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The article looks at some interpretive and quantitative methods of studying national identity in a variety of countries. Topics discussed include reconstruction of the competing discourses of national identity through theorization and conceptualization; intersubjective beliefs about the national identity; and social psychological literature and theories on national identity.

Scholars have sought to fit American foreign policy into distinct European theories of either liberalism, realism, or nationalism. America's first grand strategy, in Washington's Farewell Address (1796), instead sought to blend these views into a distinctly American strategy. Washington argued not for isolation, but that America would stand for moderation and independence in our international engagements. His legacy is evident nearly two centuries later in Eisenhower's Farewell Address (1961). These statesmen embody the distinctive quality of American political thought that balances and blends seemingly rival principles so as to avoid extremes of injustice and imprudence. Washington was influenced by Montesquieu's conception of moderation in international relations, and Tocqueville's praise of Washington's grand strategy affirms that provenance. Eisenhower adapts to new circumstances this American tradition of exceptionalism via moderation - blending interests and justice, prudence and principles, power and pacific benevolence. One element of this strategy is thus the centrality for statesmanship itself, to balance theory and practice in changing contexts, as a reflection of American moderation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does exposure to refugees affect natives' preferences for citizenship regimes? The extant literature on native-refugee relations focuses exclusively on the rare events of conict between the two groups but does not account for more general ways in which natives can react such as by preferring restrictions on national membership. Alternatively, the literature on nationalism and citizenship in Africa extensively examines how various state policies and conict between citizen groups over resources negatively affect nation-building but overlooks the positive role of migrants. Using new data on refugee camp locations provided by the UNHCR and over 40,000 geo-referenced respondents from the most recent Afrobarometer, this project examines how refugees challenge citizens' conceptions of their national boundaries and consequently, drive preferences for exclusion. I find that respondents living closer to refugee camps endorse exclusion with greater likelihood, especially with respect to jus soli or granting citizenship by birth. Respondents near camps also report lower confidence in the national economy and less interpersonal trust, suggesting that they feel threatened both economically and symbolically by refugees. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Liberal nationalists argue that the principle of national self-determination is consistent with the exercise of personal autonomy, central to liberal thought. Their argument hinges on the claim that culture, and national culture in particular, is necessary for the exercise of personal autonomy. In this paper I argue that the liberal project is unsuccessful because they cannot provide a reason to prefer national cultures over other cultural affiliations. I focus on Will Kymlicka's argument that national self-determination is consistent with individual autonomy and rejects both of its main claims: first, that individual autonomy requires a societal cultures as context of choice; second, that societal cultures are typically national groups and vice versa. Cultural membership is important for individuals as it contributes to their identity and provides context for their choices, yet autonomy does not require a single comprehensive context. Individuals can be, and typically are, members of different cultural groups which provide contexts for different choices as well as distinct forms of meaningful identification. Furthermore, I challenge Kymlicka's equation of national groups with societal cultures: some national groups are not, though they typically aspire to be, comprehensive cultures; many comprehensive cultures are not, and never want to be, national groups. Though I reject liberal nationalism, I accept its analysis of liberalism's shortcomings. The failure of liberal nationalism urges liberal theorists to provide a theory of demarcation for liberal societies as well as give liberal answers to the questions of membership and immigration. Moreover, liberal theories need an account of a civic culture which expresses local values but respects liberal constraints on state sponsored dissemination of culture. Only then can the liberal society be truly multicultural. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the circumstances under which economic crisis is likely to be associated with the rise of extreme right-wing parties. We may identify two patterns of extreme right-wing party support among the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain) countries with the onset of the economic crisis: dramatic increase in Greece versus no increase in the other countries. Why have similar crisis conditions led to dissimilar patterns of extreme right-wing party support? This article addresses this variation through a controlled comparison of the PIGS countries. We compare four cases, which are facing similar crisis conditions and have all received financial bailouts, but are exhibiting a variation in the dependent variable. We argue that the rise of extreme right-wing parties under conditions of crisis is likely when there is a simultaneous presence of two necessary and sufficient conditions: (a) systemic breakdown, which explains the potential for any fringe party to increase its support; and (b) nationalism and the extent to which national values are consistent with the ideology of extreme right-wing parties which explains the rise of right-wing parties as opposed to any other extreme, fringe or small party. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Not surprisingly, a vast amount of research has focused on the psychological and economic factors that influence attitudes toward immigration. These studies, primarily done in the United States and Western Europe, have found that strong national identities, more so than economic concerns, are associated with more negative attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. Our paper takes a novel approach by examining attitudes about migration in a country known for emigration rather than immigration. Using Mexico as our case, we examine the impact of Mexican identity and economic considerations on attitudes about immigration and emigration and on the likelihood of emigrating to the United States. Mexico provides a unique setting as a sizeable proportion of the population has friends or relatives who have migrated to another country yet it also experiences in-migration and transmigration. How do national identity and economic considerations, found to be key factors explaining immigration attitudes in "receiving" countries, affect attitudes on immigration in this "sending" country? We find that migration attitudes in Mexico are better explained by national identity than by economic considerations and that national identity is a strong predictor of both anti-immigration attitudes and the belief that emigration is a major problem in Mexico. We also find, however, that national identity does not predict the intention to emigrate. We conclude by arguing that more work needs to be done on migration attitudes in "sending" countries to get a more complete understanding of the factors that influence migration attitudes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between religious and political institutions, or religious and national loyalties, is an eternally contested one. The justification for the creation of state of Israel was the Zionist argument that the Holocaust demonstrated that only a Jewish state could ensure the survival of the Jewish people. Moreover, at the founding in 1948, Jewish religious and political elites made strategic choices to link their religion with political institutions. This paper will outline the founding connections between religion and national identity and will ask whether those linkages remain strong some sixty years later for Jewish citizens as well as for religious minorities. To what degree does being a member of either a religious majority or minority affect the connection between religion and nationalism? We will use public opinion data from the 2003 International Social Science Programme (National Identity II) and from the 2013 Israel Democracy Index poll to measure generic nationalism, and we will examine the second survey to analyze views of the settlements. We hypothesize that multiple regression will find that practicing Judaism makes one more likely to support generic nationalism and the settlements, while belonging to a religious minority will reduce levels of nationalism and support for these communities. We will conclude that the contemporary connections between religion and nationalism are very much a product of the original fusion of the Israeli state and nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the role of strikes, social Media and the mass media in suppressing the labor disputes by the Chinese authorities and ability of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to build a harmonious society. Topics discussed include nationalism and local protectionism, Chinese politics and activism, and statistical models with different dependent variables analysing the impact.

