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The article reports that U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) issued a policy on monitoring of dual-use life sciences research on March 29, 2012. The dual-use policy states that life sciences studies must be revised to prevent biosecurity worries, where it was made as a response to findings on bird flu mutations and transmissions. The policy and its linked NSABB documents were added on the National Institutes of Health Office of Biotechnology Activities webpage.

The article discusses research on experiments on the H5N1 avian flu virus. It references a study by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) published in an issue of "Science." The NSABB cites the need for censoring results from research papers describing controversial experiments on the virus. The two papers covers work on H5N1 where experiments on direct mutations on the virus were done.

The article focuses on the recommendation of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) to rescind an amendment that was enacted by the U.S. Congress in 2004. The said amendment imposed a ban on the synthesis of Variola, a smallpox virus. The aim of NSABB is to help the government devise precautionary measures against the unlawful application of life sciences research. NSABB also reasoned that the imposition of penalty on scientists who reproduce the virus may hinder research.

Reports on the creation of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) as part of the government's effort to deal with security-related issues in federally funded life sciences research that will be managed by the U.S. National Institutes of Health. Formation of a global, nonprofit center to foster a culture of responsibility in the private sector by the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute and the International Institute for Strategic Studies; Functions of the NSABB; Scope and coverage of the responsibilities of the NSABB.