its framework towards expected habits and policy outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The newest constitutional changes in Yugoslavia, dissolution of Yugoslavia and elevation of the two components of it (Serbia and Montenegro) a the level of practically two independent states is contributing a strong negative influence to the further process of European Economic Integratoin. Creation of the state SCG (Serbia and Montegnegro) is going to have negative effects upon the process of economic growth internally as well as upon the process of regional stability in the Balkans. Conclusion and suggestion of the author is either to separate two units fully and have two independent states, or make correction and create a more homogenous country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The strained relations between Islam and Orthodox Christianity occupied central stage in our analysis of the the Balkans from the early 1990s to 1998. However, after the NATO intervention in Kosovo, the issue receded into the background and has not received much attention. This paper seeks to remedy this gap by examining the "Islam versus Orthodoxy" factor in the foreign policy of a number of Balkan countries, among them Serbia, Greece, Albania, FYROM,Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Bulgaria. I compare the rhetoric about Orthodoxy/Islam as it is employed by foreign policy actors in these countries, to the actual policies, in order to see if religion is really a causal factor here or if perhaps the rhetoric is used as an internal political tool meant to shore up post-communist national identity. The paper incorporates analysis of the effect of 9/11 on the foreign policy of these countries, finding that paradoxically the fundamentalist attack on the United States has led shifted the foreign policies of the Balkan countries towards an intensified search for peaceful resolutions of Islamic/Orthodox problems. The concrete concerns of the paper are framed in the larger context of the real significance of religion in international relations, grounded in the existing theoretical arguments surrounding this contentious issue. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent blurring of internal and external security has led to the emergence of an external dimension to the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) policy which signals a new phase for the development of the European Union (EU)’s internal security governance. The achievement of internal objectives being dependant on the cooperation with third countries, the foreign policy ambitions of JHA are now well established. Through two case studies, this paper will look into the ways in which JHA influences traditional European foreign policy domains such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The first one will show how JHA has become predominant in EU’s foreign policy towards the EU’s Mediterranean neighbourhood. Through issues such as border management and terrorism cooperation new patterns of security cooperation will be identified with Morocco and Egypt. The second case study will demonstrate that ESDP operations are also increasingly influenced by internal security objectives. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EUPM police and EUFOR military missions reflects the interaction between ESDP and JHA in the fight against organized crime.This paper sheds a new light on the conceptual debates on the future of European foreign and security policies. Those two intergovernmental fields are very much intertwined and it is time for researchers and policy-makers to re-conceptualize the links between internal and external security. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Western Balkans (WB) countries are an inseparable part of the ongoing formation of a “new” European space, but it is still an unstable region in the continent. Comprising Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH), Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Albania, Serbia, and Montenegro, its integration into European structures, particularly the European Union (EU), has proved to be a difficult process due to the problematic political, economic and social situation of these countries. Using as case study the situation in Serbia, the paper argues that EU membership aspiration has been a motivating factor for the systemic and structural transformation required for the stabilization and gradual democratization of this country.In this context, this paper aims to analyze to what extent the EU efforts and initiatives in Serbia have been contributing to the area’s pacification and to fostering good governance in the country. Understanding Europeanization as the conceptual framework that links transition and integration, a multiplicity of questions arise concerning the way this state has been affected by this process. Which have been the main achievements and difficulties of the Europeanization process? And, which has been its impact in state-building in its different dimensions: political, economic, social? Searching answers to these questions, this paper aims to contribute for a better understanding of the Europeanization process in Serbia, addressing its results and effects in the democratization process and in the improvement of human rights standards. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU has gathered a significant amount of conflict management experience in the Western Balkans over the past decade-and-a-half, most of it perhaps through its early failures to prevent the violent disintegration of the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and to offer an acceptable interim solution to the Kosovo conflict in 1998/9. Since then, however, the EU has made important contributions to the stabilisation of the entire Western Balkan region and remains the largest donor to the ongoing post-conflict reconstruction effort in the region. This long-standing engagement with one of Europe’s most conflict-prone areas offers important insights into the EU’s ability to manage ethnic conflicts. By analysing the Union’s internal capabilities and assessing the specific factors at work in the Western Balkans this paper offers insights into the sources of the EU’s early failures and more recent successes. Based on this analysis, the paper outlines to what extent the Western Balkans provided a useful “training ground” for the EU in pursuit of conflict management as part of its neighbourhood policy. Focusing primarily on the post-Soviet periphery (Moldova, Georgia, Armenia/Azerbaijan) and the Middle East (Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Lebanon) the paper argues that even the relatively modest successes that the EU has had in the Western Balkans will be difficult to replicate in any of these regions because the EU’s own instruments, especially accession conditionality, will be less effective and because the EU is not the dominant, agenda-setting player that it has become across the Western Balkans. Consequently, the EU will be less likely to elicit accommodative behaviour and compliance from the conflict parties (and their external backers, such as Russia, Iran, and Syria). Importantly, thus, the EU will have to engage in building coalitions for change locally and internationally to succeed in its conflict management endeavours to build a secure and stable neighbourhood. The two most significant lessons from the Western Balkans that the EU should translate into ENP practice relate to the nature of its engagement with the countries there by way of a comprehensive and regional approach. