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This study examines how parents' and children's explanatory talk and exploratory behaviors support children's causal reasoning at a museum in San Jose, CA in 2017. One-hundred-nine parent-child dyads (3-6 years; 56 girls, 53 boys; 32 White, 9 Latino/Hispanic, 17 Asian-American, 17 South Asian, 1 Pacific Islander, 26 mixed ethnicity, 7 unreported) played at an air flow exhibit with a nonobvious causal mechanism. Children's causal reasoning was probed afterward. The timing of parents' explanatory talk and exploratory behaviors was related to children's systematic exploration during play. Children's exploratory behavior, and parents' goal setting during play, were related to children's subsequent causal reasoning. These findings support the hypothesis that children's exploration is related to both internal learning processes and external social scaffolding.

As they learn to navigate the social world, children construct frameworks to interpret others' behavior. The present studies examined two such frameworks: a mentalistic framework, which construes behavior as driven by internal mental states; and a normative framework, which presumes people act in accordance with social norms. Participants included 101 children (ages 4, 7, and 10; 81% White; 41% female) and 35 adults (66% female) tested in the northeastern United States from 2019 to 2021. Children and adults utilized both mentalistic and normative frameworks to explain others' behaviors. Framework use depended on features of the behavior being explained. Minimal developmental differences were observed. The relative independence and the utility of the mentalistic and normative frameworks for naïve reasoning about behavior are considered.

This 6-wave longitudinal study (2014-2018) of 161 German 5- to 10-year-olds from a midsized city and rural area in southern Germany (89 females, 72 males; predominantly White; mostly middle class) found that scientific-reasoning abilities first develop at 6 years. Abilities were highly stable, with the kindergarten score predicting 25% of end-of-elementary-school variance. Individual but not developmental differences were related to language abilities (0.39), mindreading skills (0.33), and parental education (0.36). In early elementary school, mindreading skills predicted scientific reasoning (0.15), but not vice versa; in late elementary school, bidirectional associations emerged (0.11-0.33). Our findings suggest that mindreading is a precursor for the development of scientific reasoning and that older children use scientific reasoning to revise their advanced theories of mind.

Children's hypothetical reasoning about a complex and dynamic causal system was investigated. Predominantly White, middle-class 5- to 7-year-old children from the Greater Toronto Area learned about novel food chains and were asked to consider the effects of removing one species on the others. In Study 1 (N = 72; 36 females, 36 males; 2018), 7-year-olds answered questions about both direct and indirect effects with a high degree of accuracy, whereas 5-year-olds performed at chance. Six-year-olds showed intermediate performance. Using food chains with clearer constraints, Study 2 (N = 72; 35 females, 37 males; 2020-2021) replicated these findings. These results indicate that the ability to think about hypothetical changes to dynamic causal systems develops between 5 and 7 years. Implications for science education are discussed.

We examined the dimensionality of oral discourse skills (comprehension and retell of texts) and the relations of language and cognitive skills to the identified dimensions. Data were from 529 English-speaking second graders (M[subscript age] = 7.42; 46% female; 52.6% Whites, 33.8% African Americans, 4.9% Hispanics, 4.7% two or more races, 0.8% Asian Americans, 0.6% American Indians, 0.2% Native Hawaiians, 2.5% unknown; data from 2014-2015 to 2016-2017). Confirmatory factor analysis revealed that oral discourse skills are best described as four related but dissociable dimensions of narrative comprehension, narrative retell, expository comprehension, and expository retell (rs = 0.59-0.84). Language and cognitive skills had different patterns of relations to the identified dimensions and explained larger amounts of variance in comprehension than in retell.

In the present study, we investigated the impact of a word-problem intervention in retention and acquisition of knowledge after the intervention ended. We based analyses upon Grade 4 students experiencing mathematics difficulty (average age at pretest = 8.77) who received one of two variants of a word-problem intervention (with [n = 111] vs. without [n = 110] embedded pre-algebraic reasoning instruction) and students within a business-as-usual condition (BaU [n = 127]) separately. Findings revealed that students who received the intervention not only tended to retain less, but they also showed more active knowledge acquisition after the intervention ended. Furthermore, word-problem intervention altered the contributions of some prior knowledge and skills on both retention and acquisition.

