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An important problem faced by children is discriminating between entities capable of goal-directed action, i.e. intentional agents, and non-agents. In the case of discriminating between living and dead animals, including humans, this problem is particularly difficult, because of the large number of perceptual cues that living and dead animals share. However, there are potential costs of failing to discriminate between living and dead animals, including unnecessary vigilance and lost opportunities from failing to realize that an animal, such as an animal killed for food, is dead. This might have led to the evolution of mechanisms specifically for distinguishing between living and dead animals in terms of their ability to act. Here we test this hypothesis by examining patterns of inferences about sleeping and dead organisms by Shuar and German children between 3 and 5-years old. The results show that by age 4, causal cues to death block agency attributions to animals and people, whereas cues to sleep do not. The developmental trajectory of this pattern of inferences is identical across cultures, consistent with the hypothesis of a living/dead discrimination mechanism as a reliably developing part of core cognitive architecture.

The current study investigates infants' and toddlers' understanding of teasing interactions and its effect on subsequent social interactions. Teasing is a special kind of social interaction due to its dual nature: It consists of a slightly provocative contingent action accompanied by positive ostensive emotional cues. Teasing thus presents an especially interesting test case to inform us about young children's abilities to deal with complex social intentions. In a first experiment, we looked at 9-, 12-, and 18-month-old infants' ability to understand and differentiate a teasing intention from a trying intention and a refuse intention. We found that by 12 months of age, infants react differently (gaze, reach) and by 18 months they smile more in reaction to the Tease condition. In the second experiment, we tested 13-, 20- and 30-month-old children in closely matched purely playful and teasing situations. We also investigated potential social effects of teasing interactions on a subsequent affiliation sequence. Twenty- and 30-month-old children smile more in the Teasing than in the Play condition. For the 30-month-old toddlers, additionally, number of laughs is much higher in the Tease than in the Play condition. No effect on affiliation could be found. Thus, from very early in development, infants and toddlers are able to differentiate teasing from superficially similar but serious behavior and from around 18 months of age they enjoy it more. Infants and toddlers are able to process a complex social intention like teasing. Findings are discussed regarding infant and toddler intention understanding abilities., (Copyright © 2022. Published by Elsevier B.V.)

Children's strong tendency to over-imitate - i.e., to reproduce causally irrelevant actions - presents a well-documented, yet puzzling, phenomenon. On first sight this instrumentally inefficient behavior seems maladaptive and different accounts have been put forward to explain it. Causal accounts claim that children are misled by an adult's demonstration, mistake the superfluous actions as causally necessary, and therefore imitate them. Other accounts emphasize cognitive-motivational aspects underlying over-imitation, e.g. social motivations to affiliate with the model, or to adhere to normative conventions. Since all accounts predict the occurrence of over-imitation under typical conditions, different parameters and circumstances have to be considered to distinguish between them. Thus, we investigated children's over-imitation and their spontaneous verbal reactions to a puppet's behavior, in contexts in which a causally irrelevant action either led to the destruction of a valuable object belonging to the experimenter, or not. In addition, children saw the full action sequence being demonstrated either with an instrumental or a conventional focus. Causal accounts predict no flexibility across these contexts, because over-imitation is said to occur automatically. Normative accounts claim that different normative considerations affect children's behavior and action parsing, and therefore predict different response patterns across conditions. We found that over-imitation was less frequent in costly and instrumental conditions. Children criticized the puppet for omitting irrelevant actions more often in the non-costly condition, but criticized her more often for performing irrelevant actions in the costly condition, often expressing their moral concern. The results support the rational normative action interpretation account of over-imitation., (Copyright © 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)