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While reaffirming China's longstanding "peace and development" line and offering a more positive take on many developments in Asia, the 2019 Defense White Paper highlights many negative features of the global security environment. This suggests an unresolved internal contradiction in China's security views and policies. Such an apparent contradiction is perhaps resolved by the Defense White Paper's description of strategic competition as driven largely by the U.S., not by China, and out of step with deeper global trends. Indeed, the PLA under Xi Jinping is depicted as working with other countries to realize Xi's "shared community for mankind" as it strengthens its deterrence capabilities. Yet this propaganda-laden take reinforces the suspicions of many regarding China's "real" goals. Beijing must inject a much more pragmatic, hard-power perspective into its public security stance and engage Washington on that basis in order to realize a meaningful level of stability based on mutual accommodation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduced in April 2022, China's "Global Security Initiative" is now two years old. This essay takes stock of the GSI's development since its introduction, examining and assessing how the GSI's content has been fleshed out, how it has been received by other states, and how its implementation has progressed. To date, the GSI's content remains vague and broad, most likely to increase support, pursue opportunistic implementation, and discredit the United States as a security actor. Formal support from other states, as reflected in including the GSI in joint documents, is limited. The GSI's implementation has been uneven, especially in Asia, with few regional organizations offering unqualified support and or pursuing cooperation under the banner of the initiative. Looking ahead, the prospects for the GSI and its implementation are mixed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's leadership has modified the military's formal role in national strategy, which is known as its "historic missions." The change reflects an appreciation of both the opportunities and the perils posed by China's rise as a great power as well as by anxiety about the intensifying domestic political vulnerabilities that stem from economic deceleration and persistent official malfeasance. Paradoxically, the government's expanded view of national security has meant a diminution in the role of the military in security policy toward one of "strategic support." As non-military threats intensify, the role of the People's Liberation Army in national strategy will likely focus on modernization and assistance to non-military efforts to protect an expanding array of interests along China's periphery and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Due to the deterioration of China's external environment in general, and its escalating tensions with the United States in particular, the Chinese government has readjusted its economic development strategy. As delineated in Beijing's 14th Five-Year Plan, which was unveiled in mid-March of this year, China will invest in efforts designed to strengthen its economic security and better protect its economy from external economic threats. These initiatives include science and technology self-sufficiency, secure supply chains in its manufacturing economy, growth sustained by domestic demand, and food and energy security. Although these efforts seem attractive on paper, China will likely encounter immense challenges in trying to implement its new development strategy. Chinese leaders may have underestimated the potential costs of strengthening national security at the expense of global integration. Beijing's disappointing records in executing industrial policy and rebalancing its economy also raise doubts whether it will be able to meet its ambitious goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Chinese government began to implement a new form of social control - grid management - about fifteen years ago. On paper, the country has largely finished setting up more than one million grids in local communities. Grid management, which entails dividing communities into small units (1,000 residents per unit, as in most cases) and equipping them with information and surveillance technology, appeals to the top Chinese leadership because it promises to provide the party-state a new and more capable instrument of social control and delivery of public services. Publicly available materials suggest that most localities adapt their existing local organizations, such as neighborhood and village committees, into grids to comply with the central government's order. As fully effective grid management requires enormous investments in well-trained manpower and reliable technology, it will likely take years for China to build such a system. At the moment, only wealthy cities seem to have made genuine progress in the development of grid management, while most grids are likely no more than relabeled neighborhood committees. Like China's social credit system, grid management is evidence, but not yet reality, of the ruling Chinese Communist Party's aspirations to construct a well-organized and technologically sophisticated surveillance state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although not the primary cause that prompted the sudden reversal of Xi Jinping's signature "zero-COVID" policy, the protests that swept twenty-one provinces and over two hundred college and university campuses in late November no doubt played a role in the timing of the decision. Yet, neither the excessive zeal with which the coronavirus prevention measures