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In large and heterogenous countries, cross-regional inequality often fuels political conflict over redistributive demands. Standard economic theory holds that initial inequality in incomes across subnational regions of a country should eventually give way to convergence. However, economic liberalization in Russia and China has not produced crossregional convergence. The paper demonstrates that interregional inequality remains high in both countries and grounds explanation for this finding in their communist institutional legacies. Their common institutional history complements country-specific explanations for the observed trends in cross-regional inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the puzzle of the politics of social policy formation by two post-communist authoritarian regimes in China and Russia. It argues that two interrelated dimensions—which we term the pillars of power and policy—shape social policymaking and change in authoritarian regimes and support authoritarian regime stability. The pillar of power involves autocrats' bargains with the public and elites, while the policy pillar includes bureaucratic and ideational processes. The latter are understood as the way policy actors perceive problems, choose solutions, and frame their policy choices. To demonstrate this empirically, the article analyzes and compares Chinese and Russian housing policies between 1990 and 2020. We find that despite bureaucratic competition within the policy pillar, neoliberal policy beliefs have guided policy while statist measures served to support—in China—and deepen—in Russia—the neoliberal approach focused on private homeownership. Yet, neoliberal measures have been channeled in ways that underpinned and adjusted the authoritarian regime bargains with different segments of the public and the elite within the pillar of power. Policy framing to match social cultural ideas was used in both countries to support public acceptance of the neoliberal measures while underlining the state's care for people's housing needs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents the "Competitive Rent-Seeking Model" that accounts for how reform policies paved the way for sustainable economic growth in "authoritarian transition economies" despite widespread corruption. Competitive rent-seeking refers to the process whereby the entry barrier to rent-generating economic activities, once monopolized by a small number of vested interests, has been lowered inviting more potential rent-seekers into the system. This was accomplished by enacting decentralizing and market-friendly reform policies that in turn exacerbated corruption but boosted production efficiency leading to improved social welfare. The model is exemplified by the Chinese and Vietnamese experiences during the 1980s. Furthermore, this article demonstrates that the model is applicable to the North Korean economy under Kim Jong Un's economic reform policy of the "Socialist System of Responsible Business Operation in Economic Management" initiated in 2014. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study traces the evolution of systemic state-sponsored coercive labor in the cotton harvest in China's northwestern Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). The recent situation in the XUAR is compared to Uzbekistan, which implemented forced labor in cotton picking until 2021. Both regions create structurally coercive labor environments through a centralized authoritarian state apparatus that deploys human resource–intensive local grassroots mobilization efforts. The article finds that while both regional entities' coercive labor dynamics are in many ways comparable, the resulting labor settings are not easily captured through static standard measures such as the ILO forced labor indicators. Instead, state-sponsored forced labor is characterized by pervasive state-induced and systemic dynamics of coercion that are deeply embedded within sociocultural contexts. Whereas Uzbekistan's coercive labor practices were primarily driven by economic considerations, Xinjiang's labor transfer program pursues some economic aims but is predominantly designed to achieve Beijing's wider ethnopolitical goals in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing literature has long debated on religious beliefs and democracy. However, the implications of religious institutions, which shall internally interpret faith and socialize followers and externally decide its political positions with authorities, have yet to be comprehensively explored. By adopting an inter-religious comparison in Hong Kong, this article argues that religious institutions decided to take different positions in response to democratization: Eastern religious organizations, including Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism, act as "state defenders" to legitimate government decisions at critical political moments. However, Christian organizations, including Catholicism and Protestantism, act as "state critics" to promote political justice. The Anglican Church is located at "in-between status" with pro-regime leaders but with pro-democracy followers. Consequently, Eastern religious institutions maintain close relations with the authorities, Christian leaders face criticisms from pro-regime associations, and intra-religious tensions within the Anglican Church are intensified. Theoretically, this article moves beyond that, from a "belief-based" perspective on how faith facilitates/hinders democratization to an "organization-based" perspective on how religious institutions choose their political positions in a sub-national hybrid regime. Empirically, this study examines how historical development in the pre-handover era contributed to different religion–state interactions in the post-handover period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Begun in 2000, China's Great Western Development Campaign (GWDC) sought to reinforce party-state legitimation narratives by extending economic development to peripheral regions often populated by ethnic minorities. In extending aid to minority communities, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) promoted narratives about its own provision of stability and prosperity, and endeavored to exert further control over the conduct of ethnic politics. However, while this subsidization of development in minority communities produced macro-level success, it also contributed to fragmentation of ethnic identity and perpetuation of instability in daily interactions. In this article, I examine the CCP's attempt to subsidize the creation of a branded ethnic economy around the production of handmade noodles (lamian) in ethnic Hui communities in rural Qinghai Province. I argue that while the state's investment in lamian did increase income in Hui communities, the migration that accompanied this developmental aid led to increased contestation of the boundaries of Hui identity and contributed to marginalization and alienation of the Hui migrants involved. I argue that these consequences stemming from the funding of the lamian economy allow the CCP to effect greater control through channeling measures. However, such measures also illuminate the limitations of performance-based legitimation strategies which justify the implementation of ever-increasing measures of control that risk overreach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper endeavors to show the importance of history for any study in the social and political sciences. Following theorist and Nobel laureate Douglass C. North, it attempts to show how the past and the present are connected through the continuity of a society''s institutions even when those formal institutions undergo a radical change, that is, revolution. To that end I will be comparing two agricultural societies – Russia and China – beginning with their Imperial periods – to show how their attitudes towards their peasantry have endured through the upheaval of both revolutions and the potential impact on development. The impact of the Russian revolution on China will also be examined. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

