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Climate action threatens to exacerbate existing social inequities, so it is important for justice to be at the heart of national responses to climate change. Based on an understanding of climate change as a manifestation of severed relationships and exploitative dynamics that are produced and reproduced through colonial, capitalist, patriarchal systems, we argue that the ways in which we conceptualize and enact climate justice must be decolonial, ecocentric, relational and integrative. Consistent with this positioning, we sought to develop an Indigenous climate justice policy analysis tool to assess and inform policy development. We drew on elements of existing frameworks and tools to develop a tool, which was progressively refined following external advisory group review and piloting. The tool addresses five dimensions of justice (relational, procedural, distributive, recognition and restorative), each of which comprises individual criteria assessed according to three levels of achievement. This rating system acknowledges progress within existing social, political and economic systems, but also identifies system transformation as a prerequisite for achieving genuine justice. Application of the tool focuses attention on issues well beyond typical climate policy considerations, such as the capacity of all human and non-human entities to express political agency. The tool has been developed for use in analysing national climate policy in Aotearoa New Zealand, but we have endeavoured to make it adaptable for use in other settings. Key policy insights: Climate injustice is rooted in colonialism; Indigenous decolonial conceptions of climate justice provide a critical grounding for policy responses to climate change. Climate justice is not attainable within existing colonial political systems. It can only be achieved through reform of governance and constitutional arrangements to re-establish Indigenous natural law. Analysis of climate policy must consider not only how to optimize justice within existing social, political and economic systems, but also how policy can disrupt those systems to create transformative change. Our policy analysis tool, grounded in relational epistemologies, extends beyond the scope of conventional analyses to examine critical issues across five dimensions of justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human rights have potential to enhance adaptation because they reflect internationally agreed upon standards of human dignity, aim to advance formal and substantive forms of equality, and can be used to hold public and private actors accountable for rights violations. We assess whether, how, and under what conditions national adaptation policies recognize human rights principles and standards. We analyze 217 adaptation policies from 147 countries to examine whether there is substantive recognition of the vulnerability and needs of equity-deserving groups that experience systemic marginalization and exclusion, and procedural inclusion of these groups in adaptation planning and decision-making. Results indicate that while under the Paris Agreement governments commit to respect human rights in their adaptation policies and actions, few countries are abiding by this commitment. Only one-third of countries refer to respect, promotion, or consideration of human rights within their adaptation policies. While most countries included here recognize specific conditions of different vulnerable groups in their policies, there is minimal evidence of their inclusion in the adaptation planning and decision-making process, and half of countries fail to identify specific measures that will be developed to reduce their vulnerability. None of the strategies that we reviewed pointed to the creation of accountability mechanisms for redressing harms that may arise due to adaptation actions. We also develop a series of regression models to examine whether hypothesized national predictors of adaptation action are associated with attention to human rights principles and standards. The models indicate that countries with greater wealth and equality are more likely to include attention to human rights norms in their adaptation strategies, but countries with less wealth, more inequality, and less political freedom appear to achieve a more substantive level of engagement with these norms in their strategies. Key policy insights: Most countries fail to link human rights obligations and adaptation in national policies. Most countries situate national adaptation policies within various structural drivers of vulnerability. Equity-deserving groups are not being included in national adaptation planning in meaningful ways. Participation of equity-deserving groups predicts inclusion of measures to build adaptive capacity among those groups. National governments do not identify accountability mechanisms that address human rights harms from adaptation actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The use of deliberative mini-publics (DMPs), such as citizens' assemblies, is becoming more common in climate policy-making across many countries. The upsurge of these methods reflects an acknowledgement of the need to engage the publics in policy choices that significantly impact their lives. Many DMPs to date have focused on the general challenge of decarbonization, across a range of policy areas. In this article, we first situate DMPs within the wider field of public engagement methods. We then draw from deliberative democratic theory and practice to argue that the next step for climate DMPs is to focus them on specific climate policy challenges and to embed and routinize their use in existing policy-making institutions. We present a case study of the targeted use of a climate DMP, which we designed and ran in partnership with the UK Climate Change Committee, focused on home energy decarbonization. We use this case study to explore barriers and challenges to embedding such an approach in climate policy-making institutions. Finally, we suggest ways that such challenges can be overcome and identify a number of tensions that must be navigated as DMPs become embedded in climate