were applied at the local level nor the resulting rise in social discontent were surprising or unpredictable. Both were the result of an increasingly autocratic system that demands absolute adherence to an increasingly infeasible task and places downward pressures on the social grassroots. The "blank page" protests brought together three disparate groups - the urban working class, suffering economic deprivation caused by the rolling lockdowns; the middle-class urbanites and university students, suffering from "lockdown fatigue"; and an exploding solidarity movement of overseas Chinese students and members of the next-generation Chinese diaspora, who provided support via social media. Predictably, public security officials attempted to defuse, dissipate, and contain these groups, and propaganda organs appeared poised to declare the end of "zero-COVID" as a public relations victory. The ongoing search for nefarious "foreign forces," allegedly behind the protests, highlights the inability of China's repressive apparatus to recognize the fact that the unorganized interests behind the protests were unlikely to have been driven by a larger anti-state agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Assessments of China's efforts to promote indigenous innovation will be fruitless without clear metrics for technological self-sufficiency. Yet, indicators of indigenous innovation are more ambiguous than other scientific and technological indicators, which complicates such assessments. Indeed, clear-eyed evaluations of China's drive to reduce foreign dependence in information-technology domains are muddied by confusion over the definition of indigenous innovation and the widening "gray zone" between domestic and foreign companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite its economic growth challenges, China's global influence remains strong due to its significant role in international finance and development. China invests globally not because of its excess capital but to serve domestic needs. Since 2016, China has consistently ranked among the top three in foreign direct investment flows and has been the world's largest bilateral official creditor since 2017. Chinese state-directed capital has amplified China's geo-economic clout, with substantial investments in overseas assets, including foreign firms and critical infrastructures. China's international creditor position and global development initiatives have made it a formidable force in redefining the sovereign debt restructuring negotiations process and reshaping global governance. China's competitive clean energy industrial sectors, such as electric vehicles and batteries, will continue challenging Western industries. Finally, China's efforts to promote an alternative financial system to mitigate geopolitical risks advance its continued global presence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nothing in economic development is certain, but China's economy has probably already peaked in size as a proportion of the global economy, reaching the peak in 2021. China now faces a structural economic slowdown as the financial system constrains economic growth rather than facilitating it. These economic pressures are directly linked to the end of an unprecedented credit and investment expansion during the previous decade. The resulting credit crunch has produced a collapse in property investment and slower local government infrastructure investment. Moreover, GDP growth has almost certainly been overstated in the official data both in both 2022 and 2023. The costs of years of low-return investments now prevent Beijing from redirecting the financial system, making it difficult to unleash improvements in efficiency or "new quality productive forces." However, nothing about Beijing's behavior in response to this structural slowdown is inevitable, as China's leaders can adjust their economic objectives and potentially ease tensions with the rest of the world by publicly acknowledging a slower growth trajectory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's leaders confront mounting internal and external headwinds to their country's continuing rise. At home, Beijing's economic engine is sputtering. Abroad, countries are pushing back against Chinese attempts to export its way to economic growth. On the security front, countries are banding together to guard against China's expansion in military capabilities. This confluence of challenges has caused some American analysts to declare the end of China's rise and warn that Beijing could lash out militarily before it begins its downturn in national power. China's leaders explicitly reject suggestions that the country's best days are behind it. They believe China's path to greater global influence is widening as America's dominance in the international system wanes. It would be a mistake to organize American policy around "peak China" theory. The United States and China are locked in a long-term competition for global influence. This competition ultimately will turn on national performance. That is where America's policy focus must reside for the United States to preserve its privileged position in the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite its current economic slump, official statements by senior Chinese leaders indicate that they remain optimistic about the country's economic future. They have responded critically to the "peak China" thesis, providing a lengthy list of favorable factors in support of their optimistic assessment of China's future trajectory, such as the country's advantages of scale, accumulated economic resources and technological capabilities, and its new development framework crafted to mitigate the effects of U.S.