The article discusses the research study conducted on the works of researcher H.N. Bialik on the Nazi Foundations in German philosopher Martin Heidegger's Work, and the relation between technology, art, language and nationalism for the creation of the self. Topics discussed include contemporary philosophy, political polemics and competition, and aletheia and ontological stability.

Are foreign policy initiatives best conceived as outcomes of domestic identity politics or as contributing factors to them? Why do elites choose to politicize national identity debates at the foreign policy level, and with what consequences? Despite numerous studies by comparativist and IR scholars on identity politics and foreign policy, the relative disconnect between the two literatures creates a gap in understanding the relationship between them. In teasing out this complex link, this article conceptualizes foreign policy as an alternative arena in which supporters of particular proposals for national identity compete in a struggle for hegemony. Highlighting various strategies of contestation aimed at achieving hegemony of one's own proposal, this article argues that political elites choose to take this identity contestation "outside" when identity gambits at the domestic level are blocked. The article draws its analysis from an in-depth study of Turkey, a case offering a promising empirical window onto these dynamics because of its recent and dramatic shifts in the dynamics of its public identity debates and its multiple international roles such as NATO ally, EU-candidate country, and regional powerbroker. The recent upsurge of Ottoman- and Islam-based public discourse at both the elite and society levels, for example, evidences a politics of identity that is fundamentally at odds with Turkey's previously dominant, Western-oriented understanding of Turkishness. This rapid increase in public support of what I term an Ottoman Islamist proposal takes place, however, during the rule of a party that pursued EU membership as a primary foreign policy objective. While this disconnect seems to suggest discarding arguments linking identity and foreign policy, this article demonstrates, counterintuitively, that the rise of Ottoman Islamism was made possible through Turkey's EU-oriented policy. Examining evidence collected from archives, interviews, surveys, news and entertainment media, and ethnographic observation, I employ intertextual analysis to identify three main identity proposals held within contemporary Turkish society, parsing out the domestic and foreign policy interests generated by each. Utilizing a cohesive framework to specify points of incommensurability among proposals, I demonstrate how the ruling AKP strategically utilized the foreign policy goal of EU accession to reduce the threat of domestic challengers supporting competing identity proposals. By taking its fight outside, the AKP was then able to consolidate support for Ottoman Islamism at home while opening space for deeper engagement to the south and east abroad. The framework developed here fills a gap in existing scholarship by closing the identity-foreign policy circle, analytically linking the means by which national identity debates spill over into foreign policy with the means by which foreign policy serves as a strategy for advancing a particular group's position in these debates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper engages the eighteenth and nineteenth-century debates over free trade, imperialism, and economic nationalism. Specifically, it focuses on the works of Friedrich List, who is considered to be the ideological forefather of economic nationalism by virtue of his critique of the British "imperialism of free trade" and his plans for building independent economies through protective tariffs. In challenging this conventional perception of economic nationalism as a mode of anti-imperial critique, I forward two interrelated arguments. First, I contend that the opposition between free trade and the national economy as articulated by List disintegrates when viewed from a global-imperial perspective. A careful reading of List's engagement with classical political economy reveals that his proposed system of national political economy closely adhered to the imperial division of labor between a manufacturing imperial core and agricultural imperial peripheries. The model of the "balanced economy" that List envisioned for France, Germany, and the United States amounted to the construction within their national borders an economic system that had already been established by the British Empire on a global scale. Secondly, the theory of economic development on which List based his policy proposals was heavily laden with categories of race and civilization that were decisively hitched to a secular telos of industrial-commercial progress. Accordingly, List's formally anti-imperial theory economic nationalism effectively hinged on the internalization of the existing global and imperial economic logics, rather than being an alternative to them. I conclude that the adoption of List's ideas of economic nationalism by postcolonial developmental states has informed a process of "internal colonization," in which the civilizational epistemologies of colonial empires were reproduced in developmentalist representations of the countryside as an inherently premodern, backward, and stagnant domain to be forcibly subordinated to rapid national industrialization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on a research paper, to be presented at the American Political Science Association's 2013 meeting, which focuses on the issues related to the European sovereign debt crisis, and its evolution through the course of the process of European integration and nationalism. It describes the crisis as a crisis of the democratic nation state in Europe and of the postwar model of regulated capitalism. It discusses the Eurozone crisis, with reference to the cases of France and Germany.

