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Although China's carbon emission trading schemes (CETS) garnered significant attention in the field of climate mitigation, limited data availability has hindered exploration into the impact of CETS on economic inequality at the county level in China. Given its potential to facilitate industrial upgrading and generate employment opportunities, the adoption of CETS holds promise for reducing economic inequality. To address data limitations, we employed a combination of gridded nighttime light data and land use data to estimate China's county-level Dagum Gini coefficient and its components. Subsequently, we applied a difference-in-difference-in-difference method to examine how CETS affected economic inequalities between and within urban and rural areas in China. Our findings reveal that: (1) CETS significantly reduced overall economic inequality in counties with a high proportion of secondary industry output; (2) this reduction primarily occurred within urban and rural areas rather than between them. Further heterogeneity analysis demonstrates that while CETS effectively mitigated economic inequality between urban and rural areas in central and western regions, it did not achieve similar outcomes in the eastern region; (3) service industry development and rural GDP per capita served as important channels through which CETS reduced economic inequality within rural areas. Infrastructure development driven by CETS primarily addressed economic inequality within urban areas rather than rural areas. Key policy insights: It is confirmed that China's CETS made a significant contribution to mitigating economic inequalities within urban and rural areas. This empirical evidence provides new decision-making support for the future promotion of CETS at the county level. It is recommended to propose higher quotas for service industries in rural areas and allocate a portion of revenue from carbon emission trading markets to promote entrepreneurship among rural residents and support upgrades in the rural industrial structure. Considering that the infrastructure development driven by CETS has predominantly addressed economic inequality within urban areas rather than rural areas, it is imperative to allocate a greater proportion of revenue from CETS towards supporting rural infrastructure construction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nature-based Solutions (NbS) form a substantial part of cost-efficient climate change mitigation options. However, public financial flows towards NbS have been limited. Among the factors impeding investments in NbS are challenges in reliable remote project identification and comparison. In this article, we demonstrate a technological solution to these challenges. Using cloud-based satellite data processing and the proliferation of open geospatial data, we developed a methodology to map NbS suitability based on a set of biophysical, pedological, hydrological and climatological criteria. To provide a proof of concept, we identify potential project areas for eight types of NbS in Rwanda and Lesotho. Building on these spatially-explicit NbS suitability data layers (accessible at ), we develop marginal abatement cost curves for projects in Rwanda and Lesotho. We thus provide a proof of concept for remote identification and project comparison. These technological developments can help investors, such as multilateral donors or governments, alleviate additionality concerns that are implied by local project selection. Key Policy Insights: Investment in climate change mitigation through Nature-based Solutions (NbS) is limited, in spite of the large, cost-efficient potential for achieving national and global goals. Remote project identification and comparison can help alleviate some of the impediments to international investment in NbS. Such remote identification and comparison of NbS projects is now possible because of breakthroughs in cloud-based satellite data processing technologies and increased availability of geospatial data. We present a proof of concept, establishing marginal abatement cost curves for climate change mitigation through NbS in Rwanda and Lesotho. Coupled with the institutional improvements necessary to create a reliable intergovernmental carbon credit market, these technological developments have the potential to boost international investment in NbS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The climate vulnerability of Indigenous Peoples is closely related to their marginalization from decision-making processes. Although the engagement of Indigenous Peoples in climate policy is increasingly promoted at the international level, there are still multiple barriers to their meaningful participation at the national level. Through an ethnography of the State, this article analyses how both the State's political orientation, and its interpretations of different stakeholders, influence the participation of Mapuche-Pehuenche communities in two mitigation projects implemented in Lonquimay, Chile, in the southern Andes. This study is based on a review of State policies for Indigenous Peoples, participant observations of the mitigation projects' implementation, and qualitative data collected through 26 semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders. The study uses an ethnographic approach to allow an understanding of how the State is constructed in the face of climate change and of Indigenous Peoples' vulnerability. The State project, which shapes the relationship of the Mapuche with their territory, with the State, and among themselves, is reflected in policy implementation patterns and the existing economic development model. All these relationships influence how officials and the Mapuche interpret and implement climate policy. This article demonstrates that by neglecting these relationships, climate policy risks being less effective in part as it reinforces the exclusion of Indigenous Peoples. While Indigenous Peoples' participation poses significant intercultural challenges, it also yields valuable lessons that can promote processes of institutional transformation that contribute to climate mitigation, such as strengthening local capacities and questioning beliefs that have led to climate change. Key policy insights: Indigenous Peoples' recognition and early participation in climate policy have a transformative potential. Counterproductive patterns of policy implementation in Indigenous Peoples' territories constrain climate policy coherence. To promote the meaningful engagement of Indigenous Peoples in climate policy, states must address long-standing conflicts and underlying factors that produce contextual vulnerability to climate change, while strengthening the intercultural competencies that allow a respectful approach to Indigenous knowledge systems and protocols. Officials must be open to transforming their own knowledge, practices, and values to put climate policy at the service of Indigenous communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social protection has gained increasing attention in global climate policy due to its potential to contribute to low-carbon, just and climate-resilient development. Unlocking climate finance for social protection is critical to realize this potential. Multilateral climate funds established under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) can play a particularly important role by financing social sectors where private investments are not attractive. Yet, there is a distinct policy and research gap in understanding the potential and limitations of the UNFCCC financial mechanisms to support social protection in low- and middle-income countries. Taking as a case study the Green Climate Fund (GCF), which is the largest multilateral fund under the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, we seek to address this gap. First, the study introduces a framework for analysis of the ways climate finance engages with social protection by looking into a comprehensive set of formal social services and transfers provided by the state to individuals, households, and on a collective basis. Second, the study identifies a continuum of entry points for integrating social protection into the GCF's project portfolio and offers a holistic perspective by capturing climate change mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage. We find that social protection can be instrumental in the design and implementation of GCF projects. In addition, our analysis reveals that the GCF has the potential to support projects that create enabling conditions for integrating climate change considerations into national social protection systems, and that aim at piloting or establishing long-term social protection mechanisms with climate change objectives. Social protection policy frameworks, infrastructure, instruments, and knowledge have supported the design and implementation of mitigation and adaptation projects funded by the GCF. The strongest linkages between social protection and climate finance in the GCF's project portfolio relate to climate services with a growing focus on shock-responsive social protection. Rural livelihood projects were the most common in the project portfolio though several projects demonstrated the potential for the GCF to support housing-related social protection in urban contexts. The study did not identify any mitigation-only projects that invest in adapting social protection systems, yet several projects demonstrate entry points towards that end. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The targets of energy conservation, decarbonization, and industry reinvigoration have significantly influenced the design of China's new energy vehicle (NEV) industrial policies and nationwide electrification. As a monumental policy framework for energy transition in transportation sector, the NEV industry development plan plays an influential role in promoting cleantech diffusion and enhancing NEV competitiveness. This study employs an event study method to investigate the stock market reaction to the NEV plan shocks. The NEV plan announced in 2020 receives a markedly positive stock price effect of 3.72% in the 6-day event window. Heterogeneity tests on subsamples indicate that state-backed entities exhibit a similar effect to the total sample, while the automotive manufacturing class and original equipment manufacturers see a significantly higher market value gain of 6.56% and 13.34%, respectively. However, battery manufacturers, as one of the key participants in the NEV value chain, experience an insignificant stock price effect. This study documents the financial consequences of clean energy policies specific to the emission-intensive automotive manufacturing sector, highlights the effectiveness of government-to-investor signalling in a cleantech diffusion context, and reveals the implications to other economies seeking to deploy clean transport and enhance environmental sustainability. The national NEV industry development plan aiming at the energy transition of the transportation sector can incur outperformance of NEV stocks in the financial market. Different stock market performances between NEV plans manifest investor preference for market-oriented industry policies. The long-term policy framework for green industry transition can send positive signals to investors, guide capital reallocation, and direct investment flows into key financial assets. The implications from the Chinese market offer valuable insights for other countries in formulating concrete industry planning, transition agendas, and binding targets for climate change mitigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Information on the benefits of green budget tagging (Green budget tagging refers to itemization and linking of every budget item with climate action, mitigation, adaptation, or both) in developing countries could help boost the uptake of this practice and in turn help these same developing countries to mobilize climate-related development finance. We apply double differences in means econometric analytical approach to evaluate the association between green budget tagging (GBT) and target outcome variables of climate-related finance and CO2 emissions. The results show that all 32 developing countries that have undertaken green budget tagging are also associated with larger inflows of climate-related finance. Among the adopters, climate-related finance inflows have been significantly larger for countries with externally-initiated green budget tagging than for those with internally-initiated tagging. The results also show that a minimum level of climate-related finance is required to achieve CO2 emissions reduction. However, the current mean yearly inflow of climate-related development finance falls short of the level that drives emissions reduction. These findings point to the importance of green budget tagging and to the need to upscale climate-related finance inflows to propel improvement in environmental quality. Although green budget tagging is a useful tool for mobilizing external development finance, current external finance inflows are insufficient to achieve ambitious emission reductions. Immense effort is therefore required to mobilize the adequate scale of climate-related finance from both external and other sources. Green budget tagging can be a crucial tool for mobilizing climate-related finance and improving environmental quality in developing countries. To entice climate-related development finance, developing countries need to clearly define climate-related projects in their national budgets. Climate finance mobilization policies designed for reducing emissions are not complete unless they emphasize and promote the scale of inflows. Hence, policymakers should put greater effort into mobilizing adequate finance (from both external and domestic sources) to drive emissions reduction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Citizens' assemblies on climate change are increasingly popular to support democratic decision-making. Such