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In the 1970s and 1980s, legislators argued whether the United States should consider a state?s human rights practices when allocating economic and military aid. The debate resurfaced during the recent discussions regarding Plan Colombia. Supporters in Congress cite the domestic drug problem as the primary reason for the need of foreign assistance; however, they often resort to human rights and democracy rhetoric for support. Opponents of Plan Colombia argue that supply side attacks in the war on drugs are and have been fruitless and funding should be provided for domestic drug treatment programs. In addition, opponents point to the impact of foreign assistance, and in this case military assistance in particular, on human rights. This paper re-examines the US decision to grant military aid to Colombia and the subsequent impact the program has on human rights in Colombia and surrounding states. The empirical analysis indicates that there is a negative relationship between foreign assistance and the realization of security rights. The case study of Plan Colombia highlights these findings. Through the analysis of several key indicators, it is apparent that during the early years of Plan Colombia the security rights situation has deteriorated. This paper emphasizes that U.S. efforts at improving human rights records across the globe have been harmed by their foreign assistance program. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper comes out of a broader project entitled ?Two-Level Games and International Narcotics Control: Cooperation Between the United States and Mexico and Colombia, 1989-2000.? In the broader project, I examine how the United States handles narcotics control in its bilateral relationships with Mexico and Colombia during the presidential administration of George H.W. Bush and both William Clinton administrations. Working out of the ?two-level games? tradition associated with Robert Putnam, I seek to explain differences in cooperation across countries and across time by examining the interaction of domestic and international political processes. In so doing, I hope to contribute to the growing literature on this interaction as well as add theoretical and empirical rigor to the narcotics policy literature. In this paper I focus on the second Clinton administration and assess the degree of cooperation between the countries. I test three hypotheses consistent with the two-level games approach: strength of the president, timing of elections, and executive-legislative relations. I also address two alternative hypotheses: the ?interdependent? U.S.-Mexican relationship and the reputation of the Colombian president and probe their impact on narcotics control cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper combines institutional and bargaining analysis to assess the consequences of decentralization policy reforms on the evolution of balance of power among presidents, governors, and mayors. I reject the limitations of static theories of decentralization in favor of a dynamic account of institutional evolution that incorporates the effects of policy feedbacks on preference formation in multi-staged processes. I define decentralization as a three-dimensional process that involves fiscal, administrative, and political reforms, and I distinguish between the partisan and territorial interests of bargaining actors. I propose a sequential theory of decentralization that considers actors? preferences, type of interests and coalitions, and the sequence of decentralization reforms. The argument of the paper is that the sequence and timing of fiscal, administrative, and political decentralization reforms and the type of political coalitions that initiate each round of reforms are two key determinants of the resulting evolution of intergovernmental balance of power. I test the argument by comparing the ways in which decentralization policies originated and unfolded in Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia between 1978 and 1999. The paper shows, against commonly held beliefs, that different trajectories of decentralization (a democratic path in Colombia, a technocratic path in Mexico, and an authoritarian path in Argentina) led to the strengthening of governors and mayors in Colombia and Mexico, and to the decline of governors? preexisting resources and capacities in Argentina. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Paper compares five guerrilla groups in Colombia -- 3 active, 2 demobilized. It compares them for survival to present day, size, and longevity. Paper cites IVs to explain these dependent variables. It is concluded that FARC pursued political goals that were in organization's self-interest to the detriment of relations with social bases. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the National Front years, the Colombian two-party system has maintained a level of stability uncommon to other nations in the Latin America. Given the historical strength of the Liberal and Conservative parties and their ability to pursue any program within their non-ideological ranks, there was little incentive to form new parties. However, a rash of new parties has appeared in recent years. This paper examines the factors that have lead to the increased share of seats awarded to 'other' parties, from 1982 to 1998, and points to some of their effects on the party system over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Globalization strengthens terrorist groups in more ways than normally assumed. The ease of transportation across borders not only facilitates the expansion and deepening of the global licit economy, but also the spread of a variety of illicit economies, such as the illegal drug industry. More and more, terrorists successfully exploit a variety of such illicit economies.However, terrorists gain more than simply money and weapons from participating in such illicit economies. Crucially, terrorists also gain political capital with local populations. In many weak states, the globalization of licit economies has failed to improve the living conditions of vast segments of the population. In fact, globalization of legal goods and services can contribute to further economic displacement of vulnerable sectors, making it exceedingly difficult for many in these countries to compete in the legal global market. The globalization of illicit goods and services frequently fills the lacunae of licit economies. As terrorist groups increasingly penetrate the global illegal economy, they not only make more money, but also provide local populations with lucrative sources of livelihood, thus acquiring legitimacy. Such legitimacy is sufficient to motivate local populations not to provide the government with intelligence on the terrorists. This dynamic is strengthened if the government attempts to suppress the illicit economy in ways that threaten the population's livelihood, such as through the eradication of illegal crops.The ability of terrorist groups to penetrate the global illicit economy and derive the multiple benefits from it - increased finances, facilitated procurement, optimization of military tactics, and enhanced legitimacy - depends on a variety of factors, including the presence of alternative regulators of the illicit economy, such as criminal syndicates, the organization of the terrorist group, and the response of the government. The paper describes how these various factors affect the scope and size of the terrorists' gains from the illicit economy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents an overview of counter-insurgency theory and practices in other conflicts and traces Colombian counter-insurgency strategy. Characteristics of insurgency warfare; Difference between search-and-destroy and clear-and-hold methods; Description of various approaches taken by the Colombian government to the peace process, paramilitaries and military deployments.