The article presents a research paper which focuses on the nationalist politics, and its association with local politics and leaders. It compares the direction and content of nationalist movements in terms of production and exchange in a capitalist economy. It focuses on the emergence of nationalist mass movement in Bombay, India; and Shanghai, China during the 1920s and 1930s.

The article focuses on whether regionalism form a basis of peace, cooperation and security in East Asia and explores the post-Cold War regional architecture in East Asia . It states that regionalism strengthens stability in East Asia and discusses three reasons of moving trends in the region including move of East Asian regionalism in teleological direction, relationship between regionalism and multilateralism and period assessment of East Asia.

This paper describes the rhetorical footprints left by partisan affiliation in the United States during the last sixty years. Operating deductively based on prior scholarship on partisanship, four antimonies guided our conceptualization of the Democratic and Republican styles: Restoration vs. Reform; Utility vs. Values; Community vs. Independence; and Populism vs. Nationalism. These concepts were operationalized by means of DICTION software, which analyzes texts via a 10,000-word search routine and then reports data on five statistically discrete master variables and forty subordinate measures. These techniques were applied to 3,903 speech segments, 907 debate exchanges, and 719 televised ads produced by national candidates for the two parties (plus Independents) in the United States between 1948 and 2008. Our results were as follows: (1) If one only knew a campaigner's party affiliation, one could predict with considerable accuracy that person's use of Democratic language (the D-style), Republican language (the R-style), and their relative use of both (the Republican-Democratic Differential--the RDD score); (2) DICTION was also able to distinguish among Classic Politicians (those adhering to prototypical party styles); Tactical Politicians (those who morphed based on electoral circumstances; and Conflicted Politicians (i.e., those signaling political desperation); (3) Independents were truly independent, deflecting equally from the Democratic and Republican poles; and (4) because of centrist tendencies in American politics, mainstream politicians must learn to speak "bilingually," intoning the opposite party's rhetoric when time and circumstances demand it; we detail the circumstances commanding this multivocality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A large literature has examined the factors that influence immigration attitudes. Yet prior tests have considered only a few immigrant attributes at a time, limiting their capacity to test several hypotheses simultaneously. This paper uses conjoint analysis to test the influence of nine randomized immigrant attributes in generating support for admission. Drawing on a two-wave, population-based panel survey, it demonstrates that Americans view educated immigrants in high-status jobs favorably, while they view those who lack plans to work, entered without authorization, come from Iraq, or do not speak English unfavorably. The results are consistent with norms-based and sociotropic explanations of immigration attitudes. Remarkably, Americans' preferences vary little with their education, partisanship, labor market position, ethnocentrism, or other attributes. Beneath partisan divisions over immigration lies a consensus about which immigrants to admit, a fact which points to limits in both theories emphasizing economic threats and those emphasizing cultural threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What do Americans think about the US role in world affairs and why do they think as they do? Existing scholarship identifies some general attitudes Americans hold toward world affairs, rejecting isolationism and favoring multilateralism, but few studies explore more specific attitudes such as assessments of US standing in the world (defined as foreign views of America"s capability, credibility and esteem abroad). American National Election Study data from 1958-2008 provide one such data point, which shows a strong correlation between party identification and attitudes toward US standing defined as weakness. When Democrats occupy the White House, Republicans generally see US standing falling. The reverse holds true when Republicans hold the White House. Past studies conclude that this correlation is primarily a matter of partisanship and domestic political ideology (conservative vs. liberal). In this article we investigate a deeper and more novel explanation rooted in the independent influence of individuals' foreign policy worldviews. Respondents assess US standing based on nationalist, realist, conservative and liberal internationalist views of the world. Across multiple statistical investigations, we find that while party ID remains a powerful heuristic for defining attitudes toward standing, foreign policy worldviews also exert a distinct influence on such attitudes, especially for more politically sophisticated respondents [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia's national interests have not been defined on the basis of conventional cost-benefit assessments, perceptions of material threat, or the identities projected onto Russia by other countries. Aspirations to regain the international great power status that Russians believe their country enjoyed during the tsarist and Soviet past were critical to the creation of its present national identity and national security interests. This paper asks how Russian elites came to have these national interests in social competition for great power status. In trying to explain how national interests are created, I present a novel aspirational constructivist approach that draws heavily on social psychology to answer three fundamental questions: What are the sources of national identity? Why do multiple identities come into contention? How does one of these candidate national identities come to dominate the others and become "social fact," acting as "the" national identity that defines a country's core national interests? In developing the answers, we gain a better understanding of how foreign "others" enter into the definition of Russia's national identity and the formation of its interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the political culture of civil society in the Czech Republic. A cultural-sociological analysis of Czech civil society is conducted in three areas: the discourse of intellectual elites; the cultural codes that make up civil society; and the social performances that depict the Czech political life. It is stated that in practice, civil society can be associated with liberalism, communitarianism, socialism, Christianity, and nationalism.

