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Social protection has gained increasing attention in global climate policy due to its potential to contribute to low-carbon, just and climate-resilient development. Unlocking climate finance for social protection is critical to realize this potential. Multilateral climate funds established under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) can play a particularly important role by financing social sectors where private investments are not attractive. Yet, there is a distinct policy and research gap in understanding the potential and limitations of the UNFCCC financial mechanisms to support social protection in low- and middle-income countries. Taking as a case study the Green Climate Fund (GCF), which is the largest multilateral fund under the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, we seek to address this gap. First, the study introduces a framework for analysis of the ways climate finance engages with social protection by looking into a comprehensive set of formal social services and transfers provided by the state to individuals, households, and on a collective basis. Second, the study identifies a continuum of entry points for integrating social protection into the GCF's project portfolio and offers a holistic perspective by capturing climate change mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage. We find that social protection can be instrumental in the design and implementation of GCF projects. In addition, our analysis reveals that the GCF has the potential to support projects that create enabling conditions for integrating climate change considerations into national social protection systems, and that aim at piloting or establishing long-term social protection mechanisms with climate change objectives. Social protection policy frameworks, infrastructure, instruments, and knowledge have supported the design and implementation of mitigation and adaptation projects funded by the GCF. The strongest linkages between social protection and climate finance in the GCF's project portfolio relate to climate services with a growing focus on shock-responsive social protection. Rural livelihood projects were the most common in the project portfolio though several projects demonstrated the potential for the GCF to support housing-related social protection in urban contexts. The study did not identify any mitigation-only projects that invest in adapting social protection systems, yet several projects demonstrate entry points towards that end. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Citizens' assemblies on climate change are increasingly popular to support democratic decision-making. Such Climate Assemblies (CAs) convene representative groups of citizens formulating policy proposals after hearing experts and deliberating intensely. CAs may help addressing climate policy issues more effectively partly because their members need not worry about re-election. CAs' effectiveness depends on their design such as the issues chosen (or not chosen) for deliberation. Agenda-setters exert substantial power by selecting certain issues and by choosing framings that benefit some solutions over others. In this paper I ask: What characterizes agendas that are suitable and legitimate for deliberation in CAs? The aim is to support practitioners in making informed agenda choices for CAs by providing a list of ten widely accepted guiding principles based on expert interviews, policy documents, and information gathered from the Knowledge Network on Climate Assemblies (KNOCA). The paper systematically discusses trade-offs of various agenda choices in the light of different CA rationales. Results show that those with system-supporting rationales tend to favour narrower agendas tailored to political demands aiming to increase immediate policy impact; those with system-disrupting rationales prefer more open agendas allowing citizens to challenge existing political practices and worldviews. Results support earlier arguments that distinctions of entire deliberative processes in either top-down or bottom-up are too simplistic and that a tool-box approach is more useful. Insights appear relevant for debates of deliberative minipublics more generally. Future research should investigate whom to involve in setting CA agendas and with how much power. Effective agenda design hinges on rationales on how to achieve assembly objectives which depend on authorities' ambition for climate action. Given high ambition, system-supportive rationales aiming for policy impact favour narrower agendas tailored to demands of the policy process but risk low transformativeness. Given low ambition, system-disruptive rationales aiming to challenge established practices and worldviews favour more open agendas but risk low impact if assemblies are not politically embedded or able to mobilize opposition groups. Assembly designs are seldom purely supportive or disruptive but often hybrid. Agenda-setting has many dimensions allowing for productive combinations of disruptive and supportive elements tailored to contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The imperative to halt global warming extends beyond human boundaries, intertwining with the urgent need to achieve net-zero emissions. To this end, the Paris Agreement (PA) states that all Parties should strive to formulate their Long-Term Low Greenhouse Gas Emission Development Strategies (LT-LEDS). This article comprehensively reviews the LT-LEDS submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) by 53 Parties (representing 75% of global emissions) as of September 23rd, 2022. First, it conducts an analysis of the quality and completeness of the LT-LEDS. The findings of this analysis highlight the need for improvement in the reported information, particularly to improve the clarity of the information presented and the monitoring of progress towards the objective of each LT-LEDS. Furthermore, the study confirms the noticeable absence of reference to the principles of equity, and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the light of different national circumstances. Yet these principles should frame climate action within the PA. Second, this article estimates the carbon budget to be utilized by the Parties that have integrated net-zero emission (NZE) targets within their LT-LEDS. The analysis reveals that this group of Parties (i.e. those reporting on LT-LEDS and those with NZE targets), currently encompasses 37% of the global population and is responsible for 62% of global emissions. If these NZE targets are met, the group is projected to consume a total of 431 GtCO2. This value notably exceeds the threshold of 400 GtCO2, exceeding the remaining global carbon budget estimated by the IPCC to be compatible with a 67% likelihood to achieve a temperature increase objective of 1.5°C. To achieve the objectives of the PA, it is necessary for all countries to develop and implement their LT-LEDS, and for the 53 countries that have already submitted them to enhance the quality and comprehensiveness of the reported information and to improve the monitoring of progress towards NZE targets. To achieve the long-term objective of limiting the global temperature increase to 1.5°C, more countries need to actively engage in formulating and implementing NZE commitments. It is also imperative to increase the level of ambition in the existing NZE commitments, particularly those formulated by developed countries. All LT-LEDS, encompassing both present submissions and those anticipated in the future, should be formulated in the light of equity considerations, and meticulously assess the share of the global carbon budget that will be allocated to the LT-LEDS' net-zero CO2 commitments. The analysis of net-zero CO2 commitments reveals that the existing NZE targets set by developed nations entail a carbon budget consumption significantly exceeding their equitable share, while those formulated by less developed countries remain notably below their due allocation. This divergence could potentially limit the capacity of the latter group to foster their development, compounded by the challenges of addressing climate change impacts. Examination of the current NZE commitments underscores that the current trajectory of emission reductions lacks a comprehensive framework to instigate the transformative changes required to achieve the ambitious mitigation objectives of the Paris Agreement. Consequently, there is an imperative for more detailed and comprehensive long-term visions at the national level, which will serve as guidance for short-term policy decisions and effectively prioritize the fundamental structural shifts needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change is a key socioeconomic and environmental concern in South Africa. The South African government introduced several climate change initiatives to address the impacts of climate change, resulting in the proliferation of climate adaptation policies across spheres of government. This paper studies different climate change adaptation policies and climate policy paradigms (CPP) to understand the adaptation landscape; it explains and compares the changes in CPP in South Africa over time. We mapped 40 policy documents from 2004 to 2022, which shows 12 national policies, 12 provincial (sub-national) policy documents and 14 metropolitan city policy documents. We then used 12 national policy documents to illustrate and understand the CPP. The research shows that different stakeholders have shaped climate change adaptation policy, both private and public firms advised on climate change policy and there are a number of different funding partners supporting the adaptation policy like GEF, C40 and GIZ. The changing policy environment has introduced new frameworks, objectives and processes. Therefore, more efforts will be needed going forward to guide adaptation policy across national, provincial and local governments. We find that several CPPs have emerged, that is different paradigms encompassing a range of policy goals, framings and instruments. The present National CC Adaptation Strategy (NCCAS) mandates adaptation across all levels of government and allows all important stakeholders to address climate change consequences. This NCCAS increases the number and ambition of adaptation policy, encourages integrated approaches, policy coherence and clear direction on how to handle climate risks and impacts in varied South Africa and its global commitment. Changes in policy paradigm enable the use of new policy instruments, including funding and budget mechanisms. Finally, climate adaptation policy has become more ambitious and stringent, requiring all levels of government to plan for climate change. The climate change policy landscape in South Africa has grown over the past 18 years, with policy development across different spheres of government (national, sectoral, provincial and metros), New CPPs have emerged, supported by new policy frames, goals and instruments. The NCCAS provides a clear policy goal, which also provides new policy instruments to implement climate actions and acts to enhance integrated approaches, The lack of domestic budget allocation remains a challenge for national government, but external partnerships have begun to provide support for policy development. Notably, a shift from a flexible to stringent approach to climate policy is needed to deliver effective climate action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The goals of the Paris Agreement (PA) on collectively managing climate change can only be reached if all parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) commit to actions supporting their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Developing-economy nations play a crucial role in reaching the PA targets, particularly in the Agriculture, Forest, and Other Land Uses (AFOLU) sector. However, developing country Parties also face several constraints in tracking and communicating progress towards their climate policy targets and implementation of their NDCs. The operationalization of Biennial Transparency Report (BTR) and Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF) under the PA will bring stricter reporting timeframes and advanced transparency for all parties. With these requirements rapidly coming into force, addressing reporting gaps is now a pressing priority. The present study analyzes the NDCs, and Biennial Update Reports (BURs) submitted by developing country Parties under the UNFCCC. In an illustrative exercise, our in-depth analysis concentrates on reporting on the AFOLU sector and identifies issues impeding a comprehensive and comparable Global Stock Take (GST): (i) issues of consistency in reporting timeframes (ii) issues in transparency of reporting on mitigation sectors and on relevant progress indicators (iii) incomparability of methodological approaches proposed and used, and (iv) the implications of limited national capacity for transparent reporting. The UNFCCC and developed country Parties now have the opportunity of providing specialized support for developing country Parties. This could include tailored guidance to address gaps in both greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions accounting, and reporting challenges, to ensure consistent, comprehensive, and transparent reporting to reinforce capacities moving forward following the next GST. The lack of consistent, transparent, and comparable communication from developing country Parties on NDC progress for key climate change impact mitigation sectors, such as AFOLU, has implications for operationalization of the GST. Delayed and inconsistent reporting are expected to affect the aggregation and consolidation of information across countries to inform global progress. Increased support for tailored capacity building and data gathering is required to enable transparent communication