policy-making. Deliberative mini-publics (DMPs) can facilitate two-way dialogue between the publics and policy-makers, overcoming weaknesses in existing forms of communication between these two groups of actors. The decision to use DMPs in climate policy and the design of such DMPs, should be informed by an analysis of the type of policy challenge being faced. Existing climate policy institutions, such as advisory bodies, provide potential venues where the use of DMPs can become routinized as a way of gathering insights on public policy preferences. Future targeted climate DMPs will need to find ways to overcome limitations to participants' familiarity with different technologies and capacities, in order to better predict the impacts of different policy options. Tensions exist between the use of DMPs as a research tool within policy contexts and as a tool for opening political possibilities for more thoroughgoing reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent decades, there has been increasing research interest in individuals' support of and resistance to climate and environmental policy instruments. However, there is an empirical bias in the literature, as few studies have been conducted in low-income countries. Based on a survey with 4,766 respondents we identify the level of public acceptability for climate policy instruments and their determinants in East Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda). While our sample is not fully representative of the East-African population, we capture highly educated individuals in urban areas, who are likely to have a large influence on policy processes. In line with previous studies in other contexts, we find that higher education and climate change concern are linked to the acceptability of policies aimed at reducing fossil fuel consumption. Specifying how the revenue from a climate tax or subsidy removal would be used, almost doubled the support for these policy instruments. In contrast to earlier studies, we find that investments in social programmes, not environmental programmes, was the revenue specification that increased the acceptability the most. One possible explanation would be that in a context where poverty is more prevalent, social issues are more salient to people. We also find weak associations between trust in government and the acceptability of climate policy instruments in East Africa and large heterogeneity across the five focal East African countries. Besides establishing an empirical foundation for future research on climate policy support in East Africa, the study provides essential policy insights: Investing in education and improved information, contributing to increased awareness and understanding of climate concerns, can potentially increase support for climate policy proposals also in the East African context. Earmarking revenues from climate policy instruments for social programmes may also significantly boost support. However, as our study is not fully representative of the population in the five countries and relies on stated preferences, which may be subject to different biases, the results should be interpreted with caution. In a sample skewed towards more urban and educated East-Africans, specifying how the tax revenue would be used more than doubled the acceptability for climate taxes. Investments in social programmes was the revenue specification that increased the acceptability for climate taxes the most. Earmarking revenue use may be a way to increase carbon tax acceptability in East Africa. Investing in education and improved information contributing to increased awareness and understanding of climate concerns, can potentially increase support for climate policy proposals. The acceptability of a climate tax on fuel is lower than the acceptability of a quantity-based regulation on fossil fuel across the urban, well-educated and potentially politically influential population in East Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change is a key socioeconomic and environmental concern in South Africa. The South African government introduced several climate change initiatives to address the impacts of climate change, resulting in the proliferation of climate adaptation policies across spheres of government. This paper studies different climate change adaptation policies and climate policy paradigms (CPP) to understand the adaptation landscape; it explains and compares the changes in CPP in South Africa over time. We mapped 40 policy documents from 2004 to 2022, which shows 12 national policies, 12 provincial (sub-national) policy documents and 14 metropolitan city policy documents. We then used 12 national policy documents to illustrate and understand the CPP. The research shows that different stakeholders have shaped climate change adaptation policy, both private and public firms advised on climate change policy and there are a number of different funding partners supporting the adaptation policy like GEF, C40 and GIZ. The changing policy environment has introduced new frameworks, objectives and processes. Therefore, more efforts will be needed going forward to guide adaptation policy across national, provincial and local governments. We find that several CPPs have emerged, that is different paradigms encompassing a range of policy goals, framings and instruments. The present National CC Adaptation Strategy (NCCAS) mandates adaptation across all levels of government and allows all important stakeholders to address climate change consequences. This NCCAS increases the number and ambition of adaptation policy, encourages integrated approaches, policy coherence and clear direction on how to handle climate risks and impacts in varied South Africa and its global commitment. Changes in policy paradigm enable the use of new policy instruments, including funding and budget mechanisms. Finally, climate adaptation policy has become more ambitious and stringent, requiring all levels of government to plan for climate change. The climate change policy landscape in South Africa has grown over the past 18 years, with policy development across different spheres of government (national, sectoral, provincial and metros), New CPPs have emerged, supported