Strengthening European identity is often considered as a 'cure' for the democratic deficit and the lack of legitimacy of the European Union (European Commission, 2001; Habermas, 2011). We distinguish two possible ways to strengthen European identity: a cognitive one (more knowledge about the EU leads to a stronger identity) and a utilitarian one (inhabitants of countries that benefit more from their EU-membership have a stronger feeling of European identity). We apply a multilevel analysis on the results of the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study to test both explanatory models. 70,502 adolescents from 21 European member states were questioned in this study. The analysis shows that knowledge about the EU only has a limited effect on European identity. The degree in which a member state contributes to the European budget doesn't seem to have an effect on the strength of European identity. The analysis rather shows that trust in national political institutions is the most important determinant for the development of European identity and that, on the country-level, a more Eurosceptic climate makes this European identity weaker. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The persistence of unrecognized states as territorial units is both intellectually puzzling and normatively problematic. Unrecognized are characterized by stagnant or crumbling economies and instability on their borders, often serve as havens for illicit trade, and challenge the territorial sovereignty of recognized states. Nonetheless, unrecognized statehood can be a remarkably stable outcome, persisting for decades. This paper uses a four player, game theoretic framework to examine the mechanisms that sustain these stalemates and leverages this model to explore paths to settlement. Unrecognized statehood emerges as an equilibrium outcome because a patron state persistently invests resources to sustain this outcome: we show, counter intuitively, patrons will make these investments even when unrecognized statehood is not their most preferred outcome. We assess comparative statics from the model to explore options available to actors in the international community who seek to impose their preferred outcomes in these disputes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the early American republic is best understood as a constitutional experiment in "settler empire," and that related migration policies played a central role in shaping collective identity and structures of authority. Initial colonists, along with their 19th century descendants, viewed society as grounded in an ideal of freedom that emphasized continuous popular mobilization and direct economic and political decision-making. However, many settlers believed that this ideal required Indian dispossession and the coercive use of dependent groups, most prominently slaves, in order to ensure that they themselves had access to property and did not have to engage in menial but essential forms of work. Crucially, settlers recognized that in order to sustain such a project of republican freedom and territorial conquest, they would need new migrants beyond the flow of English colonists. This promoted strong commitments to open immigration - but only from ethnically appropriate communities - as a central engine of settler development and expansion. Thus, although we often think of immigration and settlerism as competing national identities, I contend that for centuries the idea of the United States as a European immigrant nation - as well as the constitutional structures supporting that vision - was directly bound to settler needs and institutions [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on polarization in the political systems of the U.S. and Taiwan. It states that polarization in Taiwan was mainly regarding cross-Strait relations and national identity and was in the U.S. on security, economic and cultural issues. It mentions that catch-all parties emerged in Taiwan when polarization within citizens came to an end.

In this article the author discusses emotions in political decision making in the U.S. It states that people make decisions based on sound bites which are controlled by the media and focuses on free press in the country. It mentions that Americans joined a war against terrorism started by the U.S. government after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks based on emotions and without thinking rationally. It highlights how concepts of nationalism and religion are used to influence people.