on progress in NDC implementation, monitoring, and reporting. Developing country groups will need to improve the transparency of reporting progress on the implementation and achievement of their NDCs to match the expected increase in carbon footprints with growing economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change policies are prepared in a power-loaded environment, where different policy actors interact to meet their personal or collective interests. This paper argues that the 'power interplay' between actors plays a significant role in shaping and re-shaping climate change policies. We present examples from South Asia (Nepal, India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan) to show how actors' power interplay at the local, sub-national, national and transboundary levels influences climate change policy-making. We show that negative effects of power interplay are prominent in the climate policy domain of South Asia, including short-termism of local adaptation plans, exclusion of certain policy actors in the policy-making processes, lack of transboundary-level adaptation, and lack of coordination between actors. Nuances also exist, such as the state's authority in prioritizing technical solutions, exclusionary design and implementation of climate policies, and an agenda of securitization; these can further marginalize the actors involved in climate change policy processes. The negative effects of power interplay in South Asia can limit the success of on-the-ground implementation of adaptation and mitigation strategies, limit adaptive capacity among communities, and possibly counter the development of a strong climate change solutions space. Lastly, we argue that there are no silver bullet solutions to power asymmetries and appeal to policy actors – in South Asia and elsewhere – to design context-specific and power-sensitive policy-making approaches. Negative effects of power interplay have led to the exclusion of certain policy actors (especially communities at risk) in policy-making processes and a lack of transboundary-level adaptation in South Asia. Hard infrastructure-based adaptation measures tend to exacerbate the vulnerability of the communities at risk in South Asia. Policy actors must design context-specific and power-sensitive policy-making climate adaptation and mitigation approaches to reduce the negative impacts of power interplay. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Governments that revoke licenses and permits or take other measures to restrict the development of oil and gas in their territory will face claims from investors for compensation. When investors are foreign, they can seek compensation for 'lost future profits' in investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), even if they had not commenced production. ISDS cases are likely to obstruct a just transition by chilling supply-side climate measures and diverting public funds away from climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts. Using a dataset of ISDS-protected assets in the upstream oil and gas sector, we demonstrate that the global distribution of legal and financial risks is highly unjust. More than two thirds of the net-present value of 1.5°C-incompatible and treaty-protected oil and gas assets are found in low- and middle-income countries, including those highly vulnerable to climate change. The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) is the most significant single treaty obstructing the transition. While protection of fossil fuels in some countries may soon be phased-out of this treaty, the protection of the assets identified in our study will remain for at least ten more years. To limit ISDS risk, states should: (1) immediately cease the issuance of new permits/leases for oil and gas developments; (2) terminate investment treaties (including the ECT) and (3) develop binding rules that cap the amount of compensation that can be awarded to investors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do non-governmental organizations (NGOs) target governments for climate shaming? NGOs increasingly function as monitors of states climate performance and compliance with international climate treaties such as the Paris Agreement. Lacking formal sanctioning capacities, NGOs primarily rely on 'naming and shaming' to hold states accountable to their commitments in climate treaties and to ramp up their climate mitigation efforts. However, we know little about how and why NGOs engage in climate shaming. This article advances two arguments. First, we argue that NGO climate shaming is likely to be shaped by the international and national climate records of governments. Second, governments' climate actions can create contradicting expectations by both inviting and repelling NGO climate shaming. To test our arguments, we complied an original global data set on climate shaming events carried out by environmental NGOs. Our empirical analysis suggests that while NGOs are generally more likely to shame climate laggards, climate frontrunners may also be shamed if they engage in non-binding climate commitments. Climate laws and international climate treaties are central for our understanding of how NGOs target governments for climate shaming. NGOs are generally more likely to target climate laggards than frontrunners. Climate shaming is not only about whether but also how governments participate in global climate governance. Membership in climate institutions with non-binding commitments attracts NGO climate shaming. There is a risk that governments sign international climate treaties, without the intention to comply, in order to escape climate shaming. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Responding effectively to climate change requires an understanding of what shapes people's individual and collective sense of agency and responsibility towards the future. It also requires transforming this understanding into political engagement to support systems change. Based on a national representative survey in Sweden (N = 1,237), this research uses the novel SenseMaker methodology to look into these matters. More specifically, in order to understand the social and institutional prerequisites that must be in place to develop inclusive climate responses, we investigate how citizens perceive their everyday life and future, and the implications for their sense of responsibility, agency, and political engagement. Our research findings show how citizens perceive and act on climate change (individually, cooperatively, and by supporting others), their underlying values, beliefs, emotions and paradigms, inter-group variations, and obstacles and enablers for change. The findings reveal that, in general, individual and public climate action is perceived as leading to improved (rather than reduced) wellbeing and welfare. At the same time, climate anxiety and frustration about structural and governance constraints limit agency, whilst positive emotions and inner qualities, such as human–nature connections, support both political engagement and wellbeing. Our results shed light on individual, collective, and structural capacities that must be supported to address climate change. They draw attention to the need to develop new forms of citizen involvement and of policy that can explicitly address these human interactions, inner dimensions of thinking about and acting on climate change, and the underlying social paradigms. We conclude with further research needs and policy recommendations. In general, citizens perceive increased individual and public climate action as leading to improved (rather than reduced) wellbeing and welfare. Effective responses to climate change require addressing underlying social paradigms (to complement predominant external, technological, and information-based approaches). Such responses include increasing policy support for: o learning environments and practices that can help individuals to discover internalized social patterns and increase their sense of agency and interconnection (to self, others, nature); o institutional and political mechanisms that support citizen engagement and the systematic consideration of human inner dimensions (values, beliefs, emotions and associated inner qualities/capacities) across all sectors of work, by systematically revising organizations' vision statements, communication and project management tools, working structures, policies, regulations, human and financial resource allocation, and collaboration; and o nature-based solutions and other approaches to support the human–nature connection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2022 Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) and Paris Agreement (PA) are highly complementary agreements where each depends on the other's success to be effective. The GBF offers a very specific framework of interim goals and targets that break down the objective of the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) into a decade-spanning work plan. Comprised of 10 sections – including a 2050 vision and a 2030 mission, four overarching goals and 23 specific targets – the GBF is expected to guide biodiversity policy around the world in the coming years to decades. A similar set of global interim climate policy targets could translate the global temperature goal into concrete policy milestones that would provide policy makers and civil society with reference points for policy making and efforts to hold governments accountable. Beyond inspiring climate policy experts to convert temperature goals into policy milestones, GBF has the potential to strengthen the implementation of the PA at the nexus of biodiversity and climate (adaptation and mitigation) action. For example, the GBF can help to ensure that nature-based climate solutions are implemented with full consideration of biodiversity concerns, of the rights and interests of Indigenous Peoples and local communities, and with fair and transparent benefit sharing arrangements. In sum, the GBF should be mandatory reading for all climate policy makers. The 2022 Kunming-Montreal GBF and the PA are synergistic and complementary. The PA puts significant pressure on Parties to engage in ambitious climate action, however, it lacks a clear framework of interim targets and measures that converts temperature goals into policy milestones; this in turn does not allow concrete evaluation of progress and creates barriers to action. In this context, the GBF could inspire climate policy makers or experts to create a strategic, non-binding framework document that formulates interim goals and measurable climate policy targets for the next decade. The GBF and PA are also connected through policy and implementation linkages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While climate change has been a public policy issue for decades, central banks have only recently considered it relevant to their objectives. Beginning in 2015, the Bank of England (BoE) was among the first movers to do so. This article illustrates how two institutional features were key in enabling this response. First, the macroprudential framework that developed in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has provided the key ideas that central bankers have used to understand climate change in relation to their objectives. Additionally, government support for BoE action on climate change was also essential in empowering the BoE by setting a transition pathway and providing political legitimacy. The result has been BoE policies that not only seek to limit climate-related risks but also actively shift credit toward greener enterprises. However, this article argues that this has not amounted to a green paradigm shift in the BoE's institutional role, but is better understood as a thermostatic mode of policy innovation. While the BoE's hierarchy of goals have not changed, the types of policy problems relevant to those goals has shifted substantially. Finally, this article offers reflections on the scope and durability of the BoE's approach to climate change in this context. This article contributes to the literature on central banking and climate change beyond the BoE by providing a framework for understanding the possibilities and limitations of current central bank approaches to climate change. Financial policymakers face uncertainty about which policies lie within the bounds of their institutional roles and norms as the causes of climate change become increasingly relevant for them to address. Central banks can function as 'thermostats', with relevant policy problems and instrument types changing substantially in order to maintain enduring goals like price and financial stability. While the scope of this type of response is potentially broad, the durability of policy action will be limited in the presence of other events in the economic environment. Governments should be explicit in setting low-carbon transition pathways for central banks to align with. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humankind faces a Triple Challenge: averting dangerous climate change, reversing biodiversity loss, and supporting the wellbeing of a growing population. Action to address each of these issues is inherently dependent on action to address the others. Local, national, and international policy goals on climate change, biological diversity, and human wellbeing have been set. Current implementation measures are insufficient to meet these goals, but the Triple Challenge can still be met if governments, corporations, and other stakeholders take a holistic perspective on management of land and waters. To inform this effort, we identify a set of priority policy responses drawn from recent international assessments that, whilst not being the only potential solutions, can form the core of such a holistic approach. We do this through an iterative process using three methodological approaches: (i) structured literature review; (ii) deliberative expert analysis; and (iii) wider consultation, before synthesizing into this paper. Context-appropriate implementation of responses will be needed to capitalize on potential policy synergies and to ensure that unavoidable trade-offs between management of land and waters for climate mitigation, biodiversity restoration, and human wellbeing outcomes are made explicit. We also set out four approaches to managing trade-offs that can promote fair and just transitions: (1) social and economic policy pivoting towards 'inclusive wealth'; (2) more integrated policymaking across the three areas; (3) 'Triple Challenge dialogues' among state and non-state actors; and (4) a new research portfolio to underpin (1), (2), and (3). Multiple recent global assessments provide a strong scientific basis for action on each of the three aspects of the Triple Challenge – climate, biodiversity, and human wellbeing (with a focus on food and nutrition) – but they do not provide an integrated perspective on how to address them simultaneously. Synthesis of these assessments identifies a portfolio of five core policy responses that deliver across the Triple Challenge: (i) rapidly cutting fossil fuel use; (ii) promoting sustainable, healthy diets; (iii) increasing food productivity and cutting food loss and waste; (iv) implementing nature-based solutions at scale; and (v) strengthening governance and management of land and waters. Even with widespread implementation of that portfolio, trade-offs between climate, biodiversity, and wellbeing outcomes might be unavoidable. Policymakers, researchers, and other actors should explicitly identify such trade-offs, and take steps to ensure management priorities are set through equitable dialogue processes informed by integrated research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Institutional capacity is one of the dimensions of adaptive capacity that determines the level and pace of climate change adaptation at the local level. Local governments are key actors in climate change adaptation because they have the responsibility to translate top-down risk information to vulnerable populations and can scale bottom-up initiatives of communities in adaptation planning. There is a need for integrated approaches for adaptive capacity building that incorporate specific capacities to tackle multiple climate risks and generic capacities to address basic needs for human development. In this analysis, we assess the institutional capacity profiles of local governments in Mexico through a cluster analysis to understand how different aspects of generic and specific capacities, which operate through bottom-up or top-down approaches, coincide in local governments. Our results show that local governments in Mexico can be grouped by type and level of institutional capacity, as follows: those that (1) engage in intergovernmental coordination; (2) focus on safety-first; (3) exhibit high capacities in transparency and citizen participation; and (4) are in a poverty trap. These groups reflect challenges for local governments in Mexico, including the need to resolve short-term crises, the lack of climate change awareness, and a low capacity to access and mobilize economic resources for adaptation. Conversely, horizontal and vertical coordination, transparency, and citizen participation are found to be key elements able to strengthen institutional capacities for adaptation. In the context of multiple climate risks and underdeveloped enabling conditions for adaptation, there is a need for strategic investment in capacities that are contextually relevant and that can reduce the adaptation gap for climate action in Mexico. Further analysis will be needed to evaluate how the mobilization of the institutional capacities by local governments in each group influences climate change adaptation outcomes, particularly differentiated for urban and rural contexts, as well as for metropolitan scales. Key policy insights - Local governments in Mexico are faced with the challenge of resolving urgent and short-term issues, making it difficult to face climate change adaptation. - Intergovernmental coordination is a key attribute that local governments can develop to address and overcome deficiencies in institutional capacities for climate change adaptation - Administrative capacity, transparency, accountability, and public participation are critical elements for local governments and will assist them to access and mobilize economic resources for climate change adaptation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Association football is popular and influential globally. Interest in how football relates to climate change, and the climate policy required for football, is growing. Clubs, players and fans increasingly call for action to reduce football's impact on the climate, and for plans to adapt to climate impacts on football. However, well-intentioned actions must be underpinned by robust evidence. This synthesis reviews research at the interface of football and climate change. After summarizing the main climate actions identified for fans, players, clubs and organizing bodies, the review looks in-depth at four areas: impacts of football on climate; impacts of climate on football; football as a driver for pro-climate actions; and the relationship between football and carbon-intensive industries. The review then outlines research gaps for an evidence-driven response to climate change in football: adaptation across different geographical contexts; understanding what climate change means for community-level football; understanding how carbon-intensive industries relate to sense of place identity in football under a just transition; developing principles for phasing-out fossil fuel financing; and considering how climate change relates to women's football. Key policy insights Football is a forum for galvanizing societal action in support of climate policy. However, football also contributes to, and is impacted by, climate change, and hence requires policy support under a changing climate; Reducing transportation emissions, especially flying, is a key climate policy requirement for football. Institutional policy, with government support, may enable more efficient scheduling and use of surface transport; Institutional policies, and public health policies, should develop standards and guidelines for football under extreme heat. Football also ought to be integrated within local, regional and national climate adaptation policy to ensure climate resilience; Clubs and players can lead by example on climate-positive actions, and energize wider action through fan bases. Alignment of initiatives with national or international climate policy may raise public awareness of climate polices and targets; Institutional policies for clubs, tournaments and associations should regulate fossil fuel financing. Football also offers an avenue to understand relations between local identity and carbon-intensive industries, and thus to identify socio-cultural factors for regional just transition policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change communication on social media plays a prominent role in efforts undertaken by state agencies, NGOs, and international organizations, to make citizens aware of this phenomenon. The images used to communicate climate change are of great importance, since they can help to effectively raise citizen awareness. Building upon news values theory and the concept of availability heuristics, this research paper aims to identify principles that can be used for effective visual communication of climate change on social media on a cross-national scale, based upon analyses of characteristics of images that foster interaction on Twitter. We conducted a content analysis of a random selection of images (photographs, illustrations, and graphics, n = 380), posted on Twitter that were included in the so-called 'top tweets' about climate change. The results indicate that the types of images that are used on social media are relatively similar to those employed by conventional media, although images of identifiable people are less frequently shown on social media. We also deduced that four practical principles are especially relevant to foster user interaction on Twitter through images: (i) show 'real people' (i.e. non-staged images of people that transmit real emotions), (ii) tell a story, (iii) include a local connection, and (iv) show impacts or actions by people who are directly affected. These practical principles are based on the more general principles of meaningfulness and personification, two foundations that can help to overcome some of the main barriers to citizens' perception of climate change as a relevant issue with serious consequences in their lives. Campaigns on social media that use imagery based on these practical and general principles can be effective in communicating the shared responsibility to address climate change. This can have a relevant impact on social perception, since it can encourage citizens to care about climate, which is regarded as necessary to increase participation in climate action. Social media can play a prominent role in campaigns to make citizens aware of climate change. Images can help to effectively raise citizen awareness of climate change. Four practical principles can be effective in increasing user interaction on social media with images about climate: show 'real' people, tell a story, include a local connection, and show people who are directly affected. Visual campaigns based on the more general principles of meaningfulness and personification can be effective in representing climate change as a relevant issue in citizens' lives. These practical and more general principles can have a relevant impact on the social perception of climate change and increase citizen participation in climate debate and action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Closing the gap between current climate change mitigation policies and those needed to deliver on the Paris Agreement's temperature targets requires significant scaling up of policy ambition. This article argues that policy action that aims to reach a minimum level of effective carbon prices can increase countries' ability to implement ambitious climate change policies, including carbon taxes and emission trading schemes (ETSs). Effective carbon prices include prices applied via energy taxes, fossil fuel subsidies, carbon taxes, and ETSs. Action on effective carbon prices can create new synergies among government departments – thereby strengthening their capacity to implement climate policies. Policy action on effective carbon pricing can also integrate finance ministries more directly in climate change policy than focusing exclusively on explicit carbon pricing. Lastly, acting on effective carbon pricing can broaden countries' engagement in carbon pricing policy compared to focusing exclusively on explicit carbon pricing. Civil society actors, governments, and international organizations could foster higher ambition on climate policy by promoting action on effective carbon prices. The article also highlights that analyses of effective carbon pricing gaps – which measure differences between current effective carbon prices and benchmark prices needed to meet the temperature targets of the Paris Agreement – need to be carefully communicated and interpreted so as to avoid undermining climate change policy. Key policy insights Policy action on effective carbon prices can unlock in-house synergies in countries that have substantial experience with energy and environmental policy but not in climate policy. Climate action that focuses on effective carbon prices can enhance finance ministries' participation in climate policy. Policy action centred on effective carbon prices can help to involve more countries in carbon pricing policy. Estimates of effective carbon pricing gaps need to be carefully communicated and interpreted to avoid reducing the sense of urgency of acting on climate change mitigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Major banks are facing increased public pressure to reduce financing for fossil fuel projects. In this decade of action for the UN Sustainable Development Goals (with a focus on SDG 13 – climate action), all sectors, including the financial sector, are urged to recognize the ways in which they impact these goals and how they can best contribute to their realization. But how are the top 10 most active banks in financing the fossil fuel industry responding to this pressure? Using qualitative textual analysis of these banks' annual reports and a proposed categorization of how banks are talking about climate change, we highlight how these banks see their role in reducing climate impacts through their financing and whether their response has evolved since the Paris Agreement. We find that while these banks are stating an increasing number of climate change actions since the introduction of the Paris Agreement, there are few clear commitments in relation to their financing of fossil fuels. This absence of commitments in the annual reports may reflect an absence of critical reflection on their responsibility for financing climate change. Key policy insights Climate-related financial disclosures should target banks' climate impact regarding their client financing; most importantly this should be done in a clear, contextualized way so that regulators and the public can hold the banks accountable based on their disclosures. Effective policies need to explicitly consider how banks should measure and reduce climate impacts in a way that is comparable, aligned with the Paris Agreement, and in relation to banks' credit financing operations to clients (not only from the direct operations of a bank, as has been the focus of banks' commitments against climate change to date). Legislation mandating