China’s socialist employment system has undergone radical changes since the 1990s along with enterprise restructuring. Surplus workers have been laid off from state-owned enterprises in large numbers. China’s policy program for the management of layoffs in this process of enterprise restructuring has been evaluated as an example of ‘good practices in labor administration’. In this paper, we use original field data collected in Beijing, supplemented by additional information from recent Chinese studies, to assess this evaluation. We apply for this purpose the criteria often used by development agencies to evaluate governance systems, namely, accountability, transparency, consistency, participation, and information flow. Using these criteria as a yardstick, we argue that the Chinese experience in reforming their employment system through massive layoffs and re-employment is better characterized as a classic case of ‘muddling through’ rather than a shining example of ‘good governance’. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Corruption in transition economies has become the very focus of many recent discussions on politics and economics. However, the existing research has not taken full account of the experience of the gradual transition countries, especially China, and the incentives for rent creation in the transition process. Based on existing studies in this field, this paper addresses a new category of corruption in transition economies. In the context of the rent seeking theory, the authors examine what they regard as a unique type of corruption in China—administrative monopoly (AM), and outline its essence, causes, forms, features, the scale of the rent created, and the dissipation of the rent. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Digital authoritarianism threatens the privacy and rights of Internet users worldwide, yet scholarship on this topic remains limited in analytical power and case selection. In this article, we introduce a comprehensive analytical framework to the field of Internet governance and apply it first, briefly, to the well-known case of China and then, in more depth, to the still-understudied Russian case. We identify the extent and relative centralization of Internet governance as well as proactive versus reactive approaches to governance as notable differences between the cases, highlighting variation among digital authoritarians' governance strategies. We conclude that Russia's Internet governance model is less comprehensive and consistent than China's, but its components may be more easily exported to other political systems. We then consider whether recent changes to Russia's Internet governance suggest that it could converge with the Chinese model over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Current research on transnational knowledge transfer has a strong bias toward (often conditionality-based) advice originating in the core OECD world and focuses nearly exclusively on the link from a source to a target of knowledge transfer. This contribution provides a broader and more nuanced picture by looking at the reverse logic of non-OECD countries proactively searching abroad for policy advice and assessing this advice based on their own requirements. Based on the role of conditionality and on the attitude of the recipient country toward cooperation with foreign sources of advice, five demand-side strategies in transnational policy-related knowledge transfer are distinguished, each of which is analyzed utilizing the example of health reform. The results highlight systematic differences in the attitude toward and employment of foreign advice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hong Kong's autonomy within China is akin to a house built on sand. This article examines how Hong Kong's autonomy has weathered the waves over the years by adopting a news events analysis approach, documenting the Hong Kong government and the CCP-state's divergence from the autonomy, democratization, and human rights provisions of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law since 1997. The case study of Hong Kong indicates the profound challenge of practicing territorial autonomy within a communist state and points to a new research direction for conducting comparative autonomies studies across communist and post-communist states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2019, what began in Hong Kong as a series of rallies against a proposal to permit extraditions to mainland China grew into a raft of anti-authoritarian protests and challenges to Beijing's grip on the city. Given the gravest political crisis confronting Hong Kong in decades, this research investigates why the protests have lacked centralized leaders and why the solidarity among the peaceful and militant protesters has been immense. This article also examines the strengths and limitations of this leaderless movement with different case studies. The authors argue that serious threats to the commonly cherished values in Hong Kong, amid the absence of stable and legitimate leaders in its democracy movement, underpinned the formation of a multitude of decentralized decision-making platforms that orchestrated the protests in 2019. Those platforms involved both well-known movement leaders organizing conventional peaceful protests and anonymous activists crafting a diversity of tactics in ingenious ways, ranging from economic boycotts, human chains around the city, artistic protests via Lennon Walls, to the occupying of the international airport. The decentralized decision-making platforms, while having generated a boon to the movement with their beneficial tactical division of labor, also produced risks to the campaign. The risks include the lack of legitimate representatives for conflict-deescalating negotiations, rise in legitimacy-sapping violence, and susceptibility to underestimating the risks of various tactics stemming from a dearth of thorough political communication among anonymous participants who had different goals and degrees of risk tolerance. In short, Hong Kong's anti-extradition movement in 2019 sheds light on the basis of leaderless movements, and on both the strengths and risks of such movements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores a recent tendency in the official Chinese discourse on nationalism—the government more actively employs Chinese achievements in science and technology to boost national pride and regime legitimacy. This "techno-turn" focuses on China's construction of megaprojects, its active role in international techno-economic business, and its development of cutting-edge scientific research and technologies. This transition in the official discourse on nationalism contains several rationales along material, policy, and ideological dimensions, and uses sophisticated propaganda tactics. It also faces constraints and challenges—some derived from conflicts with reality, and others derived from internal logical imbalances. The turn marks a new stage in the development of contemporary Chinese nationalism, in which official nationalism absorbs elements from popular nationalism. This ideological transition may influence both Chinese domestic and international politics—it may lead to China's more confident engagement in international affairs, but may also generate uncertainties in relations between China and the West. