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This paper considers implications of the neoliberal shift for forms of national integration that were achieved in sub-Saharan Africa during the developmentalist era. National integration strategies pursued during the developmentalist era created and helped to manage regional competition within not-completely-integrated national units. This was the old territorial politics. The argument here is that the neoliberal shift makes old strategies of national integration difficult to sustain. What has emerged is a new territorial politics, which revolves around attempts to consolidate power within sub-units of the state and reorder relations among them, to enforce political control within communities, and to reorder rural property rights. The paper argues that the new territorial politics is structured by four institutional legacies of the developmentalist era: indirect rule, discriminatory allocation of local citizenship rights, spatially fragmented markets for land and labor, the build-up of regional caciques or strongmen. The neoliberal turn reveals spatial and territorial aspects of state-formation strategies that were not so obvious, or did not seem so politically salient, in the earlier period. Côte d?Ivoire provides a case in point. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes up the question: how did India?s economic liberalization affect the state?s decisions about nuclear weapons and disarmament? While it focuses on the India case which I have studied in depth, it critiques the general Liberal account of the political economy of nuclear development. This account posits that internationally-oriented actors resist nuclear ?acceleration? out of fear of adverse international reactions, or because they oppose the concentration of resources in statist and non-productive uses. The paper shows that a comprehensive conception of national security, a state-led economic strategy, the compulsions of the global market itself, and a fractured and inconsistent international sanctions regime alleviated such concerns in India. Unlike Realist accounts which argue that economic factors were irrelevant in explaining India?s decision, this argument takes the entire economic context?particularly elite beliefs?into consideration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the complex relationship between South and its neighbors in the quest for deeper economic integration in Southern Africa. South Africa, as the regional hegemon, will play a unique role in SADC attempts to create a free trade area and currency union for Southern Africa. Through interviews with regional decisionmakers, this paper questions the popular assumption that there is something to be feared in South African hegemony [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the Europeanization/EU Integration debates surrounding new modes of governance with a specific focus on the ‘Open Method of Coordination’ (OMC), which was introduced as an official tool of ‘soft’ policy coordination along with the Lisbon Strategy at the European Council Summit in March 2000. In contrast to studies focused on one or two OMCs, this paper’s point of departure is to conceptualize the Lisbon Strategy as paradoxically ‘self-reflexive’ political ideology. The Lisbon ‘ideology’ calls for no less than a ‘great transformation’ of Europe’s political, economic, and social landscape, and is now being used to legitimate nearly all of the EU’s economic, social, and environmental policies in its quest to become ‘the most competitive knowledge-based economy in the world with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion by 2010.’ European political actors and scholars have highlighted the OMC’s potential for achieving common objectives in sensitive issue areas, via its mechanisms (i.e. benchmarking, target-setting, best practice sharing, and multi-level surveillance) intended to enhance deliberative problem-solving, the pooling of knowledge, transparency, accountability and peer pressure, while leaving the decision-making authority with the states. This paper argues that Lisbon European Council’s call for extending the OMC to several new issue domains (e.g. employment, pensions, social protection, economic policy, education, etc.) has resulted in the emergence of a networked form of governance in which the OMCs have become the institutional ‘carriers’ of the Lisbon ideology. An increasing number of political actors are interacting in an institutional and normative opportunity structure that is ‘charged’ by the Lisbon ideology. This paper argues that there is some evidence that the non-binding coordination processes of the Lisbon Strategy has lead to a further ‘dis-aggregation’ of governmental interests (e.g. Social Ministers have new platforms on the EU stage), while simultaneously putting pressure on governmental actors to improve both horizontal and vertical coordination. Thus, the Lisbon-OMCs have multiplied the combinatorial potential of transnational alliances. Furthermore, there is evidence that the diffusion of the Lisbon-OMC network is gradually nudging the logic of social interaction in the direction of what some call ‘argumentative rationality,’ and accelerated the social selection processes required for the emergence of consensual knowledge. Indeed, the abstract ideas of the Lisbon ideology have quickly become more concrete by the emerging network of OMCs, which have lead to a growing body of normative commitments, common policy paradigms, and a growing body of indicators, benchmarks, and targets. Relying on evidence collected in twenty-five in-depth interviews, official documents, and the secondary literature, the author will argue that there is some evidence that Lisbon-OMCs have been causally related to a cognitive & normative ‘convergence’ and that this has lead to certain patterns of institutional and policy change both in the EU and in member states. The tentative conclusions drawn in this paper have emerged from the first phase of research into the question of whether we are witnessing the institutionalization of a paradoxically ‘self-reflexive’ Lisbon ideology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role of European economic integration and European norms on the rights of minority groups in Estonian and Latvian ethnic politics in the 1990s. By the end of the 1990s, Estonia and Latvia amended the citizenship and language policies of the early 1990s, while maintaining the principle of the ethnically based state. The main incentive for policy reform came from the prospect of European Union (EU) membership. The international norms on minority rights, developed mostly after the end of the Cold War, have complemented the incentive of EU membership. Estonia was quicker to respond to the incentive of European Union (EU) membership than Latvia. The domestic consensus on market reforms and membership in the West have enabled the Estonian elites to form coalitions necessary to adopt the minority policy changes required for EU membership. In Latvia, a consensus on EU membership is also present. Nevertheless, the prominent role of extremist nationalist in Latvian politics has often weakened government coalitions and slowed down the process of both economic and minority policy reform. The European norms on minority rights have played a greater role in Latvian deliberations on policy reform. Latvian centrists have referred to