Climate Assemblies (CAs) convene representative groups of citizens formulating policy proposals after hearing experts and deliberating intensely. CAs may help addressing climate policy issues more effectively partly because their members need not worry about re-election. CAs' effectiveness depends on their design such as the issues chosen (or not chosen) for deliberation. Agenda-setters exert substantial power by selecting certain issues and by choosing framings that benefit some solutions over others. In this paper I ask: What characterizes agendas that are suitable and legitimate for deliberation in CAs? The aim is to support practitioners in making informed agenda choices for CAs by providing a list of ten widely accepted guiding principles based on expert interviews, policy documents, and information gathered from the Knowledge Network on Climate Assemblies (KNOCA). The paper systematically discusses trade-offs of various agenda choices in the light of different CA rationales. Results show that those with system-supporting rationales tend to favour narrower agendas tailored to political demands aiming to increase immediate policy impact; those with system-disrupting rationales prefer more open agendas allowing citizens to challenge existing political practices and worldviews. Results support earlier arguments that distinctions of entire deliberative processes in either top-down or bottom-up are too simplistic and that a tool-box approach is more useful. Insights appear relevant for debates of deliberative minipublics more generally. Future research should investigate whom to involve in setting CA agendas and with how much power. Effective agenda design hinges on rationales on how to achieve assembly objectives which depend on authorities' ambition for climate action. Given high ambition, system-supportive rationales aiming for policy impact favour narrower agendas tailored to demands of the policy process but risk low transformativeness. Given low ambition, system-disruptive rationales aiming to challenge established practices and worldviews favour more open agendas but risk low impact if assemblies are not politically embedded or able to mobilize opposition groups. Assembly designs are seldom purely supportive or disruptive but often hybrid. Agenda-setting has many dimensions allowing for productive combinations of disruptive and supportive elements tailored to contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emissions-intensive, trade-exposed (EITE) industries must decarbonize to limit global warming to 1.5°C. This study explores how policy stringency and regional variability impact EITE industrial decarbonization. It uses Canada as a case study due to its heterogeneous industrial sector and high regional resource variability. The study has two scenarios: one with global climate action where the world pushes to limit warming to 1.5°C, and one where Canada acts to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 and the rest of the world lags. The scenarios differ in three ways: the global price of oil, the pace of technological change for low emission technologies, and domestic climate policy. In the global action scenario, a carbon price of $430USD2020 was needed to achieve 75% decarbonization of EITE industries by 2050. In our global inaction scenario, EITE industries only decarbonize 25%, as domestic climate policy considered international competition and the risk of industrial shutdown. If competitiveness concerns persist as simulated in this scenario, Canada is highly unlikely to achieve deep industrial decarbonization by 2050. The results also show that regional variability plays a significant role in low emissions technology adoption. While all regions will need targeted innovation and commercialization support as well as market uptake mechanisms, we find that relative advantages and disadvantages in terms of resource availability and industrial mix play an important role in how regional decarbonization occurs. For instance, regions with inexpensive local fossil fuels and ready geology suitable for CO2 storage have a high uptake of carbon capture and storage. Regions with access to abundant hydroelectricity rely more on electrification as a decarbonization pathway. Regions with no relative resource advantages are at greater risk for industrial shutdown due to the higher cost of decarbonization. Achieving national deep decarbonization of EITE industries in Canada or elsewhere is highly unlikely without global climate action due to competitiveness concerns. Policymakers interested in addressing competitiveness concerns might do so either through policy mechanisms that support the uptake of low emission technologies, mechanisms that penalize regions without decarbonization policy, or both. Policymakers should consider relative regional advantages and disadvantages to EITE decarbonization by designing policies that account for industrial heterogeneity and regional resource availability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Land-Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry sector (LULUCF) role is of critical importance in contributing to the ambitious targets set by the European Union (EU) to reduce by 55% net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030, compared to 1990 levels, and to become carbon neutral by 2050. The EU LULUCF regulation, approved in 2023, sets out binding targets for each individual Member State to be achieved by 2030, totaling 310 MtCO2e of net removals for the whole EU. However, it remains poorly understood to what extent the EU LULUCF climate target matches with the Member States' strategies. The alignment between the EU governance and its Member States' visions for the long-term will determine the achievement of the climate targets. The objective of this study is to understand the LULUCF expected contribution to the EU's 2030 and 2050 climate goals. In doing so, we explored the European and country-level visions of LULUCF with respect to climate change mitigation and adaptation, as expressed in their Long-Term Strategies (LTSs) and national projections; we evaluated whether national level projections for LULUCF are aligned with the EU short and long term targets. We found that most countries' LTSs envisage policies and measures in the LULUCF sector, however they are, often general and not comprehensive. Furthermore, the majority of countries' quantitative future projections of GHG emissions and removals from LULUCF differ from the pathway set in EU targets; thus, countries may need to either update existing policies or conceive and plan new policies and actions. European Union (EU) Member States are required to design and carefully implement LULUCF policies to comply with the ambitious EU targets. EU countries describe in their Long-Term Strategies LULUCF policies and measures that are potentially effective, but not comprehensive, transparent and accurate. Ideally Long-Term Strategies for LULUCF are aligned with other policy instruments, e.g. Nationally Determined Contributions and National Energy and Climate Plans. Many EU countries may grapple with the adoption and fulfilment of the currently proposed European Union targets on LULUCF. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The imperative to halt global warming extends beyond human boundaries, intertwining with the urgent need to achieve net-zero emissions. To this end, the Paris Agreement (PA) states that all Parties should strive to formulate their Long-Term Low Greenhouse Gas Emission Development Strategies (LT-LEDS). This article comprehensively reviews the LT-LEDS submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) by 53 Parties (representing 75% of global emissions) as of September 23rd, 2022. First, it conducts an analysis of the quality and completeness of the LT-LEDS. The findings of this analysis highlight the need for improvement in the reported information, particularly to improve the clarity of the information presented and the monitoring of progress towards the objective of each LT-LEDS. Furthermore, the study confirms the noticeable absence of reference to the principles of equity, and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the light of different national circumstances. Yet these principles should frame climate action within the PA. Second, this article estimates the carbon budget to be utilized by the Parties that have integrated net-zero emission (NZE) targets within their LT-LEDS. The analysis reveals that this group of Parties (i.e. those reporting on LT-LEDS and those with NZE targets), currently encompasses 37% of the global population and is responsible for 62% of global emissions. If these NZE targets are met, the group is projected to consume a total of 431 GtCO2. This value notably exceeds the threshold of 400 GtCO2, exceeding the remaining global carbon budget estimated by the IPCC to be compatible with a 67% likelihood to achieve a temperature increase objective of 1.5°C. To achieve the objectives of the PA, it is necessary for all countries to develop and implement their LT-LEDS, and for the 53 countries that have already submitted them to enhance the quality and comprehensiveness of the reported information and to improve the monitoring of progress towards NZE targets. To achieve the long-term objective of limiting the global temperature increase to 1.5°C, more countries need to actively engage in formulating and implementing NZE commitments. It is also imperative to increase the level of ambition in the existing NZE commitments, particularly those formulated by developed countries. All LT-LEDS, encompassing both present submissions and those anticipated in the future, should be formulated in the light of equity considerations, and meticulously assess the share of the global carbon budget that will be allocated to the LT-LEDS' net-zero CO2 commitments. The analysis of net-zero CO2 commitments reveals that the existing NZE targets set by developed nations entail a carbon budget consumption significantly exceeding their equitable share, while those formulated by less developed countries remain notably below their due allocation. This divergence could potentially limit the capacity of the latter group to foster their development, compounded by the challenges of addressing climate change impacts. Examination of the current NZE commitments underscores that the current trajectory of emission reductions lacks a comprehensive framework to instigate the transformative changes required to achieve the ambitious mitigation objectives of the Paris Agreement. Consequently, there is an imperative for more detailed and comprehensive long-term visions at the national level, which will serve as guidance for short-term policy decisions and effectively prioritize the fundamental structural shifts needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change is a key socioeconomic and environmental concern in South Africa. The South African government introduced several climate change initiatives to address the impacts of climate change, resulting in the proliferation of climate adaptation policies across spheres of government. This paper studies different climate change adaptation policies and climate policy paradigms (CPP) to understand the adaptation landscape; it explains and compares the changes in CPP in South Africa over time. We mapped 40 policy documents from 2004 to 2022, which shows 12 national policies, 12 provincial (sub-national) policy documents and 14 metropolitan city policy documents. We then used 12 national policy documents to illustrate and understand the CPP. The research shows that different stakeholders have shaped climate change adaptation policy, both private and public firms advised on climate change policy and there are a number of different funding partners supporting the adaptation policy like GEF, C40 and GIZ. The changing policy environment has introduced new frameworks, objectives and processes. Therefore, more efforts will be needed going forward to guide adaptation policy across national, provincial and local governments. We find that several CPPs have emerged, that is different paradigms encompassing a range of policy goals, framings and instruments. The present National CC Adaptation Strategy (NCCAS) mandates adaptation across all levels of government and allows all important stakeholders to address climate change consequences. This NCCAS increases the number and ambition of adaptation policy, encourages integrated approaches, policy coherence and clear direction on how to handle climate risks and impacts in varied South Africa and its global commitment. Changes in policy paradigm enable the use of new policy instruments, including funding and budget mechanisms. Finally, climate adaptation policy has become more ambitious and stringent, requiring all levels of government to plan for climate change. The climate change policy landscape in South Africa has grown over the past 18 years, with policy development across different spheres of government (national, sectoral, provincial and metros), New CPPs have emerged, supported by new policy frames, goals and instruments. The NCCAS provides a clear policy goal, which also provides new policy instruments to implement climate actions and acts to enhance integrated approaches, The lack of domestic budget allocation remains a challenge for national government, but external partnerships have begun to provide support for policy development. Notably, a shift from a flexible to stringent approach to climate policy is needed to deliver effective climate action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to most climate mitigation scenario assessments, limiting global warming to 1.5–2°C in the long run will not be possible without the extensive deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) from the atmosphere. CDR is required for drawing down and achieving net-zero CO2 emissions by mid-century. Thereafter, CO2 removals will likely need to exceed residual CO2 emissions, resulting in net negative emissions. A policy framework based on 'carbon removal