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Countries in the Global South are particularly vulnerable to social and political violence. This paper suggests that such violence makes certain recalcitrant economic interests more open to taxes and spending on social welfare. Using results from a survey experiment of business owners and operators in Mexico, we show that relative to more innocuous institutional weaknesses, concerns over violence generally increase support for anti-poverty spending and decrease support for tax cuts. To build a theory, we explore heterogeneous effects and textual data. The findings suggest that business interests see anti-poverty spending as a tool for shoring up costs of violence in consumer markets, with some leaders even extending support to welfare-enhancing taxes. However, violence can create challenges in labor markets that increase operational costs, leading some business interests to resist tax policies that ask them to help fund social programs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do moral beliefs influence favorability to collective violence? In this article, I argue that, first, moral beliefs are influential depending on their salience, as harm avoidance is a common moral concern. The more accessible moral beliefs in decision-making, the more they restrain harmful behavior. Second, moral beliefs are influential depending on their content. Group-oriented moral beliefs can overturn the harm avoidance principle and motivate individuals to favor collective violence. Analysis is based on a representative survey in Mexico City and focuses on a proximate form of collective violence, locally called lynching. Findings support both logics of moral influence. Experimentally induced moral salience reduces favorability to lynching, and group-oriented moral beliefs are related to more favorability. Against existing theories that downplay the relevance of morality and present it as cheap talk, these findings demonstrate how moral beliefs can both restrain and motivate collective violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does emigration affect tax preferences in migrant-sending countries? Experiencing public services in a high tax-capacity destination may reduce support for tax increases by throwing fiscal failure at home into stark relief (the socialization hypothesis). Alternatively, migrants' exclusion from certain public services may increase desire to fund these services in migrant origin countries (the exclusion hypothesis). We test these competing hypotheses with an online survey experiment in Mexico and explore variation in US healthcare access on fiscal policy preferences of migrant households. Migrant households, especially those with returned migrant members, are more supportive of taxation when tax revenue is earmarked for healthcare, a service to which many Mexican immigrants in the US lack access. It is migrants' exclusion from, rather than their socialization into, the fiscal contract in destination countries that influences fiscal policy preferences in their countries of origin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whether corruption leads to the election of women and whether increased women's representation leads to lower levels of corruption are two questions with answers that remain uncertain and context-dependent. We explore the case of Mexico and theorize that three factors--gender stereotypes, demands for the inclusion of women, and expectations of accountability--condition the relationship between women's representation and corruption. We hypothesize that given the features of the Mexican system, revelations of corruption should lead to the election of women and women should not be less corrupt than men in office. Leveraging an original dataset of close to 20 years of municipal audits to mayors, we find supporting evidence. The occurrence of audits and recent revelations of corruption increase the likelihood of women being elected and municipalities led by women report no fewer irregularities as compared to those led by men. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we examine the demand-and-supply dynamic of security policies. We argue there are two informational shortcuts through which voters process policy alternatives and choose among them: (1) their own personal experiences with violence and (2) candidates’ profiles. We test our argument through an original survey experiment conducted in Mexico. We model voters’ decisions to support candidates campaigning over a variety of security proposals. Our survey design takes advantage of recent developments in network models to better measure the effects of crime exposure on voters’ preferences. We find that higher exposure to crime victimization is associated with increased support for only some iron-fist policies, therefore highlighting the importance of unpacking security policies instead of generalizing the results of crime exposure. We show null effects of partisan advantages and reveal the role of non-partisan heuristics, such as the candidate’s professional experience, in preferences for security policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the consequences of the militarization of public safety? Governments increasingly rely on militaries for policing, but the systematic study of this phenomenon's consequences for human rights has been neglected. NGO and journalistic accounts point to widespread violations by the military, but these snapshots do not necessarily present evidence of systematic abuse. Based on unique data on military deployments and human rights complaints in Mexico, we conduct a systematic, country-wide study of the consequences of constabularization for human rights. Following matching and difference-in-difference strategies, we find that it leads to a 150% increase in complaints against federal security forces. We also leverage deployments for disaster-relief operations and complaints