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Admiration and resentment of America are deeply rooted in the current international system even among countries that are traditional US allies. This paper distinguishes in its first part between critical opinion, skepticism and prejudice as different lenses through which to view anti-Americanism and then details six different types of anti-Americanism. In the paper's next two parts these categories are confronted with data from Australia and New Zealand and the different historical trajectories in the evolution of anti-Americanism in these two countries. The fourth and final section seeks to identify commonalities, if any, across the two political settings and, in the efort to test for the effect of geographic proximity, makes some comparisons to anti-Americanism in Mexico and Canada. The expected finding is that the paper will point to a plurality ofdifferent types of anti-Americanisms, a condition that reflects the pluralis mof world politics more generally. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trilateral security cooperation among Japan, Australia and the United States has accelerated over the last few years, with the first foreign ministerial meeting held in early 2006. Not unexpectedly, the new cooperation between Canberra, Tokyo, and Washington is often characterized as a revival of Containment (against China, this time) or a mini-NATO in Asia. The paper will examine this latest development in East Asia’s security relations, with a specific focus on Japanese policymaking. The concept of a democratic state as one form of state identity will be given particular attention for understanding Tokyo’s attitude toward trilateral security cooperation, as well as the new security order in Asia. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper, part of a broader research project, is concerned with the question of how military intervention as part of the 'war on terror' was justified in the three core members of the 'Coalition of the Willing': the US, UK and Australia. In particular, we focus on the ways in which interventions in Iraq were justified to domestic audiences across these states. Building on critical constructivist understandings of security, we suggest the importance of conceiving of security discourse and policy as an intersubjective realm. Within this realm, the ability to legitimise or enable particular foreign and security practices is related to the extent to which these practices are located within dominant narratives of history, culture and identity within the political communities concerned. While political leaders in these three states therefore defined the need for intervention in broadly similar terms, subtle differences in emphasis and argumentation are potentially important not only in communicating how the military interventions themselves are made possible in different contexts, but also in illuminating the possibilities and constraints for discourses and practices of security in global politics. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents an examination of the dynamics of multilateral military alliances or 'coalitions'. Framed within the wider debate over the future security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region, it has the dual objective of both enriching the academic debate and offering guidance to policy-makers by investigating the theory and practice of coalition behaviour. The article expounds the case for the American-Japanese-Australian combination and analyses the issues that confront such an alliance-coalition using two competing theoretical perspectives of allied behaviour: 'balance of power' and 'intra-alliance politics'. The main propositions of these perspectives are empirically tested against policy statements based on American, Japanese and Australian foreign and defence policies and associated academic writings. The paper demonstrates the continued validity of realist-conceived approaches to security provision and concludes that both theoretical perspectives are useful tools of analysis in this case. Focusing on separate levels and therefore different aspects of allied behaviour, they can in fact be viewed as complementary, rather than competing, and clearly exhibit strong potential for further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines two different counter-terrorist styles: the hegemonic, often unilateral approach practiced by the West and the multilateral consultative approach of the East. America and its Western allies such as Australia have often voiced impatience with the gradualist, consultative modus operandi of Southeast Asian states in dealing with terrorism. Australia even warned after the 12 October 2002 Bali attacks that it would consider mounting pre-emptive military action to rout terrorist networks taking refuge in neighbouring countries whose counter-terrorist action was perceived as lackadaisical. This created a firestorm of protest from Canberra’s Southeast Asian neighbours. It is clearly unacceptable to allow complacency or the downside of the East’s way of approaching terrorist threats to be the norm. Conversely, a unilateral approach threatens to undermine jealously-guarded sovereignty and compound international relations in a time when multilateral collaboration is required. To strike the right balance between respecting sovereignty and instituting effective action requires a new model combining not the worst but the best of both East and West. In fact such a hybrid model may already exist in the Asia-Pacific, employed by both ASEAN and Pacific Island Nations to combat transnational crime. However, applying this model is not straightforward as some regional states barely tolerate one another and trust can be described as very poor. Nevertheless, there are some excellent best practices already found within overall Asia-Pacific strategies to combat transnational criminal activity such as people smuggling and illicit drugs, that might be similarly employed against terrorism. What is important is that whilst these Asia-Pacific transnational crime strategies fit with international conventions and treaties they are uniquely tailored to the region. The regional fora that facilitate action to combat transnational crime can be described as loose coalitions but with a ‘whole of nation’ approach where developing nations work closely with developed nations that are not members of existing regional associations. In fact the developed nations, like the US, work outside the box as dialogue partners and in some cases provide the necessary impetus for effective action. Strategies to combat terrorism in the Asia Pacific need to emulate the transnational crime approach where the power and authority exerted by the West is distilled into a formula for the East that is easily converted into a shared vision for agreed outcomes. A successful formula that injects hegemonic drive and resources to energize a loose counter-terrorist multilateralism built on bilateral and informal networks might be effective in the Asia-Pacific. One critical aspect of this top-down but mediated and multilateral counter-terrorist approach involves capacity-building: the US can help improve traditional governance arrangements in the East to more effectively cope with the threat of transnational terrorism. For example, is the ASEAN Secretariat or ASEANAPOL sufficiently resourced and does it possess the required policy base to be effective? A frustration of the West is perceived inaction by the East when in some cases developing nations do not have the capacity to participate in a multinational initiative. The question seems to be balancing the expectations of the West against the capacity of the East to deliver on global counter-terrorist conventions and treaties whilst combating a common menace. A hegemonically-energized but nuanced and multilateral counter-terrorist strategy might be what is needed to combat transnational terrorism in the Asia Pacific and even globally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S.