obligations' (CROs) has been proposed to respond to concerns about the financial and fiscal viability, the lack of incentives for CDR uptake, as well as the physical and technological risks associated with any climate mitigation scenario that relies on large scale CDR. Here we propose an updated and improved CRO policy framework, consisting of two core elements: the 'principal CRO mechanism' obliges emitters of a tonne of CO2 to remove a tonne of CO2 at the time of maturity of the CRO. On top of this obligation, CRO holders need to pay a fee for the temporary storage of CO2 in the atmosphere. This 'CRO pricing instrument' is used by regulators to steer the carbon emissions and removals pathways independently. Our update suggests that markets for CDR under the CRO framework should operate independently from markets for emission reductions. We propose a blueprint for legal implementation where CROs are integrated akin to private financial borrowing and debt mechanisms. By aligning CROs with established financial systems, we leverage familiar institutional roles, seamlessly integrating climate mitigation into the core economy. The proposal applies the polluter pays principle to the costs of carbon removal from the atmosphere, whilst providing legal guarantees that the removals will materialize. By placing climate change mitigation pricing levers in the hands of the traditional managers of financial stability, that is, central banks, better account is taken of the externality of carbon emissions as part of core economic and financial management, with the corollary that climate change mitigation response management is better integrated into the economic mainstream. Establishing a standard for the creation of removal units by CDR projects facilitates a more efficient market by reducing transaction costs and enhancing price discovery. Early action by government to put in place legislative measures indicating the direction of policy, and a timetable for introducing CROs, would enhance private sector confidence and engagement in the CDR project sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Few countries have declared sector-specific emission reduction targets in agriculture, making it difficult to construct and assess realistic climate mitigation scenarios for analytical and policymaking purposes. We aim to fill this analytical gap by using a set of cluster analyses to gauge likely ambitions levels in reducing agricultural emission at country-level, taking into consideration important country-level characteristics and referencing the 'common but differentiated responsibilities' principle. We then use the results from the cluster analysis together with information from submitted NDCs and other considerations to design formulas for assigning numerical reduction targets to individual countries. Our main results indicate a global agricultural emission level in 2030 exceeding the limit for the 1.5°C temperature target, but representing substantially lower emissions than the no-policy scenario. At individual country-level, the scenarios consist of large emission reductions in Northern and Western Europe, followed by the USA and other developed economies, and emission increases in many developing countries. To facilitate the construction of alternative scenarios, our method also contains parameters for flexibility to scale up or down ambition levels at both country and global levels, making the method useful for other researchers to develop alternative scenarios. Agricultural emission targets at country and global level are needed for analysing the likely impacts of agricultural decarbonization Only 10% of Paris Agreement parties have specific pledges limiting agricultural emissions, indicating an uncertain decarbonization pathway and hindering international climate cooperation Our analysis based on the need, intent, readiness, and scope indicators can guide the construction of plausible mitigation scenarios at country and global levels By revealing factors that limit mitigation ambitions, our results can be used to develop instruments at country/multilateral levels to incentivize setting ambitious targets Global agricultural emissions in 2030 in our 'plausible' scenario exceeds the 1.5°C target, pointing to the need for enhanced global ambition [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The goals of the Paris Agreement (PA) on collectively managing climate change can only be reached if all parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) commit to actions supporting their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Developing-economy nations play a crucial role in reaching the PA targets, particularly in the Agriculture, Forest, and Other Land Uses (AFOLU) sector. However, developing country Parties also face several constraints in tracking and communicating progress towards their climate policy targets and implementation of their NDCs. The operationalization of Biennial Transparency Report (BTR) and Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF) under the PA will bring stricter reporting timeframes and advanced transparency for all parties. With these requirements rapidly coming into force, addressing reporting gaps is now a pressing priority. The present study analyzes the NDCs, and Biennial Update Reports (BURs) submitted by developing country Parties under the UNFCCC. In an illustrative exercise, our in-depth analysis concentrates on reporting on the AFOLU sector and identifies issues impeding a comprehensive and comparable Global Stock Take (GST): (i) issues of consistency in reporting timeframes (ii) issues in transparency of reporting on mitigation sectors and on relevant progress indicators (iii) incomparability of methodological approaches proposed and used, and (iv) the implications of limited national capacity for transparent reporting. The UNFCCC and developed country Parties now have the opportunity of providing specialized support for developing country Parties. This could include tailored guidance to address gaps in both greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions accounting, and reporting challenges, to ensure consistent, comprehensive, and transparent reporting to reinforce capacities moving forward following the next GST. The lack of consistent, transparent, and comparable communication from developing country Parties on NDC progress for key climate change impact mitigation sectors, such as AFOLU, has implications for operationalization of the GST. Delayed and inconsistent reporting are expected to affect the aggregation and consolidation of information across countries to inform global progress. Increased support for tailored capacity building and data gathering is required to enable transparent communication on progress in NDC implementation, monitoring, and reporting. Developing country groups will need to improve the transparency of reporting progress on the implementation and achievement of their NDCs to match the expected increase in carbon footprints with growing economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policymakers and governments increasingly frame climate protection in terms of green growth, arguing that continued economic growth and climate protection are complementary and mutually beneficial. With such framing, governments hope to overcome the global common goods problem associated with climate change and to enable higher ambition on climate action within and across states. Yet, no empirical evidence to date has been provided on how widespread the support for green growth is in international climate politics. This paper, therefore, investigates which countries employ green growth framings at UNFCCC negotiations, and whether this relates to domestic factors, in particular economic structure, level of development and climate impacts. We conduct panel-data analysis on green growth positions derived from hand-coding a unique dataset of High-level Segment statements at the Convention of the Parties (COPs) from 2010 to 2019 for 151 countries. The results reveal that, to date, green growth proponents are those countries with the most advanced national clean energy technology (CET) capacities – as measured by the Green Complexity Index. The findings highlight that green growth is not promoted by all countries at international climate negotiations. In international climate negotiations, climate protection is increasingly framed as a green growth opportunity to motivate global ambition. Clean Energy Technology (CET) leading countries are more likely to use green growth framings than other less-technologically advanced peers and those with high exposure to climate risks. Mechanisms to support green growth pathways for all countries should be scaled up, including technology transfer and finance to foster local capacities and human capital. Given that green growth framings are not universally endorsed, further emphasis should be placed on additional co-benefits of climate action beyond economic growth, such as food and energy security, adaptation and resilience-building. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of digital technologies poses opportunities and challenges for transparency and accountability in climate governance. This paper examines their impact on information flows and accountability in the context of climate outcomes, analyzing three case examples (World Bank Climate Warehouse, Climate TRACE, and OpenClimate) to assess the potential of digital solutions to improve data availability and reliability, particularly for non-state actors (NSAs). Using Ostrom's 'rules in use' framework, we explore how digital technologies shape transparency outcomes, highlighting challenges and unintended consequences. We analyze how these initiatives frame, design, and implement their rules for digital approaches to define their participants' data collection, purpose, and access rules, all of which are crucial aspects impacting transparency and accountability for the Paris Agreement. Our findings reveal uncertainties in the rules' operationalization for these digital technologies that undermine their potential to enhance transparency. Three key issues emerge: (1) establishing appropriate rules to govern data quality for accuracy and credibility; (2) addressing power imbalances to foster inclusive and equitable transparency; and (3) aligning rules in use across digitally-enabled solutions to promote coordination and facilitate polycentrism in the post-Paris climate regime. These insights shed light on the role of digital approaches in bridging transparency and accountability gaps, emphasizing the need for careful rule design and coordination for effective implementation in global climate governance. Digital technologies have the potential to generate new modes of transparency within the Paris climate governance system, particularly at the level of non-state and subnational actors. By comparing three case examples employing digital technologies to improve climate data, we evaluate various formal and informal 'rules in use' for generating data and facilitating sharing across actors and initiatives to enhance transparency and accountability. To leverage the potential of digital technologies in advancing transparency and accountability in climate governance, policymakers should prioritize the alignment of rules in use, address power imbalances, and ensure the creation of appropriate rules governing data quality and structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change policies are prepared in a power-loaded environment, where different policy actors interact to meet their personal or collective interests. This paper argues that the 'power interplay' between actors plays a significant role in shaping and re-shaping climate change policies. We present examples from South Asia (Nepal, India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan) to show how actors' power interplay at the local, sub-national, national and transboundary levels influences climate change policy-making. We show that negative effects of power interplay are prominent in the climate policy domain of South Asia, including short-termism of local adaptation plans, exclusion of certain policy actors in the policy-making processes, lack of transboundary-level adaptation, and lack of coordination between actors. Nuances also exist, such as the state's authority in prioritizing technical solutions, exclusionary design and implementation of climate policies, and an agenda of securitization; these can further marginalize the actors involved in climate change policy processes. The negative effects of power interplay in South Asia can limit the success of on-the-ground implementation of adaptation and mitigation strategies, limit adaptive capacity among communities, and possibly counter the development of a strong climate change solutions space. Lastly, we argue that there are no silver bullet solutions to power asymmetries and appeal to policy actors – in South Asia and elsewhere – to design context-specific and power-sensitive policy-making approaches. Negative effects of power interplay have led to the exclusion of certain policy actors (especially communities at risk) in policy-making processes and a lack of transboundary-level adaptation in South Asia. Hard infrastructure-based adaptation measures tend to exacerbate the vulnerability of the communities at risk in South Asia. Policy actors must design context-specific and power-sensitive policy-making climate adaptation and mitigation approaches to reduce the negative impacts of power interplay. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reducing greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture is crucial to reach global and regional climate targets. However, the efficiency of unilateral climate policies aimed at taxing emissions might be hampered by carbon leakage. One way to eliminate leakage is to implement a global carbon tax. In this article, we study the effects of a carbon tax in agriculture on GHG emissions by simulating five policy scenarios using the CAPRI model; (i) an EU tax, (ii) an EU tax complemented with a border carbon adjustment mechanism (BCA), (iii) a global tax, (iv) a global tax scaled by GDP per capita, and (v) a low global tax at 1/10 of the tax level in the other scenarios. For the global scenarios, we also analyse the impact on food consumption and nutrient intake. We find that a global tax of EUR 120 per ton CO2-eq could reduce global agricultural emissions by 19%, but also jeopardizes food security in some parts of the world. A global tax at 1/10 of that rate (EUR 12) achieves a 3.2% reduction. In contrast, a unilateral EU tax of EUR 120 per ton CO2-eq, accompanied with a BCA, reduces global agricultural emissions by only 0.15%. A unilateral carbon tax in the EU causes significant emission leakage. This result depends strongly on differences in emission intensities between regions and on consumer preferences. A EUR 12 global carbon tax achieves a considerably larger global emission reduction than a EUR 120 unilateral EU carbon tax accompanied with a border carbon adjustment. A global carbon tax differentiated by GDP per capita is less effective than a uniform global carbon tax, as producers with higher emission intensities tend to get lower tax rates. Other ways of taking equity into account should be sought when designing climate policies in the agricultural sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