The preponderance of research on the study of ethnocentrism has primarily attributed such attitudes to learned behavior. The research here advances the argument that both socialization and genetic inheritance contribute to the development of ethnocentric attitudes and behavior. This analysis employs the Minnesota Twins Political survey data consisting of 596 complete twin pairs. Using the classical twin design we employed structural equation modeling to model the covariance of twins in regards to additive genetic effects, shared-environment effects, and unique-environment effects (i.e., the classic ACE model). The findings reveal that genetic inheritance is significant in explaining the variance in genetic attitudes. Specifically, genetic inheritance explains 18% of the variance, with the overwhelming 82% being explained by the unique environment. The validity of these findings is further tested using DeFries-Fulker models, which allows us to control for authoritarianism, conservatism and education. The results reveal that genetic inheritance possesses the largest magnitude, when compared to other explanatory variables. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay on the connections between religion and nationalism on the basis of various factors including theological, historical and empirical is presented. The author discusses ideological conflict between the different religions of the world which is evoked by nationalism. Relationship between religion and nationalism of different groups has also been analyzed on the empirical basis including Catholic identity, Orthodox and Sunni Islam.

Much of the recent literature on civil war treats explanations rooted in political and economic grievances with considerable suspicion, and many empirical studies conclude that there is no relationship between ethnic diversity or measures of inequality and political violence to support such claims. We argue that common indicators used in previous research, such as the ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) and the Gini coefficient for income dispersion, fail to capture fundamental aspects of political exclusion and economic inequality that can motivate conflict. In this paper we develop new country-level indices that directly reflect inequalities among groups, including political discrimination and wealth differentials along ethnic lines. Our results show that these theoretically informed country profiles are much better predictors of civil war onset than conventional indicators, even when we control for a number of alternative factors potentially related to grievances or opportunities for conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Separatist movements typically share a basis of legitimacy rooted in nationalism and common ancestral roots. However, a considerable subset of separatists bases their claims on religious difference as well. For instance, separatist conflicts such as the conflict in Mindanao in the Philippines, the Ogaden conflict in Ethiopia, the Karen's struggle in Myanmar, and the Chechen conflict, all represent groups in conflict with the state involving religious claims-making. In this paper, we explore the differences across religious vs. solely ethno-nationalist separatists, as well as between groups of varying degrees of extremist doctrine, focusing on the mobilization to such groups. Through a game-theoretic model and empirical analysis of recent separatist conflicts, we demonstrate systematic difference in the capacity of separatist rebel groups and trace this to their recruitment potential based on doctrinal space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There have been some 163 foreign occupations since 1900. In many cases, military occupations have led to bloody and protracted resistance. More than a mere byproduct of conflict, this resistance can be a decisive factor in interstate war. This article seeks to explain the puzzle: under what conditions do foreign occupations produce consequential resistance? Explanations in the existing literature have centered on nationalism, opportunity structures, or international context. However, states exhibit different levels of resistance to different occupiers, indicating that not only the nature of the occupied but also the nature and the policies of occupiers play a role. Specifically, I look at the role of political dislocation and trust. First, domestic groups that would have otherwise waited out the occupation may be driven to resistance when occupiers implement policies or establish institutions that permanently weaken their relative domestic position, what I call political dislocation. Second, resistance will be muted when occupiers can credibly commit to treating the population benignly and vacating occupied territory promptly. I argue that democracies, international organizations, and co-religionists are better able to make credible commitments and therefore more likely to elicit trust among occupied communities. Conversely, occupiers that victimize the occupied population will also face greater resistance. I test these hypotheses on an original dataset of occupier fatalities in every occupation since 1900. I find that political dislocation, in the form of forceful regime change, increases the likelihood of resistance. I also find that occupations led by democracies, international organizations, and co-religionists are less likely to face resistance. Thus, the nature and context of occupation are some of the most important predictors of resistance. Notably, measures of nationalism are found to be poor predictors of resistance to occupation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I address an inconsistency between the national and supranational articulations of Jürgen Habermas's theory of right. In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas departs from Kant's transcendental framework to elaborate a political grounding of rights that rests on the co-originality of human rights and popular sovereignty. In this view, human rights are basic legal rights that result from the politically autonomous elaboration of the abstract right to equal individual liberties. Human rights become concrete, enforceable, and fairly distributed rights only via democratic processes of self-legislation. In Habermas, this becoming concrete of rights confines their realization within the boundaries of discrete political communities that interpret them in light of particular national histories. This creates a tension between the universal aspiration of human rights and their local conditions of realization; a tension that returns to haunt Habermas's cosmopolitan proposal. In particular, his project of a constitutionalization of international law entails the idea of a global regime of human rights without popular sovereignty. This not only undermines the tenets put forward in Between Facts and Norms, but also precludes the possibility of an intercultural dialogue on human rights capable of addressing the common charge of ethnocentrism. I argue that this tension stems from Habermas's commitment to a nationally bounded notion of the demos. In response, I show how some of Habermas's own insights actually loosen this commitment, and outline the idea of a global demos capable of restoring the co-originality thesis at the supranational level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper confronts a significant dilemma in efforts to define the character of national identity. On the one hand, there is a long-standing scholarly tradition that distinguishes "civic" from "ethnic" conceptions of nationhood, associating them with the western world and the rest of the world (variously defined) respectively. This seems to coincide with a sharp difference in state attitudes towards minorities that separate two parts of Europe-the formerly communist states of central and eastern Europe and the longer established democracies of western Europe. On the other hand, careful empirical, survey-based study of the issue and qualitative analysis of various forms of national identification suggest that in reality there are few differences between the articulation of nationalist self-definition from one big global zone to another. The paper seeks to resolve this tension by redefining the two conceptions of nationhood as ideal types, elements of each of which may be found in every country; it draws attention to the difficulty of measuring ethnic identification in western Europe in particular. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The focus on self-reported identification as a European in existing surveys cannot assess the extent of often unconscious or implicit identification with the EU or of the impact of this identification on attitudes and behaviour. Experiments that test Billig's "banal nationalism" concept reveal that implicit exposure to visual triggers, such as the flags of established nations, has a measurable effect on related attitudes moderated by existing national attachments. The paper extends this research and examines the relationship between implicit exposure to EU-related symbols, attitudes to the European Union, and identification with the European Union, an "identity in formation". We test this relationship using large-scale online survey experiments containing visual stimuli, comparing findings within the UK, and between the UK and Ireland. Our analysis of 4350 responses finds that exposure to implicit cues that raise the salience of the European Union interacts with supranational identification to shape related attitudes. This effect differs by national context. The results of this study and the scope for extension of this experimental approach to the study of identity also have a more general resonance in relation to efforts at national, European and international level to understand and shape the relationship between identity and regime support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a study which examines the experience of the left in Arab countries. The historiography of the left, particularly the configuration of political ideas, actors and practices which came to the fore across the region as Arab socialicism is examined. The rise and impact of the left in Egypt, Syria and Iraq is considered through Nasserism and Baathism. Some of the changes which occurred within the left from 1970-1990 are also noted.

