Why was it that the banking system of Australia was more resilient than virtually any other OECD country'? Why the banks in these countries did not take on the increased degree of risk that led to the downfall of so many well-known institutions in the US, the UK and Europe"1 Were Australian bankers, regulators, politicians and investors smarter than their counterparts in the US, the UK and Europe? This paper argues that a more nuanced understanding of structures, institutions and agencies and their interaction can inform research into a specific area, namely the comparative analysis of banking systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
*GOVERNMENT agencies, *DELEGATED legislation, *POLITICAL systems
Abstract
Recent shcolarshp has suggested that regulatory styles can change suurprsngly quickly; Europe and the USA have changed places, for example, in the last twenty years in terms of their regulatory approaches. This paper argues that if the institutional venue is held constant, the old arguments that national styles of regulation are slow to change is still valid. The argument is supported with examples from an American state (Wisconsin) and the UK, both of which attmepted to to borrow regulatory approaches from other countries but with very limited success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]