National-level governments are directing and funding climate adaptation research, which is essential to informing effective and equitable adaptation practices. We sought to understand how United States (US) federal agencies prioritize, direct, and fund research related to climate adaptation and climate resilience through analyzing climate action plans created in 2021 by 13 agencies who are members of the US Global Change Research Program. We examine: (1) agencies' stated climate adaptation research priorities; (2) how agencies address collaboration, outreach, accessibility, and usability of research outcomes; and (3) agencies' adaptation research funding opportunities. We argue that certain research needs, justice and equity considerations, and interdisciplinary research should be emphasized to a greater degree. While adaptation research capacity and funding opportunities are expanding, they remain inadequate for the scale of research needed. US federal agencies vary in their integration of research as a core component of their climate adaptation plans, but most prioritize research that is relevant and accessible to stakeholders and decision-makers. While all agencies addressed environmental justice, some could more substantially incorporate justice considerations into their climate adaptation research. Adaptation research and strategies should ensure that collaborations are inclusive and sustainable and would benefit from meaningful and respectful collaboration with tribes and Indigenous Peoples, as well as marginalized and under-represented groups. Multidisciplinary research is key to climate adaptation and should be enhanced through increasing funding support for crosscutting programmes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Limiting global temperature increases to 1.5 °C while respecting 'the right to health' requires substantial reductions in Short-Lived Climate Pollutants (SLCPs), including methane, black carbon and hydrofluorocarbons, and co-emitted air pollutants. This study evaluates the inclusion of SLCP and air pollutant mitigation within Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) that were submitted between 2015 and 2022. Between pre- and post-2020 NDCs, explicit reference to SLCPs and air pollutant mitigation as priorities more than doubled, indicating a rise in policy attention to these pollutants. There was also a large increase in the percentage of countries including methane and HFCs within the scope of their overall GHG reduction targets, and three countries include explicit black carbon reduction targets. With respect to policy, there was a 45% increase in the number of specific mitigation measures included in NDCs post-2020. Hence, the number of countries with implicit reductions in SLCPs and other air pollutants covered in their NDCs is now also substantially larger compared to pre-2020, due to greater inclusion of mitigation measures that reduce SLCPs and air pollutants alongside (other) GHGs. Local benefits for human health from air pollution improvements is a key priority for more countries in post-2020 NDCs compared to earlier NDC reporting. Many countries now include specific mitigation measures in NDCs that can simultaneously reduce SLCPs and co-emitted air pollutants alongside GHGs, helping to achieve local air quality and health improvements. To demonstrate the achievement of local air pollutant and SLCP reductions, countries focusing on NDC implementation should ensure air pollutants and SLCPs are integrated into climate change monitoring frameworks. Post-2020 NDCs provide many clear examples of how inclusion of SLCPs and air pollutants can both increase climate change mitigation ambition and achieve local development benefits, which could be adopted in other countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Decisions by states to cancel oil and gas licenses in the transition to net-zero emissions can trigger investment arbitration claims. Given the massive damages that arbitration tribunals can award to investors, investment arbitration is increasingly being criticized as an obstacle to climate change mitigation and the just energy transition. Under the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method, tribunals have based their valuation on the expected production volumes during the remaining lifetime of oilfields and forecasts of international oil prices, essentially requiring states to compensate companies at market conditions for all energy left underground. With an increasing number of carbon neutrality pledges at the global level and states' due diligence obligation to reduce emissions, this article argues that tribunals can no longer ignore decarbonization considerations in the application of the DCF method. Damages decisions must instead account for the price, production cost and risk expectations under net-zero pathways. Significant downward adjustments to the estimated future income of hydrocarbon assets can be achieved by using the lower oil price forecasts in net-zero emissions scenarios, instead of current market conditions. Adjusting future cash flow projections and the discount rate to reflect carbon pricing and other climate policy risks can significantly lower the present value of hydrocarbon assets. As arbitration tribunals have so far ignored decarbonization in their oil damages calculations, legal reforms are needed to require the alignment of investor compensation to decarbonization and ensure a just energy transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Governments that revoke licenses and permits or take other measures to restrict the development of oil and gas in their territory will face claims from investors for compensation. When investors are foreign, they can seek compensation for 'lost future profits' in investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), even if they had not commenced production. ISDS cases are likely to obstruct a just transition by chilling supply-side climate measures and diverting public funds away from climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts. Using a dataset of ISDS-protected assets in the upstream oil and gas sector, we demonstrate that the global distribution of legal and financial risks is highly unjust. More than two thirds of the net-present value of 1.5°C-incompatible and treaty-protected oil and gas assets are found in low- and middle-income countries, including those highly vulnerable to climate change. The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) is the most significant single treaty obstructing the transition. While protection of fossil fuels in some countries may soon be phased-out of this treaty, the protection of the assets identified in our study will remain for at least ten more years. To limit ISDS risk, states should: (1) immediately cease the issuance of new permits/leases for oil and gas developments; (2) terminate investment treaties (including the ECT) and (3) develop binding rules that cap the amount of compensation that can be awarded to investors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent scholarly work on sustainability transitions has highlighted the importance of the development of norms against fossil fuels, or Anti-Fossil Fuel Norms (AFFNs), for climate mitigation. However, further research is needed to understand the mechanisms and conditions by which such norms are developed and secured for successful sustainability transitions. This paper contributes to addressing this, through analysing the case of the Republic of Ireland, probing the emergence of norms against fossil fuels and notably against natural gas (also referred to here as 'fossil gas'). Whilst Ireland is considered an overall laggard on climate action, in recent years the country has witnessed several ground-breaking supply-side moves against fossil fuels. Drawing on in-depth original research interviews and analysis of key political sources, including parliamentary debates and policy documents, the paper finds evidence of norms against fossil gas emerging in the Irish case. The analysis contributes insights into the iterative development of AFFNs at the domestic level, the role of environmental movements, and broader lessons for the development of a just transition away from fossil gas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To date, 79% of Local Authorities (LAs) in England have a climate plan to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 or sooner. Yet questions remain over the collective impact of these plans and targets in terms of their contribution to a national net zero carbon budget given that the LA targets are voluntary and largely uncoordinated. There is therefore scope to explore if and how the LA target-setting process could be improved. We evaluate regional ambition in the emissions targets of 311 English LAs. We assess whether the subnational targets are aligned with a national net zero carbon budget and whether LAs take proportionate action based on their respective capabilities. It is also unclear whether LAs have the resources to implement the often highly ambitious targets they have committed to. Using a composite indicator approach, we assess the relative capability of different LAs to decarbonize, as well as the degree of ambition they are demonstrating. We find that many LAs are not taking as much action as other LAs that may have less capability to act. This suggests that burden-sharing between regions and LAs is inequitable. We offer a series of policy recommendations to improve the fairness and effectiveness of the LA target-setting process as a climate governance mechanism, including establishing a statutory target-setting requirement with appropriate resourcing, and introducing a national net zero indicator framework to monitor progress. This framework could be used in England, or in other countries, to assess progress. It would also allow funding and resources to be better directed to regions and LAs that require more support to reach net zero emission targets, rendering the transition more 'spatially just' and enabling its delivery. Key policy insights The English LA targets contribute to achieving a national net zero carbon budget. However, there is still a 1.2 GtCO2 gap in achieving this by 2050. The most ambitious LAs did not necessarily score highly in terms of capability. Seven of the ten LAs with the highest capability scores were in London; the least capable LAs were more dispersed. Greater standardization, oversight and coordination could improve the effectiveness and fairness of LA target-setting, and help direct resources from the central government to less capable LAs and regions. This could render the targets 'spatially just' and enable their delivery. This could be achieved by developing a statutory target-setting requirement and national net zero indicator framework such as the one laid out in this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jurisdictions use an assortment of policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Climate policy mixes have often evolved through the ad hoc layering of new policies onto an existing policy mix, rather than deliberate design of a complete policy portfolio. This can lead to unanticipated interactions between policies which can support or undermine policy objectives and is further complicated where climate policy is implemented at multiple jurisdictional levels. In the context of Canada and its four most populous provinces, we examine the development of climate policy mixes across jurisdictional levels between 2000 and 2020 and evaluate policy interactions. We develop an inventory of 184 climate policies, and examine each in terms of instrument type, implementation timing, technological specificity, and expected abatement. We evaluate interactions between overlapping policies both within jurisdictional levels (horizontal) and across jurisdictional levels (vertical) for their impact on emissions abatement using a policy coherence analysis framework. We find that subsidies and R&D funding were the most abundant policies (58%), although pricing and flexible regulation are expected to achieve the most abatement. Sub-national jurisdictions have often acted as policy pilots preceding federal policy implementation. We evaluate 356 policy interactions and find 74% are consistent in adding abatement. Less than 8% have a negative impact by reducing abatement, although vertical interactions between federal and provincial policies were more often negative (11%) than horizontal interactions at the federal (<3%) or provincial (<2%) levels. Although the impact of many interactions is unknown (13%), we generate interaction matrices as a foundational roadmap for future research, and