European norms to justify their compliance with EU membership criteria. In Estonia, the strong domestic consensus on EU membership and lack of debate on the citizenship and language policies has meant that European norms have not played a significant role. Estonian elites complied with EU recommendations when it was clear that compliance was required for membership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We argue in this paper that the historical development of Catholic theology, organizational structure, politics and community made Catholic confessional culture particularly important to the enactment of integration proposals in the post-World War II period. Specifically, the Catholic emphasis on the visible unity of the church, the centralization of the church around the authority of the pope, the success of predominantly Catholic political parties with federalist goals, and a sense of community among prominent politicians stemming from their common Catholic cultures proved necessary in the 1950s to moving the integration agenda forward. The weight of this paper is on the historical development of a Catholic confessional culture supportive of integration, with the details of the Community founding left to a future paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature on immigration has been divided with regard to the constraints, particularly of public opinion, on EU policy cooperation. Analysts have suggested that there is a disjuncture between public opinion and policy developments, and that liberal immigration policies have emerged because negative public opinion is not factored into elite decision-making or institutional developments (Freeman, 1995). Students of globalization have gone further and suggested that based on neo-liberal theories of 20th century norms, international regimes or cooperation would be inevitable (Hollifield, 1992). These accounts fail to explain why cooperation has been fairly limited up to now. More importantly, these liberal paradigms do not consider that there are more similarities between European elites and publics than previously expected (Lahav, 2002). Bringing in norms to the immigration equation, this paper addresses the role of mass attitudes, and attempts to unravel some of the paradoxes that underlie their downplay in the literature. Based on public opinion data derived from Eurobarometer surveys, the paper explores attitudes towards immigration in 15 EU countries. In gauging the basis on which publics form their preferences, the paper assesses the role of both personal and general political conditions as they relate to immigration attitudes. The conclusions attempt to say something about the prospects for immigration cooperation in the 'new world order'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between democratization and regional integration through the lens of civil society, and to ask if the concept of civil society helps us to understand the intersection of international, transnational and domestic influences entailed in the dual process now underway in Mexico. Specifically, it explores the connection between "civil society," a concept very much in vogue in comparative politics, development policy and the world of non-governmental organizations, and "identity," itself a fashionable term employed by those practicing its politics and those analyzing them, and one which has been most closely associated with the constructivist challenge to neorealism within international relations scholarship. The analysis starts with a conceptual discussion of the overlap between ?civil society? and ?identity? during democratic transition and the resulting formulation of what might be called ?democratic identity from the inside.? Then, the paper looks at the construction of ?democratic identity from the outside? through two lenses: transnational civil society and the state’s aim of projecting a ?democratic? foreign policy. Then, the paper explores the site where the ?inside? meets the ?outside? in the intersection of democratization and regional integration, and suggest how the two identity-constructing processes may reinforce one another either positively or negatively depending upon the status of the ongoing negotiation between state and civil society regarding their relative roles in defining the form and content of the political community. The remainder of the paper applies this theoretical framework to the case of the construction of a ?North American? identity in Mexico from the inside and from the outside, highlighting the ways in which the convergence of democratization and regional integration can potentially open spaces for civil society in its renegotiation of roles and identities with a state which is, itself, in transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focusing on recent Western European experience, this paper looks at how definitions of national citizenship are changing in response to immigration. On the basis of a comparative examination of recent changes in French, German, and British nationality laws, the paper critically re-evaluates each of the three perspectives on developments in national citizenship most predominant in the recent literature: the post-nationalist view, the multiculturalist view, and the national traditions perspective. The last part of the paper then turns to developing an alternative account of recent developments, combining elements of the other approaches but going beyond them. Consistent with multiculturalists? and post-nationalists? expectations, nationality laws are converging, but not always in the ways they would predict. The convergence that is taking place stems largely from a series of shared objectives and causal beliefs that increasingly shape countries? policies. European states? informal recognition of one another as key members of their international ?reference groups? has also favored more similar citizenship policies. To explain continued differences between cases, I argue, attention to these factors is best complemented by a relatively open-ended version of the national traditions perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European institutions have in recent years increased their competence in the field of employment policy. Between the Essen summit of 1994 and the Lisbon summit of 2000, the European Commission and the Member States have developed the European Employment Strategy and in doing so, transformed the way employment policy is made in the European Union. This paper seeks to understand why the Employment Strategy developed as it did and when it did and how, in particular, the European Commission was able to critically influence the final shape of the employment title that was included in the Amsterdam Treaty. This paper argues that the inclusion of the employment title in the Treaty of Amsterdam is the result of a ratcheting strategy by which the European Commission as a two-level policy entrepreneur succeeded in facilitating the gradual representation of previously latent interests within the Member States and thereby indirectly pressured the Member States to endorse the Europe-wide employment measures. The concerns of the public over unemployment in Europe at that time, gave the Commission a position of strength from which it was able to influence agenda-setting as well as the preference formation and thereby critically influence the inclusion of the particular employment chapter in the Amsterdam