Previous research on the role of prior skills like proportional reasoning skills for the development of mathematical concepts offers conclusions such as "more (prior skills) is better (for later learning)." Insights, which prior skill "level" goes along with which "level" of learning outcomes, may advance the understanding of the development of mathematical concepts. An exploratory approach is presented based on level models to describe the relation between symbolic proportional reasoning skills and fraction outcomes beyond linearity. Analyses draw on samples of German fourth to sixth graders from a scaling (2017, N = 325, 54.8% female) and longitudinal study (2018/2019, N = 436, 42.7% female). Particularly mastering natural and internal rational ratios in proportional reasoning seems relevant for successful fraction learning.

This study examined the developmental profiles of children's social reasoning about individual agentive and deontic concerns. Tongan children (N = 140, 47.9% male), aged 4-8 years, were given a set of mentalistic (standard theory-of-mind) and deontic reasoning tasks. On average, children found diverse desires, knowledge access, hidden emotion, and belief emotion easier than the false-belief and diverse belief tasks. Tongan children were sensitive to social norms governing behavior, and this information was recruited for predicting behavior in a false-belief task when embedded in a socially normative context. We discuss the potential for cultural mandates to shape children's social understanding and the impact of culture on our theoretical framing of children's development.

This study explored children's causal reasoning about the past and future. U.S. adults (n = 60) and 3-to-6-year-olds (n = 228) from an urban, middle-class population (49% female; [approximately] 45% white) participated between 2017 and 2019. Participants were told three-step causal stories and asked about the effects of a change to the second event. Given direct interventions on the second event, children of all ages judged that the past event still occurred, suggesting even preschoolers understand time is irreversible. However, children reasoned differently when told that the second event did not occur, with no specific cause. In this case, 6-year-olds and adults inferred that the past event also did not occur. In both conditions, inferences that future events would change emerged gradually between 4 and 6.

We investigate how the ability to respond appropriately to reasons provided in discourse develops in young children. In Study 1 (N = 58, Germany, 26 girls), 4- and 5-, but not 3-year-old children, differentiated good from bad reasons. In Study 2 (N = 131, Germany, 64 girls), 4- and 5-year-old children considered both the strength of evidence for their initial belief and the quality of socially provided reasons for an alternative view when deciding whether to change their minds. Study 3 (N = 80, the United States, 42 girls, preregistered) shows that 4- and 5-year-old children also consider meta-reasons (reasons about reasons) in their belief revision. These results suggest that by age 4, children possess key critical thinking capacities for participating in public discourse.

One-hundred-six 5-year-olds' (M[subscript age] = 5;6; SD = 0.40) were trained with second-order false belief tasks in one of the following conditions: (a) "feedback with explanation"; (b) "feedback without explanation"; (c) "no feedback"; (d) "active control." The results showed that there were significant improvements in children's scores from pretest to posttest in the three experimental conditions even when children's age, verbal abilities, or working memory scores were controlled for. The training effect was stable at a follow-up session 4 months after the pretest. Overall, our results suggest that 5-year-olds' failures in second-order false belief tasks are due to lack of experience and that they can be helped over the threshold by exposure to many stories involving second-order false belief reasoning, including why questions.

This study examines the core predictors of the covariance in reading and arithmetic fluency and the domain-general cognitive skills that explain the core predictors and covariance. Seven-year-old Finnish children (N = 200) were assessed on rapid automatized naming (RAN), phonological awareness, letter knowledge, verbal counting, number writing, number comparison, memory skills, and processing and articulation speed in the spring of Grade 1 and on reading and arithmetic fluency in the fall of Grade 2. RAN and verbal counting were strongly associated, and a constructed latent factor, serial retrieval fluency (SRF), was the strongest unique predictor of the shared variance. Other unique predictors were phonological awareness, number comparison, and processing speed. Findings highlight the importance of SRF in clarifying the relation between reading and arithmetic fluency.

This study explored the hypothesis that preschoolers' deductive reasoning would be improved by encouraging use of divergent thinking (DT). Children of 4-5 years of age (n = 120) were randomly given DT or neutral control exercises before deductive reasoning problems. To allow a stronger test of the hypothesis, half of the children receiving the DT exercises were given explicit examples, which have been shown to reduce ideational originality. Results indicate that, as predicted, DT exercises without examples significantly improved rates of deductive responding, compared to exercises with examples and the control condition. These findings indicate that DT is a key component in the early beginnings of deductive reasoning. Some educational implications are discussed.