by new policy frames, goals and instruments. The NCCAS provides a clear policy goal, which also provides new policy instruments to implement climate actions and acts to enhance integrated approaches, The lack of domestic budget allocation remains a challenge for national government, but external partnerships have begun to provide support for policy development. Notably, a shift from a flexible to stringent approach to climate policy is needed to deliver effective climate action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Decarbonization policies require public support to be implemented and to remain in legislation. Examinations of public support for climate policies tend to focus on a small number of policy instruments and/or use hypothetical instead of real policy proposals. Here, we address these criticisms by examining public support across four distinct policy instruments – command-and-control, market-based, information-based, and voluntary – using sixteen policy proposals by UK political parties and government institutions. In addition to assessing UK national policy support, we also explore regional differences. Using a representative sample of the UK population (N = 1,911), we find that, at a national level, individuals preferred instruments shown to be less effective in reaching net-zero: information-based and voluntary policies. Our results indicate that the extent to which individuals believe in the free market, their environmental worldviews and political party support as well as their age are all correlated with policy support. We find stark regional differences where, compared to individuals living in Greater London, those living in the remainder of the country were 32% and 30% less likely to support command-and-control and market-based policies, respectively (among other regional differences). Regional variations in free-market beliefs and population density partly explain differences in policy support. We propose policymakers focus on place-based initiatives to increase support for decarbonization policies that are more effective in reaching net-zero and on improving the perception of market-based and command-and-control policies through positive framing and policy bundles. The majority of the UK public supports all climate policy instruments (command-and-control, market-based, information-based, and voluntary) regardless of their stringency. More stringent decarbonization policies (command-and-control and market-based instruments) received less public support compared to more lenient policies (information-based and voluntary). Population density as a structural factor helps to explain regional variation and points to the crucial role of improving public infrastructure, particularly in more rural areas. Free-market beliefs are associated with regional and individual variations in support and stress the need for overcoming ideological barriers. Income was found to influence support for less stringent (e.g. information-based) instruments, but was not associated with support for regulatory and market-based instruments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite substantial efforts being made through public and private sources, funding for climate change mitigation falls far short of what is needed. Meanwhile, philanthropic sources have begun to emerge as important sustainability partners by connecting multiple sectors and guiding funding flows. This study provides a comprehensive overview of climate-related philanthropic foundation financing and funding in China. Using a classification framework for climate change initiatives through co-word analysis and text segmentation techniques, we conduct visualization analysis to depict the changing pattern of climate philanthropy in China by analyzing donors, subfields, and flow of funds between 2008 and 2019. We conclude by providing suggestions for funders, charities, and policymakers seeking to enhance the value of collaborative governance in addressing climate change. Philanthropic sources play a key role in climate change mitigation in the new mixed-actor model of climate governance in China. Climate philanthropy in China is inseparable from strong political connections and policy influence of the government. Policymakers worldwide need to pay attention to flows and gaps in philanthropic funding as part of climate finance monitoring and to stimulate data-driven decisions concerning future investments. Policymakers need to leverage the crucial role of philanthropy in connecting multiple sectors to strengthen the climate change mitigation ecosystem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Peru was one of the first developing countries to commit to a voluntary emissions reduction target and is seen as a bridge builder within the UNFCCC. It played an important role in advancing the multilateral climate process between 2013 and 2015. Peru is a member of the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), a progressive coalition of countries that promotes ambitious positions within the climate regime. Although the country's level of activism in international negotiations has markedly declined since 2016, there have been no significant changes in its foreign position. What factors explain Peru's conciliatory and relatively progressive stance at the UNFCCC? To answer this question, I use the 'climate commitment approach' as analytical framework and trace the processes that link possible causes with outcomes, comparing two different periods in the trajectory of Peru's participation in the climate regime. The study is based on semi-structured interviews, governmental publications and data, reports and studies by independent organizations, news reports, and scientific literature. It concludes that Peru's position in the UNFCCC negotiations has been mainly determined by the dominant presence of Peru's Ministry of Environment (MINAM) in foreign climate policy decision-making as well as of individual agents who act as climate leaders. It also points to several other factors that determine its position: the low level of interest in, or understanding of, the climate issue by domestic pressure groups; the country's international profile; the