against non-security institutions to show that the increase is not due to underlying conditions or higher reporting in the military's presence. The findings have important implications for our understanding of quality of democracy and the democratic ideals of civilian policing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do criminal actors publicly display threatening messages? Studies of organized crime emphasize that criminal actors rely on clandestine networks of influence. Subtle or coded threats are an effective means of extending that influence, but publicizing these threats appears to undermine their chief advantage. We argue that publicized threats broadcast an imagined order, delineating who has a place in society under criminal control, and who does not. To demonstrate this argument, we construct a "grammar of threat" and use this to analyze public threats broadcast by four criminal actors: two groups in Colombia and two in Mexico. The analysis demonstrates that every group projects an order through their threats, but that the order imagined varies by group. Some orders are more clearly ideological; some are more localized or more expansive. These findings highlight the important role of communication—distinct from but often combined with violence—in criminal governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the legacies of armed resistance? Why do some communities engage in armed mobilization in response to violence, disorder, and insecurity, while others under very similar conditions do not? Focusing on mobilization against organized crime in contemporary Mexico, we argue that historical experiences of armed resistance can have lasting effects on local preferences, networks, and capacities, which can facilitate armed collective action under conditions of rampant insecurity in the long run. Empirically, we study the Cristero rebellion in the early 20th century and grassroots anti-crime mobilization in Mexico during recent years. Using an instrumental variables approach, we show that communities that pushed back against state incursions almost a century earlier were more likely to rise up against organized crime in contemporary times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the presence of a strong civil society is recognized as desirable for democracies, an important question is what motivates citizens to join organizations. This article presents novel experimental evidence on the conditions under which citizens join interest organizations. We presented 1,400 citizens in two Mexican states with fliers promoting a new local interest organization. These fliers contain one of four randomly selected recruitment appeals. We find evidence that both brokerage of state patronage and demand-making for local public goods are effective recruitment appeals. The effect for patronage brokerage is especially pronounced among respondents with prior organizational contact, supporting our hypothesis of a "particularistic socialization" effect wherein organizational experience is associated with greater response to selective material benefits. Our findings suggest that under some conditions, rather than generating norms of other-regarding, interest organizations can reinforce members' individualistic tendencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are vote-choice buying attempts successful? Much research across the social sciences argues that political machines expertly turn citizens into clients, undermining core aspects of democracy. Using insights from behavioral theories of vote choice, I argue that standard partisan campaigns can diminish vote-choice buying's efficiency. Machines face a targeting problem: Local brokers identify good clients using long-term markers but then campaigns shift many citizens' vote-relevant attitudes in ways that brokers cannot detect, leading to targeting errors. Vote-choice buying remains effective on recipients who are unmoved by the campaigns, but this group is small where campaigns are influential. Tests using panel surveys from Mexico's 2000 and 2012 elections measure vote-buying attempts with direct questions and list experiments, employ various measures of campaign influence, and rely on new and existing estimation techniques. The findings yield a more optimistic view of the quality of elections in new democracies than current literature implies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) sometimes prey on the communities in which they operate but sometimes provide assistance to these communities? What explains their strategies of extortion and co-optation toward civil society? Using new survey data from Mexico, including list experiments to elicit responses about potentially illegal behavior, this article measures the prevalence of extortion and assistance among DTOs. In support of our theory, these data show that territorial contestation among rival organizations produces more extortion and, in contrast, DTOs provide more assistance when they have monopoly control over a turf. The article uncovers other factors that also shape DTOs' strategies toward the population, including the degree of collaboration with the state, leadership stability and DTO organization, and the value and logistics of the local criminal enterprise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What explains the emergence of vigilante organizations? Throughout the world, vigilantes emerge to illegally punish perceived criminals, often leading to serious consequences. However, the literature presents partial and conflicting explanations for this phenomenon. This article argues that local economic inequality creates a situation ripe for vigilante organizations. Inequality creates demand for vigilantism because poorer citizens feel relatively deprived of security compared with wealthier neighbors who have advantages regarding private and public security. In addition, inequality suggests a patron-and-worker distribution of