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Why do federal and state judges reach different conclusions when the case facts presented to their respective panels are the same? Scholars have longed questioned the degree to which those presenting legal claims will receive equal treatment in federal court versus state courts. Nueborne argues that state courts cannot be expected to uphold litigant federal civil liberties and rights to the same degree as federal courts (1977). He suggests that state courts judges are less qualified, more subject to majoritarian pressures, and do not have the same "institutional psychology" of federal judges (1977). One difficulty that has always existed in comparing state and federal behavior is the fact that federal challenges that appear in state court may be systematically different from the federal challenges that appear in federal court. I intend to circumvent this problem of selection bias through the use of federal habeas corpus petitions. With an approved federal habeas corpus petition granted from a defendant on death row, state judges and federal judges have voted on a case with essentially the same facts and legal questions. Many times federal judges will grant relief to death penalty defendants by overruling states courts and overturning a death sentence and ordering a new trial. Using federal habeas petition from death penalty petitioners, I argue that in cases where a federal panel reaches a pro-prisoner outcome, whereas the state supreme court has ruled in a pro-state direction, state environment and institutional factors plays a key role. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Of late, there has been a rise in media attention regarding presidential signing statements. In this, paper we examine the conditions under which presidents choose to use signing statements. We rely on the implications of an original, formal separation of powers model to derive hypotheses regarding why and when a president chooses this unilateral action in the legislative process. By focusing on such institutional variables as regime-type and behavioral variables such as relative ideologies among Congress and the president, we argue that presidents are able to modify legislative outcomes to be more consistent with his own preferences. In fact, our formal model predicts that a president uses signing statements in response to legislation from an ideologically proximate (rather than distant) Congress. We empirically test the theoretical predictions of our model with an examination of signing statement usage from 1981-2009. Finally, we discuss the implications of signing statements in terms of presidential power in a system of constitutionally separated powers. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, tensions within the 109th Senate reached a boiling point when the majority Republican leadership, frustrated by the obstruction of Bush judicial nominees, threatened to remove the option of filibuster by unleashing the "Nuclear Option", also known as the constitutional option (Binder and Smith 2007, Klotz 2005, Gold and Gupta 2005). When obstruction reaches a level unacceptable to the majority, rule changes to curb obstruction is one threat that can motivate compromise or deter future impasses (Warwo and Schickler 2006). While the Nuclear Option has specific procedures in the Senatorial context, a general definition of the nuclear option in the legislative context is "a dramatic refusal to recognize delaying tactics permitted under the rules that facilitates the institutionalization of majoritarian procedures in a legislative body" (Klotz 2005, 843). In their rare occurrence, some legislative Nuclear Options have failed and some have succeeded. Using a game theoretic model, this paper examines the occurrence of the Nuclear Option threat and its affect on legislative behavior and outcomes. I argue that given the costs associated with legislative rule changes, in most cases the majority party prefers that the Nuclear Option threat is sufficient to deter obstruction. This outcome may be preferred even if the majority party could successfully implement the Nuclear Option. After defining the problem of obstruction and explaining the costs of rule changes in legislatures, I analyze the Nuclear Option Game and discuss its strengths and weaknesses when applied to the legislative context. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]