-led containment. Although Chinese leaders' optimism is partly grounded in reality, it may be premature because the country's immense potential will unlikely be realized without effective implementation of the necessary reforms. Examination of statements by senior Chinese leaders does not provide useful clues as to whether or when Chinese power will peak. However, it does show that Chinese leaders do not believe that their best days are behind them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China is experiencing a rapidly declining fertility rate and increased life expectancy. Most people attribute China's structural deceleration to its demographics, but the reality is that the still-incomplete urbanization is helping to offset the negative impact of aging on growth. In fact, until 2035, China's labor force is only projected to contract in the rural areas, while the urban labor force will continue to grow, which is much more productive than in the rural areas. This is why aging will not have a negative impact on growth until urbanization is completed, which is estimated to happen around 2035. From that year onwards, the rapid fall in labor supply will shave off 1.3 percentage points of growth each year. By then, China is likely to grow only 1 percent per year, in line with Japan's potential growth today. Nevertheless, rapid robotization and artificial intelligence may mitigate the negative impact of aging in economic growth. Robotization has been ratcheted up in China - as well as in Japan much earlier - but neither in Japan's case nor in China's have we so far seen productivity increase, on the contrary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a January 2023 talk to the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, shortly after the wave of "A4 protests" that called for an end to Xi Jinping's signature "zero-COVID" policies, the Party general secretary insisted that his "strict comprehensive governance of the Party" was not equivalent to "governing people to death." Instead, Xi argued, it aimed to create a healthy and vibrant society, capable of fostering a political environment conducive to innovation and entrepreneurialism. However, there is considerable evidence to suggest that it is having the opposite effect, both among grassroots officials as well as on society more generally. I argue that this is in part due to the attendant shift under Xi away from the incentive structures associated with so-called "performance legitimacy" during the early post-Mao era in favor of a renewed emphasis on ideological purity and loyalty to the Party's new "core." One such example is the rise of "lying flat" as a term of passive popular resistance that circulated widely in 2021 before it was colonized by official discourse and transformed into a broader tool of political criticism by the central authorities, who identified it with laxity, "formalism," and incompetence, particularly at lower levels of the Party-state. As a term of political abuse deployed against officials, "lying flat" peaked under China's "zero-COVID" struggle, which ended in 2022. I conclude that "lying flat" arose chiefly as a response to Xi's "comprehensive strict governance," both inside and outside the Party. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can the People's Liberation Army (PLA) achieve its ambitious modernization goals in an era of economic stagnation? Fewer national resources for procurement combined with technological restrictions imposed by the United States and temptations to use force in regional disputes could all hinder modernization timelines that extend through 2049. Nevertheless, gloomy assessments are premature. This essay argues that the PLA will probably stay on track. China's overall defense burden is far smaller than that of the Soviets during the Cold War or that of the U.S. today, meaning that funding will continue to flow. The impact of U.S. restrictions on the PLA will be diminished by domestic innovation and inconsistent participation by U.S. partners. Additionally, China's leaders have generally followed a military strategy that encourages a focus on long-term modernization priorities and avoidance of strategic distractions. Consequently, Beijing will probably not see the PLA as a diminishing asset that must be used during this decade, and competitive strategies to weaken China's military might from the outside are likely unrealistic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese policymakers have been aware that financial security is part of national security since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. During the past decade, especially since the escalation of U.S.-China trade tensions since 2018, anxieties among Chinese policymakers over the country's financial security have increased. In this context, China has accelerated development of an alternative global financial system with the goal of reducing its strategic vulnerabilities to potential sanctions. This article presents three primary strategies that the Chinese government has pursued to achieve this goal: supporting and expanding regional and multilateral currency and financial cooperation through various non-Western partnerships; increasing broader use of the renminbi in international trade and investment while also promoting the building of a renminbi-based international financial infrastructure; and, as the global economy is decarbonizing, improving the role of the renminbi in global commodities pricing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the promotion of military-industrial technocrats to central party-state leadership positions, Xi Jinping initiated a series