Treaty. Check author’s web site for an updated version of the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we look at the problems the European Commission faces as it tries to curb smoking by regulating, among other things, cigarette advertising and tobacco sponsorship of various events. We argue that tobacco control measures have encountered many obstacles because of the organizational fragmentation of DG for Health and Consumer Protection, the ineffectiveness of non-governmental organizations, and the strident opposition of a couple of member states. Among the opponents of tobacco control is Germany, which seems counter-intuitive. In the last part of the paper, we explain why Germany, a country known for its high environmental consciousness and standards, rejects EU efforts to curb smoking. Generally, the example of tobacco control demonstrates that the Commission faces many hurdles as it tries to move into ‘soft’ areas of policy making away from market deregulation and monetary integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper addresses the questions of whether and how the process of European integration fuels demands for regional self-government in the states that are members of the EU. It does so by conducting a comparative, over time analysis of the impact of European integration on the demand for self-government in Scotland at two points in time: 1979 and 1997. At these points in time, two referendums on the establishment of a Scottish parliament were held, at the culmination of two distinct periods of demand for self-government: in 1979 the proposals were rejected while in 1997 they were endorsed. This particular configuration of the politics of self-government in Scotland makes the latter an ideal case for testing the general relationship between the two phenomena. Did the European Union impact on the demand for self-government at either of the two timepoints? Did the process of European integration between 1979 and 1997 increase support for self-government in Scotland and can thus account for the different results of the two referendums? Through a comparative analysis of party and interest groups strategies and public opinion data, the paper argues that the demand for self-government in Scotland was indeed significantly raised by the Europeanisation of the politics of self-government that took place between the two timepoints. By improving the cost/benefit balance of self-government relative to the status quo, European integration indirectly raised the demand for the former. In particular, the paper identifies three crucial aspects of this dynamic: the perception of European integration changed radically between 1979 and 1997, the strategies of elite political actors were crucial intervening variables and it was the single market rather than regional policy that had the strongest impact. Check author’s web site for an updated version of the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores some of the ways in which contemporary economic and demographic changes are interacting to produce new forms of social disorder and political power. Drawing in particular on Foucault and on Marxism, it is argued that the intensification of global capitalism promoted by neoliberalism, coupled with world population growth and greater demographic mobility, is producing a particular conjunction of forces in which governments are experimenting with new forms of power. Prominent among them are greater bureaucratic and market discipline, as well as renewals of ideological and repressive strategies. The claims advanced here are illustrated by discussions in the second part of the paper of events and forms of power in Britain and France. In the UK, the focus is on debates over Faith Schools; responses to domestic terrorism; policies towards those whose lives are classified as chaotic and a recent shift away from multiculturalism towards concerns about integration and ideological experiments with new notions of Britishness. In the French context the paper considers explanations for the recent riots in the banlieues and the student demonstrations that followed them. The claim here is that underlying economic and demographic changes on a global, structural level are motivating similar solutions across Western states, in the pursuit of new forms of power. Finally, the paper argues that social critics need to trace in detail the genealogy of these new forms, in particular regarding their effects on everyday life and agency, and to evaluate them in light of the changing sociology of contemporary geopolitical forces. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our aim in this paper is to examine the appeal to logics of external economic compulsion in Britain and the Irish Republic. In both cases, policy has been characterised by a ?third way?-style rhetorical commitment to competitiveness and social justice, set in the context of the pressures unleashed by globalisation and, indeed, regional economic integration. Here we map and then compare contemporary governmental appeals to globalisation and European integration in these two contexts. Building upon earlier work, we identify a range of different discourses of globalisation and European integration. These we categorise in terms of the contingent or inevitable character attributed to the process in question and the positive, open-ended or negative connotations it is assumed to entail. What becomes apparent is the highly strategic ways in which such discourses are used, the articulation of which depends greatly upon the context in which such appeal is made. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does institutional variation have implications for questions of conflict and peace? Institutionalists offer several mechanisms by which international governmental organizations (IGOs), in general, and regional integration arrangements (RIAs), in particular, may alleviate violent conflict. Although these arguments suggest that institutional variation may have important implications for the prospects of inter-state peace, extant empirical research fails to account for this possibility. This paper takes up this issue by, first, pointing out specific institutional features that correspond to institutionalist causal mechanisms and by deriving testable hypotheses; and second by empirically evaluating the effect of institutional variation across RIAs on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). Using an original data set on regional institutionalization and employing the regional level of analysis, I find that institutional variation has important implications for intramural conflict. In particular, I find that highly institutionalized scope of activities and regular meetings among high-level officials mitigate violent conflict, and that the implementation of signed agreements is required in order to produce this pacifying effect. On the other hand, trade liberalization, security linkages, and the broader institutional framework do not seem to facilitate intramural peace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper suggests that the neoliberal reforms of the state call into question traditional models of European integration. They rest on theories of the state that concern sovereignty and aim to explain its shifting or concentration from a lower to a higher level or levels of formal authority. For the most part, this involves the transfer of means and