This study examined young children's contact with individuals of high-wealth and low-wealth backgrounds and their behavior toward peers of these backgrounds in a resource distribution task. The sample included 72 ethnically diverse higher income children (M[subscript age] = 6.68 years, SD = 0.98 years). Contact with individuals of low-wealth backgrounds (interwealth contact) affected children's behavior indirectly, through social-cognitive reasoning processes. The more interwealth contact children reported, the more likely they were to reason about access to resources rather than their own wealth preferences in this context. This reasoning, in turn, was associated with more resources allocated to a low-wealth peer relative to a high-wealth peer. Thus, interwealth contact early in development was associated with more equitable peer interactions.

Belief revision can occur at multiple levels of abstraction, including lower-level and higher-order beliefs. It remains unclear, however, how conflicting evidence interacts with prior beliefs to encourage higher-order belief revision. This study explores how 4- and 5-year-olds (N = 96) respond to evidence that directly conflicts with their causal higher-order beliefs. When shown a single event that directly violated a strongly supported prior belief, preschoolers largely maintained their initial higher-order belief. However, when the prior belief was more weakly supported and the counterevidence was stronger, children changed their minds. These findings indicate that young children can revise their higher-order beliefs and, furthermore, do so depending on the strength of both the evidence and their prior beliefs.

This study investigates the relationship between early maternal employment history and children's vocabulary and inductive reasoning ability at age 5, drawing on longitudinal information on 2,200 children from the Growing Up in Scotland data. Prior research rarely addresses dynamics in maternal employment and the methodological ramifications of time-variant confounding. The present study proposes various measures to capture duration, timing, and stability of early maternal employment and uses inverse probability of treatment weighting to control for time-variant confounders that may partially mediate the effect of maternal employment on cognitive scores. The findings suggest only modest differences in the above ability measures between children who have been exposed to very different patterns of eary maternal employment, but with similar observed covariate history.

Spatial thinking, an important component of cognition, supports academic achievement and daily activities (e.g., learning science and math; using maps). Better spatial skills are correlated with more spatial play and more parental attention to spatial concepts. Tested here was whether informing mothers about spatial thinking and ways to encourage it would increase the spatial guidance they provide to their preschool children (N = 41; M = 5.23 years) during dyadic block play. Mothers given such instructions indeed produced more spatial language and spatial guidance than mothers asked to play as usual. In instructed dyads, children also used more spatial language; both mothers and children engaged in less pretend play. Findings offer support for designing interventions to encourage parents to foster their children's spatial skills.

Children's developing reasoning skills are better understood within the context of their social and cultural lives. As part of a research-museum partnership, this article reports a study exploring science-relevant conversations of 82 families, with children between 3 and 11 years, while visiting a children's museum exhibit about mammoth bones, and in a focused one-on-one exploration of a "mystery object." Parents' use of a variety of types of science talk predicted children's conceptual engagement in the exhibit, but interestingly, different types of parent talk predicted children's engagement depending on the order of the two activities. The findings illustrate the importance of studying children's thinking in real-world contexts and inform creation of effective real-world science experiences for children and families.

Two experiments investigated the development of metacognitive monitoring and control, and conditions under which children engage these processes. In Experiment 1, 5-year-olds (N = 30) and 7-year-olds (N = 30), unlike adults (N = 30), showed little evidence of either monitoring or control. In Experiment 2, 5-year-olds (N = 90) were given performance feedback (aimed at improving monitoring), instruction to follow a particular strategy (aimed at improving control), or both. Across conditions, feedback improved children's monitoring, and instruction improved both monitoring and control. Thus, children's poor metacognitive performance likely reflects a difficulty engaging the component processes spontaneously rather than a lack of metacognitive ability. These findings also suggest that the component processes are distinct, with both undergoing protracted development.

