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In the 1970s, two floods and an earthquake turned state socialist Romania into a recipient of significant international humanitarian aid. Western relief organisations came to Bucharest to negotiate the terms of their assistance. Drawing on material from German, Swiss and Romanian archives, this article argues that giving and receiving across the Iron Curtain were deeply embedded in the systemic competition of the Cold War. It shows that Western relief workers were able to convince Romanian authorities to make humanitarianism a valid form of East-West cooperation. However, such exchanges remained limited to a few flagship projects, separated from Romania's own recovery measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores a hitherto unexamined chapter of German Cold War politics: West Germany's relations with Indonesia between 1955 and 1965. Indonesia was a peculiar case, as in the late 1950s and early 1960s, President Sukarno turned his country into a radical champion of 'anti-imperialism'. This included actions directed against the Netherlands, Britain, Malaysia, and the United States. As part of a comprehensive strategy to isolate East Germany in the 'Third World', West German diplomacy nevertheless tried to maintain solid relations with Sukarno's increasingly unpredictable Indonesia, even if that meant undermining the position of Western allies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India's recognition of West, but not East, Germany was the foundation of an inconsistent policy on Germany from India and many other non-aligned countries. It was the outcome of a lack of professionalism, indecisiveness, the pragmatic considerations of a junior Indian diplomat in Berlin, and the laconic approval of the anti-communist secretary-general of the Ministry of External Affairs, Girja Shankar Bajpai. Neither Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru nor his advisor V.K. Krishnan Menon were involved at all. Officials around Foreign Secretary K.P.S. Menon held that the GDR should also be recognised in due course, but did not exercise sufficient influence. India would stand by its decision for 23 years and thereby set an example for other non-aligned countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The case of early German-Israeli relations offers unique insight into the dynamics of the German Cold War. As this article shows, the two Germanys were ideologically and geopolitically antithetical, but vis-a-vis the question of relations with Israel East and West German representatives faced a situation that was uniquely related to the German past and to the German Cold War competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

New archival materials have become available that allow us to test the conventional interpretation of Warsaw Pact policy towards conventional arms reductions in Europe. They shed new light on the objectives of the Eastern side in talks on mutual and balanced arms reductions, how it approached the dispute over the assessments of the military balance and sought to preserve its advantages while constraining West German military capabilities, and demonstrate that Soviet military leaders perceived a shift in the conventional military balance in favour of the West in the 1980s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents elements of a novel approach to the study of social movements in a Cold War context. Using peace activism in West Germany during the 1980s as a case study, this article argues for a conceptualisation of social movement activism that moves beyond the ideological divides of the Cold War and a functional understanding of politics. Instead, this article highlights the multi-layered, fractured and contested nature of activism and shows how peace activists engaged in debates about the meanings of ‘peace’, ‘security’, and ‘democracy’ rather than merely representing ‘Communist’ interests. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

During the thaw (1963) after the Cuban missile crisis, West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt proposed jointly-hosted Olympics on both sides of the Berlin Wall. Historians have dismissed this initiative as a propaganda stunt. It was not. Belying his reputation for realism, Brandt aimed to use popular culture and non-governmental organisations to ease the Cold War at its most dangerous flashpoint. The ensuing internal and public discourses illuminate how Brandt and his Eastern and Western opponents assessed the risks and rewards of a policy of cultural and political engagement. Amid the doubly-treacherous political terrain, only false starts permitted the architect of German-German detente to trace the boundary between the imaginative and the imaginary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the intentions of the Soviet leadership towards Germany during the early 1950s in the light of recently released documents. Whereas Malenkov's comment of 2 June 1953 shows the commitment to a 'bourgeois' Germany and the victory of Beria in post-Stalin debates about the German question, Bodnăras' report on a meeting of the party chairmen and defense ministers of the people's democracies of 9 to 12 January 1951 underlines the real fear of war due to the Western decision to rearm Western Germany, and the minutes of the meetings between Stalin and the SED leadership on 1 and 7 April 1952 demonstrate both the difference of interest between Stalin and Ulbricht and the difference of performance between Stalin and Beria. Minutes of the Presidium of the CPSU's Central Committee show that the final decision for the stabilisation of the GDR was not taken before November 1955. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When the Cold War joined the decolonization process both camps had to answer the major challenges faced by the newly-independent states, that is political independence and economic development. Besides their own priorities in the Arab Middle East, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic offered their own models for modernization as alternatives and connected with a camp-choice. The research points out how Syrian and Iraqi regimes actually neutralized such a linkage and tried to secure their nation-building development through the exploitation of Cold War rivalry. German archives offer a deep insight into the troubled relations between Arab nationalism and Europe in the 1960s and mid-1970s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article compares and contrasts the impact of the Cold War upon three immigrant groups in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Spanish, Iranian and Croatian communities. In particular, it focuses on the manner in which relations between political movements within these communities and West German political milieux evolved during this period. Since ideological tension between the American and Soviet blocs had an impact on the homeland states of each of these immigrant communities, the global nature of Cold War conflict helped foster a set of, at times paradoxical, strategic alliances between immigrant political movements and West German state and party-political institutions. The attitude of an immigrant political movement towards Soviet Communism in general, and East Germany in particular, could therefore have a considerable impact on relations between its own ethnic community and the rest of West German society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article describes West German Chancellor Erhard's vision of reunification and explores Soviet and American reactions to Bonn's opening gesture to Moscow, in 1964. The main argument is that despite Washington's reluctance, Erhard envisaged offering Khrushchev massive economic aid in exchange for more political liberty in the GDR, and eventually for reunification. Evidence suggests that Erhard's objective corresponded in time with Khrushchev rethinking his relations to the FRG. The Soviet leader secretly encouraged Erhard to present a realistic proposal for a modus vivendi and officially accepted the Chancellor's invitation to visit Bonn. However, due to Khrushchev's removal from power in October 1964, the final goals of his German policy remain uncertain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]