resources and the processes that pyramid these for the few who exercise sovereignty. Yet, as the case studies of utilities liberalization illustrate, power lies in the autonomous participation in the substantive pursuits that constitute life?s activities, capacity for and uptake of agency afforded by these activities, and the application of a criterion for transforming life?s givens into desired effects. This means that state power functions, not only via direct, coercive sovereignty but through social activities such as privatization and marketization. In the case of neoliberalism, this involves the appropriation of the way economic forms of control extend formal state sovereignty all the more effectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue in this paper that Protestantism is an important cause of Euroskepticism in Britain, Scandinavia, and to some extent the Netherlands. Protestants, in contrast to Catholics, had few tools for uniting the Continent. Their Christian universalism was real, but invisible. Their churches were arms of their individual states and lacked a transnational structure. Their few confessional parties were small, parochial and lacked a common European political agenda. And Protestant culture proved inadequate to generate a community spirit across national boundaries and between political leaders. But aside from their lack of tools, Protestant nations simply did not want to meld their states into anything more than a European economic cooperation zone. To the Protestant mind, the state was not the cause of Europe?s tragedies. Individual states were the bulwarks against coercive, homogenizing forces, whether they issued from the Vatican, Napoleonic Paris, Hollywood?or Brussels. States had saved what was most important in the sixteenth century; states could still be trusted to save what was most important in the twentieth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper addresses two fundamental questions concerning data protection politics in Europe. First, why did the EU take on the issue of data protection? Second, why did it regulate in such a way that raised protection levels while allowing for continued national enforcement variation? Far from a cultural residue or technological inevitability, I argue that the answer lies fundamentally in the historical sequencing of national data protection regulation and the role that the resulting independent regulatory authorities played in international politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper builds on theories of economic calculus, political cueing, and identity to explain public opinion on European integration. We test hypotheses in a multi-level analysis of Eurobarometer data, and conclude that identity is by far the most potent influence. The European Union is a supranational polity having extensive authority over those who live in its territory, and as such it engages pre-existing group loyalties, and in particular, national identity. We theorize how the political consequences of identity are contested and shaped– that is to say, politically constructed–in national contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My previous comparative research on post-1970s immigration and integration policies in Western Europe yielded two insights that are relevant to our understanding of the motives behind the emergence of a European immigration policy domain. First, reformers wishing to grant rights to non-EU nationals or develop liberal incorporation and anti-discrimination policies had a better chance of succeeding if they avoided a large-scale public debate in which electoral games and media coverage helped mobilize an indifferent or hostile public opinion or give a platform for extreme-right parties. Second, those wishing to restrict migration (rights of entry and stay, asylum) faced a different set of "veto points" in the reform process, mainly in the judicial sphere and in horizontal inter-ministerial bargaining settings. In this paper, I first revisit the model to further assess the conditions under which the immigration issue becomes salient in public debates and public opinion. This question has been tackled by Martin Schain’s work on the local/national dynamics of immigration debates as well as in his work on the extreme-right. A number of scholars that include Ted Perlmutter, Jeannette Money, Gary Freeman have proposed different explanations on the "politicization" of the immigration issue. I will thus test their respective views on policy reform during the last decade in a number of European countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a preliminary overview analysis of a set of case studies on field research in 30 locations in 11 states. The purpose of the case studies, most of which are available in draft from the Rockefeller Institute (contact nathanr@rockinst.org), is to examine the way in which welfare reform has influenced the development of comprehensive human service systems. The sample used for this research sought to include places "where preliminary evidence suggested that significant progress has been made to build a more responsive delivery system." This study is one of a number of interconnected field network studies of the implementation of the new welfare being conducted by the Federalism Group of the Rockefeller Institute. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Qualitative studies have identified similar coping behaviors among front-line staff in different policy and national settings as claimed by Lipsky in his street-level bureaucracy theory, although most studies have focused on social policies. However, because the theory is stronger in identifying than explaining coping behaviors, this paper develops a conceptual model for explaining variation in coping in social as well as regulatory policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Military transformation, which plans to apply the information revolution to military affairs, is the apotheosis of America’s "systems approach" to military affairs. It hopes to link heterogeneous components -- simple systems -- into a complex concept of operations to achieve military goals. That depends on systems integration to assign roles to the various components of the system, making trade-offs among different "nodes" in the network. A number of different kind of organizations in the U.S. defense industry claim expertise in systems integration, including major "prime contractors" that build weapon systems, for-profit and non-profit technical advisors, and government laboratories and organizations that manage weapons acquisition. This paper describes the supply and demand for the various types of systems integration capability. It then considers various ways of measuring the quality of systems integration capabilities, including the limits of regulatory standards enforcement and of non-market competition among systems integration organizations. Finally, it proposes ways to preserve vital systems integration capability in a political economic environment that normally favors spending on production rather than on project management expertise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the relationship between interethnic contact and ethnic identity trajectories through an investigation of the Russian population in Latvia. Three possible outcomes are considered: assimilation, integration, and separation. The first indicates a cultural