human rights and environmental due diligence with explicit considerations in relation to climate change is an example of a policy that would require banks to consider a broader scope of their impact assessment and disclosure reporting which could potentially establish clearer claims for remedies by impacted communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even after years of understanding of and engagement with the climate problem, our efforts to address the issue remain wholly inadequate. This essay discusses how limitations in our capacities along three dimensions have hampered our abilities to address climate change. First, we have shown limited capacity to navigate the probabilistic nature of knowledge in this domain and the interplay of knowledge and politics. Simultaneously, there also is a widespread lack of attention to marginalized people and communities and issues of inclusivity. Finally, there is limited capacity to integrate data and knowledge from multiple sources, and include the marginalised and their interests, in the climate discussions and action. Capacity-building for climate change needs to increase our ability to act based on knowledge we have today, connect the dots and integrate multiple forms of data and knowledge, and centre the experiences of those who are most marginalised. Only then can our approach to climate change be rooted, as it must be, in the politics of a common and inclusive future. Key policy insights Capacity building must be rooted in an understanding of key dimensions of the climate arena. It is crucial to develop the capability to deal with the probabilistic and disaggregated nature of climate knowledge, and often the politics underlying such knowledge. Overcoming marginalization and lack of inclusivity in climate deliberations and action is essential if we are to move towards an integrated and just approach to climate change action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Capacity building for climate change is widely acknowledged to be a central means of implementation, and yet within the UNFCCC regime it is a messy and ambiguous concept which eludes attempts to clearly define its underlying goals, processes, actors and outcomes. In this paper, we use documents from the UNFCCC to examine the implicit logic(s) underlying the ambiguity of capacity building in the regime through a knowledge politics lens. Our study finds that there are two distinct narratives guiding capacity building in the regime: The first narrative focuses on building techno-managerial capacities utilizing standardized data to address climate change through short-term and project-based processes. The second narrative attempts to open up capacity building to plural forms of knowledge, meaningfully engaging a diverse range of actors including Indigenous Peoples, gender-specific constituencies and communities, and using transdisciplinary and holistic approaches. Our research suggests that while the former narrative is largely centralized, institutionalized and well-supported by the UNFCCC, the latter is disparate and frequently lacks necessary financial, technical, and institutional resources. Despite this, some recent developments point toward the possibilities of widening the scope of capacity building. We argue that to realize the potential of capacity building as a concept that can enable transformative and emancipatory action in the era of climate change, we must look for pathways to promote the second narrative that gives meaningful space for marginalized actors to participate in, direct, and benefit from the capacity building agenda. Key policy insights Capacity building, a widely acknowledged core means of implementation within the UNFCCC, remains ambiguous and messy on the surface but is underlined by two distinct narratives The first narrative is guided by techno-managerial and standardized data-driven goals and is well-supported and systematized within the UNFCCC The second narrative focuses on inclusive and diverse capacity building supported by transdisciplinary and holistic approaches, but remains disparate and under-funded in the UNFCCC More support and access to resources for the second narrative are required if we are to widen and deepen capacity building for climate action [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I investigate whether and how banks align green words, in terms of their commitments to tackle climate change, with deeds in terms of credit allocation across carbon-intensive industries in France. I use data on bank credit exposures to large versus small firms across 49 industries for the main banking groups operating in France, which I merge with information on industries' greenhouse gas emission intensities and a score for banks' self-reported climate-related commitments over 2010–2017. I find evidence that higher levels of self-reported climate commitments by banks are associated with a slower growth of lending to large firms in the five most carbon-intensive industries. However, lending to small and medium-sized enterprises across more or less carbon-intensive industries remains unrelated to banks' commitments to green their business. These findings suggest that devising an appropriate carbon reporting framework for small firms is likely to enhance the decarbonization of bank lending. Key policy insights Over 2010–2017, in France, banking groups that self-report to CDP as being more committed to climate change adaptation and mitigation tend to cut their lending relatively faster to domestic firms in the five most carbon-intensive industries. This pattern is entirely driven by the dynamics of banks' credit to large corporations, which in France are legally bound to regular carbon reporting. In contrast, banks' climate commitments do not seem to affect their lending to domestic small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs) in carbon-intensive industries. Overall, the results support recent calls for an extension of mandatory carbon disclosure regulations to SMEs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Solar geoengineering appears able to reduce climate change risks but raises controversy, the leading cause of which is the concern that its research, development, and evaluation might inappropriately obstruct efforts to cut greenhouse gas emissions ('mitigation'). Describing how policies could effectively and feasibly manage such possible mitigation obstruction has proven elusive. One option would be to strategically link the international policies of mitigation and solar geoengineering. Here I explore this by disaggregating states based on their relevant characteristics. I propose linkages of mitigation policy with: (1) solar geoengineering research and development, (2) decision-making regarding whether to deploy solar geoengineering, and (3) how to deploy solar geoengineering. Based on the incentives that states would face under them, these linkages are assessed on whether they can be expected to effectively increase mitigation and are seem minimally feasible. Linkages in each of the three categories have potential and could occur sequentially. In the linkage which I believe has the greatest potential, one or more states would proclaim their right to deploy solar geoengineering if and only if they meet their own mitigation goals and the rest of the world insufficiently mitigates, and would promise to forego deployment if either condition is not met. I identify this proposed linkage's possible challenges, including legitimacy, credibility, optimal size, relations among targets of the linkage, stringency of mitigation goals, and potential counterproductivity. Limitations to this exploration and assessment include the speculative nature, the assumption that states' preferences regarding mitigation and solar geoengineering are properly related, and the use of noncooperative linkage. Key policy insights Solar geoengineering could reduce the impacts of climate change but is controversial, in large part because of concerns that its research, development, or use might obstruct efforts to cut greenhouse gas emissions. I explore and assess whether linking international policies of greenhouse gas emissions reductions and solar geoengineering could feasibly and effectively increase emissions reductions. In the linkage that I believe has the greatest potential, one or more states would proclaim their right to deploy solar geoengineering if and only if they meet their emissions reductions goals and other countries do not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ocean plays a central role in climate change mitigation and adaptation. However, climate and ocean policies have been historically siloed. After decades of slow convergence, the Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue, decided at COP25 and launched online in December 2020, was the first forum for Parties and non-Party stakeholders to the UNFCCC to give their perspectives on how the climate regime should address ocean-related mitigation and adaptation. The Ocean Dialogue was informed by 47 prior open submissions provided by a broad swath of actors from across the UN system and from civil society, including traditional and youth voices. Our analysis of the submissions demonstrates a political evolution towards the nexus among climate, ocean, and biodiversity regimes. The submissions uniformly acknowledge that ocean and climate systems are inextricably linked, and that consideration of ocean-based action will strengthen climate action and vice versa. Salient themes of the submissions include changing ocean impacts, carbon sinks and blue carbon opportunities, and the need for ecosystem resilience, biodiversity management and improved understanding of normative and institutional frameworks. There is a strong call to recognize the interconnectedness of the biophysical world. Similar themes emerged during the actual Ocean Dialogue and the subsequent informal meeting on next steps. The main message conveyed is the dire necessity to implement strong stewardship and good governance of the blue planet in a disrupted climate using cooperative and concrete actions. This analysis highlights the need for a continued transdisciplinary international dialogue on the ocean and climate change which elevates the ocean-climate-biodiversity nexus via collaborative science, finance, and policy. Ocean and marine ecosystem impacts of climate change were widely acknowledged, and referenced by ninety-one percent of submissions. After decades of slow integration of ocean into climate policy, the Ocean Dialogue submissions acknowledge that climate policy must address linkages with the ocean and its biodiversity. Concerns include changing ocean impacts, carbon sinks and blue carbon opportunities, and the need for ecosystem resilience, biodiversity management and increased institutional interactions. Continuation of this Dialogue, with strengthened collaboration between States and non-state actors, may give rise to multilateral and multilevel decision-making toward sustainable climate, ocean and biodiversity action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A climate-positive COVID-19 recovery can accelerate the energy transition away from fossil fuels. Yet, current assessments of recovery stimulus programs suggest that the most fossil fuel producers are more likely to take on a 'dirty' recovery path out of the pandemic than a 'green' one. Such a path will postpone climate action and entrench fossil fuel dependence. To change course, fossil fuel producers have to get on board of a 'green recovery'. For this, cooperative international efforts mobilizing both fossil fuel consumers and producers need to promote 'just transition' policies that increase support for a green shift among fossil fuel companies and producing countries, including fossil fuel exporters. In turn, fossil fuel producers should leverage the opportunity of stimulus packages to reduce their fossil fuel production dependence and help accelerate an energy transition through supply-side measures. A combination of 'green' investments and 'just' transition reforms could help enroll fossil fuel producers into a climate-friendly post-COVID recovery. Fossil fuel producers have mostly promoted 'dirty' rather than 'green' recovery paths from the COVID-19 pandemic A green recovery agenda requires a 'just' transition component to entice and support fossil fuel producers Both demand and supply-side strategies are required to advance a 'just transition' agenda throughout the post-COVID 19 recovery The post-COVID-19 transition requires energy policies responding to the constraints of consumer and producer countries to address climate and equity challenges [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Has the Swedish Climate Policy Framework – including the new Swedish Climate Act – adopted in June 2017, been conducive to advancing climate mitigation, and if so, to what extent and in which aspects? Although Sweden is often described as a frontrunner in climate work, several evaluations prior to the adoption of the Climate Policy Framework and the Climate Act concluded that Swedish climate policy has suffered from both implementation and monitoring deficits, as well as from the fact that climate goals and strategies were non-legally binding. Taken together, such deficits make the stable, long-term prioritizing of climate mitigation over other sector policies increasingly difficult, thus limiting the possibilities to reach future targets. This article focuses on three dimensions of climate policy integration – assessing policy processes, outputs and outcomes – with the aim to analyse political developments and policy outcomes in Sweden after the implementation of the Climate Policy Framework and the Climate Act. The results of a comprehensive set of interviews with policy experts and high-level decision-makers show that the framework is believed to have had