Residential mobility has received notable attention in the literature, yet there remains limited consensus on how and when mobility is associated with detriments to children's development. Drawing on a nationally representative sample of 19,162 children in the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study followed from kindergarten through eighth grade, this study compared cumulative, timing-specific, and interactive models of mobility. Results found that mobility during middle childhood and early adolescence was negatively associated with children's cognitive skills, with short-term effects that dissipated over time. In contrast, associations with psychosocial functioning emerged in relation to early and middle childhood mobility. Effects of residential mobility were robust to more conservative modeling techniques and adjustments for school mobility.

Children (n = 747; 6.5 years) were assessed on domain-general processes and mathematics and reading-related competencies (start of first grade), addition retrieval (end of second grade), and calculations and word reading (end of third grade). Attentive behavior, reasoning, visuospatial memory, and rapid automatized naming (RAN) indirectly contributed to both outcomes, via retrieval. However, there was no overlap in domain-general direct effects on calculations (attentive behavior, reasoning, working memory) versus word reading (language, phonological memory, RAN). Results suggest ease of forming associative relations and abilities engaged during the formation of these long-term memories are common to both outcomes and can be indexed by addition-fact retrieval, but further growth in calculations and word reading is driven by different constellations of domain-general abilities.

The development of scientific thinking was assessed in 1,581 second, third, and fourth graders (8-, 9-, 10-year-olds) based on a conceptual model that posits developmental progression from naïve to more advanced conceptions. Using a 66-item scale, five components of scientific thinking were addressed, including experimental design, data interpretation, and understanding the nature of science. Unidimensional and multidimensional item response theory analyses supported the instrument's reliability and validity and suggested that the multiple components of scientific thinking form a unitary construct, independent of verbal or reasoning skills. A partial credit model gave evidence for a hierarchical developmental progression. Across each grade transition, advanced conceptions increased while naïve conceptions decreased. Independent effects of intelligence, schooling, and parental education on scientific thinking are discussed.

These two studies explored 3- and 5-year-olds' evaluation of noncircular and circular explanations, and their use of such explanations to determine informant credibility. Although 5-year-olds demonstrated a selective preference for noncircular over circular explanations (Experiment 1: Long Explanations; Experiment 2: Short Explanations), 3-year-olds only demonstrated a preference for the noncircular when the explanations were shortened (Experiment 2). Children's evaluation of the explanations extended to their inferences about the informants' future credibility. Both age groups demonstrated a selective preference for learning novel explanations from an informant who had previously provided noncircular explanations--although only 5-year-olds also preferred to learn novel labels from her. The implications and scope of children's ability to monitor the quality of an informant's explanation are discussed.

Cross-classified items pose an interesting challenge to children's induction as these items belong to many different categories, each of which may serve as a basis for a different type of inference. Inductive selectivity is the ability to appropriately make different types of inferences about a single cross-classifiable item based on its different category memberships. This research includes 5 experiments that examine the development of inductive selectivity in 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds (n = 272). Overall, the results show that by age 4, children have inductive selectivity with taxonomic and script categories. That is, children use taxonomic categories to make biochemical inferences about an item whereas script categories to make situational inferences about an item. (Contains 2 tables and 3 figures.)

Category-based induction requires selective use of different relations to guide inferences; this article examines the development of inferences based on ecological relations among living things. Three hundred and forty-six 6-, 8-, and 10-year-old children from rural, suburban, and urban communities projected novel "diseases" or "insides" from one species to an ecologically or taxonomically related species; they were also surveyed about hobbies and activities. Frequency of ecological inferences increased with age and with reports of informal exploration of nature, and decreased with population density. By age 10, children preferred taxonomic inferences for insides and ecological inferences for disease, but this pattern emerged earlier among rural children. These results underscore the importance of context by demonstrating effects of both domain-relevant experience and environment on biological reasoning.

Although often conceptualized in contradictory terms, the common assumption that natural and supernatural explanations are incompatible is psychologically inaccurate. Instead, there is considerable evidence that the same individuals use both natural and supernatural explanations to interpret the very same events and that there are multiple ways in which both kinds of explanations coexist in individual minds. Converging developmental research from diverse cultural contexts in 3 areas of biological thought (i.e., the origin of species, illness, and death) is reviewed to support this claim. Contrary to traditional accounts of cognitive development, new evidence indicates that supernatural explanations often increase rather than decrease with age and supports the proposal that reasoning about supernatural phenomena is an integral and enduring aspect of human cognition.