and political merger of two ethnic groups, the second indicates a political merger only, and the third denotes neither. A curious result emerges: in a large-n survey conducted last year by the Baltic Institute of Social Sciences, there was no relationship between interethnic contact and a propensity to assimilate. There was, however, a strong relationship between contact and integration. Surprisingly, the exact opposite result emerged in a much smaller, but more detailed, network survey of respondents I worked with earlier this year: That is, there was a strong relationship between contact and propensity to assimilate, but no relationship between contact and integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we investigate the impact of the print media on attitudes to European integration and European Monetary Union during the General Election campaign in Britain in 2001. We find that newspapers do have an impact on attitudes to Europe, but that these effects are relatively small. Identification with a political party is found to exert greater influence on public opinion, and when individuals receive reinforcing cueing information from both parties and the media these effects are stronger still. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

East-Central European countries have shown considerable political sensitivities towards foreign land ownership since 1989. In examining controversies over restitution and the regulation of foreign ownership, this paper makes three claims: 1) that a weak social basis exists for opening emerging land markets to foreigners; 2) that EU-based pressures to open fully to EU nationals drives the lion's share of land liberalization; and finally 3) that the goal of 'rejoining Europe' does not have the ideological force to end the marriage of land and identity, leaving the EU's effort to export liberal attitudes towards land to politicize nationality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the need for European welfare states to engage in reform that could be more or less radical, but highlights that the reform that is taking place today is in fact ?institutionally bounded? change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper presents a new theoretical approach to understanding the impact of precedent on judicial decision making. Using a new dataset of the use of precedent by the European Court of Justice it shows how the increase in the frequency of precedent based argumentation by judges imposes soft constraints on them and shapes the evolution of the legal rule system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines and concurrently tests the three challenges of the mature European Welfare states: Economic and social integration, demographic changes, and the alleged decline of state capacity. I argue that European welfare states have contributed to social cohesion and as a result welfare transfers traditionally were a combination of private and public goods that target segments of the population, which are politically relevant. I examine both the direct effect of the individual challenges as well as their impact on state capacity, a key determinant of a state’s potential ability to provide welfare services. My analysis of pooled data on 15 member states in the EU from 1983-1998 suggests that controlling for demographic and socio-economic variables financial integration and trade openness do not reduce the levels of state capacity, but may allow the state more leverage in devising social and economic policies to respond to societal needs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Muslims do less well on the French labor market than their non Muslim counterparts. One explanation for this relative failure can be characterized by the following syllogism: (1) the empowerment of women is a sine qua non for economic progress; (2) in-group norms among Muslims do not empower women; and hence (3) Muslim communities will underperform economically relative to non-Muslim communities. This paper, relying on a unique identification strategy that isolates religion from national origin and ethnicity, and on experimental as well as survey evidence collected in France, puts this syllogism to a test. Our data show that Muslim and Christian gender norms are as postulated. However, the correlations between Muslim vs. Christian immigrants and the channels purported to link in-group gender norms to economic progress are weak and inconsistent. Speculations are offered on the intervening variables that mitigate the effect of Muslim gender norms on economic performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The past decade and a half has seen a proliferation of studies on the determinants of public support for the European Union among its national publics. Scholars have analyzed economic, political, informational, and identity factors as influences. There has been considerably less exploration of cultural factors, most notably religion, in these analyses. In this paper, we follow up on our previous work exploring the impact of confessional culture and religious commitment on support for the EU, expanding the purview from the early member states to the more recent accessions and candidate countries. Using Eurobarometer 65.2 (2006), we examine the role that religion plays in shaping public attitudes, while simultaneously controlling for factors identified by other theories. We conclude that religion still shapes attitudes toward European integration, but in different ways and to different degrees in various parts of the Union. Among the early member states, Catholics—especially committed ones—are still more supportive of the Union than Protestants, a result confirming our earlier findings. In more recent accessions to the EU, however, the influence of religion is weaker and assumes different configurations. Finally, age cohort analysis reveals that even in the early member nations, religion is losing its ability to shape public attitudes on European integration. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we argue that U.S. National Nanotechnology Program legislation embodies an unresolved tension between two policy trends that pose a growing dilemma for future science and technology policymakers: the imperative towards rapid technological implementation and mounting pressure to conduct technology development with more effective regard to societal considerations. The tension emerges when comparing various Program Activities set forth in the 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act that require divergent research and development policy models, by which the legislation attempts to balance international competition with concern over the perceived risks of nanotechnology applications. By prescribing the integration of societal and technical concerns during nanotechnology research and development, the Act could mark a radical shift in science and technology policy insofar as it allows the consideration of societal concerns to influence technological activities and outcomes. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper compares integration efforts in Europe - focusing on the European Union (EU) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) - and the Americas - focusing on the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Caribbean Community (Caricom), the Central American Common Market (CACM), the Andean Union, the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), and the Union of South American Nations (Unasur). Europe has achieved a high level of integration, backed by rights guaranteeing the four freedoms: free movement of goods, services, capital, and people. The achievement of these freedoms is a lengthy and ongoing process driven not only by economic rationales but also by the desire to create a common, supranational political community. Such a desire appears weak or nonexistent in regional integration efforts in the Americas. Most notably, the key freedom for individuals central to European integration - free movement of people - has been almost entirely absent in the Americas. The lack of this freedom inhibits further integration along the European model but need not prohibit other varieties of integration. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