for policy-makers to consider potential interactions when designing and assessing policy effectiveness. Key policy insights Climate policy mixes have expanded and diversified over the period 2000–2020 across jurisdictions in Canada. Sub-national jurisdictions have often acted as policy 'pilots' by implementing policy before the adoption of similar national level policy. Climate mitigation policy interactions are predominantly supportive toward achieving additional emissions abatement. Vertical interactions between federal and provincial policy can undermine the additionality of policy effort by sub-national jurisdictions. These findings emphasize the need for better coordination in climate policy mix design between national and sub-national jurisdictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As part of an effort to explore and incentivize the development of innovation-driven, green and low-carbon cities, China implemented the innovative city pilot policy (ICPP) in 2008. Using the ICPP as a quasi-natural experiment, we investigate whether and through which channels the ICPP reduces corporate carbon intensity. To do this, we employ a staggered difference-in-differences (DID) econometric method and find that the ICPP indeed mitigates corporate carbon intensity. This relationship is shown to be quite robust using various alternative specifications of the DID analysis. The reduction effect on corporate carbon intensity is more pronounced for private firms, polluting firms, and capital-intensive firms, showing a convergence trend towards technology-intensive and clean firms. We find the ICPP reduces corporate intensity by enhancing corporate innovation and increasing the value-added rate (i.e. corporate upgrading). Based on these novel findings, we draw out policy implications for carbon neutrality, shedding light on pathways for addressing climate change and achieving sustainable development. Key policy insights Carbon neutrality is a long-term and ambitious target. Achieving this target requires the coordination and integration of multiple climate instruments. Among these, technological progress (e.g. renewable energy substitution and improved carbon efficiency) determines the overall cost of carbon neutrality. And innovation support policies should be included in the optimal climate policy package. Innovation policy can promote knowledge spillovers and long-term economic growth, as well as address environmental externalities of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, thereby providing a cost-effective way of combating climate change. Empirical evidence suggests that the ICPP implemented in China significantly reduces corporate carbon intensity and thus has promising prospects for the carbon-neutral target. The policy help firms enhance their innovation activities and facilitate corporate upgrading. As other emerging economies also face the sharp trade-off between climate change mitigation and economic growth, they can learn from this centrally-planned and locally-led innovation policy and lead their development mode onto a cleaner and decarbonized path. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To achieve the Paris Agreement's goals of keeping the global temperature rise well below 2 °C, or even better below 1.5 °C, relative to pre-industrial levels by the end of this century, countries need to make fair and ambitious contributions to reducing their greenhouse gas emissions. Here, three clusters are proposed that encompass fourteen approaches derived from three main equity principles to determine equitable national emission allocations in the year 2030 for the seventeen countries in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East (EMME) region. The allocations are compared with the Nationally Determined Contributions of each country in order to assess the degree to which current EMME climate change mitigation targets are sufficient. The results suggest two approaches that may be considered both realistic and fair, although with the caveat that both rich and poor EMME countries may still have reason to resist the allocations indicated by these approaches. One of these two approaches relates to the principle of responsibility and the other relates to a combination of capability and responsibility. Both require emissions in the EMME region to drop by nearly 50% by 2030 as compared to 2019 levels so as to be in line with a 1.5 °C warming scenario. The fairness of global decarbonisation efforts is foundational to climate change mitigation discussions. Achieving equitable emission reduction targets requires consideration of factors such as realism, which are less often discussed than those that are purely socioeconomic. Realistic and fair emissions abatement targets that reflect the equity principles of responsibility and capability should be identified and country-specific responses taken accordingly. The significant heterogeneity among EMME countries makes it particularly challenging to allocate emissions abatement targets in a fair and politically acceptable way. Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) of EMME countries are not aligned with required emissions abatement targets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do non-governmental organizations (NGOs) target governments for climate shaming? NGOs increasingly function as monitors of states climate performance and compliance with international climate treaties such as the Paris Agreement. Lacking formal sanctioning capacities, NGOs primarily rely on 'naming and shaming' to hold states accountable to their commitments in climate treaties and to ramp up their climate mitigation efforts. However, we know little about how and why NGOs engage in climate shaming. This article advances two arguments. First, we argue that NGO climate shaming is likely to be shaped by the international and national climate records of governments. Second, governments' climate actions can create contradicting expectations by both inviting and repelling NGO climate shaming. To test our arguments, we complied an original global data set on climate shaming events carried out by environmental NGOs. Our empirical analysis suggests that while NGOs are generally more likely to shame climate laggards, climate frontrunners may also be shamed if they engage in non-binding climate commitments. Climate laws and international climate treaties are central for our understanding of how NGOs target governments for climate shaming. NGOs are generally more likely to target climate laggards than frontrunners. Climate shaming is not only about whether but also how governments participate in global climate governance. Membership in climate institutions with non-binding commitments attracts NGO climate shaming. There is a risk that governments sign international climate treaties, without the intention to comply, in order to escape climate shaming. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Responding effectively to climate change requires an understanding of what shapes people's individual and collective sense of agency and responsibility towards the future. It also requires transforming this understanding into political engagement to support systems change. Based on a national representative survey in Sweden (N = 1,237), this research uses the novel SenseMaker methodology to look into these matters. More specifically, in order to understand the social and institutional prerequisites that must be in place to develop inclusive climate responses, we investigate how citizens perceive their everyday life and future, and the implications for their sense of responsibility, agency, and political engagement. Our research findings show how citizens perceive and act on climate change (individually, cooperatively, and by supporting others), their underlying values, beliefs, emotions and paradigms, inter-group variations, and obstacles and enablers for change. The findings reveal that, in general, individual and public climate action is perceived as leading to improved (rather than reduced) wellbeing and welfare. At the same time, climate anxiety and frustration about structural and governance constraints limit agency, whilst positive emotions and inner qualities, such as human–nature connections, support both political engagement and wellbeing. Our results shed light on individual, collective, and structural capacities that must be supported to address climate change. They draw attention to the need to develop new forms of citizen involvement and of policy that can explicitly address these human interactions, inner dimensions of thinking about and acting on climate change, and the underlying social paradigms. We conclude with further research needs and policy recommendations. In general, citizens perceive increased individual and public climate action as leading to improved (rather than reduced) wellbeing and welfare. Effective responses to climate change require addressing underlying social paradigms (to complement predominant external, technological, and information-based approaches). Such responses include increasing policy support for: o learning environments and practices that can help individuals to discover internalized social patterns and increase their sense of agency and interconnection (to self, others, nature); o institutional and political mechanisms that support citizen engagement and the systematic consideration of human inner dimensions (values, beliefs, emotions and associated inner qualities/capacities) across all sectors of work, by systematically revising organizations' vision statements, communication and project management tools, working structures, policies, regulations, human and financial resource allocation, and collaboration; and o nature-based solutions and other approaches to support the human–nature connection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2022 Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) and Paris Agreement (PA) are highly complementary agreements where each depends on the other's success to be effective. The GBF offers a very specific framework of interim goals and targets that break down the objective of the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) into a decade-spanning work plan. Comprised of 10 sections – including a 2050 vision and a 2030 mission, four overarching goals and 23 specific targets – the GBF is expected to guide biodiversity policy around the world in the coming years to decades. A similar set of global interim climate policy targets could translate the global temperature goal into concrete policy milestones that would provide policy makers and civil society with reference points for policy making and efforts to hold governments accountable. Beyond inspiring climate policy experts to convert temperature goals into policy milestones, GBF has the potential to strengthen the implementation of the PA at the nexus of biodiversity and climate (adaptation and mitigation) action. For example, the GBF can help to ensure that nature-based climate solutions are implemented with full consideration of biodiversity concerns, of the rights and interests of Indigenous Peoples and local communities, and with fair and transparent benefit sharing arrangements. In sum, the GBF should be mandatory reading for all climate policy makers. The 2022 Kunming-Montreal GBF and the PA are synergistic and complementary. The PA puts significant pressure on Parties to engage in ambitious climate action, however, it lacks a clear framework of interim targets and measures that converts temperature goals into policy milestones; this in turn does not allow concrete evaluation of progress and creates barriers to action. In this context, the GBF could inspire climate policy makers or experts to create a strategic, non-binding framework document that formulates interim goals and measurable climate policy targets for the next decade. The GBF and PA are also connected through policy and implementation linkages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While climate change has been a public policy issue for decades, central banks have only recently considered it relevant to their objectives. Beginning in 2015, the Bank of England (BoE) was among the first movers to do so. This article illustrates how two institutional features were key in enabling this response. First, the macroprudential framework that developed in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has provided the key ideas that central bankers have used to understand climate change in relation to their objectives. Additionally, government support for BoE action on climate change was also essential in empowering the BoE by setting a transition pathway and providing political legitimacy. The result has been BoE policies that not only seek to limit climate-related risks but also actively shift credit toward greener enterprises. However, this article argues that this has not amounted to a green paradigm shift in the BoE's institutional role, but is better understood as a thermostatic mode of policy innovation. While the BoE's hierarchy of goals have not changed, the types of policy problems relevant to those goals has shifted substantially. Finally, this article offers reflections on the scope and durability of the BoE's approach to climate change in this context. This article contributes to the literature on central banking and climate change beyond the BoE by providing a framework for understanding the possibilities and limitations of current central bank approaches to climate change. Financial policymakers face uncertainty about which policies lie within the bounds of their institutional roles and norms as the causes of climate change become increasingly relevant for them to address. Central banks can function as 'thermostats', with relevant policy problems and instrument types changing substantially in order to maintain enduring goals like price and financial stability. While the scope of this type of response is potentially broad, the durability of policy action will be limited in the presence of other events in the economic environment. Governments should be explicit in setting low-carbon transition pathways for central banks to align with. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humankind faces a Triple Challenge: averting dangerous climate change, reversing biodiversity loss, and supporting the wellbeing of a growing population. Action to address each of these issues is inherently dependent on action to address the others. Local, national, and international policy goals on climate change, biological diversity, and human wellbeing have been set. Current implementation measures are insufficient to meet these goals, but the Triple Challenge can still be met if governments, corporations, and other stakeholders take a holistic perspective on management of land and waters. To inform this effort, we identify a set of priority policy responses drawn from recent international assessments that, whilst not being the only potential solutions, can form the core of such a holistic approach. We do this through an iterative process using three methodological approaches: (i) structured literature review; (ii) deliberative expert analysis; and (iii) wider consultation, before synthesizing into this paper. Context-appropriate implementation of responses will be needed to capitalize on potential policy synergies and to ensure that unavoidable trade-offs between management of land and waters for climate mitigation, biodiversity restoration, and human wellbeing outcomes are made explicit. We also set out four approaches to managing trade-offs that can promote fair and just transitions: (1) social and economic policy pivoting towards 'inclusive wealth'; (2) more integrated policymaking across the three areas; (3) 'Triple Challenge dialogues' among state and non-state actors; and (4) a new research portfolio to underpin (1), (2), and (3). Multiple recent global assessments provide a strong scientific basis for action on each of the three aspects of the Triple Challenge – climate, biodiversity, and human wellbeing (with a focus on food and nutrition) – but they do not provide an integrated perspective on how to address them simultaneously. Synthesis of these assessments identifies a portfolio of five core policy responses that deliver across the Triple Challenge: (i) rapidly cutting fossil fuel use; (ii) promoting sustainable, healthy diets; (iii) increasing food productivity and cutting food loss and waste; (iv) implementing nature-based solutions at scale; and (v) strengthening governance and management of land and waters. Even with widespread implementation of that portfolio, trade-offs between climate, biodiversity, and wellbeing outcomes might be unavoidable. Policymakers, researchers, and other actors should explicitly identify such trade-offs, and take steps to ensure management priorities are set through equitable dialogue processes informed by integrated research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Institutional capacity is one of the dimensions of adaptive capacity that determines the level and pace of climate change adaptation at the local level. Local governments are key actors in climate change adaptation because they have the responsibility to translate top-down risk information to vulnerable populations and can scale bottom-up initiatives of communities in adaptation planning. There is a need for integrated approaches for adaptive capacity building that incorporate specific capacities to tackle multiple climate risks and generic capacities to address basic needs for human development. In this analysis, we assess the institutional capacity profiles of local governments in Mexico through a cluster analysis to understand how different aspects of generic and specific capacities, which operate through bottom-up or top-down approaches, coincide in local governments. Our results show that local governments in Mexico can be grouped by type and level of institutional capacity, as follows: those that (1) engage in intergovernmental coordination; (2) focus on safety-first; (3) exhibit high capacities in transparency and citizen participation; and (4) are in a poverty trap. These groups reflect challenges for local governments in Mexico, including the need to resolve short-term crises, the lack of climate change awareness, and a low capacity to access and mobilize economic resources for adaptation. Conversely, horizontal and vertical coordination, transparency, and citizen participation are found to be key elements able to strengthen institutional capacities for adaptation. In the context of multiple climate risks and underdeveloped enabling conditions for adaptation, there is a need for strategic investment in capacities that are contextually relevant and that can reduce the adaptation gap for climate action in Mexico. Further analysis will be needed to evaluate how the mobilization of the institutional capacities by local governments in each group influences climate change adaptation outcomes, particularly differentiated for urban and rural contexts, as well as for metropolitan scales. Key policy insights - Local governments in Mexico are faced with the challenge of resolving urgent and short-term issues, making it difficult to face climate change adaptation. - Intergovernmental coordination is a key attribute that local governments can develop to address and overcome deficiencies in institutional capacities for climate change adaptation - Administrative capacity, transparency, accountability, and public participation are critical elements for local governments and will assist them to access and mobilize economic resources for climate change adaptation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite substantial efforts being made through public and private sources, funding for climate change mitigation falls far short of what is needed. Meanwhile, philanthropic sources have begun to emerge as important sustainability partners by connecting multiple sectors and guiding funding flows. This study provides a comprehensive overview of climate-related philanthropic foundation financing and funding in China. Using a classification framework for climate change initiatives through co-word analysis and text segmentation techniques, we conduct visualization analysis to depict the changing pattern of climate philanthropy in China by analyzing donors, subfields, and flow of funds between 2008 and 2019. We conclude by providing suggestions for funders, charities, and policymakers seeking to enhance the value of collaborative governance in addressing climate change. Philanthropic sources play a key role in climate change mitigation in the new mixed-actor model of climate governance in China. Climate philanthropy in China is inseparable from strong political connections and policy influence of the government. Policymakers worldwide need to pay attention to flows and gaps in philanthropic funding as part of climate finance monitoring and to stimulate data-driven decisions concerning future investments. Policymakers need to leverage the crucial role of philanthropy in connecting multiple sectors to strengthen the climate change mitigation ecosystem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Irish Climate Action Plan published in 2019 outlines the significant role that agriculture will have to take to achieve a national reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in Ireland. Recent growth in the agricultural sector, especially of the bovine population, however, has led to a continuous increase of agricultural greenhouse gas emissions. For the agricultural sector to meet its potential, greenhouse gas emission targets could be challenging. The agricultural sector model CAPRI is used to investigate the impact of a 20 per cent EU-wide agricultural greenhouse gas mitigation target on the Irish agriculture sector. Three scenarios, allowing the endogenous implementation of mitigation technologies, show the possible impact range of such a policy target. The research indicates that the Irish agriculture sector can achieve the set mitigation target by adapting livestock production systems, resulting in agricultural efficiency gains, and by implementing specific mitigation technologies. Without a mandatory mitigation target but with subsidies granted, changes in the level of agricultural greenhouse gas emissions are marginal, and voluntary adoption is limited. Subsidising the implementation of mitigation technologies can buffer the impact that a mitigation target will have on the agriculture sector in Ireland while achieving the set greenhouse gas emissions reduction. Total agricultural income increases if a mandatory target is set due to strong structural changes. As the analysis shows, the emission reduction is partly achieved through a reduction in total production and strong competitors outside of the EU appear to fill the occurring supply gap. This could potentially lead to a carbon leakage effect with production and emissions shifting towards strong ruminant-based producing countries. Mitigation targets in the agricultural sector should be mandatory to achieve a sufficient reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. Subsidy payments targeted towards the implementation of mitigation technologies buffer the economic impact that a mitigation target will have on the productivity of the agriculture sector and enhance the scale of implemented mitigation technologies. Total agricultural income increases if a mandatory target is set due to strong structural changes. Mitigation targets can divert agricultural trade flows and potentially lead to carbon leakage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the Paris Agreement, virtually all countries worldwide have committed themselves to undertaking efforts to limit global warming to 1.5 °C. Within the European Union (EU), the recent 'Fit for 55' policy package proposes ambitious greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation policies for all sectors as part of the EU's contribution to limiting global warming. Yet, it is unclear whether the proposed policies are sufficient for the EU to limit global warming to 1.5 °C and it remains an open policy problem how to translate global temperature targets into sector-specific emission budgets and further into sector-specific policies. Here, we derive GHG budgets for transport in EU27 and obtain GHG mitigation pathways for Europe consistent with 1.5 °C global warming. We do not provide a comprehensive assessment of the 'Fit for 55' transport package but we discuss the main policies for road transport in light of the GHG emission budgets, their level of ambition, and suggest amendments to these policies as well as improvements to the 'Fit for 55' package. Our results suggest that parts of the 'Fit for 55' for transport are still not ambitious enough to align with a 1.5 °C scenario. Key policy insights A Paris-compatible residual carbon budget for EU transport is 10–12 Gt CO2. The budget implies net zero emissions for EU transport by 2044–2048 latest. We find the current 'Fit for 55' proposal for transport is not ambitious enough. A faster phase-out of cars and trucks with combustion engines is required and there is a need for ambitious standards for fast charging e-vehicles. CO2 pricing of transport is not a substitute but a complement to fleet targets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Association football is popular and influential globally. Interest in how football relates to climate change, and the climate policy required for football, is growing. Clubs, players and fans increasingly call for action to reduce football's impact on the climate, and for plans to adapt to climate impacts on football. However, well-intentioned actions must be underpinned by robust evidence. This synthesis reviews research at the interface of football and climate change. After summarizing the main climate actions identified for fans, players, clubs and organizing bodies, the review looks in-depth at four areas: impacts of football on climate; impacts of climate on football; football as a driver for pro-climate actions; and the relationship between football and carbon-intensive industries. The review then outlines research gaps for an evidence-driven response to climate change in football: adaptation across different geographical contexts; understanding what climate change means for community-level football; understanding how carbon-intensive industries relate to sense of place identity in football under a just transition; developing principles for phasing-out fossil fuel financing; and considering how climate change relates to women's football. Key policy insights Football is a forum for galvanizing societal action in support of climate policy. However, football also contributes to, and is impacted by, climate change, and hence requires policy support under a changing climate; Reducing transportation emissions, especially flying, is a key climate policy requirement for football. Institutional policy, with government support, may enable more efficient scheduling and use of surface transport; Institutional policies, and public health policies, should develop standards and guidelines for football under extreme heat. Football also ought to be integrated within local, regional and national climate adaptation policy to ensure climate resilience; Clubs and players can lead by example on climate-positive actions, and energize wider action through fan bases. Alignment of initiatives with national or international climate policy may raise public awareness of climate polices and targets; Institutional policies for clubs, tournaments and associations should regulate fossil fuel financing. Football also offers an avenue to understand relations between local identity and carbon-intensive industries, and thus to identify socio-cultural factors for regional just transition policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Integrating peatland restoration measures with climate policy is critical for meeting climate targets, but the current policies often fall short of utilizing the large potential that