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thousands of professionals and students left the Balkan countries during the 1990-2000 periods for better life and working opportunities in Western European and overseas countries. This is not a new phenomenon but the number and proportion are increasing as consequences of long-term general political and economic crises, war in the surroundings. The effects of the highly skilled migration ? both positive (remittances, possible investments, strengthening of social networks, etc.) and negative (losses of human capital and others) on sustainable development have not been well studied or measured. Simple models of «brain drain» and «brain gain» - which dominate most policy discussions ? do not fully capture the complexity of the movement of people and knowledge across borders.This paper looks at the impacts of highly skilled migration on sending countries, particularly on Serbia and the policy options of the State. As a matter of fact, it looks at different possible policy responses to the emigration of highly skilled from the country with the goal of minimizing its adverse effects and promoting the sharing of gains between Serbia and host countries. Theoretically, it focuses on three policy approaches: retention, return and circulating of skills. It argues that the best strategy to deal with the problem of loss of skilled labor is one based on the concept of circulation of skills, which yields mutual benefits for both sending and host countries. The paper highlights several measures that can facilitate the process of circulation, including greater cooperation between countries of origin and host countries than observe at present. It argues that the Diaspora option must be included in the strategy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT: Various definitions and approaches to nationalism notwithstanding, appearances ofnationalism-related phenomena have long been perceived as posing serious difficulties in the Balkans and creating obstructions for the region's development and wellbeing. The years since the end of the cold War only further justified the perception that it is because of the uncurbed Balkan nationalisms that the region is once again considered 'the Europe's powder keg'. Hence, it is only natural that in its approach to and interaction with the region, the European Union has had to face the issue of nationalisms. The conventional understanding is that eurointegration processes and the EU policy on the Balkans in particular mitigate Balkan nationalisms.Questioning this understanding, the paper aims at exploring the impact of eurointegration processes and EU policies in the region on Balkan nationalism. It argues that eurointegration processes and varying promises and incentives from the Union exert considerable, however ambiguous impact on Balkan nationalisms since they subdue and transform some forms and appearances of nationalisms, while at the same time stimulate and determine others. Balkan nationalisms are transformed through direct EU influence on the Balkans taking the form of setting criteria, requirements and conditions - from the ones related to various types of assistance, to participation in different formats of cooperation, to membership. Disagreements with and reactions against what is perceived as EU pressure and negatives of accession to EU oftentimes activate nationalisms taking nationalist forms and appearance. Exploring various ways in which Balkan nationalisms are influenced by euro-integration processes, the paper seeks to justify the point that EU integration processes in the region have had rather ambiguous and even controversial impact on Balkan nationalisms. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The point of departure for this paper is the global counter-terrorism focus on denial of sanctuary as an operationalized subset of failed state discourse. It explores three related issues, in an effort to unpack politicized notions of sanctuary from state failure, within the context of peacebuilding efforts in the Western Balkans. First, this paper distinguishes between forms of post-war and post-911 extremist and terrorist activity in the former Yugoslav states, in order to better understand the domestic client market for refuge from military security and rule of law. Second, it contrasts the actions and perceptions of domestic and foreign extremists vis-à-vis the state, in order to better understand differing approaches to sanctuary and the relative level of threat that each represents to safety and stability in the region. Third, it argues that a strategic focus on internationalist terrorism cannot be separated from domestic and regional security issues, and must consider the role and impact of local actors in perpetuating administrative dysfunctions of state. The overarching theme of this paper is that terrorist sanctuaries are subversive political spaces, shaped by such variables as access, intent, interest, and motive, and as such are vulnerable to exploitation by a complex matrix of criminal, insurgent, and elite actors. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Normalization of relations in the Western Balkan / SEE is opening chances for wider contacts in economy. The paper is showing how far the economic regional cooperation is going and what does it mean for the economic integration of the SEE in the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The extensive empirical involvement of international organisations in attempts at conflict management and prevention, which often see this as one of their main security tasks and the frequent calls to increase their involvement, as well as the simultaneous relative lack of systematic comparative research on their involvement in these situations constitute the starting point for this paper. Initially, we establish a theoretical framework for the involvement of third parties, and especially international organisations, in conflict management and prevention processes that focuses on the nature and impact of their engagement. We then embark on an empirical investigation of their role in the Western Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Kosovo) and the former Soviet Union (Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia) and ask two questions:(1)How are IOs involved in managing peace settlements (direct/indirect ‘conditioning’ of particular settlements during negotiations; post-settlement implementation an operation support)?