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Recent research suggests that, regardless of the truth of libertarianism about free will, there appears to be a widespread belief among nonphilosopher laypersons that the choices of free agents are not causally necessitated by prior states of affairs. In this paper, I propose a new class of debunking explanation for this belief which I call 'reasons-based accounts' (RBAs). I start the paper by briefly recounting the failures of extant approaches to debunking explanations, and then use this as a jumping off point to articulate several alternatives, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to relational views of autonomy, some social relations or forms of dependence are necessary for autonomous agency. Recent relational theorists have primarily focused on autonomy of action or practical autonomy, and the result has been a shift away from individualistic conceptions of autonomy in the practical realm. Despite these trends, individualistic conceptions are still the default when it comes to autonomy of belief or intellectual autonomy. In this paper, I argue for a relational account of intellectual autonomy. Specifically, I claim that intellectual autonomy requires a sense of one’s standing as an equal member of the epistemic community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Accounts of adaptive preferences are of two kinds: well-being accounts fully theorized for their own sake and political accounts theorized to facilitate the political project of reducing oppression and marginalization. Given their practical role, the latter are often less fully theorized, and are therefore less robust to theoretical criticism. In this paper, I first draw on well-being accounts to identify the well-theorized elements that political accounts should want to adopt in order to strengthen their project and avoid common criticisms. Second, I appeal to the political project to show the shortcomings of the well-being accounts on which I draw. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article focuses on the author's views on the defense of the underlying principles of toleration. It discusses the presented definition of Peter Nicholson on the moral aspect of toleration. It also puts emphasis on the integration of the adopted principle of John Stuart Mill on the liberal moral theory which highlights the relationship between autonomy and toleration and the possibility of autonomous sacrifice in the autonomy. Further, it reveals that such presented works manifest argument on toleration.

This article presents views and insights of philosophers regarding the logical autonomy of ethics. Some philosophers used to think that the logical autonomy of ethics mattered because it bore on the debate over descriptivism versus prescriptivism in ethics. The problematic character of the ethical domain is affirmed immediately in premise, which denies that directly justified knowledge of ethics is possible. Premise might be thought unnecessary, but it is included to make the argument explicitly logically valid, and can be read as saying no more than.

Explains the limitations of the neutrality of autonomy for the purpose of proposing an alternative, weakly substantive account. Examples of self-effacers; Failure of neutral theories to deal with self-government; Responsiveness of autonomous actions to agent's substantive wants and beliefs; Account of autonomy as active self-guidance based on one's own sense of values.

Explains philosopher Harry Frankfurt's hybrid theory of autonomy and the asymmetrical dependency thesis. Outline of Frankfurt's hierarchical model and its problems; Outline of the hybrid theory of autonomy; Evaluation of Frankfurt voluntarism that appeals to the notion of decisive identification; Defense of the asymmetrical dependency thesis; Relevance of hybrid theory and asymmetrical dependency thesis.

Responds to the critique of Alfred R. Mele on historical autonomy. Degree of reflection allowed by the process of acquiring a desire; Agent's reflection; Models.

Presents a critique on the genetic and historical account of individual autonomy advanced by John Christman. Historical and nonhistorical constraints on autonomy; Models of autonomy.