President Fernando Henrique Cardoso?s administration presided over three critical junctures in the development of Common Market of the South (Mercosul): the attempted military coup in Paraguay (1996), the devaluation of the Brazilian real (1999), and the Argentine economic crisis (2002). We argue that the Cardoso government?s responses to these events were critical to the development of Mercosul because of Brazil?s unique position as the largest country in the bloc. Many theories of free trade and regional integration state that successful economic integration requires a regionally preponderant power that acts as a core provider of collective goods for member-states. We test this argument by examining the Cardoso government?s policies during the three critical junctures. Evidence shows that regional integration declined when Argentina incurred costs during the Brazilian currency crisis, but improved when Brazil provided aid during the Argentine economic crisis and aided in defeating the attempted coup in Paraguay. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the process of enlargement of the European Union (EU). Nature of the bargaining asymmetries that have affected the association and membership negotiations with Central and Eastern Europe; Terms of the EU membership agreement and the ways in which the interests of the Central and East European countries have been marginalized; Ways in which the Europe and membership agreements have been crafted to protect the interests of the old EU member states.

After more than forty years of inertia, Italy has produced intense dynamism and political change. The literature has been bifurcated in the emphasis on domestic and European factors explaining such an extraordinary transformation. This special issue collects works that use approaches and methods of comparative politics and policy analysis to disentangle the relative importance of European and domestic factors shaping electoral competition, legislative voting behaviour, administrative reform of local authorities, lobbying, nature of Italian capitalism, and reform of regional, pension and monetary policies. Although any generalisation on the Europeanisation of the Italian political system is unwarranted, a meso-level non-teleological approach has good leverage in the analysis of political change in Italy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Europeanization has brought radical change to the governance practices of all EU member-states, which have in turn clashed with traditional ideas about democracy. These changes in practices and challenges to ideas have profoundly affected all EU member states, but some more so than others, largely as a question of ?institutional fit.? The EU, as a ?compound? supranational polity in which governing activity is highly diffused through multiple authorities, has been more disruptive to ?simple? national polities such as Britain and France, in which governing activity has traditionally been channeled through a single authority, than to ?compound? national polities such as Germany and Italy, in which it has traditionally also been diffused through multiple authorities. The main problem for EU member-states, however, is not so much that practices have changed and that ideas have been challenged than that national leaders have generally failed to come up with new ideas and discourse that reflect the new Europeanized realities. But here, too, institutional differences matter, although to differing effect. Simple polities have greater potential for speaking to changes in practices and challenges to ideas, were they to so choose, because their concentration of authority ensures them a more elaborate ?communicative? discourse to the general public, in which they are better able to speak in one voice and to convey a single message than more compound national polities, let alone the EU, given the number of potentially authoritative voices with differing messages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article compares preferences for Europeanizing thirteen policies among European elites, national elites, and public opinion. Elites are more willing to cede national authority in sovereignty areas, but citizens are more favorable to EU social policies. Are there contrasting logics at work? The answer is two-sided. Elites and public preferences are similar in that both are least enthusiastic about Europeanizing high-spending policies. Here is a common distributional logic: shifting authority could de-stabilize vested interests. However, as the single market intensifies labor market volatility, the public seeks to contain this distributional risk through selectively Europeanizing market-flanking policies. In contrast, elite preferences are consistent with a functional rationale, which conceives European integration as an optimal solution for internalizing externalities beyond the national state [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of the literature on military effectiveness assumes that there is a single trajectory of improvement in the quality of military forces. However, there is actually substantial variation in the way that militaries are organized, equipped, and trained. Different military formats (a term introduced by Samuel Finer) are probably more or less suited for different missions, and their effectiveness also probably depends on the military format chosen by the adversary. Consequently, the definition of military effectiveness should be applied in a more nuanced fashion than it has been. Moreover, endowments of labor, capital, and technology should affect the ease with which a country can mobilize to fight in different military formats - for example, labor-abundant countries should find it easier to adopt mass-mobilization military formats. The domestic institutional environment should likewise influence the choice of military format - for example, some institutions are better suited to the mass production of particular military equipment (suggesting capital-intensive military formats), while others are better suited to the development of limited numbers of innovative, high-quality forces (suggesting a technology-intensive military format). Ultimately, countries’ choices of military format should be constrained by the strategic environment (the need for political-military integration) and by the cost of each format. