Search

Background: Current models of loneliness emphasise the role of maladaptive cognitions in causing and/or maintaining loneliness. However, standardised paradigms to experimentally examine the role of maladaptive cognition in loneliness are lacking, making it difficult to establish causality. This paper tested a mock online chat paradigm designed to induce changes in negative affect (loneliness, depression, and anxiety), and strength of belief in lonely thoughts, by manipulating comparative and normative fit.Participants (N = 59) were randomised into either the loneliness arm (i.e., loneliness induction chat followed by a social connectedness induction chat), or the social connectedness arm (i.e., two separate social connectedness induction chats), and subsequently completed outcome measures.The experimental paradigm significantly and specifically increased lonely affect; however, this was associated with non-significant changes in strength of belief in lonely thoughts. The social connectedness induction chat led to significant reductions in broad negative affect for both groups, with these effects accruing across chats for participants in the social connectedness arm.Experimentally manipulating comparative and normative fit to either emphasise differences or similarities between an individual and group members is an effective paradigm for increasing lonely affect or decreasing general negative affect, respectively.Methods: Current models of loneliness emphasise the role of maladaptive cognitions in causing and/or maintaining loneliness. However, standardised paradigms to experimentally examine the role of maladaptive cognition in loneliness are lacking, making it difficult to establish causality. This paper tested a mock online chat paradigm designed to induce changes in negative affect (loneliness, depression, and anxiety), and strength of belief in lonely thoughts, by manipulating comparative and normative fit.Participants (N = 59) were randomised into either the loneliness arm (i.e., loneliness induction chat followed by a social connectedness induction chat), or the social connectedness arm (i.e., two separate social connectedness induction chats), and subsequently completed outcome measures.The experimental paradigm significantly and specifically increased lonely affect; however, this was associated with non-significant changes in strength of belief in lonely thoughts. The social connectedness induction chat led to significant reductions in broad negative affect for both groups, with these effects accruing across chats for participants in the social connectedness arm.Experimentally manipulating comparative and normative fit to either emphasise differences or similarities between an individual and group members is an effective paradigm for increasing lonely affect or decreasing general negative affect, respectively.Results: Current models of loneliness emphasise the role of maladaptive cognitions in causing and/or maintaining loneliness. However, standardised paradigms to experimentally examine the role of maladaptive cognition in loneliness are lacking, making it difficult to establish causality. This paper tested a mock online chat paradigm designed to induce changes in negative affect (loneliness, depression, and anxiety), and strength of belief in lonely thoughts, by manipulating comparative and normative fit.Participants (N = 59) were randomised into either the loneliness arm (i.e., loneliness induction chat followed by a social connectedness induction chat), or the social connectedness arm (i.e., two separate social connectedness induction chats), and subsequently completed outcome measures.The experimental paradigm significantly and specifically increased lonely affect; however, this was associated with non-significant changes in strength of belief in lonely thoughts. The social connectedness induction chat led to significant reductions in broad negative affect for both groups, with these effects accruing across chats for participants in the social connectedness arm.Experimentally manipulating comparative and normative fit to either emphasise differences or similarities between an individual and group members is an effective paradigm for increasing lonely affect or decreasing general negative affect, respectively.Conclusion: Current models of loneliness emphasise the role of maladaptive cognitions in causing and/or maintaining loneliness. However, standardised paradigms to experimentally examine the role of maladaptive cognition in loneliness are lacking, making it difficult to establish causality. This paper tested a mock online chat paradigm designed to induce changes in negative affect (loneliness, depression, and anxiety), and strength of belief in lonely thoughts, by manipulating comparative and normative fit.Participants (N = 59) were randomised into either the loneliness arm (i.e., loneliness induction chat followed by a social connectedness induction chat), or the social connectedness arm (i.e., two separate social connectedness induction chats), and subsequently completed outcome measures.The experimental paradigm significantly and specifically increased lonely affect; however, this was associated with non-significant changes in strength of belief in lonely thoughts. The social connectedness induction chat led to significant reductions in broad negative affect for both groups, with these effects accruing across chats for participants in the social connectedness arm.Experimentally