1. The Strategic Impasse in Low-Intensity Conflicts: The Gap between Israeli Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Tactics during the Two "Intifadas".
- Author
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Catignani, Sergio
- Subjects
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ARAB-Israeli conflict, 1993- , *ARAB-Israeli conflict, 1973-1993 , *INSURGENCY , *POLITICAL crimes & offenses , *GUERRILLA warfare , *RESISTANCE to government - Abstract
The following paper will analyze how during the two Intifadas Israel has strategically and tactically responded to local Palestinian insurgency, which has evolved from civil disobedience to outright terrorism and guerrilla warfare, particularly following the now-defunct Oslo peace process. The paper will show how the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has tried to transform its conventional-based and trained army and to adopt low-intensity urban warfare strategies and tactics over the last 15 years ? particularly during the Al-Aqsa Intifada ? against violent rioters, guerrilla fighters and terrorists. The paper will, consequently, analyze whether or not the IDF has been able to impose a battlefield decision on Palestinian insurgency efforts and has been able to achieve ultimately strategic success during the last four years of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The paper will argue that, notwithstanding the extensive innovations in tactics, weaponry and training adopted in response to Palestinian attacks, the political nature of low-intensity insurgencies and, thus, the inherent strategic restraint imposed by the Israeli political echelon?s decision to conduct low-intensity warfare ad nauseam without seriously providing an alternative political resolution to the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict, stop the IDF from imposing a clear battlefield decision. Finally, the paper will conclude by claiming that the decision to conduct low-intensity warfare in turn leads to a prolonged war of attrition, which historically has always ended in a strategic deadlock and, thus, military failure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2004
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