labor, and this is ideal for organizing a particular type of group, the patron-funded vigilante group. Empirical tests use original data on the 2013 wave of Mexican vigilante organizations, present in 13 of Mexico’s 32 federal entities. Municipal-level income inequality is robustly associated with organized vigilantism. Less support is found for competing explanations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What determines how authoritarian regimes use internationally attained revenues such as natural resource rents to stay in power? The answer, this article argues, lies partly in the nature of the socioeconomic cleavages in the country. The article presents a comparison of Kenya and Mexico, two countries that experienced similar rises and falls in internationally derived nontax revenue in the context of similar political regimes. The countries differed, however, in their socioeconomic cleavages: In Mexico, cleavages were along sectoral or class lines, whereas in Kenya they were along ethnic lines. The author demonstrates how these differences led governments in the countries to use nontax revenues in different ways, with important consequences in particular for social spending. Despite the recent turn in the resource curse literature emphasizing domestic contextual factors, socioeconomic cleavages have been relatively ignored. The findings here begin to fill that gap, with important implications for several literatures. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

How do citizens in developing countries access public services? Scholars study this question by emphasizing the role of government, measuring government performance as household access to public services, such as clean water and sanitation. However, the authors argue that the state does not hold a monopoly on provision of such utilities: Citizens in developing countries often turn to nonstate providers for basic utilities. In Mexico, the authors find that direct money transfers from migrants, known as remittances, are used to provide household access to public services. The statistical analysis across Mexico’s 2,438 municipalities demonstrates that citizens improve their own access. The results also contribute new evidence to the literature on remittances and development by offering a micro-level explanation for how remittances affect both the availability and the source of basic utilities. The findings suggest that the measures scholars typically associate with government performance may in fact capture nonstate provision of basic utilities. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The growing empirical literature on political corruption shows trust (interpersonal and political) to be both cause and consequence of corruption: a conclusion that largely builds on studies using cross-national measures of corruption based on perceptions of corruption rather than actual experience, raising questions of endogeneity. The lack of trust fed by corruption is considered critical in that it undermines government efforts to mobilize society to help fight corruption and leads the public to routinely dismiss government promises to fight corruption. After disaggregating the major concepts, this article empirically explores the relationship linking corruption and trust in Mexico based on data from the 2004 Americas Barometer survey. The authors discover a powerful mutual causality between perceptions of corruption and trust in political institutions that suggests that rooting out perceptions of corruption or shoring up trust in public institutions will be an extremely difficult project for anyone who takes on the task. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on recent work that suggests that voters in proportional representation (PR) systems have incentives to cast strategic votes, the authors hypothesize that levels of strategic voting are similar in both first-past-the-post (FPTP) and PR systems. Comparing vote intentions in majoritarian elections in the United States, Mexico, Britain, and Israel to PR elections in Israel and the Netherlands, the authors find that a substantial proportion of the voters desert their most preferred candidate or party and that patterns of strategic voting across FPTP and PR bear striking similarities. In every election, smaller parties tend to lose votes to major parties. Because there tend to be more small parties in PR systems, tactical voting is actually more common under PR than under FPTP. The findings suggest that whatever the electoral system, voters focus on the policy consequences of their behavior and which parties are likely to influence policy outcomes following the election. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Partisan theories of political economy expect that bondholders will panic with the election of a left-wing presidential candidate. The latter seems to be what happened in Brazil in the 2002 presidential elections. However, quantitative analysis of perceptions of sovereign credit risk in Argentine, Brazilian, Mexican, and Venezuelan presidential elections from 1994 until 2007 shows no real evidence of a link between partisanship and perceptions of risk, even if the left-right divide is further broken down into left, center-left, centerright, right. Instead, international and domestic economic fundamentals have a stronger influence on risk evaluations. Qualitative analysis of the individual presidential elections shows the importance of policy uncertainty in explaining why certain electoral periods seemed more critical than others and how bondholders select between multiple equilibria. This research helps shift political analysis away from partisanship and more in the direction of policies and articulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on a survey of more than 4,000 respondents, this article argues that contrary to claims by the 1994 Zapatista insurgency, indigenous and noilindigenous respondents in southern