The current study investigated the contribution of 5 hypotheses to the estimated effects of preschool in the Child-Parent Centers on occupational prestige, felony arrest, and depressive symptoms in adulthood in the Chicago Longitudinal Study. An alternative-intervention, quasi-experimental design included over 1,400 low-income participants (93% of whom were Black) who attended preschool for 1-2 years or the usual early educational intervention and were traced to age 24. LISREL analysis of 5 hypotheses (cognitive advantage, family support, school support, motivational advantage, and social adjustment) indicated that while each individually accounted for part of the estimated direct effect of preschool on adult well-being, the best fitting model across outcomes included indicators of all 5 hypotheses. The full model completely accounted for the direct effect of preschool on occupational prestige and official felony arrest, and 79% on depression symptoms. Key mediators included cognitive skills at school entry, school quality in the elementary grades, juvenile arrest, and school completion. The identified processes may help establish, strengthen, and sustain effects in other programs and settings.

This research examines how youth in arts and leadership programs develop skills for organizing actions over time to achieve goals. Ethnically diverse youth (ages 13-21) in 11 high-quality urban and rural programs were interviewed as they carried out projects. Qualitative analyses of 712 interviews with 108 youth yielded preliminary grounded theory about youth's development of "strategic thinking", defined as use of dynamic systems reasoning to anticipate real-word scenarios and plan work. Strategic thinking appeared to develop through youth's creative engagement with tactical challenges in the work and feedback from the work's outcomes. Program advisors supported this development by giving youth control and by providing nondirective assistance when needed. (Contains 1 table.)

This study examined parent-child emotion discourse, children's independent social information processing, and social skills outcomes in 146 families of 8-year-olds with and without developmental delays. Children's emergent social-cognitive understanding (internal state understanding, perspective taking, and causal reasoning and problem solving) was coded in the context of parent-child conversations about emotion, and children were interviewed separately to assess social problem solving. Mothers, fathers, and teachers reported on children's social skills. The proposed strengths-based model partially accounted for social skills differences between typically developing children and children with delays. A multigroup analysis of the model linking emotion discourse to social skills through children's prosocial problem solving suggested that processes operated similarly for the two groups. Implications for ecologically focused prevention and intervention are discussed.

This study investigated at what point in development 3- to 6-year-old children begin to demonstrate counterfactual reasoning by controlling for fortuitously correct answers that result from basic conditional reasoning. "Basic conditional reasoning" occurs when one applies typical regularities (such as "If 'whenever' it doesn't rain the street is dry") to counterfactual questions (such as "If it had not rained, would the street be wet or dry?") without regard to actual events (e.g., if street cleaners had just been washing the street). In "counterfactual reasoning", however, the conditional reasoning must be constrained by actual events (according to the "nearest possible world"). In situations when counterfactual reasoning and basic conditional reasoning would yield the same answers, even the youngest children gave mostly correct answers. However, tasks in which the 2 reasoning strategies resulted in different answers proved unusually difficult even for the older children. (Contains 2 tables and 3 figures.)

Young children show significant changes in their mental-state understanding as marked by their performance on false-belief tasks. This study provides evidence for activity in the prefrontal cortex associated with the development of this ability. Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) were recorded as adults (N = 24) and 4-, 5-, and 6-year-old children (N = 44) reasoned about reality and the beliefs of characters in animated vignettes. In adults, a late slow wave (LSW), with a left-frontal scalp distribution, was associated with reasoning about beliefs. This LSW was also observed for children who could correctly reason about the characters' beliefs but not in children who failed false-belief questions. These findings have several implications, including support for the critical role of the prefrontal cortex for theory of mind development.

Two studies (N = 456) compared the development of concepts of animal species and human gender, using a switched-at-birth reasoning task. Younger children (5- and 6-year-olds) treated animal species and human gender as equivalent; they made similar levels of category-based inferences and endorsed similar explanations for development in these 2 domains. In contrast, 10-year-olds and adults treated gender and species concepts as distinct from one another. They viewed gender-linked behavioral properties as open to environmental influence and endorsed environment-based mechanisms to explain gender development. At all ages, children demonstrated differentiated reasoning about physical and behavioral properties, although this differentiation became more stable with age. The role of psychological essentialism in guiding conceptual development is discussed.

