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Existing theories of change in campaign strategies predict cross-national convergence in terms of candidates' linkages to voters and the degree of policy focus and cleavage priming in their appeals. However, the prevailing national patterns of electioneering in Chile, Brazil, and Peru have actually diverged from one another since their transitions from authoritarian rule. This paper develops a theory of success contagion that can explain the evolution of presidential campaign strategy in these countries as well as other third-wave democracies. I argue that the first politician to combine a victorious campaign with a successful term as president establishes a model of electioneering that candidates across the ideological spectrum are likely to adopt in the future. Such contagion can occur through imitation as well as the consolidation of norms among campaign professionals. Strategic convergence is less probable in cases of repeatedly poor governing performance, such as Peru. Instead, candidates are likely to choose strategies through an inward-oriented process of reacting against previous errors. This paper draws upon content analysis of television advertising, interviews with campaign staff, and case studies of specific elections in Chile, Brazil, and Peru. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A significant portion of international relations scholarship over the last two decades has focused on the democratic peace hypothesis that democratic states do not go to war against each other. But one category of coercive policy that has been omitted from the debate and which poses certain caveats for democratic peace claims is that of covert action. Nixon’s policies toward Chile and Peru in 1969-1970 provide an interesting contrast that is difficult for democratic peace theorists to explain. Both states were implementing nationalization policies that threatened US economic interests, but Chile was an established democracy while Peru was under military rule. The democratic peace thesis would predict that Washington would try to negotiate and compromise with Chile and be more aggressive with Peru. Yet, the Nixon administration did the exact opposite, attempting to subvert Allende’s election in Chile, while negotiating with Peru. Using original documents and a process tracing approach, and evaluating factors at the systemic, domestic, and individual levels, this paper will illuminate the causal mechanism(s) behind the administration’s decisions in these two cases, shedding light on why it reacted so differently to substantially similar events in the two states and on whether their respective regime types played any role in the policy decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Events such as the UK-Iceland "Cod Wars" and the Peruvian and Chilean seizure of American tuna boats brought fishery and maritime issues to international prominence in the 1960s and 1970s. More recently, armed conflicts have erupted over maritime issues between such advanced industrialized democracies as Canada and Spain. Several solutions have been proposed to manage the increasingly contentious world of maritime claims. Stemming from the literature on common property resources, solutions focus on authority, privatization, and institutions. Two primary mechanisms for resolving competing maritime claims are evaluated in this paper: 1) the creation of private ownership of maritime zones in the form of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), and 2) the creation of an institution, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to establish standards for maritime claims and resolve disputes. Privatization may promote long-term cooperation and more efficient extraction of maritime resources, but may be suboptimal if the creation of private property rights for maritime areas generates distributional conflict. Similarly, the institutional approach to managing resources of the seas offers many advantages for resolving competing maritime claims and providing explicit mechanisms for dispute resolution, but may be problematic if distributional conflicts arise and/or institutional design is suboptimal. We evaluate the effects of UNCLOS and EEZs on the peaceful and militarized management of maritime claims in the Western Hemisphere and Europe (1900-2001). Our analyses suggest that declared EEZs work more efficiently for helping parties reach agreements in bilateral negotiations, although membership in UNCLOS promotes more frequent third party conflict management efforts. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]