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Credible commitment is central to regimes for climate mitigation policy. In the climate policy literature, it is widely argued that the solution to the credible commitment problem is legislation and delegation of goal-setting to a technical body insulated from political incentives, and the UK's Committee on Climate Change is in part modelled on this approach. However, drawing on the comparative politics literature, this paper argues that the focus on legislation and delegation as the solution to the credible commitment problem is too narrow. Seen within the context of comparative political institutions, it is a response that fits the political logic in countries with majoritarian electoral systems. By contrast, in countries with electoral systems based on proportional representation, while legislation plays a role, an important element in the creation of credible commitment comes in the form of negotiated long-term agreements between political parties. This contrast is explored through a comparison between the Climate Change Act and associated Committee on Climate Change in the UK on the one hand, and a series of Energy and Climate Agreements in Denmark over the 2010s. Both approaches appear to have worked to date. However, while negotiated long-term agreements typically have an internal process for managing conflicts that inevitably arise after the respective mechanisms have been put in place, disputes arising following legislation and delegation must be resolved within the more informal processes of intra-party politics. Mechanisms of accountability also differ between the two approaches. Key policy insights Legislation and delegation is widely seen as the key route to credible commitment for climate policy, but other routes are possible. Legislation and delegation is particularly suited to countries with majoritarian, or first-past-the-post electoral systems and resulting political dynamics. In countries with proportional representation, an alternative route to credible commitment is possible via formal agreement between political parties. Both routes can work well, but political agreements tend to have internal mechanisms for mediating conflicts that subsequently arise, whereas delegation relies on intra-party politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scope 3 emissions from the UK higher education sector are globally significant, and long-distance air travel and catering are particularly emissions-intensive aspects of workplace routine. They each present complex problems, as transition to low-carbon alternatives requires the reconfiguration of professional practices. This paper examines the sustainability policies of 66 UK universities to establish the extent to which planning and action in these areas are commensurate with climate emergency declarations. The findings indicate that universities recognize their role in creating demand for long-distance travel and sustaining high-carbon diets. However, few have specific emissions reduction targets or action plans that would rapidly and substantially reduce emissions in these areas. Discussion focuses on two core points; first, how greater cohesion in reporting and target-setting can be achieved across the sector to raise the ambition of targets and intervention; and second to identify opportunities for institutions to disrupt and reshape professional practices to reduce emissions in these areas. Key Policy Insights Reducing emissions in the higher education sector requires organizations to foster low-carbon academic practices by engaging with the systemic cultural and material conditions that support high-carbon academic practices. The establishment of robust targets, action plans and monitoring processes would further support sector-wide decarbonization, and require consensus across HE institutions and governing bodies. Sector-wide agreement on the level and pace of emissions reduction will help to accelerate ambition regarding Scope 3 emissions reduction and determining the appropriate contribution of different institutions will help identify where action is most urgently required. Findings suggest a need for absolute targets for emissions reduction associated with long-distance travel, and that food policies focus on achieving a volumetric reduction in the weight of meat served so that absolute levels of greenhouse gas emissions are reduced. Travel and food provision are complex aspects of university emissions, but a climate emergency framing requires all organizations to use their full range of influence to rapidly and substantially reduce emissions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the UK introduced a Climate Change Act (CCA) in 2008, similar legislation has followed in a number of states, with each having a slightly different take. What unites these examples is that they all represent framework legislation that aims to facilitate climate change mitigation by creating continuous policy processes whereby mechanisms for the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are developed and implemented. This article is concerned with the extent to which they are living policy processes or rather symbolic gestures. We analyse seven European CCAs with regard to GHG emission reduction targets, planning/implementation mechanisms, and feedback/evaluations prescribed by the laws. These three features correspond with three aspects of climate policy integration (CPI): interpretations of CPI as a norm; CPI as a process of governing; CPI as a policy outcome. We show that CCAs address all three aspects of CPI and constitute living policy processes, although to varying extents. However, CCAs are also policy processes in that they are part of a political system, affected by political forces external to the legislation, positively and negatively. Key policy insights CCAs can provide a normative basis for policymaking on climate change at the national level, especially through quantitative emission reduction targets. Whilst CCAs can bring some stability and predictability to policymaking on climate change (mainly because legislation is more difficult to amend or remove than policy strategies), they are still vulnerable to political developments. Most CCAs lack either short/medium-term (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden) or long-term (Austria) targets. Given EU Member States' aim to decarbonise in the next three decades and the Paris Agreement's global goal of pursuing efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C, states need to find ways to guide this process. One approach could be the inclusion of short-term, medium-term and long-term targets in their CCAs. Since sanctioning mechanisms are lacking across all the CCAs analysed here, it is not clear what will happen if legally binding targets are not met. Just as it is difficult to imagine speed limits and speed cameras without accompanying penalties, it is hard to imagine how CCAs without sanctions can deliver decarbonization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mobilizing climate finance for climate change mitigation is a crucial part of meeting the 'well-below' 2°C goal of the Paris Agreement. Climate finance refers to investments specifically in climate change mitigation and adaptation activities, which involve public finance and the leveraging of private