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This article discusses the end of the Cold War in Southern Africa and its impact on the Apartheid Government's nuclear weapons program. The program was developed as a strategic deterrent against perceived communist threats in the region. However, with the changing political landscape, including the end of hostilities in Angola and the rise of progressive leaders like FW de Klerk, the program was deemed unnecessary and a burden. In 1989, de Klerk ordered the termination of the program and the dismantling of the nuclear arsenal. This decision, along with South Africa's subsequent commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, played a significant role in the country's transition to democracy and its emergence as a leader in promoting disarmament. [Extracted from the article]

In the 1950s and 1960s, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) protested nuclear weapons testing, called for nuclear and conventional disarmament, and simultaneously embraced the promises of atomic energy. The ICFTU also, particularly through its atomic energy committee, pressed the United Nations (UN), the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for stronger worker protections and union input at atomic energy sites. Such efforts revealed how a non-governmental organization (NGO) attempted to shape international narratives and standards regarding nuclear weapons and atomic energy, revealing a complex approach to the use of the atom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tunisia's postcolonial leadership intervened in North African decolonisation and the Cold War arms race by monitoring fallout from French nuclear explosions in the Algerian Sahara. This article examines the international negotiations that facilitated Tunisian access to monitoring technology and Tunisian participation in nuclear weapons governance. When the International Atomic Energy Agency denied Tunisia's request for technical assistance, Tunisian officials struck a deal with US diplomats, who cleared this arrangement with French counterparts. Radiation detection demonstrated the stakes of Tunisia's intergovernmental relationships, enhanced Tunisia's leverage in nuclear-armed capitals, and revealed nuclear weapons' relevance to Tunisia's foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In October 1957, Poland proposed the Rapacki Plan for the denuclearisation of Central Europe. While North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members attacked the initiative, Canada viewed it as a means to ease Cold War tensions. Although Canada joined with its allies to reject the Plan, it embarked on a quest for counterproposals to restrain NATO nuclear sharing and reduce the chances of nuclear war. Canada's efforts alarmed Western allies and helped lead to a second Rapacki Plan. Overall, this article details Canada's struggle to assert itself as a middle power and provides a robust example of Western interest in the Rapacki Plan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents the first reassessment of the strategic rationality and credibility of French nuclear weapons policy before 1974. Building on untapped primary material from across the world as well as technical analysis, it shows that early Cold War French nuclear weapon procurement and deployment are incompatible with a precise grand design and the requirements of strategic rationality. The first generation of French nuclear forces also lacked technical credibility, despite reliance on outside help. Several French officials knew about it, as did their allies and adversaries. These findings de-exceptionalise French nuclear history and challenge conventional wisdom about Cold War nuclear history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the authors talk about the papers discussed in the special issue on topics including nuclear dimension of the Cold War, importance of nuclear history, and the difficulties of creating a nuclear order.

The 1951 Franco-Indian bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement was the first such cooperation outside the Manhattan Project, and preceded President Eisenhower's 1953 ‘Atoms for Peace’ proposal. This cooperation on one hand upset the United Kingdom, which regretted losing leverage over its former colony to its colonial rival, and on the other, enhanced the United States' interest in playing a key role in the region. Based on multi-archival research, this paper explores the significance of Franco-Indian nuclear relations against the backdrop of Anglo-American endeavours to censor information related to atomic energy and to secure control of strategic minerals during the early Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article, based on multi-archival research in the United States of America and South Africa, analyzes the nuclear relationship between South Africa and the US during the Reagan, Bush and Clinton Administrations, by tracing South Africa's journey to non-proliferation during the last decade of the Cold War. During the Reagan years, anti-communism and the Cold War formed a major component of US foreign policy and dictated a closer nuclear relationship between the US and South Africa, coupled with US non-proliferation efforts vis-a-vis South Africa. At the end of the 1980s, the US efforts coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of Soviet support and indeed a nuclear war potential from Southern Africa. In late 1989, South Africa at last gave up its nuclear weapons development and destroyed all its nuclear weapons, followed by signature of the NPT in July 1991. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Teaching and research on the Cold War in the United Kingdom developed in three phases. The first phase ran from the emergence of the Cold War in the 1940s up to the 1970s, a period which saw studies produced by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, various polemical works and some attention to the conflict in the memoirs of politicians and officials. These years witnessed some teaching by political scientists but no teaching and very little work by historians. By the 1970s, however, the rise of an interest in contemporary history and releases of documents under the new thirty year rule led to a major growth in courses and publications on the Cold War. This trend continued until the end of the conflict in 1988/1991. Since the demise of the Cold War there has been a continued interest in the topic but the range of approaches has widened from diplomacy and strategy to include propaganda and cultural policies, the impact on everyday life, and the roles of sport and religion. At the same time, new topics have gained prominence: from the Middle East to climate change, from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons to terrorism. Nevertheless, the field remains vibrant with a dedicated journal, a specialist centre at the LSE and an impending three-volume study from Cambridge University Press. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the role of the United States in and reaction to South African nuclear development from its inception in 1949 to the end of the Carter Administration, within the framework of the Cold War objectives of the United States and the anti-communism of the South African Apartheid Government. As early as 1965, South Africa hinted at developing nuclear weapons; yet the response from the United States remained placid and nuclear cooperation between the two countries continued. Thus, when the Ford Administration at the end of 1976 took the first step in the direction of limiting United States' nuclear cooperation with South Africa, it was already too late to stem South Africa's build-up of a nuclear arsenal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]