Recent research has shown that infants as young as 13 months can attribute false beliefs to agents, suggesting that the psychological-reasoning subsystem necessary for attributing reality-incongruent informational states (Subsystem-2, SS2) is operational in infancy. The present research asked whether 18-month-olds' false-belief reasoning extends to false beliefs about object identity. Infants watched events involving an agent and 2 toy penguins; 1 penguin could be disassembled (2-piece penguin) and 1 could not (1-piece penguin). Infants realized that outdated contextual information could lead the agent to falsely believe she was facing the 1-piece rather than the 2-piece penguin, suggesting that 18-month-olds can attribute false beliefs about the identity of objects and providing new evidence for SS2 reasoning in the 2nd year of life.

This study used data on 2,453 children aged 4-17 from the National Survey of Child and Adolescent Well-Being and 5 analytic methods that adjust for selection factors to estimate the impact of out-of-home placement on children's cognitive skills and behavior problems. Methods included ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions and residualized change, simple change, difference-in-difference, and fixed effects models. Models were estimated using the full sample and a matched sample generated by propensity scoring. Although results from the unmatched OLS and residualized change models suggested that out-of-home placement is associated with increased child behavior problems, estimates from models that more rigorously adjust for selection bias indicated that placement has little effect on children's cognitive skills or behavior problems.

This study interconnects developmental psychology of fair and moral behavior with economic game theory. One hundred eighty-nine 9- to 17-year-old students shared a sum of money as individuals and groups with another anonymous group (dictator game). Individual allocations did not differ by age but did by gender and were predicted by participants' preferences for fair allocations. Group decision making followed a majority process. Level of moral reasoning did not predict individual offers, but group members with a higher moral reasoning ability were more influential during group negotiations and in influencing group outcomes. The youngest participants justified offers more frequently by referring to simple distribution principles. Older participants employed more complex reasons to justify deviations from allocation principles.

Spontaneous transfer of learning is often difficult to elicit. This finding may be widespread partly because pretests proactively interfere with transfer. To test this hypothesis, 7-year-olds' transfer was examined across 2 numerical tasks (number line estimation and categorization) in which similar representational changes have been observed. As predicted, children given feedback on numerical estimates learned to use a linear representation of numerical quantity instead of a logarithmic one, but providing practice on a categorization pretest led children to continue using a logarithmic representation on the same task, which they otherwise abandoned with surprising frequency. These findings imply unsupervised practice of inappropriate representations impedes transfer, and studies of learning can greatly underestimate children's potential for transfer if pretest effects are uncontrolled.

Six experiments examined children's ability to make inferences using temporal order information. Children completed versions of a task involving a toy zoo; one version required reasoning about past events (search task) and the other required reasoning about future events (planning task). Children younger than 5 years failed both the search and the planning tasks, whereas 5-year-olds passed both (Experiments 1 and 2). However, when the number of events in the sequence was reduced (Experiment 3), 4-year-olds were successful on the search task but not the planning task. Planning difficulties persisted even when relevant cues were provided (Experiments 4 and 5). Experiment 6 showed that improved performance on the search task found in Experiment 3 was not due to the removal of response ambiguity.

Two studies investigated children's metacognition about everyday reasoning, assessing how they distinguish reasoning from nonreasoning and "good" reasoning from "bad." In Study 1, 80 1st graders (6-7 years), 3rd graders (8-9 years), 5th graders (10-11 years), and adults (18+ years) evaluated scenarios where people (a) used reasoning, (b) solved problems with nonreasoning approaches, or (c) reacted appropriately but automatically to events. All age groups distinguished reasoning from type (b) nonreasoning cases, but age-related improvement occurred for type (c) cases. Study 2 tested 160 1st, 3rd, 5th graders' and adults' evaluation of good and bad reasoning processes, finding 2 developmental changes: initial improvement in discriminating thinking processes by 3rd grade and emergence of an adult-like, process-focused (vs. outcome-focused) concept of thinking quality by 5th grade.