(2)What impact does particular IO involvement have on the stability of particular settlements (stalemate/status quo, viable reintegrated state, two/multi-state solution)? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The West Balkan’s after almost two decades of hardships are entering the new phase of its development and reintegration in the European and global economy. Education presents one of the main pillars of this reintegration and development. The United Nations has recognized the need for economic and social revival of this region and has launched different initiatives to assist this revival. The UN Universities have been established in different parts of the region. This paper will address the achievements and the challenges for these Universities, and their importance for the economic, and political, social and cultural development of the region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Police restructuring in BiH is one of the remaining requirements that BiH must meet in order to proceed with Community accession negotiations. In the case of BiH, and for the Balkans as a whole, the problem of organized crime is an obstacle to democratic governance and economic sustainability. Without either domestically effective law enforcement capabilities or sustainable police services, international efforts to reduce organized crime will be minimally effective. Inexorably, the fight against organized crime in BiH is contingent upon police and rule of law reform and the strengthening of local police capacity. In this paper, I will provide an evaluation of the progress achieved by BiH authorities in the implementation of police reform and restructuring.The study will address several related questions. To what extent have the BiH police and intelligence services increased their capacity to be self-sustaining and independent? What have been the successes of the EU Police Mission (EUPM-II) in its second term and, conversely, what have been the continuing and unresolved problems in fostering local ownership of EU policy initiatives among BiH authorities? What problems and opportunities do BiH police and government officials identify as most relevant to the task of designing and implementing their own programs to address organized crime? And, in light of upcoming EU leadership of police and rule of law reform in Kosovo, what are the lessons of BiH for Kosovo? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of the analysis of the wars in the Balkans is based on assumptions and concepts from international relations (IR). IR tends to take as a given that conflict between states is caused by and is essentially the result of the relationship between states. When IR scholars turn their focus to wars internal to states, they tend to start from those same assumptions, and thus see the same dynamics. Thus in both the international arena and in civil (including ?ethnic?) wars, the model of the security dilemma is used to explain and understand the violence; the focus is on the ?interests? of states or of ?ethnic groups? vis-à-vis other such entities. In the Yugoslav wars, it was the interests of the various Yugoslav Republics, or of the various ?ethnic groups,? which was posited as the reason for the violence. But such an approach misses the actual dynamics of these conflicts. By ignoring the social context and environment in which political actors exist, within their own societies, IR and similar approaches, rather than being an objective or scientific exploration of the causes of conflict, tend instead to reproduce a particular ideological construct of the state or ?ethnic group.? Drawing on the case of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, this paper argues that elites create conflict and war with other states not in order to ensure external stability or security, but in order to achieve their own goals, including especially within the state and society. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has played an important role in the stabilization of the Western Balkans and continues to be actively engaged in institution and community building, and other activities intended to uphold the democratic governance in these countries. The paper will look at the actions of the OSCE in Kosovo and explore the salience of the processes of ?securitization? and ?desecuritization? in examining the rationale for democracy building in that troubled society. It will focus specifically on the OSCE?s work in the area of human rights and the rule of law as preconditions for social, economic and political development. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The sources of instability in the aftermath of contemporary violent conflicts such as those in the Balkans represent complex interplay of traditional and non- traditional security threats. While those deriving from a desire to contest the borders generally tend to weaken, the threats spanning economics and politics through the operation of illiberal transnational networks forged in the course of the conflict tend to strengthen. These networks benefit from the weakness of the state, and present one of the main obstacles to building sustainable peace. Consequently, weak state has become one of the main sources of insecurity in the Balkans as manifested by the incidence of human rights violations and profound economic insecurity resulting out of a lack of formal employment, poor social safety protection, inadequate access to health and education and specific vulnerabilities of those categories of population most affected by conflict i.e. refugees, displaced people, minorities and the poor. All of these reflect the main security concerns at an individual level that are directly related to the lack of public capacity to provide human security understood both as freedom from fear and freedom from want as the essence of peace building and development in general. The establishment of legitimate political authority capable of upholding human security i.e. security of an individual is the main challenge of post-conflict rehabilitation. Traditional hard security approaches that are concerned with the protection of state borders in view of traditional security threats do not work well in the context of weak statehood and associated security threats such as those in the Balkans. The presence of illiberal networks which perpetuate state weakness poses strong limitations to the international donors? approach to state building through (re)building of formal institutions as stabilization strategy in the Balkans. The role that civil society can play in this process by compensating for the weakness of the state in furthering human security while at the same time contributing to improved state legitimacy has not been sufficiently appreciated. This is clearly illustrated in a range of European Union?s programmes designed specially for the Western Balkans within the Stabilization and Association Process which have by and large been focused specifically on the state-building. The paper will try to look at the merits of a strategic approach to civil society as a complementary strategy to the state- centered approach in furthering human security in the Balkans. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The prospects for stability and prosperity in the Western Balkans will be greatly enhanced through Europeanization and integration with the EU. This paper argues that security and economic development in the region are interdependent and will gain momentum from the widening of the EU. There will be some emphasis on Croatia. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For the European Union, the Balkans region is a very problematic one in its backyard. Any source of instability in this area represents a serious threat to all the members of the European Union. All the countries of the Western Balkans face common problems and need assistance to resolve them. Being conscious of this need, the top foreign policy priority of the European Union has been, in the last years, to assist this group of countries adopting new policies and instruments.The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) is an example of this. The diverse and complex ethnic composition (with a large Albanian minority) of this country means that inter-ethnic relations are a long-standing issue upon which its stability, and possibly that of the entire region, depends. After almost a decade of relative political stability, FYROM was plunged to the brink of civil war in March 2001, when the ethnic Albanian minority took up arms against the Macedonian security forces. Until now, the political situation has remained generally stable, building on the process initiated by the Ohrid peace agreement which remains crucial to ensure the development of the country as a unitary and multiethnic state. But, many challenges still lie ahead.This paper aims to analyze the extent to which the conjugation of EU efforts promotes regional security and stability, contributing to the pacification of the Balkans. And, in the case of Macedonia, with potential external and internal source of conflict, how the EU policies might help finding a responsible resolution for the inter-ethnic tension. In searching answers to these questions, this article wants to contribute for a better understanding of the root causes of the Balkans conflicts, showing through the example of FYROM that the EU has an important role in the promotion of stability and good governance in the region. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I begin from the presumption that the post-cold war has seen the emergence of "political systems of a new type" which are staffed by domestic and international officials and in which classical sovereignty has decreasing relevance even as the rhetoric of national sovereignty remains robust. These emerging political systems have not succeeded at building the stable and inclusive institutions that are an essential basis for democracy and prosperity. This paper will explore these loosely bounded systems through an examination of international assistance to the development of domestic political institutions It suggests that the quality of institution building flows from the type of external intervention, the quality of domestic-international cooperation, and the capacity of local actors to achieve some consensus on basic rules of the game. This analysis will demonstrate these broader points through an exploration of efforts to develop stable and inclusive representative and executive institutions that can process demands, deliver services and manage conflict at the putative end of wars. It will explore the complex bargaining between international donors and domestic political actors in efforts to build representative institutions and executives in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neoliberal institutionalist and constructivist approaches of International Relations argue that the integration of states into international regimes increases the influence of NGOs, since they can urge governments to comply with international obligations. In this regard the international environment of the Western Balkans is quite favourable for human rights NGOs for four reasons. First, all states of the Western Balkans intend to join the European Union as soon as possible. In order to fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria, they have to respect and protect human rights. Second, the states of the Western Balkans are already members of the OSCE, UN and Council of Europe. They have ratified several international conventions on human rights and minority rights. Third, international assistance is tied to certain human rights standards. Finally, the OSCE, EU and UN maintain missions in many countries of the former Yugoslavia. International organizations and western governments provide political and especially financial support to local human rights NGOs. In this paper I argue that the involvement of international organizations and western governments on human rights issues in Macedonia and Kosovo has led to a paradoxical outcome: since human rights NGOs derive political and financial support from external actors, NGOs do not have to be backed by local constituencies. Thus, they do not act as transmission belts between international organizations and local constituencies, as it is foreseen in donor programs, but de facto operate as the appendage of international organizations and western governments. Kosovo presents a special case for human rights advocacy, because as an international protectorate it is run by the UN, EU and OSCE. Thus, the international organizations, which provide political and financial support to local human rights NGOs, are also in charge of human rights issues. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores how the external effects of the conflicts in the Western Balkans affected the transformation of the security agenda of the European Union (EU). It cites that the reaction to the conflicts by the EU member countries included the restrictions on borders for the flow of humans, capital and products along with an increasing external intervention in the region. It discusses the options considered by the EU in its attempt to widen the organization including offering immediate membership to the former communist countries.