of significant directional and policy changes in China's political economy, including the strengthening of the ultra-statist model, the militarization of the economy, and, especially, technology-driven growth based on independent technological innovation. However, in the past year this plan has encountered tremendous setbacks, particularly in actualizing China's self-reliance in key technology and industry sectors, such as semiconductors. Huge financial inputs to these sectors have produced rampant corruption, highlighting the inherent dilemma between statist governance and economic and technological development. Furthermore, Xi's power politics to control the rising military-industrial leaders has created a contradiction between his personal/power concerns and his policy/governance preferences. Such "politics against governance" helps explain why, since assuming his third term of absolute dominance in the leadership, Xi still seems to be facing a series of problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has two security services responsible for domestic surveillance. The "political security protection" bureau of the Ministry of Public Security and its local equivalents perform most of the duties of domestic political spying. The Ministry of State Security and its local outfits play a largely secondary role in domestic political spying, with a remit to target individuals suspected of external connections or being ethnic minorities. Not much is known about the organization, size, and operational tactics of these two secret police services due to the secrecy surrounding them. This analysis uses open-source materials to construct a basic profile of their organizational structure, missions, and activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan's election in January 2024 was the first to focus primarily on domestic policy rather than national identity or relations with China. The presidential candidates' platforms converged to support protecting Taiwan's sovereignty and rejecting China's formula for unification. Meanwhile, Taiwan's complex domestic problems, including unaffordable housing, stagnating wages, an aging population, energy insecurity, and unsustainable entitlements, were prominent election issues. The Democratic Progressive Party won an unprecedented third term for the presidency, but the legislature was split among three parties. Although Beijing will likely continue its economic coercion and military build-up, it will also need to develop different strategies to win hearts in Taiwan. Taiwanese are also increasingly skeptical of the US, which has been upgrading political relations with Taiwan but without enhancing Taiwan's international role or offering it tangible economic benefits. With no single political party securing a majority of seats in parliament, Taiwan will be unable to balance its interests between China and the US or expedite the implementation of reforms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The text provides information about the 20th Party Congress in China and subsequent National People's Congress, which resulted in a new group of leaders focused on national security. These leaders are aligned with Xi Jinping's vision and prioritize domestic and foreign security. The text highlights key leaders such as Li Qiang, Wang Huning, and Chen Wenqing, who have diverse backgrounds and play important roles in China's domestic security and political landscape. It also discusses the roles and activities of Chen Yixin and Wang Xiaohong in promoting national security and implementing policies to protect it. These individuals have emphasized the importance of a safe and stable political and social environment, maintaining public security, and international law enforcement cooperation. [Extracted from the article]

This article discusses China's response to its economic slowdown in 2023. The government implemented modest stimulus measures and focused on rhetorical reassurances due to high levels of debt and limited fiscal resources. President Xi Jinping's emphasis on security and stability may have influenced this approach. The economy experienced a moderate recovery in the third quarter, but there are indications of ongoing weakness. The government has taken a two-pronged approach, providing rhetorical support and implementing modest monetary easing measures, but substantive policy changes are desired by private entrepreneurs. Constraints such as high debt levels limit the government's ability to deploy more aggressive monetary tools. [Extracted from the article]

The upcoming Taiwan elections on January 13, 2024, will be a crucial moment to observe Beijing's approach to cross-Strait relations. Despite efforts to coerce and economically entice Taiwan, reunification seems no closer for China. The Democratic Progressive Party's Lai Ching-te is unlikely to change this, as Beijing is expected to continue using coercion. The article also discusses military tensions, Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, and Beijing's efforts to deter independence. Beijing has used economic coercion to influence Taiwan's politics, but this has not been effective. If Lai Ching-te wins the election, Beijing may take further coercive actions. A peaceful settlement seems unlikely under current leadership. [Extracted from the article]

