Search

Globalization is portrayed by some analysts as forcing convergence to a liberal norm, while others argue for the continued efficacy of organized market forms of capitalism, to use Peter Hall’s description, despite globalization. Has there been a general move toward liberal market structures among European economies? And are there discernable differences in economic performance that can be traced to these transformations (or lack thereof)? This paper seeks to explore these questions empirically through an examination of institutional change and economic performance in six advanced industrial economies that offer a mix of liberal and coordinated economic structures (i.e., the United States, Britain, and Ireland on the liberal side; France, Germany, and the Netherlands as coordinated economies). The convergence question is often posed strictly in economic policy terms, an unfortunate limitation given that globalization reduces states’ ability to control economic change. The key question is how the broader institutions of economic and social regulation -- society rather than government -- respond to globalization. As such this paper first produces an empirical index based on capital mobility, labor relationships, economic regulation, and social attitudes for gauging whether markets in these states have largely liberalized or remain relatively coordinated. Comparative economic performance since 1989 (marking both the fall of the Berlin Wall and the introduction of the World Wide Web) will then be examined to see if there is any correlation between political-economic responses to globalization and economic outcomes. The hypothesis is that there will be more diversity among European capitalist economies than the mainstream reading of globalization would predict, but that more coordinated economies face rising opportunity costs that will comparatively hinder economic performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nowhere is the gap between winners and losers in the Central and East European (CEE) transition more evident than in its subnational, cross-regional variation. Both globalization and economic integration in the European marketplace have strongly impacted the geographic and regional distribution of the benefits and costs of integrating markets. Declining activity rates and purchasing power in the less advanced CEE regions and rapidly increasing economic disparities across more and less advanced CEE regions place significant burdens on the future outlook of these less developed regions. Empirical evidence suggests that in CEE the real losers of European integration are low and unskilled workers with little education in declining regions. Variation in regional rates of economic growth and development is of course not news in the wider European Union. Despite evidence of increasing economic convergence across states, increasing regional disparities are a global phenomenon (Sala-I-Martin, 2002) and are likewise well recognized in the European context (Quah, 1996). The appearance of regional disparities in CEE however represents one of the greatest challenges both to the political and economic stability of CEE and to the Union as a whole. This is above all the case because the less developed regions of CEE have experienced some of the worst features of the economic transition.FDI has flowed far more strongly to CEE’s more developed regions, indirectly contributing to rising economic disparities across the more and less advanced regions. And economic decline in the CEE’s less advanced regions has thus far not been stemmed by attempts at creating regional support mechanisms. Central governments themselves are torn between investing in the less developed regions and cementing economic development at the national level (Ellison, 2007). Thus the question remains how best to promote the economic development of the less developed regions.What strategies should be employed to attract investment to and build employment in these regions remains controversial. This paper asks what can be done? Will EU structural and cohesion funds or the Lisbon Agenda help reverse these trends? Can more FDI be directed to the less developed regions of Central and Eastern Europe through other public policy tools? This paper will provide an empirical analysis of the factors influencing subnational regional economic development. Using data on the subnational regional distribution of FDI flows, this paper will ask what factors best explain the regional distribution of FDI flows and will further explore the impact of this and other variablesâ€"in particular New Economy modelsâ€"on the prospects for regional economic development. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given their economic capacity and tradition as the major providers of Overseas Development Aid, global development policy is an obvious field for much more advanced co-operation between Europe and Japan. However, while there are similar intentions and responsibilities, actual policies and preferences differ. Apart from different regional emphases, there are also different normative considerations that guide European and Japanese development assistance. Japan and Europe seem agree on a philosophy that emphasises humanitarian considerations, an appreciation of the concept of “human security”, the recognition of global interdependence, environmental conservation and potential for self-help as desirable conditions for development aid. When actual decisions on donations are made, many other considerations, among them traditional notions of regional hegemony and trade interest, seem to guide policy-makers in both regions. The paper looks at shared and differing concepts of Japanese and European development aid and asks whether better co-ordination between the poles could change the global debate on development aid. The paper has a normative agenda which is, however, rooted in a remarkably deep understanding of the practicalities of Japanese ODA. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]