governmental perception of economic, political, and diplomatic benefits associated with a more ambitious climate position; and the wish to access international climate financing. Foreign pressure and support were major pillars of the development of Peru's foreign climate policy. Peru's diplomatic position was profoundly shaped by the vision and interests of MINAM, which filled a political vacuum and exercised leadership in international climate negotiations. Given the ministry's expertise, and international support for its activities, other ministries could hardly compete with MINAM for influence. Recently, the diminished authority of MINAM, the inclusion of climate change into Peru's national policy agenda combined with domestic political turmoil, have translated into a marked decline in the country's level of foreign activism. Peru has continued to align with AILAC due to the link between the country's foreign trade and climate policy agendas, and to the benefits associated with a more ambitious foreign climate position, including possibilities for attracting international climate finance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UK government's net-zero commitment assumes the use of bio-energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS). Quantifying where the costs of funding these technologies fall – and their magnitude – provides greater insight into potential fairness of future government policies. Using a microsimulation model, this study is the first to evaluate the potential distributional impacts. We consider the distributional incidence and magnitude on household income deciles if the costs for deploying and operating BECCS and DACCS are placed on different sectors of the economy via a range of viable policy funding options. Using existing and novel policy funding options, we demonstrate that levying the costs entirely on the household energy bill is the most regressive of the options considered. We find aviation to be an important point of intervention from a distributional perspective. Higher-income households have larger aviation carbon footprints than lower-income households, meaning passing costs onto households via aviation alone could help fund BECCS and DACCS while having minimal impacts on social welfare. Funding BECCS and DACCS via income tax emerged as the only progressive way of apportioning costs across income deciles. As the benefits of carbon removal accrue to society as a whole, there is further argument that the costs should be shared across society in the fairest way possible. However, such an approach has the potential to blunt the price signal that polluters face. In reality, some pass-through cost may be desirable to adhere to equity principles under a polluter pays principle and to create an incentive for polluters to switch to cleaner inputs and adopt low-carbon technologies. This study is the first to evaluate distributional incidence and magnitude of costs to households, if costs for deploying and operating BECCS and DACCS are placed on different sectors of the economy. Recovering policy costs via income tax provides a progressive option to fund BECCS and DACCS. All modelled alternative funding options result in regressive outcomes where low-income households pay disproportionately more towards the costs of BECCS and DACCS. Funding BECCS and DACCS through levies on household energy bills further entrenches inequality; spend on electricity as a share of income is disproportionately high for low-income households. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate politics and governance across the globe involve an increasing number of interest groups such as from business and civil society. Against this backdrop, it matters a great deal whether interest group mobilization is able to influence climate policy-making. First, there is an increasing number of climate policy supporters like nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and green businesses lobbying in favour of additional climate policies. Second, there is also strong mobilization of groups from energy-intensive and fossil fuel industries lobbying against potentially costly climate policies. In this paper, we investigate the potential effects of these mobilization patterns. More precisely, we ask whether there is any systematic effect of competing interest group mobilization on national climate policy production. To this end, we harness arguments from literatures on interest group mobilization and climate policy-making. Empirically, we exploit a comprehensive global dataset on the adoption of national climate laws and interest group mobilization (over 4,000 organizations) between 1997 and 2016. The results show that the increasing mobilization of climate policy supporters is positively related to national climate policy production. Climate policy opponents are able to weaken this effect, but are hardly able to block new climate laws. The results add to our understanding of climate politics focusing on the role of business organizations and NGOs. This is highly policy relevant for both analysts and practitioners given that the Paris Agreement relies heavily on national policy efforts. The growing mobilization of climate policy supporters is positively related to the adoption of additional climate laws. The positive effect of climate policy supporters is weakened but rarely blocked by climate policy opponents, such as those from the fossil fuel industry. The effect of lobbying over climate policy needs to be assessed in its competitive context, that is by considering how political support and opposition on climate policy interact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We measure the comprehensive carbon price from 2008 to 2019 resulting from climate policies imposed by 25 high-polluting countries that represent 82 percent of global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in 2019. Comprehensive carbon prices build upon previous notions—including explicit, effective, and implicit carbon prices—by incorporating a broad range of policies that reduce carbon emissions. We consider seven types of major market-based policies commonly used to create marginal incentives to reduce emissions: carbon taxes, emissions trading systems, fossil fuel taxes, fossil fuel subsidies, renewable portfolio standards, feed-in tariffs, and low-carbon fuel standards. Comprehensive carbon prices represent the weighted average of marginal incentives imposed on polluters by country policy mixes. We measure country-level comprehensive carbon prices by summing across all seven policies the product of (1) the marginal incentive imposed by a policy (expressed in dollars per ton of CO2 emitted), and (2) a CO2-emissions-coverage weight for that policy (equal to the proportion of CO2 emissions regulated by the policy relative to that country's total CO2 emissions). We measure the global comprehensive carbon price by summing across all 25 countries the product of (1) each country's comprehensive carbon price, and (2) that country's proportion of CO2 emissions relative to total CO2 emissions from our sample of 25 countries. The global comprehensive carbon price has risen upward from +8.68 USD in 2008 to +19.13 USD in 2019, with a dip to +6.94 USD per ton in 2012. These values are far too low to appropriately address climate change. The comprehensive carbon price varies widely between countries, ranging from −128.35 USD to +146.25 USD in 2019. This heterogeneity means that polluters face uneven marginal incentives to reduce CO2 emissions. Our focus is on measuring marginal incentives rather than policy outcomes, such as overall emissions abatement, which we identify as a promising area for future research. Comprehensive carbon prices represent a useful metric for summarizing and tracking global and country-level efforts to mitigate carbon emissions through public policy. Comprehensive carbon prices report a dollar per ton of carbon dioxide emissions imposed by a wide range of climate policies including carbon taxes, emissions trading systems, fossil fuel subsidies and taxes, renewable portfolio standards, feed-in tariffs, and low-carbon fuel standards. Country-level comprehensive carbon prices vary widely, from −128.35 to +146.25 USD in 2019, reflecting wide heterogeneity in the overall effort countries are putting into climate mitigation. The global comprehensive carbon price has approximately doubled over the last decade, reaching a value of +19.13 USD in 2019, and remains too low to seriously address climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sweden's 2017 Climate Act is part of a climate policy framework aiming for net zero domestic greenhouse gas emissions by 2045. The framework was based on a proposal from the All Party Committee on Environmental Objectives (the Committee), in which members from all participating parliamentary parties agreed unanimously. This was despite a contested climate debate running in parallel, notwithstanding strong criticism from business confederations and trade unions. Aiming to draw lessons of value for climate policy-making, this study explores the main factors that influenced the work and outcomes of the Committee, based on a series of in-depth interviews and document review. The research design is linked to policy process theories. The interviews mainly concern underlying motives, the role of knowledge, the influence of impact assessments, and international influence. It is shown that a continuous and comprehensive learning process in the Committee was instrumental for achieving consensus, including addressing concerns among some members regarding policy costs and constitutionality. The Committee was also influenced by policy developments elsewhere, referred to as policy diffusion, notably from the U.K. Climate Change Act and the UNFCCC COP 21 policy process. Over time, a cross-party consensus among Committee members emerged and led to the invention of an original policy proposal. The consensus was instrumental for generating support for the proposal in an otherwise conflictual political landscape. As a result, a governmental bill based on the proposal was eventually enacted into law, renewing Sweden's climate policy with a climate change act coupled to ambitious climate objectives. Key policy insights Joint learning on factually complex and normatively contested climate issues requires time and comprehensive processes but can lead to policy inventions and ambitious outcomes. Policy diffusion between countries may be important for raising ambitions and shaping innovative, new elements of national climate policy. Framework climate change acts and specific climate laws can be mutually supportive, i.e. frameworks foster more ambitious sectoral laws and the more precise sectoral laws, the easier it is to agree on stricter overall ambitions. Adoption of more stringent climate policies may require precise dismantling of arguments working against action, in particular on policy costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australia is a well-known climate laggard with a history of political conflict over climate policy and the dubious distinction of being the only country to repeal a national emissions trading scheme (ETS). This article examines the puzzle of why four subnational governments in Australia's federation succeeded in enacting durable framework climate legislation based on a model that came to be widely regarded as 'best-practice'. We show that in 2007 South Australia was the first jurisdiction in the world to enact framework climate legislation with a 2050 emissions reduction target and an independent expert advisory committee to provide guidance on the implementation of interim targets. We show that this local legislative innovation set off a process of political learning, policy transfer and a virtuous political competition among like-minded Labour and Labour-Green governments at the subnational level. We call this 'convergent evolution' insofar as the legislative innovation and diffusion over the period 2007–2015 was similar to, but occurred independently of, the UK Climate Change Act 2008 and the diffusion of this model elsewhere in Europe. Common to all cases was a strong commitment by the premier and/or the relevant minister to pursue a decarbonisation strategy via targets, and reliance on sources of advice for legislative reform that were professionally and/or