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We examine public opinion of planting genetically improved poplars on public lands in western Canada. Policy scenarios consider the use of three different breeding methods (traditional selective breeding, genomics-assisted breeding, and genetic modification), each with and without poplars being used for biofuels. We employ a choice experiment to provide alternative outcomes to policy scenarios and to investigate differences among characteristics of respondents. Overall, a majority of respondents voted in favour of policies that allowed improved poplars on public land if the fibre is used to generate biofuels. Adding biofuel production to a policy scenario increases the probability of acceptance by 17%-32%. In contrast, the various types of breeding technology do not matter as much regarding public acceptance. Responses differ among segments of the population, but these differences do not greatly influence choices. Attributes that increase the probability of acceptance are being a male, being from Alberta, and being from a population centre of 10 000-100 000 people (relative to centers that are >100 000 people). Attributes that decrease the probability of acceptance are age, being from British Columbia, and being from a population centre of <10 000 people (relative to centers that are >100 000 people). Despite these significant patterns of preferences, there is substantial uncertainty underlying the responses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A forest-level model is developed that estimates how policies towards hybrid poplar plantations on private and public land impact harvest levels and values for producing biofuel feedstock. We simulate three policy changes: (i) permitting an increase in harvest levels on public land as a result of establishing hybrid poplar plantations on private land; (ii) permitting the establishment of hybrid poplar plantations on public land; and (iii) including forest carbon emission offsets in the net benefits realized by the forest operator. We are interested in whether the increase in harvest created by the policies might be enough to supply a biorefinery, and how the value of the operation changes. Our results suggest that jointly managing public and private lands under sustained yield can increase harvest by between 7% and 93%, and increase the value of the operation by between 39% and 263%. Results also suggest that hybrid poplar plantations could enable a leaseholder of one million hectares of public forestland to initiate an allowable cut effect and thereby increase harvest enough to supply a new biorefinery, in addition to its existing pulp mill. Carbon offsets further increase the value of the forest, although harvest begins to decline at high carbon prices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Provincial governments across Canada rely on regeneration requirements and penalties to promote reforestation following harvesting. However, little has been written on how to determine optimal levels of penalties for noncompliance such that tenure holders have incentives to further social reforestation objectives. This paper shows how reforestation penalties may be calculated in the case of Alberta. The calculation of the penalty is shown to be dependent on (i) changes in the values of future annual allowable cuts caused by failure to promptly regenerate, (ii) the portion of stumpage values collected with stumpage fees, (iii) nontimber values influenced by reforestation, (iv) differences in private and social discount rates, (v) costs of detecting noncompliance, and (vi) the probability of detecting infractions. In the case of Alberta, (v) and (vi) are minor considerations, as detection costs are low and probability of detection is high. However, values of (i) through (iv) have large potential impacts on the optimal penalties. For example, if (i) annual allowable cuts drop by 99 m3 for a 3-year reforestation delay (vs. an acceptable 2-year delay) on a 783-ha forest, (ii) stumpage fees are $10 below stumpage value, (iii) nontimber values are zero, and (iv) the private discount is 9%, while the social rate is 6%, then the optimal penalty is $49.17CAN·ha–1. However, if we change (ii) and (iv) such that stumpage fees are $30CAN below stumpage value and the private discount is 9%, while the social rate is 3%, then the optimal penalty is $168.58CAN·ha–1. With zero nontimber values, zero monitoring costs, no divergence between public and private interest rates at 9%, and a probability of detection of 1.00, the current penalty of $30CAN·ha–1·year–1 would approximate the optimal amount if stumpage fees were $20CAN·m–3. The variability in values of (i) through (iv) across forests and over time suggests that problems will arise in establishing a constant penalty for all provincial forests and that penalties should be revised as values change over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A correction to the article "Public preferences for planting genetically improved poplars on public land for biofuel production in western Canada" that was published in the November 2015 issue is presented.