The article explores the Chinese government's efforts to suppress feminist groups in China, citing concerns about foreign influence and the promotion of traditional family norms. Mainstream women's rights activists have aligned themselves with the party, but the government's focus on gender equality to address demographic decline may pose challenges. The text discusses the detention of activists and the targeting of a Japanese feminist scholar. The women's rights movement in China faces pressure due to the government's emphasis on national security and traditional values. The emergence of a "pink feminist" movement is also discussed, where online fan circles engage in discussions about women's rights but align themselves with nationalist and pro-regime ideologies. Some grassroots activists resist cooptation and continue to advocate for genuine women's rights. The text also highlights the increasing masculinist and heteronormative agenda of the Chinese party-state, erasing women's contributions during the COVID-19 pandemic and promoting traditional family values. Recent developments in women's rights and family planning policies are mentioned, including concerns about intrusive measures and inducements to encourage reproduction. The author suggests that the party's new fertility support policies may lead to conflicts with feminist movements. [Extracted from the article]

This article examines the effectiveness of the Biden administration's export controls on semiconductor fabrication equipment targeting China and China's response. The controls on chipmaking equipment have been relatively loose, allowing China to continue using critical American, Dutch, and Japanese equipment. However, recent revisions to the controls may make it more difficult for China to advance in chipmaking. The article also discusses the fabrication process and the specific equipment involved, highlighting China's progress in developing its own equipment. Overall, the article suggests that the decoupling of the American and Chinese semiconductor industries has been limited. [Extracted from the article]

Although Xi Jinping is widely seen, both inside and outside of China, as a vigorous centralizer of political power, the party-state responded to the sudden emergence of COVID-19 with an arguably less visible but dramatic shift in the opposite direction: a sudden delegation of power and authority to lower-level organizations in order to maintain social governance and control at the grassroots. This unprecedented rapid downshift of authority greatly empowered the urban subdistricts (街道) and neighborhood organizations (社区) that operate just outside the margins of official state power. Such a downward shift to the margins was supercharged by a rapid buildup of the high-tech capacities of the urban grassroots that included a proliferation of digital instruments to control and restrain the movement of ordinary residents on a grand scale, resulting, during the period of the pandemic, in the strictest social control since the Maoist era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's economy has emerged from "zero-Covid" without the inflation that occurred in some other major economies but with reduced consumption, minimal private investment growth, a weakened real estate sector, high youth unemployment, and constrained local government finances. Beijing is banking on a surge of new household spending and is planning only marginal new stimulus measures. Chinese leaders, however, are sending contradictory signals to entrepreneurs and foreign investors. China will almost certainly achieve its conservative growth target of 5 percent this year. But in the next few years, Beijing's prioritization of national security over economic reforms will pose a risk to China's economic trajectory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relations between China and Russia have deepened since 2022, although each country is now more careful in messaging, especially to foreign audiences, about their partnership. The priority of Russia for China comes at the expense of its previous partnership with Ukraine and Chinese economic interests there. China now aspires to take on a role in any future peace process for Ukraine, but Xi and Putin, by and large, speak with one voice on what they call "the Ukrainian crisis." The deepening partnership is reflected in their synergy in the information space, their ongoing cooperation in technology and defense, and energy and agriculture deals. Despite these trends, their partnership is also one of interdependence, whereby Beijing is willing to accept costs to derive perceived benefits. Even as Russia becomes more economically dependent on China, Xi's ability to restrain or even influence Putin's thinking remains untested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Xi Jinping has intensified his patriotic education campaign to reaffirm the CCP's authoritarian rule and he has nurtured a new generation of nationalists who are intolerant of any criticism of the CCP regime and who are muscularly hostile to the Western powers and to Western values. The campaign has fueled ever-sharper demands for deference to China's wishes by foreigners, making compromise extremely difficult if not impossible on issues China deems to be its core interests. But nationalism has been a double-edged sword. Chinese people have become increasingly disaffected, directing their anger to the regime and to Xi personally. After the collapse of Xi's zero-COVID policy, it has become increasingly difficult for Xi to engage young people through nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's sudden exit from zero-Covid in early December surprised many observers. The most powerful motivations for this decision were the prohibitive costs to the economy inflicted by zero-Covid, the growing evidence of its ineffectiveness in face of a more infectious Covid variant, and the greatly diminished political incentive for maintaining zero-Covid after the 20th Party Congress. The party's poor preparations for the exit were mainly due to the leadership's overriding desire to stage a successful party congress. The politicization of the pandemic response continued even after the sudden end of zero-Covid as the official propaganda apparatus sought to reshape the narrative and the government refused to approve more advanced Western vaccines and to include an imported Pfizer anti-viral treatment in its health insurance program. The decisive end of zero-Covid and the subsequent pivot to the economy nevertheless reveal the party's pragmatist side. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After a decade of rapid credit growth, China is now much more indebted than countries at similar levels of economic development. The slowdown in the economy over the past year has increased pressure on overleveraged borrowers, posing risks for the financial system. China has three main options to address these problems: using the central government's balance sheet, readjusting the fiscal balance sheet, or selling state assets. If instead Beijing chooses to simply muddle through, it faces the risk of a Japanese-style lost decade. Policymakers should embrace the debt challenge as an impetus to reform China's fiscal system and adjust the role of government in the economy. These changes could once again set China on a path to more rapid growth. Doing so, however, would require a major shift in the Xi administration's ideological approach to the economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Chinese economy has been undergoing a structural slowdown during the past decade, due to aging, decelerating productivity, and lower returns on assets. The Covid-19 pandemic, coupled with China's dynamic Zero-Covid policies, have worsened that trend, together with two other important factors, namely the demise of China's real estate sector as well as the much more difficult external environment stemming from growing U.S.-China strategic rivalry and the war in Ukraine. China's Covid experience started well but it is ending poorly. With much better economic performance in 2020 compared to the rest of the world, China managed to attract large amounts of capital while keeping its borders closed. However, doubling down on the Zero-Covid strategy with a much more contagious virus, while the rest of the world was opening, changed China's fortunes for the worse. In fact, China is bound to grow barely half of what the government promised for 2022 (5.5 percent). Moving forward, as the Chinese government starts to show some signs of opening-up, the question remains whether a strong recovery should be expected. The answer is "no." The factors behind China's structural deceleration are still intact. In addition, Covidrelated scarring effects are bound to hurt the Chinese economy in terms of human capital and innovation. Finally, the 20th Party Congress has made it crystal clear that the role of the state - and the party - in the economy is bound to increase. All in all, even if the Covid restrictions are lifted, China might see a temporary recovery but the structural deceleration will still lead to growth at around 2 percent by 2030. This implies that any convergence with the U.S. economy will not continue for long. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nowhere is the effort to control the flow of digital information more extensive and sustained than it is in China. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses a wide range of tools and strategies to achieve two related, but distinct, goals of digital information control: to shape public knowledge and to "guide" the public in the aftermath of sudden, unexpected events. Controlling social media is especially relevant to the second goal, and the CCP uses strategies of content removal (censorship) and content generation (propaganda) to pursue this aim. Recent studies of the Chinese internet and social media show that the CCP has adapted quickly to new digital communication technologies, though it is in sometimes unexpected ways, and CCP control of Chinese social media is integral to its efforts to shape public beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines China's diplomatic responses to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It argues that the war created an immediate diplomatic "trilemma" for China as it sought to balance three competing interests: alignment with Russia, adherence to core principles of Chinese foreign policy and need for stability with the United States and Europe. To manage this trilemma, China adopted a policy that I term a "strategic straddle" in which China tries to balance these competing interests at the same time. In practice, this straddle has manifested in strong rhetorical, informational and diplomatic support for Russia while, at the same time, Beijing has been very careful, to date, to avoid providing substantial material support to Russia. Maintaining this balancing act will be difficult as Russian needs grow. In relations with the United States and Europe, China has sought to put a floor under worsening relations but has had limited success doing so. The one area where China has sought strategic advantage is in its ties with the Global South, which is suffering from economic dislocations associated with the war. China has sought to use these deprivations to generate greater solidarity in resisting U.S.