Search

India has a decade-long experience with independent regulatory agencies in public services as an institutional transplant from the industrialized world. Introduced at the behest of international donor agencies, regulators in India are intended, somewhat naively, to provide an apolitical space for decision making to assuage investor concerns over arbitrary administrative actions, and thereby stimulate private investment. In practice, regulators have had to negotiate a terrain over which the state has continued to exercise considerable control. Regulators have also been been shaped in their functioning by national and sub-national political traditions and by administrative and political practices. The result is a hybrid institutional form that combines politics as usual with intriguing new, and unanticipated, opportunities for political intervention.This paper will explore the origins of electricity regulation as a form of institutional "isomorphism." It will then compare the regulatory experience in India's electricity sector across two Indian states to understand the implications of transplanting regulatory agencies in the global south. An examination of the process through which regulatory decisions are reached illustrates how existing bureaucratic and technocratic networks, transplanted procedures, and administrative cultures combine to conservatively manage long-standing political tensions around electricity. In seeking to manage those tensions, regulators often take decisions - on tariff setting, for example - based on a political reading that belies the technocratic narrative on which institutional credibility rests. At the same time, civil society groups ranging from residential associations to professional associations to individuals are using newly created regulatory spaces to structure a more deliberative decision process. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and India are two major rising powers in Asia. The two countries fought a border war in 1962 and since then border negotiations have been going on. Studying the relationship between these two major powers in Asia has significant implications for the future of Asia. This paper focuses on three major Chinese foreign policy decision makers –Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping—their operational code beliefs and belief changes during the 1960s and examines their belief changes and the impact of belief changes on the Chinese decisions to fight a war with India after breaking up with the Soviet Union. The 1960s was a hard time for the newly founded PRC, however, the Chinese leaders made the hard decision to break up with its ally and big brother, and fight a war with India who was the head of the non-aligned movements. As three major decision makers, do they have the same belief changes in making those strategic moves? This is an interesting question in helping us to understand the Chinese foreign policies during the Cold War time and also to look into the future of Sino-Indian relations. By examining the international and domestic situations of the Sino-Indian War in 1962, this paper compares the results of the narratives with an operational code analysis of three Chinese leaders and their subjective games. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multiparty cabinets in parliamentary political systems create a unique context in which foreign policy decisions are made. Under certain (and frequent) conditions, the senior political party must negotiate any differences with its junior partner(s) or risk the collapse of the governing coalition. This context occurs in many important states in international politics, including Israel, Japan, Germany, Turkey, and India. The result may be a government unable to resolve differences and make meaningful policy decisions or a government that is hijacked by narrow political interests and pushed to extremes. This paper will compare the foreign policy behaviors and processes of multiparty governments to those of single party governments using events and crisis behavior datasets. Building on previous research, specific theoretical propositions will be tested across a number of states in order to provide a general understanding of the effects of, and conditions under which, coalition politics may influence the foreign policies of key players in global politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACTINTELLIGENCE REVIEWRECENT INDIAN MILITARY HISTORYCol ® Virendra Sahai Verma Research Scholar Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. In this presentation we shall examine the intelligence and its role in decision making in the important Indian military events after independence on 15 August 1947. 1947-48, Jammu & Kashmir WarThe British Act of Parliament that created the dominions of India and Pakistan in August 1947 had given options to the princely states to chose and accede to either of two. While Hari Singh, Hindu King (Maharaja) of Jammu & Kashmir, a Muslim majority state, took time to decide, thousands of armed Pakhtun irregulars from North West Frontier Province of Pakistan invaded the state. The Pakistani plan of annexation of the state caught Kashmiri and Indian leaders totally unaware. On 26 October 1947 Maharaja finally decided to accede to India and asked for Indian military assistance. On 27 October 1947 Indian troops were air-dashed to Sri Nagar and drove out the invaders from the valley. UN sponsored ceasefire on 01 January 1948 retained strategic 1/3rd of the state illegally with the aggressor though India possessed clear military superiority.Pakistan was determined to annex the Muslim majority state by force if Maharaja did not play cards well and started planning for the same soon after independence on14 August 1947. There were good indications of enemy’s plan. Indian political leadership who had just got power and Maharaja failed to take the warnings seriously. Had Indian and Kashmir leadership paid attention to the intelligence leads and taken a preemptive action the history of Kashmir would be different. 1962 Sino-Indian WarSeptember 1962 Governent orders to army to move forward to McMahon line in Arunachal Pradesh in East India were opposed by senior field commanders as it would provoke China. There was information of Chinese offensive deployment all along the northern borders with superior strength. Indian troops, then, were in poor equipment and clothing at the altitude of 12000 ft and above. They were hurriedly inducted and were not acclimatized. The opposing field commander was removed with pliable Lt Gen B M Kaul who was in good books of the Prime Minister. The Indian move at Dhola post led to a war in Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh. Indian troops were routed and Chinese occupied all areas which they had claimed. Later they withdrew to their side of McMahon line.1962 is a sad story of political will being imposed on the army which was not prepared for an immediate military action against well prepared superior enemy. The assessment of the field commanders was ignored causing shameful defeat.1965 India-Pakistan WarIn August 1965 Pakistan had again infiltrated thousands of irregulars in Kashmir to disrupt lines of communications with a plan to annex Kashmir by regular troops. Pakistan plan failed with counterattack by Indian armed forces all along the western border. India was again caught up unaware of the infiltration and Pakistan plan.1971 India-Pakistan WarPrime Minister Indira Gandhi had planned a military offensive against East Pakistan in April 1971. She postponed the operations to end of the year on insistence of army chief who pleaded unprepared ness as war would escalate into both east and west wings of Pakistan and its ally China may also intervene. 14 day quick and short war saw birth of a jubilant new nation Bangladesh. It is a good example where the political expediency bowed to a realistic threat assessment by the professionals.1987-90 India’s Misadventure in Sri-LankaYoung Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi hurriedly pushed through three division worth of troops to obtain surrender of militant Tamils (LTTE) who have been demanding separate homeland in Jaffna northern Sri-Lanka... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]