-Australia relationship has never been stronger. Nor, paradoxically, has it ever been so threatened. Australia's place in the world is undergoing a profound transformation that could eventuate in the first material divergence of interests between the two close allies and friends in history. The transformation of Australian maritime security represents a notable factor in this shift and illustrates the potential for tension in the future relationship. Island nations live and die by their mastery of the sea. An island continent with 40 percent of its GDP reliant on international trade, Australia is no exception. Yet Australia has until recently relied on others for trade and security. During the Industrial Revolution, Australia was one of the primary sources of raw materials for the British Empire, in both wartime and peacetime. The empire sought to protect its interests in Australia by assuring maritime security. This was a doubly profitable arrangement for Australia, guaranteeing the nation a market for its goods in the "home country," covered by the security blanket provided by the British taxpayer in the form of the Royal Navy. Yet wealth did not come without sacrifice, as the disproportionate number of Australian war dead (per capita) in the service of British, and later American, strategic interests attests. Indeed, with the exception of the campaign in the Pacific in World War II, all of Australia's military deployments have been largely tied to its historical and cultural allegiances. These deployments had less to do with narrow national interests or pragmatic calculations of geopolitics. At the outbreak of World War I, World War II, the 1991 Gulf War, and the Global War on Terror, Australian forces were immediately dispatched to the Middle East, a region hardly within Australia's immediate strategic orbit. Explaining this anomaly furnishes some insight into Australia's emerging strategic dilemma. While Australia's key trading relationships have rapidly shifted from historic partners (UK/U.S.) to geographical partners (China), its strategic posture is still largely premised on historical, demographic, and cultural linkages. For a variety of global and local reasons, this situation is rapidly becoming untenable. The wartime prime minister, John Winston Howard, has said that he sees no need to choose between Australia's strategic military alliance with the United States and its strategic trading alliance with China. He might be right in terms of the immediate political cycle, but a longer view suggests this assumption might prove dangerous. To fully explore this dilemma, this paper will examine Australia's competing maritime priorities between culture and power. It will determine whether Canberra will be forced to choose between a rising China and its traditional alliance with the United States in maritime matters. And, the paper will recommend strategies and policies that Australia should pursue in order to strike a balance that accommodates both Washington and Beijing. The paper thus will have immediate policy relevance in Canberra and Washington. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the role of Australia as the lead member state in the United Nations (UN)-sanctioned International Force in East Timor (INTERFET). It discusses the significance of the role of Australia for the U.S. military and its allies in the Pacific Command (PACOM) area of responsibility (AOR). It cites that the success of Australia in dealing with the East Timor crisis offers insights for the U.S. in replicating other UN peacekeeping forces (PKF). A historical overview of the relations between Australia and East Timor is provided.

Extant accounts of the origins of ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United States) Pact have tended to situate it one a half-way point between America’s interest to enlist support in containing communism through regional pacts and (primarily) Australia’s interest to obtain a long-term security guarantee, underwritten by the superpower, against future Japanese and/or communist invasion. This paper considers the pact from the perspective of national identity. If ANZUS is an institutionalization of a set of shared historical, political, and racial/ethnic traits among its members, than the exclusion of Britain from the pact is puzzling. Why was Britain, despite an official request for membership, excluded from the club? To borrow from a venerable puzzle of International Relations (IR) theory, why is there no English-speaking NATO in Asia-Pacific? Neither interest nor identity offers a simple explanation of why an obvious friend and ally with a long-standing and continuing (colonial) presence in the region should be excluded from a multilateral arrangement with claims to collective defense. I will consider this question by analyzing the effect of the content and contestation of Australian and New Zealander identities on the drafting process of the ANZUS Treaty in 1951. My argument is that Australia and New Zealand â€" through contemporary foreign policy debates as well as the drafting process itself â€" clearly signaled that Britain would become a “shadow member” of ANZUS, partaking in anything from information-sharing to collective defense-planning in the region. I will conclude with a reflection on the absence of the identity variable in the institutional design research program in IR. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Should Australia's relationship with the United States sensibly be called the other "special relationship", implying that Australia, along with Great Britain, is one of America?s two most favored allies? Or into the future will "the mission define the coalition", making Australia favored as long as it commits troops to American-led operations? Do most Australians see their nation's alliance relationship and broader bilateral relations with the United States as special? To address these questions two competing narratives regarding the history of Australian involvement in US-led wars will be examined. The first narrative asserts that the shared wartime experiences of the two nations have cemented the bond between them. The second narrative views this history as one of Australia continually undermining its own independence. Finally to measure the strength and depth of pro- and anti-American sentiment in Australia, these narratives will be discussed in the context of contemporary public opinion on US-Australia relations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]