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under Putin and Xi, the post-communist authoritarian regimes in Russia and China had both initiated anti-corruption programs that exhibited some parallels but were also profoundly different. Through a contextualized comparison, and drawing on Russian and Chinese sources, this article puts forth an institutionalist argument that these campaigns were being driven by divergent strategic objectives shaped by different formal and informal institutional settings. Whereas Putin's more limited anti-corruption program was essentially a defensive move, embedded in factionalism, primarily aimed at protecting his political power under "competitive" authoritarianism, Xi's broader and deeper campaign could be seen as an offensive initiative, targeting factionalism with a long-term goal to strengthen the CCP party-state, in addition to the obvious short-term objective of his own power consolidation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article will analyze the connection between history, countervailing ideologies, that is, the legacy of the Cold War, and the perceived identification of human rights violations as they pertain to countries with major security interests in Northeast Asia. This article will further show that the enduring nuclear-weapons problem in North Korea has been inextricably linked to human rights issues there, specifically because Washington wants to change the behavior of officials in Pyongyang so that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) becomes a state that at least remotely resembles a liberal democracy. Although supported by much of the international community, including the United States' South Korean and Japanese allies in Northeast Asia, Washington's North Korean policy has remained ineffective, as Pyongyang has continued to perform missile testing and still possesses nuclear weapons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Partisanship has become the dominant ideological incentive to political polarization. Likewise, the analytical association between polarization and the party system in electoral democracies has focused, in most of the existing literature, on political polarization, leaving aside authoritarian or semi-authoritarian contexts where a fair multi-party election is absent or dysfunctional. By collecting and analyzing online posts about international terrorism from Sina Weibo in China, between January 2011 and December 2016, this study proves the existence of opinion polarization on terrorism in China's digital media sphere. By categorizing the findings into two camps, 'global war on terror discourse' and 'anti-imperialist narrative', the study elucidates these polarized attitudes in terms of their acceptance, denial and decomposition of the global discourse of fears about terrorism. Drawing on our case study, the study then proposes an alternative explanation for the motivation/driver of mass polarization in digitally networked communication in China, identified as the effect of globalization and localization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is established that Party-army relation followed a "separated" pattern in the Soviet Union as opposed to an "infused" pattern in China. This article explores the historical origin of this difference in the revolutionary periods. By analyzing the biographies of communist military elites, it argues that this discrepancy took shape before the revolutionary takeover and resulted from the differentiated intensities of warfare across Russia and China. In China, the numerous civil wars and military defeats, radicalized the old military structure and boosted societal militarization; thus, eroding the mutual exclusion between the military and revolutionaries. The effect was lesser in Tsarist Russia than in prerevolutionary China, making the old military a conservative and professional corporate that the Bolsheviks could not completely subordinate to Party control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Is China still building socialism or has it already built capitalism? Or maybe both? Or maybe none of those two systems? Or maybe with the market reforms that deviate from the traditional socialism, it has created something different from the classical types of political and socio-economic regimes known from the 20th century? Some authors have proclaimed that there has been capitalism in China for some time; others claim that socialism has developed there, of course one with Chinese characteristics. Shortages have been successfully eliminated, but the economic system is unbalanced, showing surpluses this time. So, is it socialism, as the official Chinese authorities claim, or capitalism, as asserted by numerous economists? Tertium non datur ? By no means, as there are yet other possibilities of system interpretations and the most fascinating of them is being offered by the present-day China, where a unique internal convergence is taking place. Features of socialism intermingle with essentials of capitalism and vice versa , creating a new, different quality. Tertium datur. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the planned US and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 looming ever closer. and Central Asia's own future increasingly in doubt, major powers are all competing to enhance their influence in Central Asia. 2014 may mark a regional tipping point, but none can accurately predict how the regional balance might shift after the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan. During 2009-2010, the signs of growing Russian dependence on China in terms of economy and energy were palpable, as were the signs of China successfully subordinating Russia to its Central Asian economic agenda. In 2011-2012, it was difficult to see Russia simply acquiescing in its subordination to China without reacting to that situation negatively. Since 2011, to avoid this dependence on China, Russia has vigorously pushed for its regional integration schemes. 2011 marked the launch of the US "New Silk Road" initiative. Great power regional integration schemes, however, undermine both regional and national development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]