manipulating comparative and normative fit to either emphasise differences or similarities between an individual and group members is an effective paradigm for increasing lonely affect or decreasing general negative affect, respectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Evidence about empathy in people high in social anxiety has produced mixed outcomes. The current study aimed to compare cognitive and emotional forms of empathy among university women who were high or low in social anxiety. Methods: Empathy was assessed using both self-report and a directly observable social interaction task. Sixty adult women with either high or low levels of social anxiety completed a self-report measure of empathy and also engaged with a female confederate online. The interpersonal exchange included disclosure of a recent stressful experience by the confederate and participants' responses were coded for indicators of cognitive and emotional empathy. Results were analysed with depression both controlled and not controlled. Results: When depression was statistically controlled, participants who were high in social anxiety demonstrated more robust indicators of empathy on both self-report and the interpersonal exchange for both cognitive and emotional measures of empathy. Results were very similar when depression was not statistically controlled, however the groups no longer differed significantly on the self-report measure of cognitive empathy. Conclusions: The implications for these findings on the interpersonal functioning of socially anxious individuals are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pre- and post-event rumination have been proposed to be key processes involved in the maintenance of social anxiety disorder. While the importance of addressing rumination in treatment is becoming increasingly clear, factors that mediate the relationship between changes in social anxiety and changes in rumination have yet to be investigated. Individuals with social anxiety disorder (N = 82) completed measures that assessed key cognitive and attentional processes of social anxiety, including pre- and post-event rumination, before and after cognitive behavioural treatment. Following treatment there were significant reductions in pre- and post-event rumination in addition to other cognitive and attentional aspects of social anxiety. Mediation analyses revealed that changes in state anxiety and performance and threat appraisals mediated the relationship between changes in social anxiety and pre-event rumination, while only changes in threat appraisals mediated the relationship between changes in social anxiety and post-event rumination. It appears that key cognitive and attentional processes have differing importance when anticipating feared social situations and when reflecting on it afterwards. This suggests that treatment that aims to reduce the role of pre-event rumination needs to consider multiple factors, while threat appraisals particularly need to be addressed when addressing post-event rumination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present studies examined attentional bias for photographed faces and household objects among individuals diagnosed with generalised social phobia using a letter-probe computer task. Study 1 was conducted to replicate previous findings showing evidence of avoidance for faces among individuals diagnosed with generalised social phobia using a similar methodology as Mansell, W., Clark, D., Ehlers, A., and Chen, Y. P. (, Cognition and Emotion, 13(6), 673–690) on a clinical sample. Thirty-one clinical participants and 32 matched controls received identical threat instructions regarding an upcoming speech-task following the computer task. Contrary to previous findings, clinical participants demonstrated a preference for attending toward faces than household objects, regardless of facial expression and more so than controls. Study 2 was conducted on a different clinical sample in an attempt to replicate the findings of Study 1 with clearer instructions regarding the upcoming speech task. Thirty-one clinical participants and 32 matched controls were administered the same speech threat and task instructions as those used by Mansell, W., Clark, D., Ehlers, A., and Chen, Y. P. (, Cognition and Emotion, 13(6), 673–690). Findings revealed the same pattern found in Study 1. Hence, in contrast to previous findings, both studies demonstrated that under conditions of social threat individuals diagnosed with generalised social phobia are more vigilant of pictorial faces generally than non-anxious individuals. The current findings lend support to cognitive models predicting that anxious individuals prefer to attend more to social cues of threat, in this case, faces. Explanations for these contradictory findings on attentional processing in social phobia are discussed with reference to the possible impact of perceived social threat and altered levels of state anxiety. Suggestion is also made for clearer research to reconcile these seemingly opposing results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent evidence suggests that video feedback helps improve the accuracy of self-ratings of performance in speech-anxious participants (e.g., Rapee & Hayman, 1996. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 34, 315–322.). Evidence also suggests that this effect is stronger for participants who have a more negatively distorted impression of their performance (self-observer discrepancy; Rodebaugh & Chambless, 2002. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 26, 629–644.). Data collected in Rapee and Hayman’s study were analyzed to determine if similar results would be found in this independent sample. Evidence was found for moderating effects of self-observer discrepancy comparable to those shown in Rodebaugh and Chambless. The self-observer discrepancy itself showed relatively weak relationships with general indices of social anxiety, but a very strong relationship with initial self-rating of performance. The results suggest that self-observer discrepancy is a predictor of response to video feedback, and that clinicians may be able to estimate the discrepancy by examining self-rating in conjunction with behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Maladaptive interpretations of negative social events are considered to be an important cognitive feature of social phobia. The present study sought to investigate the content-specificity of interpretative biases in social phobia, and to examine the influence of concurrent depressive symptoms on the interpretation of different types of events. Individuals with social phobia were compared with non-clinical controls in terms of the degree to which they believed different interpretations of hypothetical social or non-social situations with either positive or negative outcomes. The effect of including scores on a measure of depression as a covariate in analyses was also examined. The results showed that individuals with social phobia were more likely than controls to believe negative interpretations of negative social events, regardless of their level of concurrent depression. Negative interpretative biases were also evident for other types of events when depression was not included as a covariate, although the majority of these biases were no longer evident when depression was controlled. Results are discussed in terms of their implications regarding cognitive differences between social anxiety and depression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Current theories predict that following a social–evaluative performance, people high in social anxiety will ruminate about the negative features of the event and, in turn, will show a bias toward recalling the negative aspects of the event. In this study participants presented an impromptu speech and were then provided with half positive and half negative feedback on their performance. A free-recall task was used to test immediate recall for the feedback. Participants returned 1 week later and were again tested on recall for the feedback as well as completing a questionnaire indicating the extent to which they engaged in both positive and negative rumination regarding the speech task during the preceding week. Evidence for a negative memory bias in the high socially anxious group (HI) was found at both times, however this negative bias did not increase over time. The hypothesis that the HI group would spend more time than the low socially anxious group ruminating over perceived negative aspects of the speech task was also supported. Social anxiety and depression scores were both uniquely associated with negative rumination, however when controlling for depression the Group × Rumination–Valence interaction became nonsignificant. The HI group did engage in greater levels of overall rumination however, even when depression scores were statistically controlled. There was no significant relationship shown between negative recall bias and negative rumination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study tested D. M. Clark and A. Wells’ (1995) proposition that negative post-event rumination is produced by negative self perceptions formed by socially phobic individuals during anxiety-provoking events. A socially phobic group and a nonanxious control group performed an impromptu speech, and appraised their performance immediately afterwards. One week later, participants were assessed as to how frequently they had had negative thoughts about the speech, how much they engaged with these thoughts, how distressing these thoughts were, and how much control they felt they had over the thoughts. The socially phobic group engaged in more negative rumination than controls on each of these levels, and perceived their performance as worse than controls immediately after the speech. Perception of performance was found to mediate the relationship between social anxiety and post-event rumination, providing support for Clark and Wells’ model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigated the role of control beliefs in childhood anxiety disorders. The sample comprised 117 youth aged 9–17 years (86 met diagnostic criteria for an anxiety disorder and the remaining 31 were nonreferred comparison participants). Participants' anxiety levels and their perceptions of control over anxiety-related events (e.g., “things that might be harmful,” “feeling shaky or nervous”) were assessed. Findings indicated that perceived control over anxiety-related events was significantly negatively correlated with self-reported anxiety levels. Moreover, youth with anxiety disorders reported significantly lower perceived control about anxiety than the nonreferred participants. Findings were consistent with theory and suggest that anxiety disorders in youth are associated with beliefs that anxiety is uncontrollable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]