-led rules, norms and institutions. China's ability to maintain this straddle will be challenged the complexities of managing competing ties with these different countries, regions and institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dual circulation may sound like a buzzword without much relevance, but it is not. It actually enshrines China's long-standing ambition to become self-sufficient. Such an ambition was made known to the world in 2015 after the launch of China's industrial policy masterplan, Made in China 2025, even though the world at the time was still in full engagement with China. Since Trump's push for a trade and technology war against China, the Chinese leadership has been relying on a dual circulation strategy to support China's growth. This basically means insulating the domestic market from the rest of the world by eliminating any bottlenecks, whether in terms of natural resources or technology, so as to vertically integrate its production and achieve self-reliance served by China's huge domestic market. A relevant consequence for the world, though, is that China will no longer need to import high-end inputs, with obvious negative consequences for major exporters of technology, such as Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. As if this were not enough, the second aspect of dual circulation, boosting external demand, in a context of Western containment, will increase the importance of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to ensure open markets in the emerging world. In essence, dual circulation is part of China's masterplan to become self-reliant in terms of resources and technology but also in terms of demand through its huge market as well as through third markets available through the BRI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China, grassroots civil society is in trouble. Democracy advocates in Hong Kong are being handcuffed while rights activists in the Mainland are pre-emptively smothered. Xi Jinping-style control over civil society entails a three-pronged strategy to transform civil society into a more palatable sector. The first prong of this strategy is tightening regulation of both domestic and international civil society. The second is to crack down on grassroots organizations. The third is to deepen party control over all of civil society. As a result, while some rights advocacy organizations have disappeared altogether under this rule, others have learned to adapt. A new strategy for engaging civil society actors in both mainland China and Hong Kong is needed. In pivoting from Trump's isolationism to Biden's multilateralism, it will also be important for the U.S. to work with its allies to help build the infrastructure for people-to-people exchanges with China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Chinese Communist Party oversees the vast coercive apparatus of the party-state. Its main responsibilities include providing policy proposals on domestic security, supervising implementation of the party's domestic security agenda, coordinating the actions of law enforcement and the judiciary, and ensuring the political loyalty of officials in law enforcement agencies. In the 1980s, the most open period in post-Mao China, the role and power of the commission were limited. But as the CCP leadership became more conservative in the post-Tiananmen period, the commission was granted more power to strengthen domestic security. It is now the CCP's principal enforcer to maintain the supremacy of the party over the state's coercive apparatus and an essential institution in organizing surveillance, supervising campaigns of repression, and providing for public safety. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese president Xi Jinping has put forth a set of significant commitments in response to the threat of global climate change. He has called for China to achieve peak CO2 emissions by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060, to enhance the role of renewable energy in its energy mix, to increase forest cover, and to make use of market mechanisms, such as an emissions trading system, to incentivize industry to decarbonize. Several of these initiatives, however, face design and implementation weaknesses that raise questions about their efficacy. In addition, the international community and the Chinese expert and NGO communities have called on Beijing to provide a more detailed action plan with benchmarks for realizing its climate targets and to end the export of coal plants through its Belt and Road infrastructure initiative. China's climate commitments are notable, but ultimately, its efforts will be judged by the results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There seems to be a growing consensus in Beijing that U.S.-China relations will remain rocky for the foreseeable future. Even so, President Xi Jinping and others have been touting that time and momentum are on China's side in its quest to move closer to the center of the world stage. Chinese officials recognize that they will need to overcome obstacles in their country's pursuit of its national goals. To do so, China appears to be pursuing a three-pronged medium-term strategy: maintaining a non-hostile external environment in order to focus on domestic priorities; reducing dependence on America while increasing the rest of the world's dependence on China; and expanding the reach of Chinese influence overseas. At the same time, China's actions are generating significant reactions, both at home and abroad. Whether China can learn from this feedback loop to address its own vulnerabilities remains an open question, one that only China will be capable of answering. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese leader Xi Jinping's signature anti-corruption campaign has attracted attention because of its high-profile investigations and arrests, but it has also advanced government policies in areas beyond corruption control. This article discusses the campaign's recent developments and how the party leadership has used it as an all-purpose tool for governing during Xi's second term. Since the 19th Party Congress in 2017, the campaign has become more institutionalized and has brought down even more high-ranking officials. At the same time, the Xi administration has used anti-corruption work to support a wide range of recent policies and directives, such as the party's anti-poverty and anti-crime initiatives. The administration's sweeping inspections of party and state institutions have been integral to the anti-corruption campaign, but they have also aimed to improve general policy implementation, support organizational reforms, and ensure loyalty to Xi and the Chinese Communist Party. Governing through the campaign in this way has helped advance Xi's political vision, in which a strong and disciplined party leads the country and penetrates every area of China's state and society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2015 China announced the ambitious target of eliminating poverty by 2020. Since then China has launched an all-out, campaign-style push to meet this goal, using a "Precision Poverty Alleviation" strategy that targets individual households and monitors their progress using a nationwide poverty database. Investments of financial and human resources in this program have been considerable. Although the poverty reduction target is ambitious, it is also pragmatic. It applies only to the rural population and it is based on a low poverty line. Funding for the program, while large in absolute terms, is a small percentage of government revenue. Thus, the target is achievable. Reaching the target, however, will not mean that China has won the war on poverty. Many households will remain vulnerable to poverty, and the government's current definition of poverty does not adequately reflect what it means to be poor in China going forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the past eight months of the global COVID pandemic, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been active in promoting China's claims in the South China Sea. This essay evaluates PLA statements, military exercises and operations, and deployment of relevant platforms and weapons in the South China Sea during this period. I leverage Chinese-language sources in addition to my own operational knowledge from over a decade of military experience to provide greater context for these activities. I argue that the greatest change in the PLA's role in the South China Sea has not been operational. Instead, the most interesting development has been the fact that the PLA has taken on a more significant signaling role. Specifically, the Chinese military seems to be purposefully using, and perhaps even exaggerating, its capabilities and activities to enhance deterrence against the United States. This may be seen as necessary as the US increases its own efforts to push back on China's militarization of the South China Sea. In other words, the PLA has taken a more active role in China's South China Sea strategy, but not necessarily a more aggressive one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping has overseen a significant transformation of China's domestic economic system, undergirded by important new reforms that have drastically expanded the reach of the Chinese state into the economy and Chinese firms. This has included the integration of CCP organizations into public and private firms, the regulatory shift of SASAC from "managing enterprises" to "managing capital," and the role of government guidance funds in driving industrial policy. The overall change in China's economic and regulatory structure - and the political control wielded by the CCP - combined with the Xi era blending of the public and private, and market and planning, is of such a proportion that it marks a new paradigm in China's development trajectory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In January 2018 China began a three-year campaign, known as the saohei campaign, to crack down on "underworld forces." A key emphasis of the campaign was its targeting of "protection umbrellas," an effort to break the links between criminal organizations and their government and party protectors at the local levels. In the rhetoric of the campaign, "black and evil" underworld forces not only threatened the safety and finances of ordinary citizens but also infiltrated and weakened political authority, thereby damaging both social stability and the party's ruling foundation. Saohei, therefore, is not only a cleansing of corruption at the grassroots levels but also a purification and re-strengthening of governance under party supervision. The campaign has resulted in the removal of a large number of personnel throughout the political-legal system, moving from initial removal of key leaders to lower levels of the system as the campaign has continued to unfold. It has also allowed local authorities to use the idea of "black and evil" to target specific local groups, from housing-demolition protestors to alleged "underworld forces linked to the Dalai Lama clique." The saohei campaign will end early next year, but many of its key themes and foci will continue in the 2021 "education and rectification campaign" announced by Chen Yixin for the entire political-legal apparatus, suggesting that the party leadership perceives unfinished work within the political-legal apparatus. Xi Jinping, having already successfully replaced most of the leadership in the political-legal apparatus, now appears to be using saohei and its successor rectification campaign to push his authority down to lower levels of the political-legal system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]