Why and how do nations turn to religion to justify their claim for statehood? This paper addresses the question in both theory and practice, showing that religion plays multiple legitimating roles, which dynamically shift according to the success they yield for the national movement. Theoretically, I posit four legitimating models: (1) nationalism instead of religion ("secular nationalism"), (2) nationalism as a religion ("civil religion"), (3) religion as a resource for nationalism ("religious nationalism"), and (4) religion as a source of nationalism ("chosen people"). I submit that national movements use dynamic mixtures of these ideal-types. I explain that changing the role of religion in national legitimation is performed both dialogically and dialectically: in ongoing deliberations as well as in response to the relative success of the various legitimating argumentations. Empirically, the paper analyzes Zionist efforts to legitimate a Jewish state in Palestine. I argue that Zionism has responded to persistent delegitimation by expanding the role of religion in its political legitimation. The right of self-determination, which stands at the core of the "secular nationalism" legitimation, has given way to leveraging Judaism ("religious nationalism"), which in turn has been eclipsed by constructing Zionist civil religion as well as a "chosen people" justifications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nationalism is widely viewed as a force for interstate violence, but does it really have an important effect on state aggression that cannot be explained by strategic concerns? I provide strong evidence that it does using regression discontinuity analysis. I take advantage of the fact that many countries experience a surge of nationalism when they go to the World Cup, and the World Cup qualification process from 1958-1998 produced a large number of countries that barely qualified or barely missed. I show that these countries are well-balanced across a wide range of factors, including past levels of aggression. However, the qualifiers experienced a significant spike in aggression during the World Cup year. I also replicate the analysis using the FIFA regional soccer championships and find similar results. In both cases, the estimated treatment effect is larger for authoritarian states than democracies, suggesting that democratic norms may help constrain nationalistic aggression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article describes that paradigm of methodological nationalism ignores transnational networks, associations, and organizations and global social and economic structures. The author explains how methodological nationalism distorts research on migration in the social sciences. He also demonstrates that prominent positions on migration and political theory emerge from a methodological nationalist perspective.