exists. Despite growing private sector interest, few regional voluntary carbon markets for peatlands have emerged worldwide. In this study, we explore three pioneering examples from Europe. From the perspective of social innovation, we aim to provide clarity on how these innovations emerged and developed, which actors drove the innovation process by assuming which roles, and which factors fostered or hindered the development. We do so by mapping the innovation process using Process Net-Map. The results show that all three cases have followed remarkably similar patterns in their innovation processes. Four phases, i.e. preparation, definition, refinement, and up-scaling were identified, as were actors' roles as innovators, promoters, intermediaries, implementers, and knowledge providers. However, the case studies are very different with regard to which actor constellation drove the innovation process: MoorFutures is driven by public and scientific actors, Valuta vor Veen is promoted by civil society actors in consultation with practitioners, and Hiilipörssi shifted from civil society to private actors. The governance modes, that is, actor constellation and their goals, have led to differences in concept, robustness of methodology, mitigation measure, and possibly potential for up-scaling. Our study indicates that the timing of interventions when actors with certain roles stepped in can accelerate the innovation process. Important political, economic, technical, and social factors influencing the innovation process, especially knowledge and trust accumulated between some key actors, are outlined. Private funding for regional voluntary carbon markets (VCMs) can tap the climate mitigation potential from peatlands, which is not currently adequately addressed by governments. Actor constellation drove the innovation process, leading to different concepts, methodologies, and mitigation measures. The timing of interventions by actors, notably providing seed funding, network, expertise and visibility, was critical for success. Building trust for regional VCMs requires not only a robust methodology to calculate emission reductions but also partnership and endorsement. The future development of climate policy on peatlands could be a decisive factor in regional VCMs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1982, China's blue carbon management policies have made significant contributions to blue carbon's development. Blue carbon is carbon captured and stored by marine ecosystems and it plays an important role in addressing climate change. Analyzing the evolution of blue carbon management policy is necessary to understand its potential to contribute to climate action, and to improve its management and maximize its effectiveness. This paper considers these issues in China. It used content analysis and ROSTCM6 software to empirically analyze 82 blue carbon management policy documents from China. The evolution of relevant policies and their performance is as follows: First, policy focus has gradually shifted from protecting blue carbon ecosystems to increasing blue carbon stocks; second, policy participants became increasingly diversified; and third, the policy approach has changed from simple protection to comprehensive, integrated land use – marine system management. Although the Chinese government has made progress in blue carbon management policies, it still faces many challenges including blue carbon ecosystem protection; legal status; trading mechanisms; and international cooperation. The development of future blue carbon management policy should focus on optimizing the land use structure of coastal zones, on promoting environmental legislation highlighting blue carbon issues, on supporting the establishment of blue carbon trading mechanisms, and on strengthening its international cooperation in this arena. China's blue carbon management approaches shows that relevant policies contribute greatly to addressing climate change and sustainable development. This provides new theoretical support to promote future development of blue carbon management policies. Establishing a blue carbon trading mechanism provides economic incentives for its management. Blue carbon's property rights, accounting standards, and trading entities need to be further clarified. A detailed legal definition of blue carbon is needed to ensure that appropriate penalties are imposed for the destruction of blue carbon ecosystems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Financing climate change mitigation and adaptation in Asia is critical for its population and economies but also for those of the world. This editorial provides a commentary and overview of ten articles within this special issue of Climate Policy on 'Green Finance in Asia'. Contributions are diverse in terms of focus and methods. Most of the articles focus on managing transition risk with six of the articles having an energy focus; the dominant themes are the risk of stranded coal assets in China; the role of export finance by China and Japan for fossil fuel-fired power generation assets within Asia; and investment in renewable power generation and the policies to support such investment. The remaining four articles explore various policies in specific country contexts: the effects of green bond policies in China; the greening of monetary policy in China; the governance of sustainable finance in Indonesia; and policies to support investment and finance of off-grid electricity access in Bangladesh. Most of the ten contributions come from researchers in developed countries and principally from non-Asian countries, suggesting there is a need to develop green finance research capability and capacity across Asia. Despite being withing scope of the special issue, this collection does not contain papers on physical risk or adaptation finance. We highlight these as important gaps and priorities for future research. Key policy insights This editorial provides a commentary and overview of ten articles within this special issue of Climate Policy on 'Green Finance in Asia'. Most of the ten contributions come from researchers in developed countries and principally from non-Asian countries. There is a need to develop green finance research capability and capacity across Asia. Most contributions were focussed on transition risk, with limited or no focus on physical risk and adaptation finance. This likely reflects the multiple resource and expertise challenges faced when conducting physical risks assessments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This perspective paper explores the potential of climate finance to support Caribbean Small Island Developing States (SIDS) efforts in achieving their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement. Through a content analysis of sixteen Caribbean countries NDCs, it provides, first, a comprehensive overview of SIDS countries' perspectives on climate financing needs for mitigation and adaptation activities in meeting their climate targets. Second, the paper examines whether Caribbean SIDS acknowledge a role for domestic financing and international and domestic fiscal policy reform within their NDCs, as a way to address climate change mitigation and adaption. The analysis of Caribbean SIDS NDCs reveals that only eight countries provide clear cost estimates for mitigation activities, five for adaptation and one with a combined cost. This gives a total of US$51.3 billion for the combination of Caribbean countries across their NDCs. The majority of climate change activities identified in the NDCs are conditional on the provision of international climate finance. While some countries discuss domestic sources of finance, few note the need for domestic fiscal policy reform to counteract direct and underlying drivers of greenhouse gas emissions and their reduction. The findings suggest that, while much attention is directed to inadequate quantities of international climate finance, fiscal policy and the use of domestic finances are important for realizing transformative change and yet receive little attention from in-country policymakers. Caribbean SIDS suffer from a significant climate finance gap. Caribbean countries cannot remain dependent on international climate finance and must pursue more innovation and diversified options to achieve climate goals. Caribbean countries struggle to use domestic policy and investment options to align finance and incentives to promote their climate goals. The region faces challenges inherent in aligning domestic fiscal policies and other economic and regulatory incentives, as well as private sector investment, to complement and augment international climate finance objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate smart agriculture (CSA) is increasingly vital for enhancing agricultural adaptation to extreme weather shocks and sequestering carbon in the face of climate change. However, CSA adoption remains low in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and other developing regions due to resource constraints and weak agricultural extension systems, among other factors. To reverse this trend and increase CSA adoption, the use of participatory extension services like farmer extension facilitators (FEFs) are increasingly viewed as a pathway to improving extension services in rural communities in SSA and elsewhere. Yet, rigorous analyses of the impacts of the FEF approach as a pathway for CSA adoption remain limited. Here we estimate the impacts of the FEF approach on CSA adoption in terms of resource intensity of CSA practices promoted by FEFs through a large CSA-related intervention in southern Malawi. We apply recursive bivariate probit regression to primary survey data from a sample of 808 households across five districts in the project area across southern Malawi in 2016, accounting for endogeneity and selection bias in farmer interaction with FEFs and the impact of the FEF approach on CSA adoption. Results show that interaction with FEFs had a positive and statistically-significant impact on CSA adoption; low, medium, and high resource intensity CSA categories increased by 42%, 87%, and 96%, respectively. The results suggest that the FEF approach can significantly enhance CSA adoption and thereby contribute to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals, including climate action in Malawi, similar contexts in SSA, and elsewhere. Key Policy Insights Participatory extension systems like the FEF approach can improve agricultural extension services in poor communities and thereby enhance CSA adoption in such areas. Smallholder farmer interaction with FEFs can enhance their adoption of resource-intensive CSA practices. Mainstreaming the FEF approach into national adaptation policies and programmes can help scale up CSA adoption in dryland communities. The FEF approach can enhance an achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals, including climate action in dryland developing countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change communication on social media plays a prominent role in efforts undertaken by state agencies, NGOs, and international organizations, to make citizens aware of this phenomenon. The images used to communicate climate change are of great importance, since they can help to effectively raise citizen awareness. Building upon news values theory and the concept of availability heuristics, this research paper aims to identify principles that can be used for effective visual communication of climate change on social media on a cross-national scale, based upon analyses of characteristics of images that foster interaction on Twitter. We conducted a content analysis of a random selection of images (photographs, illustrations, and graphics, n = 380), posted on Twitter that were included in the so-called 'top tweets' about climate change. The results indicate that the types of images that are used on social media are relatively similar to those employed by conventional media, although images of identifiable people are less frequently shown on social media. We also deduced that four practical principles are especially relevant to foster user interaction on Twitter through images: (i) show 'real people' (i.e. non-staged images of people that transmit real emotions), (ii) tell a story, (iii) include a local connection, and (iv) show impacts or actions by people who are directly affected. These practical principles are based on the more general principles of meaningfulness and personification, two foundations that can help to overcome some of the main barriers to citizens' perception of climate change as a relevant issue with serious consequences in their lives. Campaigns on social media that use imagery based on these practical and general principles can be effective in communicating the shared responsibility to address climate change. This can have a relevant impact on social perception, since it can encourage citizens to care about climate, which is regarded as necessary to increase participation in climate action. Social media can play a prominent role in campaigns to make citizens aware of climate change. Images can help to effectively raise citizen awareness of climate change. Four practical principles can be effective in increasing user interaction on social media with images about climate: show 'real' people, tell a story, include a local connection, and show people who are directly affected. Visual campaigns based on the more general principles of meaningfulness and personification can be effective in representing climate change as a relevant issue in citizens' lives. These practical and more general principles can have a relevant impact on the social perception of climate change and increase citizen participation in climate debate and action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Solar power is now economically competitive with fossil fuels in many countries, yet relatively few homeowners have elected to install solar panels. A principal reason for this behavior stems from cognitive biases—such as myopia, inertia, and