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Newborn infants have been shown to extract temporal regularities from sound sequences, both in the form of learning regular sequential properties, and extracting periodicity in the input, commonly referred to as a regular pulse or the 'beat'. However, these two types of regularities are often indistinguishable in isochronous sequences, as both statistical learning and beat perception can be elicited by the regular alternation of accented and unaccented sounds. Here, we manipulated the isochrony of sound sequences in order to disentangle statistical learning from beat perception in sleeping newborn infants in an EEG experiment, as previously done in adults and macaque monkeys. We used a binary accented sequence that induces a beat when presented with isochronous timing, but not when presented with randomly jittered timing. We compared mismatch responses to infrequent deviants falling on either accented or unaccented (i.e., odd and even) positions. Results showed a clear difference between metrical positions in the isochronous sequence, but not in the equivalent jittered sequence. This suggests that beat processing is present in newborns. Despite previous evidence for statistical learning in newborns the effects of this ability were not detected in the jittered condition. These results show that statistical learning by itself does not fully explain beat processing in newborn infants. • Sleeping newborns process musical beat. • Transition probabilities are not enough to explain beat processing in newborn infants. • No evidence of statistical learning (based on transition probabilities) without isochronous stimulation in newborns. • Results converge with previous evidence on beat processing of newborn infants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human action control is highly sensitive to action-effect contingencies in the agent's environment. Here we show that the subjective sense of agency (SoA) contributes to this sensitivity as a subjective counterpart to instrumental action decisions. Participants (N = 556) experienced varying reward probabilities and were prompted to give summary evaluations of their SoA after a series of action-effect episodes. Results first revealed a quadratic relation of contingency and SoA, driven by a disproportionally strong impact of perfect action-effect contingencies. In addition to this strong situational determinant of SoA, we observed small but reliable interindividual differences as a function of gender, assertiveness, and neuroticism that applied especially at imperfect action-effect contingencies. Crucially, SoA not only reflected the reward structure of the environment but was also associated with the agent's future action decisions across situational and personal factors. These findings call for a paradigm shift in research on perceived agency, away from the retrospective assessment of single behavioral episodes and towards a prospective view that draws on statistical regularities of an agent's environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We suggest a normative model for the evaluation of explanations B because A based on probabilistic conditional reasoning and compare it with empirical data. According to the modus ponens model of explanations, the probability of B because A should equal the joint probability of the conditional if A then B and the explanans A. We argue that B because A expresses the conjunction of A and B as well as positive relevance of A for B. In Study 1, participants (N = 80) judged the subjective probabilities of 20 sets of statements with a focus on belief-based reasoning under uncertainty. In Study 2, participants (N = 376) were assigned to one of six item sets for which we varied the inferential relevance of A for B to explore boundary conditions of our model. We assessed the performance of our model across a range of analyses and report results on the Equation, a fundamental model in research on probabilistic reasoning concerning the evaluation of conditionals. In both studies, results indicate that participants' belief in statements B because A followed model predictions systematically. However, a sizeable proportion of sets of beliefs contained at least one incoherence, indicating deviations from the norms of rationality suggested by our model. In addition, results of Study 2 lend support to the idea that inferential relevance may be relevant for the evaluation of both conditionals and explanations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]