important effects, mainly in terms of changing both policy language, cross-sector coordination, and increasing the prioritization of the climate issue. Thus the study (1) contributes to a better theoretical and empirical understanding of Climate Change Acts as instruments for climate policy integration; (2) paves the way for future comparative studies; and (3) presents important practical lessons for policy makers on the effects of legal mechanisms to achieve climate mitigation. Key policy insights Climate Acts provide a legal framework for governmental climate activities. A comprehensive framework including three dimensions of climate policy integration – assessing process, output and outcome, should be used to evaluate Climate Act effects. The Swedish Climate Policy Framework and Climate Act has induced a weak type of climate policy integration, showing effects on climate policy debate, coordination, policy measure implementation and policy support. The framework sends strong signals of political will to address climate change, but the non-inclusion of targets and instruments in the Swedish Climate Act is causing debate and insecurity regarding what policy instruments will be implemented [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Soil carbon is the major active pool of terrestrial carbon, and as such, soil organic carbon (SOC) targets, policies and measures will be pivotal to achieving global climate targets. SOC sequestration may reduce the net annual greenhouse gas emissions from Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use by between 3% and 71%, while simultaneously supporting various ecosystem services. Accurate SOC accounting and monitoring, however, is constrained by various technical challenges related to indicators, rates of SOC change, measuring the impact of management practices on SOC, and the long-term persistence of sequestered SOC. We assessed countries' pledges to the Paris Agreement for SOC in agriculture to better understand the level, transparency, and specificity of commitments. Reviewing 184 countries' initial Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), we considered whether SOC was included, what was pledged, the level of ambition promised and the specificity of mitigation targets. Twenty-eight countries referred to SOC in their NDCs, citing quantified or unquantified mitigation targets, national policies or programs, and actions and measures to be implemented in agricultural lands (14), peatlands (6) or wetlands (14). Countries' reasons for not including SOC in NDCs included the need to prioritize goals of sustainable development and food security above climate mitigation, a lack of incentives for farmers to improve management practices, and the difficulty of accurately monitoring changes in SOC. Including SOC targets in NDCs can improve NDCs' comprehensiveness and transparency to track and compare policy progress across NDCs; it can also leverage SOC-related climate finance, technical support, and capacity building. Key policy insights Many NDCs specify practices known to have the potential to achieve SOC sequestration or protection without explicitly mentioning SOC. The SOC-related mitigation potential of these practices can be quantified in future NDCs. NDCs are not presently a good indicator of countries' interest or commitment to SOC action at national level. To improve this, countries with existing SOC policies, programs, and actions can specify their SOC-related commitments in future NDCs. Increased collaboration between countries with experience managing SOC and countries needing support to develop SOC-related targets, policies, measures and incentives for land users and farmers would facilitate the provision of such needed support. To increase country commitments and attention to managing SOC, there is a need for improved SOC measurement and monitoring, for better evidence on the impacts of management practices on SOC, and for incentives for farmers to change practices and overcome barriers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Securing accountability of states for their climate actions is a continuing challenge within multilateral climate politics. This article analyses how novel, face-to-face, account-giving processes for developing countries, referred to as 'Facilitative Sharing of Views', are functioning within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and what these processes help to shed light on. We analyse the nature and scope of the 'answerability' being generated within these novel processes, including what state-to-state questioning and responses focus on, and what 'performing' accountability in this manner delivers within multilateral climate politics. We find that a limited number of countries actively question each other within the FSV process, with a primary focus on sharing information about the technical and institutional challenges of establishing domestic 'measuring, reporting and verification' systems and, to lesser extent, mitigation actions. Less attention is given to reporting on support. A key aim is to facilitate learning, both from the process and from each other. Much effort is expended on legitimizing the FSV process in anticipation of its continuation in adapted form under the 2015 Paris Agreement. We conclude by considering implications of our analysis. Key policy insights We analyse developing country engagement in novel face-to-face account-giving processes under the UNFCCC Analysis of four sessions of the 'Facilitative Sharing of Views' reveals a focus on horizontal peer-to-peer learning States question each other more on GHG emission inventories and domestic MRV systems and less on mitigation and support We find that limited time and capacity to engage, one-off questioning rather than a dialogue, and lack of recommended follow-up actions risks generating 'ritualistic' answerability Such account-giving also intentionally sidesteps contentious issues such as responsibility for ambitious and fair climate action but may still help to build trust Much effort is expended on 'naming and praising' participant countries and legitimizing the process [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rising importance of cities, states and regions, firms, investors, and other subnational and non-state actors in global and national responses to climate change raises a critical question: to what extent does this climate action deliver results? This article introduces a conceptual framework that researchers and practitioners can use as a template to assess the progress, implementation, and impact of climate action by sub- and non-state actors. This framework is used to review existing studies that track progress, implementation, and achievement of such climate action between 2014 and mid-2019. While researchers have made important advances in assessing the scope and future potential of sub- and non-state climate action, we find knowledge gaps around ex-post achievement of results, indirect impacts, and climate action beyond the realm of greenhouse gas reductions. Key policy insights While we increasingly understand the scale, scope, and potential of climate action by sub- and non-state actors, we lack rigorous evidence regarding the results achieved and their broader impacts. More information on progress and impact is essential for the credibility of sub- and non-state climate action. Policymakers need to understand which approaches are working and which are not, promoting the diffusion of best practice and creating conditions for stronger action in the future. The proposed conceptual framework can be tailored and applied to a wide range of initiatives that target mitigation, adaptation, and other spheres of climate action. By providing a template to identify key elements of progress tracking and evaluation, the framework can help align both research and practitioner communities around the data and metrics required to understand the overall impact of climate action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unlike climate change mitigation, adaptation to climate change does not as much suffer from the fundamental global public good problem – at least at the country-level – since it is in the self-interest of each individual country to adapt. However, the observed level of adaptation is insufficient from an economic perspective. We address this puzzle by adding a psychological perspective to explain actors' behaviour. Based on existing meta-analytic evidence we discuss micro- (i.e. individual-), meso- (i.e. group-) and macro- (i.e. society-) level factors that may contribute to more engagement in adaptation and provide recommendations on how to address them. The results show that the strongest predictors of individual adaptation behaviour are people's beliefs whether adaptive actions will be effective in protecting them from climate-related hazards (outcome expectancy), the degree to which people believe that they are able to engage in adaptive actions (self-efficacy) and their emotional reaction to climate change. Equally strong on a meso-level are behavioural norms and cultural aspects on a macro-level. We recommend that decision-makers create more transparency about the cause–effect chain between adaptation activity and desired adaptation effects to strengthen individuals' sense of efficacy. Furthermore, inducing reflection on social norms through communicative interventions may contribute to motivate adaptive actions by individuals and organisations. Key policy insights Psychological factors play an important but underestimated role in explaining adaptation behaviour. If people believe that they can address the risks of climate-related hazards they will show stronger adaptation behaviour. This insight can be used to incentivise more investments in adaptation. Social norms and cultural values are linked to adaptation behaviour. Public communication campaigns and other policy interventions can help to change social norms, and they should be tailored to the cultural values of societies. The influence of social norms and cultural values can be stronger than individual-level variables such as beliefs and preferences. People underestimate the extent to which others are willing to contribute to society, in particular in societies scoring high on individualism and masculinity. This can prevent people from investing in adaptation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the integrated assessment model TIAM-ECN, we analyze how Madagascar's nationally determined contribution (NDC) to the Paris Agreement can be implemented in both the energy and non-energy sectors. We explore how the country's national climate goal for 2030 can be reached under two different cost levels for climate change mitigation through land-use change. We find that land use is the main sector in which large greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions must be achieved, but there are opportunities to also exploit the country's abundant domestic low-carbon energy resources. We explore the options for such a transformation of Madagascar's energy system, which today largely relies on the use of biomass. If GHG emissions reduction in land use is hard or too costly to implement, e.g. as a result of land property rights or forest logging practices, total final energy use needs to be almost entirely renewable by 2050. The power sector needs to rely on 100% renewables already by 2030. In our scenario runs, biomass, hydropower, solar and wind energy account for the vast majority of electricity generation in Madagascar from 2030 onwards. Electrification is introduced in the residential sector – notably for cooking. Cumulative additional undiscounted investment requirements may be as high as US$ 8 billion up to 2050. Key policy insights Madagascar could reach its 14% GHG emission reduction target relative to 2030 business-as-usual levels through the land use sector only. However, given the potential higher mitigation costs in land use and its links with the energy system, overlooking mitigation options in the energy sector could be a missed opportunity to exploit abundant domestic low-carbon energy resources. Biomass may well remain the most important energy resource in Madagascar until 2050, mainly driven by residential cooking demand. Solid biomass stoves with efficient combustion should be promoted hand-in-hand with alternative fuels, e.g. electricity and bioethanol. Promoting GHG mitigation in both AFOLU and energy sectors maximizes co-benefits, which enables achieving a higher number of sustainable development goals (SDGs). Providing electricity for household services is an important part of climate change mitigation. Investments in power distribution infrastructure and decentralized electricity generation are needed to achieve electrification of rural households. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From a complexity thinking perspective, the world is understood as complex, systemic, and only partially knowable. The particular perspective we inhabit is determinant of what we can know. Perspective or 'approach' is therefore foregrounded by complexity thinkers as an active part of knowing and acting. We take a complexity view of climate change mitigation policymaking to argue that climate change mitigation policy communities have a dominant approach, which determines both our understanding of the climate change mitigation policy problem, and how we respond to it. To construct this argument, we first summarize and describe the existence of a hegemonic scientific and cultural worldview. We use multi-disciplinary literatures to demonstrate how this worldview operates in the approach of the international climate change mitigation policy community. Finally, we draw on empirical datasets to describe how the influence of this worldview characterizes the dominant approach of the South African climate change mitigation policy community. That climate change mitigation policy communities have a dominant approach means that, whilst aspects of the complex policy situation are illuminated by this approach, others are obscured. It is clear from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report on 1.5°C warming that policymakers are not yet responding adequately to the problem. If approach determines what we see and how we act, it follows that approach can be interrogated as an active site of the policy challenge. A complexity view, for instance, enables us to see differently, emphasizing perspective, impartial knowledge, non-linearities and emergence in complexity and complex systems. This in turn has implications for our policymaking. Key policy insights Policymakers should explore how an understanding of approach informs climate change mitigation policymaking. Climate change mitigation policy communities should critically examine the underlying assumptions and worldviews that influence both how we encounter climate change mitigation and how we act upon it. An appreciation of 'approach' demands skills not typically valued or taught to climate change mitigation policymakers, with implications for climate change mitigation policy curricula and the composition of policymaking teams Complexity thinking opens up spaces for policymaking currently obscured by the dominant climate change mitigation policy approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we examine legal perspectives on remedies for harm caused by climate related loss and damage. We start by discussing the meaning of loss and damage, and its relationship to climate mitigation and adaptation. We then consider, at a conceptual level, how those harmed by loss and damage from human-induced climate change may pursue remedies against those who have contributed to the harm suffered. Key policy insights Loss and damage is an issue that requires the attention of law and policy makers at domestic and international levels While existing legal systems are unlikely to be adequately equipped in their present form to respond adequately to claims for remedy to harm caused by loss and damage, they will be challenged to evolve over time to respond more effectively Legal systems will be challenged to identify appropriate claimants, appropriate respondents, appropriate remedies and actionable wrongs Different legal systems will make different choices on these critical issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how the introduction of a specific provision on loss and damage (L&D) in the Paris Agreement affects the construction of provisions on 'mitigation' and 'adaptation' as established within the treaty framework of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It shows that the establishment of L&D at treaty level has created a legal basis for finding 'responsibility' for adverse consequences that can be attributed to the failure to fulfil UNFCCC obligations as laid down in the provisions on mitigation and adaptation. This, it argues, strengthens the legal basis for pursuing remedies aimed at reparation for these consequences, such as the establishment of climate change funds and of insurance solutions. Moreover, it demonstrates that prior to establishing L&D at treaty level, L&D issues and measures (such as the Warsaw International Mechanism) were treated in legal terms within the framework of adaptation. However, with the adoption of the Paris Agreement, L&D has been given its own legal basis and therefore L&D issues and measures must henceforth be treated within this new framework. Key policy insights The provisions on mitigation and adaptation in the UNFCCC may be re-interpreted in light of Article 8 of the Paris Agreement so as to instil a legal responsibility in the UNFCCC provisions on mitigation and adaptation. The limits of 'adaptation' must be re-defined in light of the adoption of the Paris Agreement and the introduction of L&D as a third pillar of international climate change law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing research has increasingly identified synergies and trade-offs between urban climate change mitigation and adaptation policies. There is a gap, however, in our knowledge of the extent to which urban climate change mitigation efforts affect the adoption of adaptation policies. Analysing the presence of different levels of climate change mitigation efforts in European cities, while also considering local climate risks and national adaptation mandates, our results show a positive and significant correlation between mitigation and adaptation policies. This is partly a result of the perceptions and discourses linking global and local climate risks, and partly a consequence of the co-benefits of the two activities at the local level, which enable cities to piggyback on their prior mitigation efforts when adopting adaptation policies. A conceptual 'mitigation-adaptation nexus' governance framework is adopted to improve the current synergy versus conflict debate. Multilevel logit regression analyses of 261 European cities, controlling for both city- and country-level factors, suggest that adaptation is positively influenced in cities with mitigation action policies with monitoring systems, rather than mere mitigation commitments. We also find that national mandates drive local adoption of adaptation policies. Key policy insights The mitigation-adaptation nexus approach enables cities to regard climate change policies not as single-dimensional, but as comprehensive capacity building efforts. Cities committed to actual progress on mitigation policy (i.e. with a monitoring system in place) are more likely to adopt adaptation policies. Cities are driven to join municipal adaptation networks on the basis of their established mitigation policies rather than local climate risk profiles. National adaptation mandates have an important influence on local climate planning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Populism and its rhetoric are on the rise. Political actors across different ideological camps and parties are employing dispositional blame attribution, emphasizing the non-responsiveness of 'corrupt elites' to the needs of 'good and honest' people. In this paper, we focus on one specific and common area of blame attribution; climate change. In particular, in the United States, a central player in global climate governance, climate change is a very contested issue. The successes of populist candidates in both major US parties suggest that populism could affect citizen support for climate mitigation policies. The often abstract, elite-driven, and technical nature of climate change makes this issue an ideal target for populist critique. Our paper offers an empirical assessment of this claim. First, we test whether populism truly has an independent effect on people's climate attitudes. Second, we assess to what extent frames about elite responsiveness are important heuristics for individuals in their formation of preferences concerning climate policies. To accomplish this goal, we fielded representative US surveys (N = 3000) and collected both observational and experimental data. Results suggest that populist attitudes enhance the effects of partisanship, rather than creating an independent, orthogonal dimension. Populist Democrats support climate policies more than non-populist Democrats do, whereas populist Republicans oppose such policies more than non-populist Republicans do. Additionally, while our experimental results indicate that populist treatments blaming elites for being non-responsive to citizens' preferences do not affect policy support, we also find that reassuring individuals that political elites care about citizens' needs and preferences in relation to climate policy increases support for the latter. Key policy insights Citizens' support is central for implementing ambitious climate policies. Populist attitudes amplify partisanship effects on public opinion about climate policy. Populist discourse per se is not an obstacle to adopting ambitious climate policy in the US. Political entrepreneurs can foster support for climate policies by emphasizing elite responsiveness to citizens' needs and preferences. Populist attacks on established elites are unlikely to derail support for climate policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Increasing attention is being given to integrating adaptation and mitigation in climate change policies. Policy network analysis is a way to explore connections between adaptation and mitigation, and the opportunities or barriers to effective integration between these two policy subdomains. This study explores climate governance and policy networks by examining collaboration and information flows in national policy processes in Peru, a country with an active climate change policy domain. In contrast to most climate policy network analyses, this study distinguishes adaptation and mitigation subdomains through a multiplex approach. We used ERGM (Exponential Random Graph Models) to explain the existence of information flows and collaborations among 76 key actors in climate change policy in Peru. We identified actors who could connect adaptation and mitigation subdomains. Results show a concentration of influence in national government actors, particularly in the mitigation subdomain, and the isolation of actor groups that matter for policy implementation, such as the private sector or subnational actors. Results highlight the predominance of mitigation over adaptation and the existence of actors well positioned to broker relationships between the subdomains. The top brokers across subdomains were, however, not only actors with high centrality and brokerage roles in the subdomains, but also several 'unusual key players' that were not brokers in any of the two layers separately. Key policy insights National government institutions are central actors in climate change policy networks in Peru, reflecting national ownership of the climate change issue. Private sector organizations and subnational actors in Peru are the least involved in information sharing and collaboration on climate change. Actors from different levels and sectors are active in both adaptation and mitigation, which is good for climate policy integration. Actors with the capacity to bridge the two policy subdomains are not necessarily central to each subdomain but may be actors that close structural holes between subdomains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Concern over mitigation costs impedes the adoption of the climate policies needed to achieve agreed global warming targets. While costs are important to consider, so are benefits. However, the evidence for climate policy co-benefits, that is, the benefits in addition to avoided climate change costs, is commonly overlooked in policy-making. In many areas, the research is limited and not comprehensively synthesised. This article counters that problem and reviews 239 peer-reviewed articles, selected from 1,749 hits from a literature search covering 'co-benefits' and related terms. Aiming to aid policy-makers and to identify research gaps, we structure, describe, analyse and synthesize the rapidly expanding knowledge on climate policy co-benefits. Improved air quality is the co-benefit category dominating the literature, but studies covering a broad geographic range also focus on diet, physical activity, soil and water quality, biodiversity, economic performance, and energy security. In these areas, co-benefits are shown to be of substantial economic value, regarding air quality often of the same order of magnitude as mitigation costs, in some instances even larger. However, the share of studies quantifying or monetizing co-benefits is limited, and the empirical evidence is small, in particular for areas besides air quality and health. Furthermore, the knowledge is seldom used in policy-making, meaning that decision-making is often biased and overly concerned with costs, leading to suboptimal climate policies and goal failures. Evidently, more research is needed, as well as improved decision-making. Understanding and acting on climate policy co-benefits can promote policies that better mitigate climate change and improve overall welfare. Key policy insights Climate policy co-benefits in well-researched fields such as air quality and health are large, often equalling or exceeding mitigation costs. Despite their significance, co-benefits are seldom considered in decision-making, leading to biased policies and goal failures. In several areas, such as diet and energy security, co-benefits are sparsely researched, but emerging evidence points to high values. More research is needed, including on how to describe the total value of different co-benefits. Improved processes, documentation requirements and criteria in decision-making are needed, in order to ensure that political decision-makers consider co-benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thus far, efforts of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) to mobilize finance have failed to meet the needs of developing countries for addressing climate change. How the GCF's limited funds could be used to leverage additional financial resources has therefore become a key challenge. This study investigates whether the experience of the Global Environment Facility (GEF), especially with co-financing, could offer useful lessons. It analyzes 4,574 projects implemented by the GEF and investigates how leverage has been used to acquire greater international environmental assistance. We find that the co-financing ratio of GEF grants increased from 3.95–7.69 during 1991–2018, and climate change projects show the strongest leverage potential. We also find that the GEF generates different co-financing effects on different receipts, being higher in emerging economies and lower in low-income countries. These lessons are applied to GCF fundraising to determine which of four different funding allocation mechanisms could achieve the maximum co-financing effect. If the GCF follows the GEF leverage ratio, then the co-financing achieved by the proposed Carbon Reduction Contribution Principle (CC) allocation mechanism is the highest, while that of the Adaptation Needs Principle (AN) is the lowest. Although emerging economies are generally richer than other developing countries, excluding emerging economies from the GCF is not a wise option as it not only inhibits co-financing, but also weakens the climate mitigation purpose of the GCF. Key policy insights Emerging economies are able to leverage more co-financing than lower income countries. The GCF should therefore reserve partial grants for emerging economies to enhance total co-financing. To balance the allocation of funds among recipients, the GCF should set different co-financing standards for different developing countries, with emerging economies required to secure more co-financing than lower income countries. Regional co-financing ratios of the GEF for climate change purposes can be used as a reference. Co-financing will make climate mitigation more attractive than climate adaptation. The GCF should therefore balance the three targets of co-financing, climate mitigation and climate adaptation together to achieve a more equitable and effective use of the fund. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the UK introduced a Climate Change Act (CCA) in 2008, similar legislation has followed in a number of states, with each having a slightly different take. What unites these examples is that they all represent framework legislation that aims to facilitate climate change mitigation by creating continuous policy processes whereby mechanisms for the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are developed and implemented. This article is concerned with the extent to which they are living policy processes or rather symbolic gestures. We analyse seven European CCAs with regard to GHG emission reduction targets, planning/implementation mechanisms, and feedback/evaluations prescribed by the laws. These three features correspond with three aspects of climate policy integration (CPI): interpretations of CPI as a norm; CPI as a process of governing; CPI as a policy outcome. We show that CCAs address all three aspects of CPI and constitute living policy processes, although to varying extents. However, CCAs are also policy processes in that they are part of a political system, affected by political forces external to the legislation, positively and negatively. Key policy insights CCAs can provide a normative basis for policymaking on climate change at the national level, especially through quantitative emission reduction targets. Whilst CCAs can bring some stability and predictability to policymaking on climate change (mainly because legislation is more difficult to amend or remove than policy strategies), they are still vulnerable to political developments. Most CCAs lack either short/medium-term (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden) or long-term (Austria) targets. Given EU Member States' aim to decarbonise in the next three decades and the Paris Agreement's global goal of pursuing efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C, states need to find ways to guide this process. One approach could be the inclusion of short-term, medium-term and long-term targets in their CCAs. Since sanctioning mechanisms are lacking across all the CCAs analysed here, it is not clear what will happen if legally binding targets are not met. Just as it is difficult to imagine speed limits and speed cameras without accompanying penalties, it is hard to imagine how CCAs without sanctions can deliver decarbonization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on policy support or public acceptability of climate change policies is proliferating. There is, however, a great diversity in how these evaluative responses have been defined, operationalized, and measured across studies. In order to shed some light on this subject, we reviewed 118 studies published over the last 15 years aiming at measurement of policy acceptability, acceptance, support, and other responses to climate change mitigation policies. We found that conceptual vagueness and weak theoretical embedding are pervasive in the field, which leads to uncertainty over what is being measured, ambiguity of policy recommendations, and difficulties in comparing empirical results. In response, we propose a construct of policy attitudes as an overarching concept comprising the diversity of measures and constructs already in use. The purpose of the construct is to serve as a common basis for operationalization and survey design. In order to inform policy makers, researchers should be clear in how they formulate surveys with a focus on questions of importance to research and policy-making. Key policy insights Acceptability, acceptance, and support are defined as distinct and possibly empirically distinguishable classes of responses evaluating a policy proposal. These responses are expressions of underlying policy attitudes. People may respond to policies in other ways as well, including lack of interest. There is no popularity threshold for a policy to be safe to implement, but instead it is a matter of identifying the conditions of policy support or other responses. Results obtained using different measures of mitigation policy attitudes vary widely with respect to the characteristics of the policy in question and the measured response. Thus, great care must be taken when designing surveys and interpreting their results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change is projected to increase the frequency, intensity and unpredictability of extreme weather events across the globe and these events are likely to have significant mental health implications. The mental health literature broadly characterises negative emotional reactions to extreme weather experiences as undesirable impacts on wellbeing. Yet, other research in psychology suggests that negative emotional responses to extreme weather are an important motivation for personal action on climate change. This article addresses the intersection of mental health and functional perspectives on negative emotions, with a specific focus on the potential that reduced negative emotional responses to extreme weather may also translate to diminished motivation to undertake climate change mitigation actions – which we term the 'resilience paradox'. Using survey data gathered in the aftermath of severe flooding across the UK in winter 2013/2014, we present new evidence indicating that self-appraised coping ability moderates the link between flooding experience and negative emotions and thereby attenuates the indirect link between flooding experience and climate change mitigation intentions. We conclude that support for flood victims should extend beyond addressing emotional, physical and financial stresses to include acknowledgement of the involvement of climate change and communication of the need for action to combat future climate risks. Key policy insights Psychological resilience to flooding and other extreme weather events can translate to diminished motivation to mitigate climate change Negative emotional reactions need to occur at an optimal level to enable people to respond appropriately to climate risks. Flood victims' subjective appraisal of their ability to cope does not necessarily encompass consideration of the role played by climate change. Therefore, support for victims of extreme weather should include explicit acknowledgement of the involvement of climate change and the need for action to mitigate future climate risks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The role of agriculture in the context of climate change is a complex issue. On the one hand, concerns about food security highlight the need to prioritize adaptation; on the other hand, the target of the Paris Agreement (keeping global temperature rise well below 2°C) cannot be achieved without a significant decrease in agricultural emissions. Various analyses of nationally determined contributions (NDCs) submitted under the Paris Agreement show how countries intend to prioritize the needs for adaptation and mitigation in the agricultural sector. This paper focuses on 46 countries that contribute 90% of global agricultural emissions and asks how they are addressing the agricultural sector in their climate mitigation policies. It takes into account that conditions and circumstances in countries vary significantly but might also indicate similar patterns. The analysis is based on information provided by countries in their NDCs, as well as their Biennial Reports (BRs) or Biennial Update Reports (BURs) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It further includes data on national agricultural emissions. By applying a mixed methods approach, which combines qualitative content analysis and comparative cluster analysis, we find that countries vary in their progress on agriculture and climate mitigation for many different reasons. These reasons include the national perception of the problem, divergent starting points for climate policy, particularities of the agricultural sector and, correspondingly, the availability of cost-effective mitigation technologies. Key policy insights While for many countries the NDCs signify the beginning of their climate policy, UNFCCC biennial reports can be used to learn more about the policies that countries have already implemented. Mitigation action in the agricultural sector is emphasized most prominently in cases where co-benefits are possible and production is not impacted negatively. Policies and measures in the agricultural sector often do not align with the UNFCCC system of monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV). In addition to improving MRV-systems, it seems equally important to exchange national experiences with implemented measures and policies. The Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture could take into account the problem of different definitions of sector boundaries and thus the importance of different mitigation measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Company cars have received considerable attention because of their partial tax-exemption and the changes in travel behaviour they stimulate, including car model choices, distances driven, and car ownership patterns. This paper is the first to present evidence on actual transport behaviour change, based on mobility and fuel diaries, and comparing a sample of 624 company cars and 9328 private cars in Germany. Analysis confirms that company cars belong to the more heavily motorized car segments (with an average 97 kW, as opposed to 79 kW of private cars), and are driven more than private cars (24,672 km per year, compared to 12,828 km per year for private cars). Company car benefits also increase average household vehicle numbers by 25%. Results show that it is imperative to distinguish company cars of company owners relative to those driven by employees, as negative externalities increase significantly where company cars are used by the latter. Abolishing company car benefits could significantly reduce emissions from passenger road transport and stimulate change in the country's automotive industries towards a lower-carbon path. As Germany is not currently on track to meet its climate mitigation targets, this would be a timely policy shift. Key policy insights Company car benefits increase transport demand, car ownership, and average vehicle fleet engine power. These effects are particularly relevant for employees. Company cars have, in spite of their larger size and greater engine power, a (modestly) better fuel economy than private cars, possibly because they represent more recent and hence more efficient car models. A policy focus on vehicle fuel efficiency improvements will fail to reduce the German car fleet's CO2 emissions to a sustainable level. Abolishing company car benefits could yield a significant reduction in GHG emissions from passenger road transport. Company car subsidies are an out-dated mode of support for the fossil-fuel based automotive industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Paris Agreement establishes provisions for using international carbon market mechanisms to achieve climate mitigation contributions. Environmental integrity is a key principle for using such mechanisms under the Agreement. This paper systematically identifies and categorizes issues and options to achieve environmental integrity, including how it could be defined, what influences it, and what approaches could mitigate environmental integrity risks. Here, environmental integrity is assumed to be ensured if the engagement in international transfers of carbon market units leads to the same or lower aggregated global emissions. Four factors are identified that influence environmental integrity: the accounting for international transfers; the quality of units generated, i.e. whether the mechanism ensures that the issuance or transfer of units leads to emission reductions in the transferring country; the ambition and scope of the mitigation target of the transferring country; and incentives or disincentives for future mitigation action, such as possible disincentives for transferring countries to define future mitigation targets less ambitiously or more narrowly in order to sell more units. It is recommended that policy-makers combine several approaches to address the significant risks to environmental integrity. Key policy insights Robust accounting is a key prerequisite for ensuring environmental integrity. The diversity of nationally determined contributions is an important challenge, in particular for avoiding double counting and for ensuring that the accounting for international transfers is representative