herding—that cause consumers to avoid investing in long-term measures, even those that are financially attractive to them and produce social benefits, such as reducing the long-term consequences of climate change. A behavioral risk audit can demonstrate ways to address these cognitive biases, in concert with short-term economic incentives, social influences and regulation to spark climate action now. We focus on the installation of solar panels and the additional use of solar energy, an issue that has global relevance. The behavioral risk audit offers a way to guide decisions on how to incentivize and accelerate diffusion of solar in the United States and offers lessons for other countries. Key policy insights Solar power is now economically competitive with fossil fuels in many countries, yet relatively few homeowners have installed solar panels on their property. Cognitive biases such as myopia, inertia, and herding cause consumers to avoid investing in long-term measures, such as solar panels, even if they are financially attractive. A behavioral risk audit that addresses biases in concert with short-term economic incentives, social influences and regulation encourages the adoption of solar panels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emissions trading systems (ETS) have been a widely-adopted policy instrument for global climate mitigation and a key choice in China's pledge for peaking emissions and carbon neutrality. Broader adoption and linkage of ETS programmes require a better understanding of whether, to what extent, and how existing regional programmes address carbon emissions at an aggregate level. Combining a synthetic control method and event studies, we adopt a comprehensive evaluation framework to investigate regional mitigation effects, pathways, and ancillary impacts in three Chinese regions with four independent pilot ETS programmes. The findings show economy-wide responses to pilot announcement even in non-ETS sectors, but enduring mitigation only within ETS sectors. Mitigation was achieved via improvement in energy efficiency and fuel switch, without impairing industrial activities. There were local air-pollution reduction co-benefits but no leakage or spillover. Bounded extrapolation from the pilots suggests 18%–20% reductions can be achieved in non-pilot regions by a national market, which could learn from pilots' experiences to broaden sector coverage and ensure policy consistency and transparency. Regional ETS were able to stabilize emissions with little cost, providing rationale for rapidly developing economies to adopt such systems. Key policy insights Despite being unlinked, regional ETS pilots delivered substantial climate mitigation and local air pollution reduction in China. Policy effects were initially driven by economy-wide mitigation due to policy expectations, followed by ETS-sector mitigation due to carbon pricing. Industries reduced CO2 emissions from energy efficiency improvements and fuel switch. Mitigation was accompanied by little emission leakage or impairment to the economy. Extrapolating mitigation rates in a national market suggests 18%–20% reduction of CO2. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Closing the gap between current climate change mitigation policies and those needed to deliver on the Paris Agreement's temperature targets requires significant scaling up of policy ambition. This article argues that policy action that aims to reach a minimum level of effective carbon prices can increase countries' ability to implement ambitious climate change policies, including carbon taxes and emission trading schemes (ETSs). Effective carbon prices include prices applied via energy taxes, fossil fuel subsidies, carbon taxes, and ETSs. Action on effective carbon prices can create new synergies among government departments – thereby strengthening their capacity to implement climate policies. Policy action on effective carbon pricing can also integrate finance ministries more directly in climate change policy than focusing exclusively on explicit carbon pricing. Lastly, acting on effective carbon pricing can broaden countries' engagement in carbon pricing policy compared to focusing exclusively on explicit carbon pricing. Civil society actors, governments, and international organizations could foster higher ambition on climate policy by promoting action on effective carbon prices. The article also highlights that analyses of effective carbon pricing gaps – which measure differences between current effective carbon prices and benchmark prices needed to meet the temperature targets of the Paris Agreement – need to be carefully communicated and interpreted so as to avoid undermining climate change policy. Key policy insights Policy action on effective carbon prices can unlock in-house synergies in countries that have substantial experience with energy and environmental policy but not in climate policy. Climate action that focuses on effective carbon prices can enhance finance ministries' participation in climate policy. Policy action centred on effective carbon prices can help to involve more countries in carbon pricing policy. Estimates of effective carbon pricing gaps need to be carefully communicated and interpreted to avoid reducing the sense of urgency of acting on climate change mitigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Currently, businesses worldwide are expected to make long-term commitments aimed at climate change mitigation to achieve carbon-neutrality by 2050. However, before companies make long-term commitments, they may need incentives or institutional arrangements that encourage them to act. Previous studies have suggested that these incentives and institutional arrangements differ from those offered to encourage short- and mid-term activities. Japan has established a government-industry collaboration to mitigate climate change. This framework has proven to be organized and effective in undertaking climate action for the short- and medium-term; however, a more effective framework could be developed to promote a long-term strategy. This study surveyed 235 Japanese companies to examine effective institutional arrangements related to climate action. It demonstrated that the business sector aims to formulate institutional arrangements to ensure fairness and transparency in its climate change actions. Accordingly, norms, financial incentives, and accountability were identified as important factors. Furthermore, norms set by industry associations and international organizations influence the establishment of long-term commitments, unlike those set by third parties. Financial incentives were effective for encouraging long-term commitments and general mitigation activities, notably short- to mid-term activities. Information disclosure and verification by a third party had a positive effect on ensuring accountability in vision and quantitative target-setting for CO2 emission reduction. Long-term commitments are encouraged when such institutional arrangements serve as a self-regulating system for companies to establish and implement their vision. Key policy insights The role of non-state actors has attracted attention for achieving climate-related goals. Thus, identifying a mechanism that incentivizes non-state actors, particularly in the business sector, is crucial. Traditionally, government-guided frameworks have worked well in Japan. This study demonstrates the role of business associations, international organizations, and third parties in formulating institutional arrangements that promote a long-term commitment toward the 2050 vision. Industry associations and international organizations serve as norm-setters, while third parties act as a verifying body, enforcing fairness and transparency. Thus, appropriate institutional arrangements could serve as a self-regulating system to encourage companies to achieve climate change-related actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Major banks are facing increased public pressure to reduce financing for fossil fuel projects. In this decade of action for the UN Sustainable Development Goals (with a focus on SDG 13 – climate action), all sectors, including the financial sector, are urged to recognize the ways in which they impact these goals and how they can best contribute to their realization. But how are the top 10 most active banks in financing the fossil fuel industry responding to this pressure? Using qualitative textual analysis of these banks' annual reports and a proposed categorization of how banks are talking about climate change, we highlight how these banks see their role in reducing climate impacts through their financing and whether their response has evolved since the Paris Agreement. We find that while these banks are stating an increasing number of climate change actions since the introduction of the Paris Agreement, there are few clear commitments in relation to their financing of fossil fuels. This absence of commitments in the annual reports may reflect an absence of critical reflection on their responsibility for financing climate change. Key policy insights Climate-related financial disclosures should target banks' climate impact regarding their client financing; most importantly this should be done in a clear, contextualized way so that regulators and the public can hold the banks accountable based on their disclosures. Effective policies need to explicitly consider how banks should measure and reduce climate impacts in a way that is comparable, aligned with the Paris Agreement, and in relation to banks' credit financing operations to clients (not only from the direct operations of a bank, as has been the focus of banks' commitments against climate change to date). Legislation mandating human rights and environmental due diligence with explicit considerations in relation to climate change is an example of a policy that would require banks to consider a broader scope of their impact assessment and disclosure reporting which could potentially establish clearer claims for remedies by impacted communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Enhancing the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) is an important exercise to achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. The Paris Agreement also recognizes that support to developing countries in this regard will help them to aim for higher climate ambition. The role of international support programmes in the NDC enhancement process is crucial but is not often covered in scientific research. Consequently, the factors driving a country's decision to apply for NDC-related assistance have also not yet been fully explored. Acknowledging the research gap, this paper framed and tested multiple hypotheses to evaluate the impact of potential factors on the likelihood of a country applying for assistance to enhance its NDCs. For this, a logistic regression method was employed. Data from the two initiatives coordinating the technical and financial assistance worldwide, namely the Climate Action Enhancement Package (CAEP) and Climate Promise, were reviewed for this purpose. The CAEP program is financially supported by Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK. This study identifies the level of socio-economic development and the population's exposure to air pollution as key factors which influence the likelihood of applying for assistance under CAEP and Climate Promise in developing countries. Further, the presence of democratic aspects in the form of governance may also influence this choice. Finally, this study discusses the results and associated policy implications for countries receiving assistance to enhance their NDCs. Developing countries with relatively low socio-economic development are more likely to apply for assistance to enhance their NDCs. The assistance is designed to help them to build capacities to develop and implement future climate policies. Air pollution and climate change issues are interconnected. Exposure to air pollution is a potential indicator that can influence the NDC enhancement process in developing countries. The assistance for enhancing NDCs will lead to NDC targets that are well-informed and are aligned with national and sub-national development priorities with realistic prospects of implementation. Climate vulnerability and net trade do not influence the decision-making process to apply for NDC enhancement assistance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even after years of understanding of and engagement with the climate problem, our efforts to address the issue remain wholly inadequate. This essay discusses how limitations in our capacities along three dimensions have hampered our abilities to address climate change. First, we have shown limited capacity to navigate the probabilistic nature of knowledge in this domain and the interplay of knowledge and politics. Simultaneously, there also is a widespread lack of attention to marginalized people and communities and issues of inclusivity. Finally, there is limited capacity to integrate data and knowledge from multiple sources, and include the marginalised and their interests, in the climate discussions and action. Capacity-building for climate change needs to increase our ability to act based on knowledge we have today, connect the dots and integrate multiple forms of data and knowledge, and centre the experiences of those who are most marginalised. Only then can our approach to climate change be rooted, as it must be, in the politics of a common and inclusive future. Key policy insights Capacity building must be rooted in an understanding of key dimensions of the climate arena. It is crucial to develop the capability to deal with the probabilistic and disaggregated nature of climate knowledge, and often the politics underlying such knowledge. Overcoming marginalization and lack of inclusivity in climate deliberations and action is essential if we are to move towards an integrated and just approach to climate change action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]