politically committed to climate action rather than from vested industry groups. More generally, we argue that framework climate legislation carries lower political risks than an ETS because it does not draw attention to the upfront costs of action. The diffusion of subnational climate change legislation, accompanied by renewable energy promotion, has helped to limit the impacts of Australian national climate policy failure while also providing a springboard for renewed climate legislative momentum at the national level. Key Policy Insights Similar innovations in climate policy and legislation can occur independently in different regions in response to similar global pressures. Framework climate legislation based on long-term and progressive interim targets carries lower political risks than an ETS because it does not draw as much attention to the upfront costs of action. Innovation in subnational framework climate legislation in a federation can generate a virtuous competition in target setting and renewable energy promotion in states that are not heavily dependent on fossil fuels or close to retiring fossil fuel assets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change is perhaps the central challenge that faces humanity. If the concept of green growth is to be anything more than a mere rebranding of the concept of sustainability, then it must elucidate the relationship between economic activity and pollution and provide a more detailed economic account of it. The articles in this Special Issue focus on ways in which GHG emissions may be reduced while satisfying the increasing demand for energy: from global, technological or economic solutions, to sub-national, financial or regulatory ones. Although the wide disparity in income between the least and most wealthy makes it difficult to reach a consensus on the best way to achieve a low-carbon society, the scale and potential effects of climate change make it imperative that one is reached. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The feasibility of two low-carbon society (LCS) scenarios, one with and one without nuclear power and carbon capture and storage (CCS), is evaluated using the AIM/Enduse[Global] model. Both scenarios suggest that achieving a 50% emissions reduction target (relative to 1990 levels) by 2050 is technically feasible if locally suited technologies are introduced and the relevant policies, including necessary financial transfers, are appropriately implemented. In the scenario that includes nuclear and CCS options, it will be vital to consider the risks and acceptance of these technologies. In the scenario without these technologies, the challenge will be how to reduce energy service demand. In both scenarios, the estimated investment costs will be higher in non-Annex I countries than in Annex I countries. Finally, the enhancement of capacity building to support the deployment of locally suited technologies will be central to achieving an LCS. Policy relevance Policies to reduce GHG emissions up to 2050 are critical if the long-term target of stabilizing the climate is to be achieved. From a policy perspective, the cost and social acceptability of the policy used to reduce emissions are two of the key factors in determining the optimal pathways to achieve this. However, the nuclear accident at Fukushima highlighted the risk of depending on large-scale technologies for the provision of energy and has led to a backlash against the use of nuclear technology. It is found that if nuclear and CCS are used it will be technically feasible to halve GHG emissions by 2050, although very costly. However, although the cost of halving emissions will be about the same if neither nuclear nor CCS is used, a 50% reduction in emissions reduction will not be achievable unless the demand for energy service is substantially reduced. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The ocean plays a major role in regulating Earth's climate system, and is highly vulnerable to climate change, but continues to receive little attention in the ongoing policymaking designed to mitigate and adapt to global climate change. There are numerous ways to consider the ocean more significantly when developing these policies, several of which offer the co-benefits of biodiversity protection and support of marine-dependent human communities. When developing forward-thinking climate change policy, it is important to understand the ways that the ocean contributes to global climate and to fully inventory the services that the ocean provides to humans. Without more inclusive consideration of the ocean in climate policy, at all levels of governance, policy makers risk weaker than necessary mitigation and adaptation strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A central issue in tackling climate change is to understand to what extent different short-term mitigation strategies are consistent with long-term stabilization targets. The present article aims at cross-comparing emission paths derived by plausible short-term policies against those implied by long-term climate targets, comparing, for example, differences in peak periods. Short-term policies considered are, for instance, Kyoto-type targets with or without participation by the USA and/or by developing countries. Long-term targets focus instead on stabilization of CO2 concentrations, radiative forcing and the increase in atmospheric temperature relative to pre-industrial levels. In order to account for the uncertainty surrounding the climate cycle, for each long-term goal multiple paths of emission - the most probable, the optimistic and the pessimistic projections - are considered in the comparison exercise. Comparative analysis is performed using the FEEM-RICE model, a regional economy- climate model. The results suggest that some early policy action should take place for short-term emissions to be compatible with long-term targets. In particular, the Kyoto-type regimes appear to be on a compatible emission path, at least up to the second commitment period. However, this is no longer the case when assuming a pessimistic realization of the uncertain climate parameters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]