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This paper seeks to provide an original examination of the nature of the proliferation of sensitive materials and technologies by Chinese entities. A number of publications have attempted to understand the issue of proliferation stemming from businesses based in China, with many having commented on the efforts undertaken both by international actors and by the Chinese government to prevent it. However, relatively few scholars have sought, in any systematic and sustained way, to understand the types of Chinese companies involved in proliferation and the evolution of their behaviour. This paper seeks to argue and account for the declining role of, and concern regarding, Chinese state-owned enterprise in the global proliferation problem. Different accounts for this change, and the relating proliferation challenge posed by China, are examined. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This essay assesses various dimensions of China's defence industrial enterprises. It argues that the defence industrial system should be divided into two tiers: tier one, composed of weapons and equipment producers for the military, and tier two, composed of “civilian” industrial enterprises that provided critical inputs for tier one enterprises, and which in national emergencies could be mobilized to produce weapons themselves. In 1985, there were 1,158 tier one defence enterprises and 827 tier two enterprises among China's 8,285 large- and medium-scale enterprises. Additional information is provided on defence enterprise shares of the economy at the provincial and the national levels, on enterprise distribution by industrial sector, and on when enterprises were built. The article attempts to estimate the total number of workers, output value and fixed assets of the defence industrial sector, and their weight in the national economy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]