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Children of ages 2 1/2, 3, and 3 1/2 years were tested for their understanding of object hiding, believed to reflect an early developmental level of knowledge about visual perception. Even the youngest subjects could nonegocentrically hide an object by placing it on the opposite side of a screen from another person, even though placing it there necessarily left it unhidden from themselves. In contrast, there was a significant increase with age in the ability to achieve the same physical end state by placing the screen between the other person and the object. Most subjects at each age level correctly indicated that the other person could see the object when the experimenter interposed the screen between the child and the object but that the other person could not see the object when she placed the screen between the other person and the object. These and other recent findings indicate that children of this age can be both nonegocentric and skillful at estimating what other people do and do not see under various viewing conditions.

In communicative situations, preschoolers use shared knowledge, or "common ground," to guide their interpretation of a speaker's referential intent. Using eye-tracking measures, this study investigated the time course of 4-year-olds' (n = 95) use of two different speakers' perspectives and assessed how individual differences in this ability related to individual differences in executive function and representational skills. Gaze measures indicated partner-specific common ground guided children's interpretation from the earliest moments of language processing. Nonegocentric online processing was positively correlated with performance on a Level 2 visual perspective-taking task. These results demonstrate that preschoolers readily use the perspectives of multiple partners to guide language comprehension and that more advanced representational skills are associated with the rapid integration of common ground information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examined developmental changes in Level-2 visual perspective taking (VPT2) in 90 children aged 4-12 years and tested the role of their ability to mentally simulate changes to their bodily locations (self-motion imagery; SMI). Performance of a mental toy rotation task and a self-motion (SM) task (changing location of children) was superior to that of VPT2 and SMI tasks. Task performance of SMI was better than that of VPT2 before 10;0 (years;months). Furthermore, egocentric responses in VPT2 and SMI tasks were significantly more frequent than those in the mental rotation and SM tasks before 10;3. These findings suggest the involvement of embodied cognitive processes in perspective taking and the advantage of utilizing bodily information by age 10. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a theoretical review of the developmental origins of children's "folk theories" about the nature of the self, linking theoretical developments in philosophy with empirical discoveries from developmental psychology. The article first reviews children's views about the material nature of the self, outlining evidence that children naturally think about the self as distinct from the body. It then discusses children's understanding of the persistence of the self over time and, finally, explores children's views about conflict within the self. Together, these findings suggest that preschoolers possess stable, coherent, and predictive theories about the nature of the self that are stable across individuals, early emerging, and in some cases undergo interesting developmental change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigated the cognitive mechanisms underlying age-related differences in emotional egocentricity bias ( EEB) between children (aged 7-12 years, n = 30) and adults (aged 20-30 years, n = 30) using a novel paradigm of visuogustatory stimulation to induce pleasant and unpleasant emotions. Both children and adults showed an EBB, but that of children was larger. The EEB did not correlate with other measures of egocentricity. Crucially, the developmental differences in EEB were mediated by age-related changes in conflict processing and not visual perspective taking, response inhibition, or processing speed. This indicates that different types of egocentricity develop independently of one another and that the increased ability to overcome EEB can be explained by age-related improvements in conflict processing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theorists have speculated about the symbolic underpinnings of theory of mind (ToM), but no study has examined them across the main developmental span of ToM. Here, the onset of symbolic understandings in three domains (pretend play, language, and understanding representations) and ToM was examined. Fifty-eight children were tested on batteries of tasks four times from ages 2.5 to 5 years. Some significant interrelations among variables were seen at each age level. Canonical correlation analysis found that a subset of the symbolic variables was significantly related to ToM at ages 4 and 5, providing the best evidence to date that ToM is undergirded by a symbolic element that also supports language, pretend play, and representational understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dynamic relations during the preschool years across processes of control and understanding in the domains of emotion and cognition were examined. Participants were 263 children (42% non-White) and their mothers who were seen first when the children were 3 years old and again when they were 4. Results indicated dynamic dependence among the processes studied. Specifically, change in cognitive processes of control and understanding were dependent upon initial levels of the other processes. Changes in emotion control and understanding were not predicted by earlier performance in the other processes. Findings are discussed with regard to the constructs of control and understanding and the developmental interrelations among emotion and cognitive processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Children (aged 6-10) and adults (total N = 136) completed a novel visual perspective-taking task that allowed quantitative comparisons across age groups. All age groups found it harder to judge the other person's perspective when it differed from their own. This egocentric interference did not decrease with age, even though, overall, performance improved. In addition, it was more difficult to judge one's own perspective when it differed from that of the other person, suggesting that the other's perspective was processed even though it interfered with self-perspective judgments. In a logically equivalent, nonsocial task, the same degree of interference was not observed. These findings are discussed in relation to recent findings suggesting precocious theory-of-mind abilities in infancy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research