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Encouraging the adoption and diffusion of low-carbon agricultural technology innovation is an important measure to cope with climate change, reduce environmental pollution, and achieve sustainable agricultural development. Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper establishes a game model among agricultural enterprises, government, and farmers and analyzes the dynamic evolutionary process and evolutionary stable strategies of the major stakeholders. The impact of innovation subsidies, carbon taxes, and adoption subsidies on low-carbon agricultural innovation diffusion is simulated using Matlab software. The results show that the government’s reasonable subsidies and carbon taxes for agricultural enterprises and farmers can increase the enthusiasm of agricultural enterprises and farmers to participate in low-carbon agriculture. This study can be used as a basis for the government to formulate more targeted policies to promote the diffusion of low-carbon agricultural innovation.

M-eigenvalues of fourth-order partially symmetric tensors play important roles in the nonlinear elastic material analysis and the entanglement problem of quantum physics. In this paper, we introduce M-identity tensor and establish two M-eigenvalue inclusion intervals with n parameters for fourth-order partially symmetric tensors, which are sharper than some existing results. Numerical examples are proposed to verify the efficiency of the obtained results. As applications, we provide some checkable sufficient conditions for the positive definiteness and establish bound estimations for the M-spectral radius of fourth-order partially symmetric nonnegative tensors.

Financing difficulty is recognized as the main bottleneck in the technology innovation process of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The governments generally provide financial support for SMEs’ innovation activities. Numerous research studies have been conducted on the role of the government in enterprises’ innovation, while there is no consistent conclusion on whether government subsidies can improve stakeholder collaboration and effectively ease financing constraints of SMEs’ innovation. Due to information asymmetry and the bounded rationality, the dynamic game among the government, external investors, and SMEs has the characteristics of complexity. This paper aims to explore the collective strategies of the major stakeholders in SMEs’ innovation and investigate the effect of antecedents on innovation activities. We establish a trilateral evolutionary game model on the relationship among the government, external investors, and SMEs. The simulation results show that the evolutionary system converges quickly to the equilibrium; when the government subsidies decrease, the external investors’ appraisal costs decrease and the investment amount and return rates of external investors increase. Furthermore, under the condition of government subsidies, external investors will not change their investment strategies even if the external investors’ recognition costs have exceeded their return on SMEs’ investment. The findings can provide good reference for the government to solve the financing problem of SMEs’ innovation.

Agricultural enterprises play a significant role in China’s economic development. However, compared with other enterprises, agricultural enterprises are facing serious financial problems. Financing difficulty is essentially a question of financing efficiency. Based on the DEA method, this paper evaluates the financing efficiency of 39 agricultural listed companies in China from 2013 to 2017. The results suggest that the financing efficiency is generally low, and the Total Factor Productivity of agricultural enterprises’ financing has a tendency to decrease first and then increase. The influencing factors of financing efficiency are analyzed using the Tobit regression model and the random forest regression model. And we find the following: (1) The random forest regression model significantly outperformed the Tobit regression model, with determination coefficients (R2) greater than 0.9 in full sample sets. (2) Total liability, financial expenses, return on total assets, and inventory turnover rate are important factors affecting financing efficiency of agricultural listed companies. (3) Return on total assets and inventory turnover rate promote the financing efficiency, while total liability and financial expenses reduce financing efficiency. Finally, the paper makes some suggestions for the financing of agricultural enterprises.