The author analyzes the democracy in the Balkans and Bosnia. He relies on Will Kymlicka's account of liberal multicultural citizenship and ethno-cultural justice. He notes that political democratization, economic liberalization and formal recognition of the multinational character of the Bosnian state are the three pillars of the constitutional and institutional structure of Dayton Bosnia. He cites that the Bosnian model of citizenship did not follow the normative concepts of liberal pluralism.

This article considers the impact of two of the most powerful international organizations. Scholars have argued that applicants to NATO and the EU have altered their policies, foreign and domestic, so that they can become members. This article argues that conditions imposed on potential applicants have less of an impact that frequently argued as neither the applicants nor the existing members care as much about the formal criteria as is often asserted. Instead, we assert that international organizations are more likely to have a powerful impact upon a country's policies if they alter how decisions are made, not merely the costs and benefits of particular choices. A quick comparison of American experiences with demobilizing existing armies in the Balkans where NATO procedures shaped American decision-making procedures, and in Iraq, a non-NATO operation, shows that process matters, and that international organizations may have influence, but through less obvious, less blunt but more enduring pathways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the nineteenth century Western perspectives on other societies were steeped in assumptions about comparative civilization and stratified cultures. Social Darwinism was born. In the course of the twentieth century the relevance of culture in relations between societies was allowed to decline alongside the parallel decline of concepts like national character. But from the eve of the twenty-first century, culture has returned to international studies. This return has been helped by debates about clash of civilizations, theories of the Information Superhighway, and the resurgence of ethnic politics in the Balkans and the postcolonial world. The return of culture to international studies has also been facilitated by new intellectual paradigms from the developing world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do Balkan states comply with EU conditionality? The rationalist international relations approaches account for the different degrees of sovereignty (from international protectorates through semi-sovereign states to fully sovereign states) enjoyed by Balkan states and their objective to join the EU but they fail to explain the varying degree of confrontation with regard to specific EU conditions in the period after the EU extended the European perspective to them. I offer a systemic constructivist explanation of compliance and argue that it is the insistence on political recognition and social acceptance that drives the Balkan states to abide by the EU rules. Confrontation is a reaction to a perceived loss of internal sovereignty and it is higher, the more sovereignty-intrusive the EU conditionality is. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Balkans are a key region for NATO and its history. In the early 1990s, the break-up of Yugoslavia was instrumental in redefining the role and mandate of the Alliance. At a decade of distance from those events, most countries in the region are, at var ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the late 1990s, many counter-trafficking activities have focused on the Balkans. One widely-acknowledged problem has been a lack of coordination and information exchange. Governments, international organizations, and NGOs have often failed to devise ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East are the areas most in need of conflict resolution arrangements and cooperative policies. Strategic linkages limit the effectiveness of regional solutions in the area of politico-military security, but they also emphas ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

DUE TO THE RECENT HISTORY AND ALL TROUBLES WHICH REGION WAS FACING IT IS NOW EXTREMLY IMPORTANT TO HAVE OBJECTIVE AND HIGHLY RESPONSIBLE EDUCATORS. FROM THE PROBLEM HOW THE RECENT HISTORY IS PRESENTED WERY MUCH DEPENDS HOW THE FUTURE IS GOING TO BE BUILT. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

SECURITY STUDIES ARE SPECIALY IMPORTNAT FOR SLOVENIA AS A SMALL COUNTRY WHICH WAS ABLE TO GO RELATIVLY FAST TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND WHICH COULD BE NOW SEEN IN THE AREA IF BALKANS AS A MODEL FOR OTHER COUNTRIES. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

INTERNATIONA SUMMER SCHOOL ON THE ISLAND SIPAN , CROATIA, IS ORGANIZED FOR THE FIFTH TIME. THE SCHOOL IS DEVOTED TO YOUNG LEADERS FROM THE AREA OF BALKANS AND THROUGH ALL THESE ONE WEEK SEMINARS MORE THAN 5OO PEOPLE WENT. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Macedonia" and "the Balkans" have become geopolitical terms that signify, respectively, mixed-up/impure and marginal/chaotic, often in far-distant geopolitical contexts from the original places but always reflecting a specific understanding of "Europe" and "Europeanness." Europe's "imperial legacy," therefore, at least in terms of some elements of geopolitical language, begins in Europe itself. Such representations, however, involve very particular readings of the original places of reference without which they could not "travel" elsewhere. Europe's Greek borderland in Macedonia has a geopolitical resonance the world over. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