Mexico have been united more by socioeconomic and land tenure institution variables than by ethnic identity. Based on statistical models, it concludes that in rural southern Mexico, ethnicity alone is less important in shaping peoples' attitudes than whether the dominant land tenure institutions are the "communitarian" state-penetrated ejidos (communitarian collective farms) of Chiapas or the more "individualist" so-called communal lands of Oaxaca. It concludes by affirming that-contrary to many analysts of Chiapas's 1994 indigenous rebellion—external influences (here state-established land tenure institutions) can trump ideology in framing social movements. Rural Chiapas's prevalent communitarian attitudes seem to have resulted partly from exogenous land tenure institutions (ejidos) rather than from endogenous indigenous identities alone, as claimed by Zapatistas and scholars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Efforts to engage citizens in democratic forms of governance in developing societies are complicated by deeply rooted socioeconomic and political inequalities. In this article, the authors analyze the conditions under which local politicians in rural areas of Latin America are likely to open up to citizen participation in governance decisions. The analytical approach focuses on the incentive structures of local politicians under both decentralized and centralized regimes. The argument is that, regardless of regime type, participatory governance institutions are more likely to emerge when the goals of these institutions are compatible with the interests of the local executive. The authors test the argument by analyzing patterns of interaction between central and local governance actors in 390 municipal governments in Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru. They find that local politicians' incentive structures explain a great deal as to why local governments decide to invite citizens to take part in governance activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article studies the endogenous transformation of the Mexican Senate. Changes in the electoral rules for the Senate composition are explained as an effort by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) politicians to protect their majority in a broader strategy of division and cooptation of its opponents. That strategy expanded seats for the opposition while reducing risks for the incumbent party. The article calculates, through Monte Carlo simulations, counterfactual scenarios for the composition of the Mexican Senate under alternative electoral rules. Those simulations highlight the inherent uncertainty involved in institutional design. In spite of the demise of the PRI in the 2000 presidential election, the Senate will afford in the foreseeable future veto power to the hitherto hegemonic party. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors combine elite and mass survey data to create indicators of representation for nine nations: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay. For the first time, a quantified measure of the extent to which political parties represent voters' policy preferences in these countries is offered. The authors then examine the political, social, and economic correlates of representation. Consistent with extant literature and theory, they find that party system institutionalization and socioeconomic development are positively related to representation. On the other hand, drastic liberalization efforts seem to be associated with lower levels of representation. Furthermore, the authors find that leftist parties contribute to the representative structures of political systems. They also find that perceptions of fraud in an electoral system are correlated at a fairly high level with the indicator of representation: Citizens' subjective perceptions of a system are consistent with its reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents a study which examined variation in mass populist party adaptation in Latin American countries during the 1980s and 1990s neoliberal era. Assessment of the environmental factors which shape the incentives to adapt; Discussion on the organization capacity of the populist parties to adapt; Degree of economic reform in Argentina, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela from 1985 to 1995.

Examines why certain state Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI) affiliates in Mexico are able to rebuild their organizations and why others are not. List of states in which the PRI has lost the governorship; Role of PRI governors in the state from 1930 to 1980; Factors that indicate whether a PRI state-level party organization is united.

This article provides a non-formal modification of the standard spatial model of party competition to make it more applicable to the study of opposition parties in dominant party systems in transition. Dominant parties' virtual monopoly over resources forces challengers to rely on activist-based strategies. Challengers then face the problem of balancing programmatically radical activists against the moderate preference of the median voter. The article shows that opposition parties' programmatic locations depend on the number of competing parties. Contrary to standard expectations, it finds that two-party competition between the incumbent and one challenger produces a center-fleeing strategy by the challenger, whereas three-party competition between the incumbent and two challengers yields center-seeking strategies by both challengers. The second half of the article applies this modified model to the case of Mexico. Data come from in-depth interviews, electoral returns, public opinion polls, and original sample surveys of national party leaders and activists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents a study which addressed the political attitudes and participation of informal sector workers in Mexico. Methodology; Conclusion.