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This paper looks at how the memory and, subsequently, narratives of the Waffen SS "Galicia," later known as the 1st Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army, are being (re)constructed and presented to a wider audience by scholars, politicians, and World War II veterans. The narratives and political framings of the "Galicia" Division tend to divide into two dichotomous approaches, each presenting itself as "historical truth." On the one hand, the ex-members are often portrayed as traitors, opportunists, and war criminals. On the other, ex-"Galicians" are seen as those who arguably chose "the lesser of two evils" and joined the German Army in order to defend their motherland against the Soviet invasion and build a nucleus for the Ukrainian army. Rather than follow the well-trodden paths of attempting to justify or condemn the Division's actions, this paper analyzes how the interpretations of the Division's identity are presented in contemporary debates, addressing at the same time the concept of memory. It offers a discussion of the political framing of history in contemporary Ukraine and of the challenges that Ukrainian historiography faces with regard to the question of World War II in general and the "Galicia" Division in particular. In this way the paper seeks to contribute to an understanding of the institutionalization of memory and the shaping of national identity through existing and newly emerged narratives about World War II in contemporary Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines contrasting memories of Soviet and émigré discourses in Ukrainian literature. The Soviet discourse tended to sanitize the war experience, exploiting the concept of the Great Patriotic War, along the ideological lines of the socialist realist style in literature, with a designated set of topics and characteristics to glorify this war, including the leading role of the Communist party, and Soviet messianism. Despite some periods of liberalization, this model remained under the tight control of the Moscow centre and was reinforced after Brezhnev's re-introduction of Victory Day. Presenting an alternative voice, the émigré discourse is shown as a more vibrant one, which found itself on a mission to undermine the mono-centric nature of the imperial discourse and record the complex truth about the war. Being a deliberate attempt to battle for its own representation, the émigré discourse, though with its own biases, addressed all those issues ignored in Soviet literature, including the critical attitude of Ukrainians to the Soviet regime and the war, the portrayal of the resistance movement, and the presentation of World War II as a tragedy for the Ukrainian nation, caught between fascism and Bolshevism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the popular response to Soviet myths in the post-Soviet period through the lens of the complicated treatment of Zoia Kosmodem'ianskaia. As arguably the most famous Soviet World War II martyr, Kosmodem'ianskaia's image splintered after glasnost' and has been located at the nexus of debate in various media since 1991. This paper poses questions about the fracturing of national memory when a nation has undergone upheaval: about the stability of heroes, about citizens' responses to them, and about heroes' transformation in the new regime. Catriona Kelly has demonstrated that the treatment of a national hero can illuminate the circumstances that produced the hero and the cultural climate of subsequent decades. Building on her work, this article asks "Why and how has the image of Kosmodem'ianskaia remained relevant while other Soviet heroes have been neglected since 1991?" This article posits that Kosmodem'ianskaia's continued significance lies above all in the flexibility of her image and the transitional aspects of her body. Her depictions in various contexts represent prominent responses to the authoritarian regime which gave birth to both Kosmodem'ianskaia and her legacy. The variety of her images demonstrates the continued relevance of this figure two decades after the collapse of the USSR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the evolution of nostalgic sentiment in Russia over the past 25 years. Unlike in the 1990s, the nostalgic perception of the Soviet past in the 2000s was transformed under the influence of a new government ideology. Leonid Parfenov’s projectNamedniin both its forms – a television program and a book anthology – is an example of reflexive nostalgia for the Soviet period of 1946–1991. Reflexive nostalgia as expressed by liberal intellectuals presumes a freedom of interpretation. Thus,Namednidoes not reflect the official “patriotic” discourse. The article discusses the specifics of the television and book versions, the significance of visual and literary imagery, and the relationship between history and historical memory. BecauseNamedniexhibits signs of an autobiographical text, the article concludes that memory takes a higher priority than historical science in Parfenov’s project. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article discusses the formation of nostalgic sentiment in contemporary Russia. Nostalgic emotions which idealize the Soviet experience are typical of Russian society today. To a great extent, they are a natural consequence of the forming of historical memories concerning the recent past. However, to a greater extent, they must be viewed as a socio-cultural phenomenon formed in the context of the social catastrophe that accompanied the collapse of the USSR. Nostalgia is amplified by political practices. Nostalgic sentiment is also sustained and cultivated by the mass media, which responds both to consumer demand and to political trends. Nostalgia for what was lost in the aftermath of a social catastrophe transforms a psychological reaction, typical of the older generation, into a nostalgia of catastrophes. It is the particular condition of a society that has lived through complicated historical periods, when dramatic changes resulted in the loss of the behavioural models and values which used to define people’s lives. The nostalgic mindset facilitates the mythologization of certain intervals of Soviet history as a “golden age”, one that is not completely lost. The period of the 1950s to 1970s is particularly actively mythologized. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article seeks to provide a nuanced understanding of why some Russian citizens look upon Josef Stalin respectfully today. Based upon the results of an original nationwide survey conducted by the Levada Analytical Center and supplemented by seventy field interviews, this article posits that a considerable number of Russians view Stalin respectfully on account of three factors. First, Stalin remains a somewhat revered historical figure in part because most Russians harbour no feelings of shame about the Soviet past. Additionally, the tendency of some to rationalize Stalin's main policies of the 1930s, by claiming that there was no other way for the USSR to industrialize than according to the course adhered to by Stalin, helps to safeguard the former General Secretary's reputation. That said, the primary reason why some Russians view Stalin respectfully is due to the pervasiveness of nostalgia for the Soviet period, a widespread phenomenon which serves to bolster Stalin's image as a leader whose contributions led to the realization of great achievements. This article contends that feelings of respect for Stalin are mainly grounded in how Russians evaluate the present ordering of society in comparison to the Soviet past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the core propositions articulated by several public actors in the so-called Bandera debate, i.e., discussions about the usable past and legacy of the wartime Ukrainian nationalist insurgency and its central symbolic figure, Stepan Bandera. In Western Ukraine, popular historical imagery as well as intellectual polemics about the "Ukrainization" of World War II challenged both the Soviet myth of the Great Patriotic War and the European model of politics of regret. Correspondingly, one of the main ideas conveyed during the Bandera debate in Western Ukraine was the necessity of liberalization of the national politics of memory, i.e., the process of opening the political discourses and public debate to the circulation of diverse voices and narratives concerning the national past, a circulation unrestrained by political pressure. Generally, however, wartime events and figures continue to be presented in line with dichotomous national discourses. As the example of a chain of restaurants exploiting the theme of World War II demonstrates, one-dimensional interpretations of the contentious past suggested to the public by the actors involved in the commercialization of historical knowledge may have far-reaching, unpredictable implications. This is especially true in post-Orange Western Ukraine where politics--including the politics of memory--is increasingly determined by ultra-right forces such as VO Svoboda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers the following questions: how and with the aid of which resources was the memory of forced labour during World War II constructed and recreated in the public space of Soviet and post-Soviet Ukraine? How has the perception of the place of forced labourers in the general pantheon of war participants changed? And what kinds of transformations took place in the meaningful emphases and symbolic accretion of images associated with this group of people? The initial focus is on the Soviet version of this memory because some correction must be made to the theory that was formulated in the early 1990s and which gradually acquired normative significance in post-Soviet (including Ukrainian) journalism and scholarly literature: namely, that the history, creativity, and memory of this population group were "forgotten" in the official Soviet version of the war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the ways in which post-Soviet debates over whether and how to remember the defeats of the early period of World War II were shaped by earlier Soviet-era debates over war memory and legitimacy. It argues that the reaction against the Khrushchev thaw in the early Brezhnev era--which eventually gave rise to the quintessentially late socialist "war cult"--initially led to a deep contestation between the state and some of the Soviet intelligentsia, not only regarding the Soviet narrative of 1941, but also over the broader question of whether Soviet public memory could and should accommodate defeats and trauma as well as celebration of victory. Though promptly curtailed by the exercise of party-state authority, this debate quickly resurfaced in glasnost', when debates over the early war once again became a crucible for disputes over broader questions of Soviet memory and its role in legitimating (or re-legitimating) Soviet power. These two debates are then compared with the strikingly similar dynamics of war memory contestation in post-Soviet Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction to the special issue on historical memory and the Great Patriotic War and its impact on Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine is presented.