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Debates surrounding the appropriateness of "humanitarian intervention" remain a key feature of the post-Kosovo international security environment. NATO has attempted, in the past, to intervene on "humanitarian" grounds, both in Kosovo in 1999 and Libya in 2011. By systematically comparing both operations—analyzing three related phases, namely the pre-intervention justifications offered, the manner in which NATO, and particularly the United States, sought to intervene, and the level of commitment shown in the post-intervention phase—it is clear that the best that Western organizations and efforts can hope for is "limited humanitarianism," even with the added boosts—in the case of Libya—of a cleaner international mandate from the United Nations Security Council and normative support from the relatively newly minted but already damaged concept of responsibility to protect (R2P). There are lessons for future operations of this nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two decades after NATO's Operation Allied Force (OAF) was successfully concluded in June 1999, to the extent at least of forcing Serbia to give up control of its rebellious Kosovo province, the articles in this special issue, timed to coincide with this anniversary, set out to explore the lasting controversies, implications and legacy of this demonstration of the use of coercive force for declared "humanitarian" purposes. OAF and the follow-on deployment of NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) in 1999 did consolidate what has become an enduring NATO and western presence and set of interests in the Balkan region. Complementing Rynning's argument finally, Smith suggests that the longer-term impact of OAF and the KFOR deployment have proved to be surprisingly transient and limited in terms of NATO's ongoing post-Cold War evolution. [Extracted from the article]