has found that children engage in Level 2 visual perspective-taking, that is, the understanding that others may see things in a different way, between 4 and 5 years of age (e.g., ). This ability was reexamined in 36-month-olds using color filters. In Experiment 1 ( N = 24), children had to recognize how an object looked to an adult when she saw it through a color filter. In Experiment 2 ( N = 24), a novel production test was applied. Results of both studies show that 36-month-olds know how an object looks to another person. The discussion focuses on the psychological requirements of visual perspective-taking and its relation to other 'theory of mind' abilities, such as the distinction between appearance and reality and understanding false belief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does early gesture use predict later productive and receptive vocabulary in children with pre- or perinatal unilateral brain lesions (PL)? Eleven Children with PL were categorized into 2 groups based on whether their gesture at 18 months was within or below the range of typically developing (TD) children. Children with PL whose gesture was within the TD range developed a productive vocabulary at 22 and 26 months and a receptive vocabulary at 30 months that were all within the TD range. In contrast, children with PL below the TD range did not. Gesture was thus an early marker of which children with early unilateral lesions would eventually experience language delay, suggesting that gesture is a promising diagnostic tool for persistent delay. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2 studies mothers read wordless storybooks to their preschool-aged children; narratives were analyzed for mental state language. Children's theory-of-mind understanding (ToM) was concurrently assessed. In Study 1, children's ( N=30; M age 3 years 9 months) ToM task performance was significantly correlated with mothers' explanatory, causal, and contrastive talk about cognition, but not with mothers' simple mentions of cognition. In Study 2, the same pattern was found in an older sample of typically developing children ( N=24; M age 4 years 7 months), whereas for children on the autism spectrum ( N=24; M age 6 years 7.5 months), ToM task performance was uniquely correlated with mothers' explanatory, causal, and contrastive talk about emotions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research has found that the acquisition of theory of mind (ToM) is delayed in children with specific language impairment (SLI). The present study used a battery of ToM and visual perspective taking (VPT) tasks to investigate whether the delayed acquisition of ToM in children with SLI is associated with delayed VPT development. Harris' (1992, 1996) simulation theory predicts that the development of VPT will be delayed. Participants were 20 children with SLI ( M=62.9 months) and 20 typically developing children ( M=61.2 months) who were matched for nonverbal ability, gender, and age. The results supported Harris' theory and a role for language in ToM and VPT development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Perner (1991) has claimed that the linguistic structures and reasoning tasks mastered by 4-year-olds share a requirement to handle metarepresentation. In contrast, de Villiers (2000) has argued that they share a requirement to handle misrepresentation. In the current study, a correlation is observed between success on false belief tasks and the acquisition of relative clause sentences. This correlation is not predicted by de Villiers's account because such sentences do not require the handling of misrepresentation, but it is consistent with Perner's account because such sentences do require the handling of metarepresentation. It is proposed that only an account that integrates the accounts of both de Villiers and Perner can explain extant data on language and cognition in 4-year-olds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Automatic attention cueing by perceived changes in gaze direction was studied in 2-year-old children with autism and typically developing (TD) controls using a visual attention cueing paradigm. In Experiments 1 and 2 the cue consisted of an eye movement (Eyes) and a nonbiological movement (SimEyes), respectively. The results suggest that visual attention in children with autism and their TD counterparts is cued by perceived eye movement. Thus, although in naturalistic situations toddlers with autism do not follow the gaze of others, they are sensitive to directional cues inherent in eye movement. Cue-specific differences in performance related to the level of engagement and cue-processing time may suggest reliance on different underlying strategies for gaze processing in autism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research examined the relation between individual differences in inhibitory control (IC; a central component of executive functioning) and theory-of-mind (ToM) performance in preschool-age children. Across two sessions, 3- and 4-year-old children (N = 107) were given multitask batteries measuring IC and ToM. Inhibitory control was strongly related to ToM, r = .66, p < .001. This relation remained significant controlling for age, gender, verbal ability, motor sequencing, family size, and performance on pretend-action and mental state control tasks. Inhibitory tasks requiring a novel response in the face of a conflicting prepotent response (Conflict scale) and those requiring the delay of a prepotent response (Delay scale) were significantly related to ToM. The Conflict scale, however, significantly predicted ToM performance over and above the Delay scale and control measures, whereas the Delay scale was not significant in a corresponding analysis. These findings suggest that IC may be a crucial enabling factor for ToM development, possibly affecting both the emergence and expression of mental state knowledge. The implications of the findings for a variety of executive accounts of ToM are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Very young children seem to know that people experience several mental states: desires, perceptions, emotions. In three studies, we investigated 2- and young 3-year-olds' judgments and communications about how these states connect together in people's lives and minds. Two experimental studies with 56 participants demonstrated young children's understanding of at least one set of connections: In appropriate circumstances, a person's perception of desirable or undesirable objects leads to related emotional experiences. A complementary investigation of four young children's everyday conversations demonstrated their awareness of and expression of several additional connections between people's desires, perceptions, and emotions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on a study which investigated chimpanzees' understanding of visual perception. Methodology of the study; Data analysis; Results and discussion.