for the mitigation efforts by Parties over time. Unit quality can, in theory, be ensured through appropriate design of carbon market mechanisms; in practice, existing mechanisms face considerable challenges in ensuring unit quality. Unit quality could be promoted through guidance under Paris Agreement Article 6, and reporting and review under Article 13. The ambition and scope of mitigation targets is key for the incentive for transferring countries to ensure unit quality because countries with ambitious and economy-wide targets would have to compensate for any transfer of units that lack quality. Encouraging countries to adopt ambitious and economy-wide NDC targets would therefore facilitate achieving environmental integrity. Restricting transfers in instances of high environmental integrity risk - through eligibility criteria or limits - could complement these approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) has emerged as a promising climate change mitigation mechanism in developing countries. In order to identify the enabling conditions for achieving progress in the implementation of an effective, efficient and equitable REDD+, this paper examines national policy settings in a comparative analysis across 13 countries with a focus on both institutional context and the actual setting of the policy arena. The evaluation of REDD+ revealed that countries across Africa, Asia and Latin America are showing some progress, but some face backlashes in realizing the necessary transformational change to tackle deforestation and forest degradation. A Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) undertaken as part of the research project showed two enabling institutional configurations facilitating progress: (1) the presence of already initiated policy change; and (2) scarcity of forest resources combined with an absence of any effective forestry framework and policies. When these were analysed alongside policy arena conditions, the paper finds that the presence of powerful transformational coalitions combined with strong ownership and leadership, and performance-based funding, can both work as a strong incentive for achieving REDD+ goals. Key policy insights The positive push of already existing policy change, or the negative stress of resource scarcity together with lack of effective policies, represents institutional conditions that can support REDD+ progress. Progress also requires the presence of powerful transformational coalitions and strong ownership and leadership. In the absence of these internal drivers, performance-based funding can work as a strong incentive. When comparing three assessments (2012, 2014, 2016) of REDD+ enabling conditions, some progress in establishing processes of change can be observed over time; however, the overall fluctuation in progress of most countries reveals the difficulty in changing the deforestation trajectory away from business as usual. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The increasing number of coastal floods in recent years in France has resulted in the design of new adaptation principles for the most endangered coastal areas. The aim of the government is to reduce the vulnerability of these areas by relocating property and infrastructure. These measures have, however, come up against considerable opposition from the population concerned. Using a survey of 421 inhabitants of Hyeres, a coastal town in the South of France, this article proposes the study of resistance to relocation through the creation of an index for resistance that incorporates attachment to place, residential mobility and risk perception. The results show a correlation for the index and distance from the sea that highlights the existence of conflicting interests with adaptation measures depending upon population categories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change mitigation has two main characteristics that interact to make it an extremely demanding challenge of governance: the complexity of the socio-technical systems that must be transformed to avoid climate change and the presence of profound uncertainties. A number of tools and approaches exist, which aim to help manage these challenges and support long-term decision making. However, most tools and approaches assume that there is one decision maker with clearly defined objectives. The interaction between decision makers with differing perspectives and agency is an additional uncertainty that is rarely addressed, despite the wide recognition that action is required at multiple scales and by multiple actors. This article draws inspiration from dynamic adaptive policy pathways to build on current decision support methods, extending analysis to include the perspectives and agency of multiple actors through a case study of the UK construction sector. The findings demonstrate the importance of considering alignment between perspectives, agency and potential actions when developing plans; the need for mobilizing and advocacy actions to build momentum for radical change; and the crucial influence of interaction between actors. The decision support approach presented could improve decision making by reflecting the diversity and interaction of actors; identifying short-term actions that connect to long-term goals and keeping future options open. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Globally, agriculture and related land use change contributed about 17% of the world’s anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2010 (8.4 GtCO2e yr−1), making GHG mitigation in the agriculture sector critical to meeting the Paris Agreement’s 2°C goal. This article proposes a range of country-level targets for mitigation of agricultural emissions by allocating a global target according to five approaches to effort-sharing for climate change mitigation: responsibility, capability, equality, responsibility-capability-need and equal cumulative per capita emissions. Allocating mitigation targets according to responsibility for total historical emissions or capability to mitigate assigned large targets for agricultural emission reductions to North America, Europe and China. Targets based on responsibility for historical agricultural emissions resulted in a relatively even distribution of targets among countries and regions. Meanwhile, targets based on equal future agricultural emissions per capita or equal per capita cumulative emissions assigned very large mitigation targets to countries with large agricultural economies, while allowing some densely populated countries to increase agricultural emissions. There is no single ‘correct’ framework for allocating a global mitigation goal. Instead, using these approaches as a set provides a transparent, scientific basis for countries to inform and help assess the significance of their commitments to reducing emissions from the agriculture sector. Key policy insights Meeting the Paris Agreement 2°C goal will require global mitigation of agricultural non-CO2 emissions of approximately 1 GtCO2e yr−1 by 2030. Allocating this 1 GtCO2e yr−1 according to various effort-sharing approaches, it is found that countries will need to mitigate agricultural business-as-usual emissions in 2030 by a median of 10%. Targets vary widely with criteria used for allocation. The targets calculated here are in line with the ambition of the few countries (primarily in Africa) that included mitigation targets for the agriculture sector in their (Intended) Nationally Determined Contributions. For agriculture to contribute to meeting the 2°C or 1.5°C targets, countries will need to be ambitious in pursuing emission reductions. Technology development and transfer will be particularly important. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Food-insecure households in many countries depend on international aid to alleviate acute shocks and chronic shortages. Some food security programmes (including Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program-PSNP - which provides a case study for this article) have integrated aid in exchange for labour on public works to reduce long-term dependence by investing in the productive capacity and resilience of communities. Using this approach, Ethiopia has embarked upon an ambitious national programme of land restoration and sustainable land management. Although the intent was to reduce poverty, here we show that an unintended co-benefit is the climate-change mitigation from reduced greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and increased landscape carbon stocks. The article first shows that the total reduction in net GHG emissions from PSNP’s land management at the national scale is estimated at 3.4 million Mg CO2e y−1 - approximately 1.5% of the emissions reductions in Ethiopia’s Nationally Determined Contribution for the Paris Agreement. The article then explores some of the opportunities and constraints to scaling up of this impact. Key policy insights Food security programmes (FSPs) can contribute to climate change mitigation by creating a vehicle for investment in land and ecosystem restoration. Maximizing mitigation, while enhancing but not compromising food security, requires that climate projections, and mitigation and adaptation responses should be mainstreamed into planning and implementation of FSPs at all levels. Cross-cutting oversight is required to integrate land restoration, climate policy, food security and disaster risk management into a coherent policy framework. Institutional barriers to optimal implementation should be addressed, such as incentive mechanisms that reward effort rather than results, and lack of centralized monitoring and evaluation of impacts on the physical environment. Project implementation can often be improved by adopting best management practices, such as using productive living livestock barriers where possible, and increasing the integration of agroforestry and non-timber forest products into landscape regeneration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on low-carbon transformation pathways has focused on carbon pricing as a means for climate stabilization. By contrast, technology policies remain the more prominent national climate policy instruments today: renewable energy subsidies amount to more than US$100 billion per year globally - more than twice the value of priced carbon in 2016. Given technology spillovers and global learning effects, it remains unclear how technology policies can be coordinated internationally as part of climate stabilization policy. Our study is the first to derive optimal technology and climate policy for the 2C target using an energy-economy-climate model. We show an economic rationale to include an international technology protocol alongside carbon pricing: Cumulative low-carbon subsidies of more than US$1 trillion from 2020 until the end of the century mainly support solar power as well as electric- and hydrogen-powered passenger vehicles. Higher carbon pricing could replace subsidies at very low cost, but mitigation cost increases from delayed carbon pricing can be reduced only somewhat by stepping up subsidies. Our study suggests that existing low-carbon subsidies must be complemented by full carbon pricing to achieve 2C cost-efficiently: Alongside the optimal carbon price, low-carbon subsidies should amount to no more than ∼6% of the value of priced carbon. Key policy insights International spillovers in low-carbon technologies may slow their deployment. We derive optimal technology and climate policy for 2C in an energy-economy-climate model. Subsidies of more than US$1 trillion support mainly solar and advanced car technologies. Replacing all subsidies by carbon pricing barely increases mitigation costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a detailed analysis of the Tokyo Metropolitan Emissions Trading Scheme (Tokyo ETS), Japan’s first emissions trading scheme with mandatory cap initiated by the government of Tokyo. Unlike trading schemes in other countries, the Tokyo ETS covers indirect emissions from the commercial sector. It is well known that a variety of market barriers impede full realization of energy efficiency opportunities, especially in the commercial sector. Experiences with the Tokyo ETS should therefore provide important lessons for the design of climate change mitigation policies, especially when targeting the commercial sector. The emissions from covered entities have been drastically reduced from those at the scheme’s outset, with an average 14% reduction as of the end of the first commitment period of five years (2010-2014) compared with 2009 levels. This paper shows that the Tokyo ETS alone did not cause these reductions; there were other drivers. Among them, the energy savings triggered by the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 were crucial. The contribution of credit trading, in contrast, was limited since most of the covered entities reduced emissions by themselves. Through an investigation of official reports, an assessment of the emissions data from the covered entities compared to those of uncovered entities and in-depth interviews with firms covered by the scheme, this paper confirms that the main drivers of emissions reductions by covered entities were separate from the ETS. In fact, the advisory aspect of the scheme seems to be much more important in encouraging energy-saving actions. Key policy insights Most of the observed emission reductions were not caused by the Tokyo ETS alone. An advisory instrument was crucial to the effectiveness of the Tokyo ETS. The experience of the Tokyo ETS suggests that making full use of the advantages of emissions trading is difficult in the case of the commercial sector. Price signals have not provided a stimulus to climate change mitigation actions, which implies that establishing a cap to yield effective carbon prices poses a challenge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]