This article examines the willingness of majority individuals in France to accept black minorities in the national community. I use original data from a recent online survey to focus on how acceptance varies according to minorities' occupations. The standard debate over why majority individuals are more or less likely to accept immigrant-origin minorities focuses on economic and cultural threats. In this article I challenge that juxtaposition by examining how the two concepts may overlap. In particular, I explore how an ostensibly "economic" indicator such as minority occupation may have cultural and symbolic dimensions. I do this by measuring attitudes towards minorities in four occupations: banker, chef, civil service, and winemaker. The results indicate that majority individuals are more likely to accept minorities as part of the French nation as bankers or civil servants than as chefs or winemakers. To account for this variation, there is support for both economic and cultural threat but the relationship with cultural threat is stronger. When majority individuals feel an occupation is more culturally important for French identity they are less likely to accept minorities who are employed in that occupation as part of the national community. I interpret these results as evidence that minority occupation holds important cultural and symbolic content. These findings have numerous implications for our understanding of majority-minority relations and national communities more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper employs an aspirational constructivist approach that brings together social psychology and constructivism to provide causal micro-foundations for the identities and status-seeking behavior of rising and declining power. It explains how the psychological need for collective self-esteem and value rationality, and construction of multiple ingroups and outgroups, shape its national identity, its status aspirations and international behavior. It applies this approach to post-Soviet Russia, where the elite converged around a status-driven national self-image that located Russia in the group of global great powers and the West. Contrary to oftrepeated warnings of a new Cold War, however, this identity generated diffuse national interests in social, rather than material, competition for global status, primarily with the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the drivers of terrorist campaigns waged specifically for the sake of ethnic identity groups. The causes of this breed of political violence - "ethnic terrorism" - have traditionally been explained by pointing to intransigent nationalist fervors. However, nationalist movements are marked by various distinct features, including 1) political grievances; 2) economic grievances; 3) desires for self-rule; 4) and competition and outbidding between elites for ultimate control over the group. Thus far, research has not identified which of these characteristics matter most in provoking campaigns of ethnic terrorism. With a dataset at the ethnic group level of analysis and constructed with figures from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) and Global Terrorism Database (GTD) projects, I find that high political grievances, recent self-rule movements, and elite competition increase the likelihood of ethnic terrorism, while neither economic grievances nor the attainment of autonomy is associated with this form of violence. Post-estimation techniques provide tentative instruction on how to rank the impact of these factors, and the Basque Country and Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) serves as a case to show one way through which these factors shape ethnic terrorist movements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that more ethnically fractionalized states such as Iran or the United States, once they pacify internal divisions and become established polities, are more likely to be involved in power projection and international disputes. The converse is that ethnically homogeneous states such as China are less likely to project themselves abroad. Theoretically, we surmise that both realist postulates about the need for internally divided states to deploy chauvinist nationalism to gain legitimacy and symbolist arguments about diverse societies necessarily turning to missionary nationalism obtain. Related arguments about dominant minorities such as Syria's Alawis advocating legitimating expansionist ideologies like pan- Arabism or ethnic nationalists resisting territorial expansion for fear of ethnic dilution offer compatible frameworks of analysis. Analysis uses the MID and Kosimo dyadic datasets to assess the hypothesis that ethnic fractionalization in a state is associated with an enhanced risk of taking part in interstate conflict. It finds that the interaction between a state's ethnic fractionalization index and its age (a measure of how well established a state is) is positively associated with interstate conflict in both datasets. Most of today's rising powers, such as China, are established but relatively ethnically homogeneous states. As such, they are unlikely, from this research, to need to pursue interventionist foreign policies to find identity and legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why did Greece fight for its independence before Bulgaria? Why is it that Albania, being at the periphery of the Ottoman Empire, was the last state to gain its independence? Why Serbs and Greeks before the Bulgarians? What explains the timing of Balkan secessionist movements from the Ottoman Empire in the 19th and early 20th centuries? Drawing on a new dataset of interstate and intra-state wars in Ottoman Europe, this paper examines alternative theories of secession. In contrast to the dominant functionalist narrative of aggrieved nations rising up against Ottoman oppression, the paper demonstrates peripheral areas were far more likely to experience secessionist movements due to external intervention by the Great Powers, which tried to balance and undermine the territorial control of rival states, and aided local elites seeking outside intervention to secure local power. The Ottoman Empire is an excellent context to test two important arguments in the literature, namely direct rule and state capacity. The importance of the introduction of direct rule from the center for the emergence of peripheral national movements has been highlighted in the literature. However, we do get secessionist rebellions in the Ottoman context before the application of direct rule. More interestingly, although we also do get secessionist rebellions after the introduction of direct rule these do not always come in the 'nationalist' variety. Then again, other scholars have argued that, although nationalism may be an important ideological doctrine, wars are not driven by ideology but by opportunity structures. Following, this logic the timing should follow the patterns of state capacity across the various Ottoman territories in Europe. However, state weakness might be endogenous to other dynamics such as international intervention or interstate wars. Moreover, it could be the result of a looming secessionist war. The findings of this article have significant implications for our understanding of secessionist conflict and nationalism alike. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does nationalism shape political action? Most IR literature posits a causal link between nationalism and resistance to military occupation. We question this nexus through a detailed study of a crucial case: the German occupation of France during World War II. In highly nationalistic France, resistance to the German occupation developed late, grew slowly, and was never a threat to German aims. French patriots voluntarily led Vichy France into collaboration with Germany despite opportunities to continue fighting in 1940 or defect from German orbit later. Collaboration with Germany was widely supported by French elites and passively accommodated by the mass of nationalistic Frenchmen. Nationalism can therefore explain neither why collaboration was the dominant French response, nor why a relatively small number of Frenchmen resisted. The Vichy regime and the French Resistance were equally nationalistic. Instead, we argue that French behavior is best explained by two other factors: the international balance of power and domestic political competition. Expecting a German victory in the war, French rightwing nationalists chose collaboration with the Nazis as a means to suppress and persecute the French Left. The French case requires a reexamination of the role of nationalism in the IR literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we examine a two-dimensional, circular model of political conflict. We consider O'Donnell (1973)'s canonical interpretation of regime instability in Argentina between 1955 and 1966, the impossible game, and evaluate such characterization empirically through the analysis of roll call votes. Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) analysis supports a two-dimensional radex representation composed of two intercorrelated facets: (1) ideological outlook (its elements being "liberal" versus "nationalistic"), and (2) attitudes toward peronism. The radex structure, resembling a dart board, derives from the combination of a one-dimensional simplex (with radial lines capturing stands on peronism) and a one-dimensional circumplex (with concentric circles corresponding to ideological outlook). These findings indicate that, because of the circular - and thus multidimensional - nature of political conflict during the 1955-1966 period, stable political outcomes failed to exist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the impact of Euroscepticism on the European integration, democracy and nationalism in Germany and France. The effect of European sovereign debt crisis on the economic health in Europe is also discussed. The article tackles the democratic ideals and market efficiency in the continent.

