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Since the onset of the Coronavirus Disease 2019(COVID-19) global pandemic, Sino–US strategic rivalry has dramatically heightened to a pitch where there is a mounting discussion over whether or not China and the United States have embarked on a "new Cold War." There are three main views in this regard. The first is that China and the United States have indeed entered a new Cold War; the second is that China and the United States are heading for a new Cold War; and the third is that China and the United States will not descend into a new Cold War. Different views reflect different scholarly understandings of the essential properties of the Cold War concept. Fundamentally, the two core features of the Cold War were ideological confrontation and proxy war. Considering that current US–China strategic competition is in the technological rather than ideological domain, and that neither side has instigated any proxy war; however, the phrase "new Cold War" is inappropriate; that of "Porous Curtain" is more apt. The ever-narrowing power gap between China and the United States has undoubtedly prompted the US government's adoption of a policy of blockade and containment to curb China's rising power. However, the deep integration of the international system and historical inertia of US–China interaction preclude the US's complete isolation from China. This has resulted in bilateral relations of a more porous nature. Although the future may not be promising, competition does not necessarily lead to conflict. For this reason, managing the bilateral competitive relationship and striving towards coexistence under competition should be the key task of both countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the Trump administration, Sino-American relations have deteriorated to the point where the new consensus in the U.S. foreign policy establishment is that a new Cold War has begun between the U.S. and China. This article looks at the origins of the "first Cold War" for insight into how a second Cold War might be avoided. There is a danger of the Cold War turning hot because of power transition dynamics. This article also invokes the pre-1914 Anglo-German rivalry, and argues that if conflict is to be avoided, the U.S. must accommodate China's rise by yielding hegemony in East Asia and meeting China's status claim. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Constructing a credible foreign threat is a key activity in the US national security community. By adopting a narrative approach to threat formation, we attempt to delineate the contours of the Soviet Union, Japan, and China in the US threat discourse spectrum. The Soviet threat is constructed through a story of two ideologically opposed rivals competing for world domination and the Japan-bashing narrative is of victimisation due to Japan's unfair competition. China threat stories, however, are now more complex, conflating a story of US victimhood at the hands of China's unfair competition, advocated by President Trump, with a widely embedded but malleable epic tale of power competition between a rising power and the ruling power, and a new Cold War script propagated by the 'deep state' hawks. We have found that as long as a country may potentially threaten the United States' hegemonic identity, be it a formidable power with an antagonistic outlook like the Soviet Union, an ally from inside like Japan, or a rising peer competitor like China, the United States will invariably construct a diametrical self-other story in a zero-sum mindset and resort relentlessly to its superior Self while customising its threat story scripts in accordance with the rival's characteristics and dimensions of challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The year 2019 saw the curtain rise on a US–China bipolar rivalry quite different from the Cold War US–Soviet bipolarity. The fundamental difference between the current bipolar rivalry and that during the Cold War is that ideology is no longer the main engine driving international competition, but rather the new digital dimension of strategic competition that is emerging between the United States and China. Technological advancement over the past 15 years has led world history's entry into the early digital age. The development of digital technology has created new ways of protecting national security, of accumulating national wealth, and of obtaining international support. Cybersecurity is becoming the core of national security and the share of digital economy in major powers' gross domestic product dramatically increases. For the leading powers, strategic competition in cyberspace in this early digital age outstrips to a crucial extent that within physical geographic boundaries. This article observes that Cold War mentality and digital mentality will have mixed impact on foreign policy-making in the digital age, and that interactions between the nations whose foreign policy is simultaneously influenced by both mentalities will shape the emerging international order into one of uneasy peace, where there is no direct war and few proxy wars. It will rather be a scenario reflecting the dark side of globalization and downside of global governance, evident in the violation of agreements, double dealing, cyber-attacks, and technology decoupling between states. Although further digital advancement will indeed change international politics in ever more aspects, US–China bipolar configuration will nevertheless remain in place for at least for two decades, or perhaps longer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Yan Xuetong's Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers argues that China should follow moral values in its foreign policy in order to attain international leadership. Drawing on ancient Chinese thought, Yan makes the case that China should strive for humane authority, influencing other states by leading through moral example and attracting supporters through providing benefits rather than using coercion. This essay evaluates the feasibility of China's attainment of humane authority, which is related to status. Humane authority follows norms consistently toward rivals as well as friendly states whereas a hegemon uses a double standard. But double standards may not be so easily avoided because they derive from inherent psychological bias. The option of acquiring followers by providing them with security guarantees is not available to China in East Asia because of the prior existence of the US alliance system. Yan predicts that China's growth will lead to a bipolar structure but points out that the conditions for a Cold War are absent. Nevertheless, technological competition between the US and China could lead to a 'new Cold War', which would hamper China's efforts to widen its circle of followers. To be a humane authority, China should also avoid a war with the USA. There is a risk that naval competition could lead to local conflicts as a result of security dilemma dynamics. The two states should control status rivalry through a division of labour, by accepting the other's pre-eminence in different areas through social cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The post-Cold War international system, dominated by the United States, has been shaken by the relative downturn of the US economy and the simultaneous rise of China. China is rapidly emerging as a serious contender for America's dominance of the Indo-Pacific. What is noticeable is the absence of intense balance of power politics in the form of formal military alliances among the states in the region, unlike state behaviour during the Cold War era. Countries are still hedging as their strategic responses towards each other evolve. We argue that the key factor explaining the absence of intense hard balancing is the dearth of existential threat that either China or its potential adversaries feel up till now. The presence of two related critical factors largely precludes existential threats, and thus hard balancing military coalitions formed by or against China. The first is the deepened economic interdependence China has built with the potential balancers, in particular, the United States, Japan, and India, in the globalisation era. The second is the grand strategy of China, in particular, the peaceful rise/development, and infrastructure-oriented Belt and Road Initiative. Any radical changes in these two conditions leading to existential threats by the key states could propel the emergence of hard - balancing coalitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article evaluates, through statistical analysis, China’s foreign policy of non-intervention, and answers the question of whether or not China has kept to its declared policy regarding intrastate wars relative to the other four powers that are permanent members of the UN Security Council. The evidence in this article suggests that the Chinese policy of non-interference was more a declaration than a policy. China significantly lower only from the United States and the USSR/Russia and differs solely in numbers of interventions, their extent, and diversity. Yet China is the only power that has not sent troops to interfere in intrastate wars. The country’s share among the powers in supporting actors in intrastate wars is significantly less as time passes, although China exhibited no significantly different trends between the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods. It is, on the contrary, the United States and UK among the powers that have significantly increased their relative share of interference. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article explores the diplomatic relations between the U.S. and China, highlighting Yan Xuetong's superficial friendship theory which explains the stability and instability of U.S.-China relations. It highlights the application of events data which evaluates overall patterns of conflict and cooperation in the U.S.-China relationships. It tackles the impact of Cold War and Uyghur terrorism on the relationship between the two countries.