In Study 1, 10-, 13-, and 16-year-olds were assigned to conditions in which they were instructed to think logically and provided alternative antecedents to the consequents of conditional statements. Providing alternatives improved reasoning on two uncertain logical forms, but decreased logical responding on two certain forms; logic instructions improved reasoning among adolescents. Correlations among inferences and verbal ability were found primarily when task conditions created conflict between automatic and controlled inferences. In Study 2, when the cognitive demands of the logic instructions were reduced, 10-year-olds made more logically correct inferences, but only when a conditional's consequents were strongly associated with alternative antecedents. Discussion focuses on the ability to inhibit invited inferences and the role of automatically activated memories.

Do young children appreciate the importance of access to premises when judging what another person knows? In Experiment 1, 5-year-olds (N=31) were sensitive to another person's access to premises when predicting that person's ability to point to a target after eliminating alternatives in a set of 3 cartoon characters. Experiment 2 replicated the finding when 5- to 6-year-olds (N=102) judged who the other person thought the target was, and whether the other person knew who the target was. Experiment 3 demonstrated that children aged 57 years (N=107) more successfully imputed inference by elimination than syllogistical inferential knowledge. Findings suggest that an early understanding of inference by elimination offers a route into understanding that people can sometimes gain knowledge without direct perceptual access.

Two experiments compared 10-year-olds' and adults' ability to choose positive and negative diagnostic tests over positive and negative nondiagnostic tests. Findings indicated that both age groups were more likely to prefer positive diagnostic tests over positive nondiagnostic tests, although only adults showed a significant preference for negative diagnostic tests over positive nondiagnostic ones. Both groups preferred negative diagnostic tests over negative nondiagnostic ones, demonstrating children's ability to reason diagnostically. (JPB)

Investigated development of reasoning about the teaching of values in school and family contexts among 8-, 10-, and 13-year olds and college students. Found that children and young adults' reasoning is multifaceted and distinguishes between moral values that reflect justice, rights, and moral character traits and other forms of desirable personality traits and social values. Their evaluations became better differentiated and coordinated with age. (JPB)

Examined the relationship between age and the normative/descriptive gap--the discrepancy between actual reasoning and traditional standards for reasoning. Found that middle adolescents performed closer to normative ideals than early adolescents. Factor analyses suggested that performance was based on two processing systems, analytic and heuristic systems, with analytic processing more clearly linked than heuristic processing to age and intelligence. (Author/KB)

Investigated 6-, 8-, and 10-year-olds' reasoning about laws and legal compliance. Found that children considered several factors in their judgments, including perceived justice of the law, its socially beneficial purpose, and potential for infringement on individual freedoms and rights. Found that children apply moral concepts of harm, rights, and justice to evaluate laws and to inform judgments of compliance. (Author/KB)

Suggests ways to use dynamic systems analysis to illuminate the pluralistic and multidimensional model described by Larivee, Normandeau, and Parent (2000). Issues discussed include the characteristics of developmental transitions, such as hysteresis; nature of growth processes, such as hierarchical development or predator-prey interactions; and the construction of effective scales for measuring change in logical reasoning. (Author/KB)

Examined the emergence of theory-motivated reasoning biases when early and middle adolescents evaluated evidence either congruent or incongruent to their theories of social class or religion. Found that higher order scientific reasoning was used to reject theory-incongruent evidence; judgmental heuristics were used to evaluate theory-congruent evidence. Beliefs regarding origin, acquisition, and certainty of knowledge moderated reasoning biases and theory polarization. (Author/KB)

Examined dual representation among toddlers and preschoolers in four studies. Found that dual representation was as difficult for 2.5-year-olds with a set of individual objects as it was with an integrated model. Decreasing the physical salience of a scale model made representation easier for 2.5-year-olds. Increasing the model's salience made representation more difficult for 3-year- olds. (Author/KB)

Compared the "on-line" (real time, ongoing internal representation) understanding of ongoing social events of boys with and without attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Found that younger children and those with ADHD showed less integrated on-line representations, accounting for poor recall and reasoning. (Author/KB)

Two studies examined age differences in conditional reasoning. Results indicated that 8-year-olds performed better when antecedents were weakly associated with consequents than on strongly associated antecedent/consequents, with no difference among 11-year-olds. Eight-year-olds did better on ad hoc premises than on causal premises, with no difference among 11-year-olds. Findings suggest importance of children's ability to explore their own knowledge base. (Author/KB)