RECENT DEVELOPMENT IS ENCOURING AND MORE AND MORE CONTACTS BETWEEN DIFERENT INSTITUTIONS ARE ESTABLISHED. DISPITE THAT IS NO ONE COORDINATING BODY COOPERATION IS RUNNING THROUGH DIFERENT CHANELS AND PROBABLY THERE IS A TIME TO THINK TO CHANELISE ALL THIS EFFORTS. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Balkan wars of the 1990s threatened a newfound optimism in post-Cold War Europe. While the bipolar standoff?at least nominally?came to a close before the Balkan conflict, East-West relations were not beyond suspicion. Indeed, the Balkan wars brought back into view longstanding ethic and historical ties, competing spheres of influence and geo-strategic interests. The credibility of an expanding U.S.-led NATO was in question, as the prospect of a resurgent Germany emerged with the crumbling of Russia?s empire and influence. By all accounts, the Balkans again threatened to unravel a hopeful Europe. Yet, conflict did not engulf the continent. Why? Some (offensive) realists argue that the international system encourages expansionist behavior, while others (defensive realists) suggest the system provides incentives for more restrained conduct. The former view paints a grim picture of international relations, where concern over relative gains leads to exploitation and security (cooperation) rises only out of power relations. The latter provides a more optimistic outlook, where states often forego potential gains in favor of the status quo and concern over power relations is tempered by ?structural modifiers??geography, technology, perceptions of intent, etc.?that places greater emphasis on threat. Contrary to the first view, this suggests states may seek to avoid rather than exploit conflict, opening the door for greater cooperation. Indeed, I argue that the Balkan wars present a test case of defensive realism. Not only did regional actors eschew expansive actions?to the extent of taking a ?hands-off? approach to the conflict?but security seeking rivals pursued cooperative means to contain the wars as well as future conflicts though the NATO Partnership for Peace program. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous researches on nations? characteristics and their propensity to engage in militarized disputes suggests that regime type similarities (i.e., democracies), similar interests as well as social-cultural similarities decrease the likelihood to use military force. The latter factor is evident in the period following the Cold War era, as the international community has been plagued by conflicts that seem to have been triggered by cultural differences. The war in the Balkans is a good example of the war initiated by cultural variances. However, it is also apparent that a militarized dispute can occur between nations with a similar or even identical culture, for instance, the war between South and North Korea fought in 1950. It seems that in this case national / political interests went beyond other influences such as cultural identity. In this study, I explore the relative weight of cultural and national/political interest factors in the support for a decision to use military force. An experimental design is used where the participants have to make decisions whether to support their country?s military initiative against a fictitious adversary within a context of a hypothetical international crisis. The depiction of the adversary nation will represent the experimental manipulations of similarity along the social-cultural and nation interest dimensions. The experiment (with appropriate modifications) will be run both in the US and S. Korea. The result of the controlled study will add to the clarification of the relative effects of cultural versus national interests concerning the public approval of the use of force. Moreover, comparison of the experimental results across nations will add to the generalizability of the findings as well as to the underlying conceptualization. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines recent assessments of the transitional administrations in the Balkans and East Timor with particular regard to the division of labor (international-domestic). Much of the writing on East Timor decries the failure to give more authority to domestic officials, while that on the Balkans disparages international officials for insufficient vigor in forcing domestic nationalists to implement "cosmopolitan" mandates. With the exception of the UN Secretary General's first substantial report about UNMIK, these analyses eschew systematic treatment of how authority is divided between international and domestic officials and how it is transferred from international to domestic officials. The article argues that an effective division of labor is essential to the success of postconflict administration and that it deserves more analytic and operational attention. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]