Analysis of the connection between the narcotics economy and insurgent movements in Peru and Colombia shows that the guerilla access to illicit substances intensifies and lengthens the militarized conflicts. The insurgents gains are in the form of financial assets, enhanced military capabilities, expanded strategic and tactical options, and improved relations with local populations ? the latter, crucially, denying governments important intelligence on the guerrillas. The existence of a ?narco-guerrilla? threat, however, is a misnomer, for the guerrillas and the drug dealers often have competitive interests and highly problematic relations. Governmental attempts to defeat the insurgency through crop eradication are often counterproductive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1998 the Bolivian Government has waged an aggressive counternarcotics strategy throughout the country. Official policy has included ‘zero tolerance’ and ‘zero coca,’ whereby the previous and current governments have pledged to eradicate all illegal coca crops in the country. The policy has caused social unrest, grassroots organizing, and violations of constitutional and human rights. Bolivia’s democratic transition and consolidation have been negatively affected. Nevertheless, the policy has appeared to be successful on the eradication front. In contrast, in Colombia since 2000, the externally financed Plan Colombia has been less successful in drug eradication, and has involved greater constitutional and human rights violations. Democratization has also been hindered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the determinants of the social reintegration of ex-combatants from armed conflicts? In post-conflict settings around the world there has been growing interest in and reliance upon community-based programs and activities to bring ex-combatants back into society. Implicit in these programs is the theory that the social participation of excombatants in the communities where they settle and their acceptance by these communities are helpful for minimizing recidivism to illegal activities and increasing perceptions of security. Participation can help ex-combatants feel socially fulfilled and acceptance by their communities can reduce their needs to maintain social connections to their former armed group networks and bosses. Yet little is known about the factors that drive social reintegration or its overall importance for increasing security. We evaluate individual-level, community-level, and broader security environment predictors of social reintegration. A central hypothesis is that the strength of community organization and social relations among residents are associated with increased participation of excombatants in their communities. Well organized communities may support participation through providing opportunities to do so and advocating and vouching for the excombatants in their midst to mitigate the security dilemma they face and protect them from remaining armed groups. We test the individual, community, and environmental factors using data from a nation-wide survey of randomly sampled ex-combatants from Colombia. The results suggest which ex-combatants are most likely to socially reintegrate and where. We lastly examine how the social participation of ex-combatants and the recent social reintegration program interventions in Colombia may contribute to meeting broader definitions of successful reintegration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Will constitutional courts enforce social rights? According to incentive drive theories of judicial empowerment the answer is no, or at least not initially. Structural constraints and the preferences of power holders create disincentives for the judicial promotion of redistributive justice, and constitutional judges are not likely to pursue decisions that could compromise their institutional legitimacy and well-being. In Colombia, however, we observe that the new Constitutional Court was, from the outset, a strong defender of the normative aspects of the new constitution, effectively affecting the policy outputs of the elected branches. This outcome is explained by changing role perceptions inside Colombian judicial circles, and questions the assumption that judges base their decisions on the anticipated reactions of political actors. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We report a remarkable universality in the patterns of violence arising in three high-profile ongoing wars, and in global terrorism. Our results suggest that these quite different conflict arenas currently feature a common type of enemy, i.e. the various insurgent forces are beginning to operate in a similar way regardless of their underlying ideologies, motivations and the terrain in which they operate. We provide a microscopic theory to explain our main observations. This theory treats the insurgent force as a generic, self-organizing system which is dynamically evolving through the continual coalescence and fragmentation of its constituent groups. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses findings of a study which analyzed armed clientelism in Colombia. The armed conflict in Colombia began during the mid-1960s. By the 1980s, the country adopted a series of decentralizing reforms in the context of an attempt to achieve a negotiated settlement with armed insurgents. The reforms implemented during the 1980s and 1990s were aimed at ending attacks by multiple guerrilla groups and reincorporating these groups into the country's political systems.

The article shows that belligerents also gain freedom of operation and political capital with the local population based on the cases of Peru, Colombia, Afghanistan, Burma, and Northern Ireland. The benefits belligerent groups derive from access to drug production and trafficking are not simply the improvement of capabilities due to an increase in financial profits, but also an expansion of strategic and tactical options and the improvement in relations between the belligerents and the local population.

In January 2005 a new reform to the criminal justice system came into force in Colombia. As a result of this reform, that implied a change in the structure of the 1991 Constitution, the system was transformed from being an accusatorial European system to be a sort of American accusatorial system. According to the defenders of the reform, the Colombian legal system has proven to be unable to deal with the enormous amount of criminal acts that are committed every day in the country. For the reformers, we need to modernize the Colombian Criminal Justice System to respond to the challenges of new forms of criminality and the challenges of globalization. Crime and inefficiency of the criminal justice system not only affect the stability of the country, but at the same time it is considered an obstacle to its development. Several questions arise when we see this reform: why is the criminal justice system transformed as a whole? How is this connected to the war on drugs where some aspects of the CJS were changed as a result of American pressures? What are the agencies involved in the reform? What kind of development is promoted? What is the role of the law and the state in this process? ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]