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study fills an important gap in the literature by identifying the factors related to minority and female representation in U.S. state government bureaucracies. Specifically, we model the employment success of African Americans, Hispanics, Asian Americans, Native Americans, and women using 1995 EEO-4 data collected from the states. A common model predicts the employment success of each group as measured by coefficient Rho - a new metric that combines elements of penetration (getting hired) and stratification (getting promoted). Our findings provide some strategic advice for policymakers and public managers trying to increase workforce diversity in government. One important finding is that internal factors such as the size and structure of state personnel systems are the most important factors affecting minority representation, while external factors - which are not easily controlled - seem to drive female representation. Our findings on inter-minority competition are especially interesting. Contrary to conventional wisdom, one group’s employment success does not necessarily come at the expense of other downtrodden groups. Sometimes the result is a ‘win-win’ situation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Practitioners and scholars alike have heralded the emergence of a new wave of human services integration in states and communities over the past decade. A series of innovations has begun to reconfigure the ways services are designed, delivered, administered, and funded in children’s mental health, child welfare, juvenile justice, education, and other sub-fields. This article examines the origins and evolution of these reforms, using the concepts of advocacy coalitions and learning from the public policy literature. After briefly reviewing federal services integration initiatives since the War on Poverty, it traces the emergence of the new wave of reforms through a process of interactive learning between practitioners in the field and analysts working in think tanks and foundations. This learning process has enabled the advocates of the new wave of services integration to devise a number of innovations that address the political and administrative difficulties that hindered prior waves of services integration. To translate these innovations into fundamental changes in the policies and practices that govern mainstream human services, however, the advocates must win more support from elected officials, voters, and other policy brokers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Commission endorsed a pro-active approach and undertook a self-assessment exercise to review its internal procedures, defining guidelines for a European governance. In search for renewed performance, a plea has been articulated for disentangling political responsibilities from technical and administrative rulings. It constitutes a shift from a majoritarian to a consensual arrangement, an institutionalisation of opportunistic functionalism as a regulatory mode per se: Lean, unbound and unbundled governance is being promoted, based in fine on a concept of privatised polity. However, an open-end integration process could be unstable in the long run. The European Convention proves, at last, to be a moment of truth. At this stage, the draft constitutional treaty likely to emerge remains undefined. But, if the adventure is to be prolonged, any reasonable proposal will have to invent a European government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent decisions to give the European Union its own capacity for undertaking military operations have been some of the most rapid in the history of the organization, and signal a remarkably new direction for what was once purely an economic institution. Most surprisingly, it was Britain that proposed the innovations, a theoretical puzzle for culturalists who maintain that the country is marked by a cross-party consensus against further progress in integration. Based on dozens of interviews with top-ranking British officials, including former ministers, I demonstrate that party ideology is the crucial factor in accounting for the reversal. Contrary to intergovernmentalist claims that governments evaluate each possible area of cooperation individually, I find that the Conservative Party was hampered by a broad unilateralist objection to expanding the scope of EU competences. The pragmatic politics foreseen by functionalist theories only came about when the more multilateralist Labour Party came into office. The new direction does not suggest that Britain is drifting away from NATO, only that the Blair government resolved the dilemma of how to increase European power projection capabilities in a different way as a result of its particular ideological foundations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What difference do institutional environments make? Do they primarily affect strategy, with constraining and enabling effects on behavior as rationalists hold? Or do they also affect attitudes, identities, and how interests are formulated as constructivists assert? Within a given institutional environment what impact does the ‘style? of decision-making ? which beyond formal characteristics such as the decision-rule includes informal rules, norms and shared understandings ? play in determining bargaining outcomes? This article examines these questions in the context of EU decision-making by focusing on the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper). Coreper is an ideal laboratory to test these questions empirically, because this committee represents the needle’s eye through which the legislative workload of the Council flows. And the permanent representatives who live in Brussels and meet weekly to prepare upcoming ministerial meetings are exemplars of state agents given their prominence in articulating and defending national interests across the gamut of EU affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I propose a new version of political proceduralism, a ?normatively thin proceduralism,? designed to deal with the challenges to social integration posed by the moral pluralism of modern liberal societies and communities. I illustrate my proposal’s empirical purchase with examples from Muslim immigrant communities and their relationship to state and society in France, Germany, and England today. My version of proceduralism follows from a distinction between ?thick? and ?thin? forms of normativity, or distinctions among degrees or amounts of normative content: people who share thin norms share less normative content than people who share thick ones. By ?bracketing? thick differences and concentrating on thin sharings, my proposal can motivate participation in political community by generating ?correct? results; by accommodating a system of majoritarian rule; by emphasizing participants? interests over their identities, and then urging compromise among competing interests; by employing techniques such as ?balancing? the interests of individual members with those of the group, or ?bracketing? differences, or reducing normative complexity; by providing its own grounding, in this way ‘solving? the problem of the lack of ultimate or exterior foundations for political community today; and by pursuing a modus vivendi in the sense of mutual accommodation rather than agreement on substantive matters. But it cannot accommodate fanatic or absolutist groups, and persons unable to identify their needs and articulate their aspirations except in thick terms. It can, however, bring into a proceduralist social order members of the community now disinclined to