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The Asian financial crisis in 1997 triggered the fierce debates over the validity of Korean developmental state model. Some scholars argue that the demands of global agents undermine the state autonomy and capacity. The state, facing the crisis, could not help accepting the financial aids from international organizations, which in return, demanded the neo-liberal economic transformation favorable to them. For them, the state is doomed to lose its own room to maneuver the domestic market, which means the end of the developmental state. Others insist that the crisis paradoxically provides an opportunity to strengthen the state autonomy and capacity. According to them, the state becomes the only fundamental body responsible for concluding an entente with the foreign organizations and meeting their needs. In this context, this paper tries to answer this controversial question: "Has the financial crisis transformed the developmental state?" This paper examines the transformation of the Korean developmental state during the so-called "IMF regime," based on the concept of the state autonomy and capacity. This paper focuses on the public fund, of which role was critical in overcoming the financial crisis. The public fund was an emergency financial measure given to the hands of the state under the name of overcoming the crisis and restoring the economy.This study champions the importance of positive and proper intervention of the state. As seen in the case of public fund in Korea, the failures in restructuring process are not because of the state intervention but because of the improper intervention of state. Moreover, it traces the continued characteristics of the developmental state which have been criticized as the main cause of the financial crisis in 1997. The path the crisis is overcome cannot be separated from the path the crisis is formed. Such a historical and social continuity in Korean society could not be transformed in spite of the financial crisis and now calls for the reappreciation on the East-Asian developmental state in the age of global transformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In the late Ming Dynasty, Emperor Wanli sent his eunuch tax collectors to Suzhou and Wuchang to implement his new fiscal measures in order to extract more taxes for an ever shrinking state purse. This policy met great resistance and triggered riots in the two regions. However, while riots of similar scales broke out in both regions, they had different dynamics. The riot in Suzhou lasted only five days, but in Wuchang it grew in scale and persisted for almost two years. In this article, we argue that the different dynamics of the riots in the two regions can be explained by the different state capacities of the two local governments. The Suzhou government was able to put down the riot quickly because it maintained its autonomy and governing capacity after the arrival of the eunuch tax collector, which in turn allowed the government to deal with the riot with a coherent policy. The riot continued and intensified in Wuchang because the local government was unable to deal with the riots coherently after it lost its autonomy in a failed confrontation with the eunuchs. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study re-examines private sector influence in Mexico?s1982 neoliberal economic transition, a transition typically attributed to an autonomous semi-authoritarian state. It does so by exploring two modes of private sector influence that may be more important in developing countries than in advanced industrial countries and which may also address the following two unresolved questions regarding Mexico?s neoliberal transition: 1) Why did a group of politically savvy government employed economists (technocrats) pursue neoliberal economic reforms before the debt crisis of 1982? 2) How did technocrats associated with neoliberal reforms secure the presidential nomination in 1982? With an investigation of the capacity of pro-neoliberal business sectors to mobilize through social networks, their relative economic power and attendant capacity to constrain government decisions through investments, this study reveals that private sector interests figured more prominently in Mexico?s 1982 neoliberal transition than previously estimated and raises questions about the role of the domestic private sector in making successful neoliberal transitions possible more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]