Explores the autistic child's theory of mind. Child's understanding of a mistaken belief; Ability of child to infer knowledge about the content of a container from having or not having looked inside; Difficulty of autistic child in taking account of mental states.

Studies young children's understanding of the psychological causes of behavior. Knowledge of psychological states and preference for internal versus external causes of behavior; Analysis of key issues of interest; Implications on child development.

WIMMER, HEINZ, HOGREFE, G-JÜRGEN, and FERNER, JOSEF Children's Understanding of Informational Access as Source of Knowledge CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 1988, 59, 386-396. A sharp improvement was found between 3 years and 5 years in children's understanding of the role of visual perception and linguistic communication in knowledge formation. Although children at any age were able to obtain knowledge and could reliably introspect on the existence of knowledge obtained through visual and linguistic information, most 3- and some 4-year-olds seemed completely ignorant about the causal connection between access to an informational source and resulting knowledge. They could not tell how they themselves had acquired a particular piece of knowledge (i e, whether they had been shown or told). They were also incapable of assessing another person's knowledge of a fact on the basis of observing that person being deprived of or being given information about that fact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the competence of children in attributing ignorance and attributing false belief to the other. Ability of 3-4 year-olds to attribute ignorance and failure to attribute the resulting false belief; Developmental gap found for children two years older between the attribution of second-order ignorance and second-order false belief.

Although recent research indicates that an increased sensitivity to visual appearances develops around 4 or 5 years of age, evidence from perceptual studies suggests that certain types of appearances, that is, projective size and shape, are not noticed or understood until at least 7. 4 experiments investigated preschool children's knowledge of the projective size--distance and projective shape--orientation relationships. In Experiment 1, 3- and 4-year-olds were asked whether an object should be moved farther or nearer in order to increase or decrease its apparent size. 4-year-olds performed significantly better than chance, but 3-year-olds did not. Experiment 2 showed that 3-year-olds are able to perceive projective size changes, indicating that although they do not fully understand the projective size-distance relationship, the necessary perceptual information is potentially available to them. In Experiment 3, 3- and 4-year-olds were asked to indicate how a circular object should be rotated to make it appear either circular or elliptical. Again, 4-year-olds performed significantly better than chance, but 3-year-olds did not. Again also, the results of Experiment 4 indicate that although 3-year-olds are not aware of the projective shape-orientation relationship, they are capable of attending to changes in projective shape. Thus, the constraints on children's knowledge of the projective size-distance and projective shape-orientation relationships seem to be at least partly cognitive rather than wholly perceptual. These results are interpreted as further evidence for the acquisition of level 2 percept knowledge during early childhood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evaluates the effects of stimulus complexity and rule usage on a visual perspective-taking task in preschoolers, first, third, and fifth graders, and adults. Indication that error decreased with age; Occurrence of more errors with the more complex visual arrays; Most egocentric errors; Inability to relate the array to pictorial presentations; Different views rule.

Studies children's understanding of the distinction between appearance and reality. Hypothesis that phenomenism errors predominate when children are asked about objects' real and apparent properties; Intellectual realism errors; Property-identity hypothesis.