finance. A large proportion of climate finance is Official Development Assistance (ODA) from OECD countries to ODA-eligible countries. The evidence shows that the largest proportion of climate finance for climate change mitigation has been channelled to the development of renewable energy, with a much smaller proportion flowing to other crucial forms of clean energy-related measures, such as demand-side management (DSM) (particularly sustainable cooling) and carbon capture, usage and storage (CCUS). This forms the rationale and aim of this synthesis paper: to review the role of climate finance to develop clean energy beyond renewables. In doing so, the paper draws on practical policy and programme experiences of some donor countries, such as the UK, and Development Finance Institutions (DFIs). This paper argues that a greater amount of climate finance from OECD countries to ODA-eligible fossil fuel-intensive emerging economies and developing countries is required for sustainable cooling and CCUS, particularly in the form of technical assistance and clean energy innovation. Key policy insights Demand-side management (DSM) and carbon capture, usage and storage (CCUS) are underfunded in climate finance compared with the promotion of renewables. Climate finance for sustainable cooling, in particular, represents just 0.04% of total ODA, despite cooling projected to represent 13% of global emissions by 2030. Public investment in CCUS is limited at US $28 billion since 2007, despite the costs of meeting the Paris Agreement estimated to be 40-128% more expensive without CCUS. Additional climate finance for these sectors should not come at the expense of funding for renewables but should be complementary to it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change is projected to increase the frequency, intensity and unpredictability of extreme weather events across the globe and these events are likely to have significant mental health implications. The mental health literature broadly characterises negative emotional reactions to extreme weather experiences as undesirable impacts on wellbeing. Yet, other research in psychology suggests that negative emotional responses to extreme weather are an important motivation for personal action on climate change. This article addresses the intersection of mental health and functional perspectives on negative emotions, with a specific focus on the potential that reduced negative emotional responses to extreme weather may also translate to diminished motivation to undertake climate change mitigation actions – which we term the 'resilience paradox'. Using survey data gathered in the aftermath of severe flooding across the UK in winter 2013/2014, we present new evidence indicating that self-appraised coping ability moderates the link between flooding experience and negative emotions and thereby attenuates the indirect link between flooding experience and climate change mitigation intentions. We conclude that support for flood victims should extend beyond addressing emotional, physical and financial stresses to include acknowledgement of the involvement of climate change and communication of the need for action to combat future climate risks. Key policy insights Psychological resilience to flooding and other extreme weather events can translate to diminished motivation to mitigate climate change Negative emotional reactions need to occur at an optimal level to enable people to respond appropriately to climate risks. Flood victims' subjective appraisal of their ability to cope does not necessarily encompass consideration of the role played by climate change. Therefore, support for victims of extreme weather should include explicit acknowledgement of the involvement of climate change and the need for action to mitigate future climate risks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

New Labour came to power in 1997 pledging to put environment concerns at the heart of policy-making. Shortly after being elected, the Labour Government signed the Kyoto Protocol and adopted a voluntary domestic target of a 20% cut in carbon dioxide emissions by 2010. This article looks at the development of UK climate policy since 1997 and the political drivers that have led to development of the climate policy mix. It assesses the Climate Change Programme adopted in 2000 and its delivery, and it also looks at the 5-year Climate Change Programme Review published in March 2006. It conducts a quantitative assessment of the UK's performance by looking at emissions data, and it also provides a qualitative analysis, by looking at the UK policies and measures within their political and institutional context. The article concludes that Labour has been actively promoting climate policy since coming to power and has played a strong leadership role internationally. The UK is on track to meet and surpass its Kyoto target, meeting its international commitments. Between 24.1 and 29.1 million tonnes of carbon savings per year are expected by 2010. Policies and measures in the industrial sector are delivering real emissions reductions, in addition to the reductions made through fuel switching. The Government has found it more difficult to make some of the tough choices necessary to deliver emissions reductions in the transport and the household sectors. The article seeks to explain why the Labour Government has found it uncomfortable, politically, to implement stronger measures in these parts of the economy. The article highlights the changing dynamics within UK politics and concludes that there are two possible avenues for taking more stringent measures in the future. The first involves the development of a cross-party consensus on climate change. The second is to change the way that climate change is framed, so that it is no longer seen as an 'environment' issue but one with which voters and decision-makers can immediately connect. Only then will it be possible to implement the necessary policies and measures across the whole economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although levels of concern and awareness about climate change have been rising in many nations over the past 20 years, climate change remains of low importance relative to other global or personal issues. Powerful contextual barriers act to prevent public engagement with it, such as psychological distancing and externalized responsibility. Despite extensive media coverage of the issue since 2006 there was a gradual decrease in public concern between 2006 and 2010. Possible explanations are issue fatigue, the impact of the global financial crisis, distrust, and the deepening politicization of the issue. Risk and uncertainty will become part of the debate about climate change policy in the future. Although engaging both the public and decision makers needs to draw upon the best guidance already developed in communicating risk, it is also likely that a radical reframing of the terms of public debate and new approaches to ‘risk communication’ will be needed. The most significant risk to achieving ambitious climate mitigation and adaptation goals appears to be the ‘governance trap’ engendered by current national and international systems of governance, such that the public and governments each seek to attribute responsibility for instigating change to the other. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]