participate in it. In the case of immigrants, it can discourage or at least mitigate fundamentalism in a variety of ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Religious institutions and places of worship have played a pivotal role in American Politics. What about the role of the mosque? Does the mosque, as an institution, play any different of a role than that of churches or synagogues in political participation? Some scholars have argued that Islam as a religion and a culture is incompatible with liberal, democratic American values; not only is Islam inconsistent with the West, but it poses a direct conflict. This viewpoint has likewise been popularized in American and European media and by some government officials who have labeled Muslims as enemies of freedom and democracy. Through the examination of the Muslim American Public Opinion Survey (MAPOS), which has a large sample size (N=1410), we argue that the mosque emerges as an important indictor for Muslim social and political integration into American society. We demonstrate that not only do those Muslims who attend the mosque regularly are more likely to identify as American Muslims rather than by national origin, they are also more likely to believe mosques encourage Muslims to integrate into U.S. society. Our analysis further exemplifies that mosque attendance and involvement, beyond creating a common identity among American Muslims, leads to more political participation in the U.S. In contrast to prevailing wisdom, we also find that more religiously devout Muslims are significantly more likely to support political participation. Based on our findings, we conclude that there is nothing inconsistent with the mosque and American democracy, and in fact, religiosity fosters support for American democratic values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the past 50 years two sets of events have had a profound influence on the development of public policy on immigrant integration. The first is the challenge to public order posed by urban unrest in France in the early 1980s and in Britain beginning in the late 1950s. In each country, the public policy response to this urban crisis involved important elements of multiculturalism as part of a strategy to maintain public order. In each country the public policy response was also influenced by other political consideration of domestic politics, but policies that at least implicitly recognized differentiated community (or "minority") needs and benefits were common to each of these approaches. The second set of events is generally related to the challenge of Islamic terrorism, and the recognition that some of it has domestic roots. In this context, there have been overlapping similarities in the approach of all European countries to questions of immigrant integration. The first similarity has been a movement towards policies of civic integration, and the second, a movement towards anti-discrimination policies. If the first has constrained policies of multiculturalism, the second has given new support and legitimacy to racial and ethnic diversity. Nevertheless, I argue below that national models—or policy paradigms— are still useful for understanding why convergence has been limited, that public philosophies in each country have differentiated both the intention and the approach of integration policy, and that these differences are most evident in the relative success and failure of different integration policies. If criteria by which success of integration is judged on the European level appear to have converged in European standards, national policy approaches have shaped the success of integration programs, sometimes in unexpected and contradictory ways. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the degree to which migrant groups in Western Europe are involved in mainstream political channels by analyzing data on ethnic minority voting rates in three 2004 French elections. I use those results to make three main contributions to the literature on political participation. The first contribution is empirical as the article presents the first quantitative data to allow comparison of turnout rates among multiple ethnic minority groups in France. In addition, these data allow the first regression analysis of ethnic minority voting patterns in France. The data show that ethnic minorities consistently have lower voting rates than native white French citizens across each 2004 election. Second, the conventional wisdom of socio-economic disadvantage as the explanation for low ethnic minority turnout is critiqued as the ethnic minority/native white turnout difference is statistically significant even when controlling for a number of socio-economic variables. Third, I argue that geographic location is important, as the ethnic minority/native white turnout difference is no longer statistically significant once a series of geographic variables are included in the analysis. This suggests that the determinants of ethnic minority voting behavior in France are similar to those of native whites, but because ethnic minorities are more likely than native whites to live in disadvantaged urban areas they have lower overall turnout. This therefore raises important questions about the opportunities for mobility and access to mainstream political channels in contemporary France. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Integration is a key element of the West European Model that most of Europe has now adopted. The European Union (EU) has helped guarantee peace and prosperity on the European continent, but it is now threatened by cultural tensions. A failure to understand the role of culture in the integration process has led many to continue to advocate an unworkable federal structure for Europe. Federation is unlikely because Europe is missing a democratic people, a demos. Traditional integration theory does not account for this missing demos, but the "constructivism" of Karl Deutsch holds promise. He argued that common values, a shared way of life, a spirit of community, and a "we-feeling" were essential to the creation of an amalgamated community. He did not identify from where such a felt community might emerge; I believe the answer lies in culture defined as "the overall way of life of a people." Religion is a very important element of culture, maybe its most important component, and its central role in the shaping of new social communities is attested to by Tocqueville, Weber and Walzer. If religion is important to the shaping of new communities, it should be important to the shaping of the EU.I argue that the "religious culture" of Europe has shaped integration. By religious culture (which can be subdivided into confessional cultures such as Roman Catholicism, Orthodoxy, etc.) I mean the ideas, ecclesiastical organizations and political institutions that characterize a religious tradition. Religious (confessional) culture provides the sense of community necessary to create a true demos. It also provides the ideas and institutional structures needed to encourage or discourage integration. The European Union contains two major confessional cultures, Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, that continue to divide Europe over the nature of integration and make it impossible for a demos to develop. Federation in Europe is thus improbable at this point in history. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]