Very high levels of foreign bank ownership in central and eastern Europe (CEE) gave rise to fears that the region would be vulnerable to 'cutting and running' during a financial crisis, whereby western parent banks would repatriate capital and liquidity to their home markets and abandon their CEE clients. Such fears were compounded by the economic nationalism of late 2008 and early 2009 in western Europe, as well as by west European bank bail-out programs that privileged home markets over foreign ones. Although CEE experienced a severe credit crunch in late 2008, compared to other financial and economic crises, western bank behavior in CEE has not amounted to 'cutting and running'. While many experts credit the 'Vienna Initiative' for maintaining foreign bank exposures in the region, this paper argues instead that it was the deep form of financial integration to which CEE was subject that kept banks committed. Specifically, western banks' 'second home market' business model, in which capital moved east via foreign-owned bank subsidiaries as opposed to primarily via branches or cross-border lending, led to only moderate retrenchment from CEE. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses a perspective on national politics through classic accounts of nationalism depending on how leaders tackle issues and reflect on contingencies towards national movements. Concerned are the different forms of nationalism that have taken place in the context of capitalism and modernity. Explored are cases in Shanghai, China and Bombay, India wherein compared are the direction and content of nationalist movements and global capitalist economy in the early 20th century.

We consider the relationship between xenophobia and nationalism in Russia, by examining multi-level determinants of xenophobia and considering how those factors speak to existing models of nationalism. We begin with a discussion of the theoretical relationship between xenophobia and nationalism, including definitions and theoretical models of contributing factors. We then conduct an original analysis of the determinants of xenophobia in Russia. In particular, using hierarchical linear models we analyze how individual and regional level characteristics affect xenophobic attitudes. We discuss the significance of these findings within the context of the Russia and in the broader evaluation of common understandings of the causes of xenophobia. We then discuss these results in light of the existing literature on nationalism in Russia and other former Soviet states. Individual level data for the xenophobia analysis were collected in 2003-2004; we compiled regional level data from Russian statistical agencies and the All-Russia 2002 Census for the 43 regions in which we had individual survey responses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay is presented on the U.S. foreign policy and human rights. It outlines three general orientations for discussing U.S. President Barack Obama administration and its foreign policy on human rights such as enlightenment cosmopolitan, providential nationalism, and muddling through as policy reality often contradicts aspirational rhetoric.

This paper asks what explains similar Eurosceptic positions between radical right and radical left parties. In answering this question, it focuses on the paradoxical role of nationalism as an integral part of the discourse of both radical right and radical left wing parties. Although these two party families differ in terms of origins, transnational links and policy and although nationalism is usually associated with parties of the right in the literature, this paper argues that in fact nationalism cuts across party lines and is associated with both party families' opposition to European integration. In order to test our argument, we employ a mixed methods approach. First, we use a new dataset from the 2009 Euromanifestos Project (EMP), which coded party manifestos. We have isolated questions that refer to nationalism and European integration and examine broad policy parallels between the two party families across Europe. Second, we apply the findings from the quantitative analysis on Greece and France as two countries with a strong presence of both radical right and radical left small parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the strident debate over national identity in Taiwan. It charts the emergence of the issue and its seeming amelioration during the second half of the 1990s and describes the escalating polarization on national identity over the last decade. It argues that elite polarization on national identity appears to be inconsistent with the attitudes of the general electorate.