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Organisational change is as likely to fail as to succeed. The core proposition of the approach outlined in this paper is that the functionality of a socio-technical system is a potential constraint on the way that it can change, and this is something that current theories do not address. Thus, some of the variance in the success rate of change could be due to the inherent properties of the system and/or the way in which these properties are understood. This paper explores this proposition through a high-level discussion of four aviation industry case studies. These include: the change of a small regional airport from a public body to a business concern; the introduction of Airport Collaborative Decision-Making (A-CDM) at a major international airport; the introduction of a new Safety Management System at a major airline; and the assessment of risk in advance of major change in a regional airline. A theory of the mechanisms of socio-technical systems is proposed based on the relation between the functional requirements of operational processes and the social relations that are necessary to support them. Cycles of knowledge and information mediate between these and provide opportunities for intervention. This theory is applied to the case studies through a system change and operational evaluation tool (SCOPE/Structured Enquiry). The theory provides a basis for supporting the change initiatives as well as a framework for evaluating their status and progress. The evaluation emphasises the following themes: understanding the functionality of the operational system, how this can be enhanced by management processes, the inclusiveness of social relations, trust, the transformative role of information and the development of knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study presents a narrative synthesis of a systematic literature review relating to multi-agency interoperability and major incident decision-making in high risk, high stake environments. The review methodology includes the identification of relevant studies, a critical appraisal of the concepts inherent in the main review question and a narrative synthesis of the central themes that relate to the study as a whole. The review firstly outlines what, currently, appear to be the perceived defining features of successful interoperability by using the SAFE-T phase model of major incident decision-making. It then considers whether these defining features are realistically achievable in major incident practice. Findings suggest that the current definition of an interoperable network is too demanding for the inherent complexity and dynamic nature of the major incident task environment. Individual teams tend to focus on agency-specific behaviour, as opposed to coordinated multi-team functioning, and so collective interoperability is not achieved. Inevitably, this reduces the ability to perform collaborative behaviours, including decision-making and action implementation. The paper concludes that aiming for the current conceptualisation of interoperability along a hierarchical command structure may actually inhibit effective decision-making. Instead, multi-agency systems would do better to work towards an improved understanding of a non-hierarchical and decentralised yet interoperable major incident management network. Recommendations include the need to relate theory and practice in the development of multi-agency decision-making via simulation-based training and to deepen our understanding of interoperability to prevent inertia in high risk, high stake major incident environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]