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So‐called insight problems are widely studied because they tap into the creative thinking that is crucial for solving real problems. However, insight problems are typically presented in static formats (on paper, computer) that allow no physical interaction with the problem elements, whereas such an interaction might in fact reduce the load on limited cognitive resources, such as working memory (WM) capacity, thereby facilitating solutions. To test this proposition, 124 young adults were allowed to interact physically with nine established insight problems, while another 124 people attempted to solve these problems using paper and pencil. Additionally, hints were provided for three problems that typically no‐one solves. No general facilitating effect of physical interaction was found, with only one problem clearly benefitting from it. Furthermore, making use of hints was actually hindered by physical interaction. No difference in perceived task load and correlation with WM capacity was observed between the formats, and subjective ratings of insight were virtually unaffected by presentation format. Overall, physical interaction minimally affected insight problem‐solving, which appears to rely strongly on internalized cognitive processing involving WM. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The human face is arguably the most important of all social stimuli because it provides so much valuable information about others. Therefore, one critical factor for successful social communication is the ability to process faces. In general, a wide body of social cognitive research has demonstrated that perceivers are better at extracting information from their own‐race compared to other‐race faces and that these differences can be a barrier to positive cross‐race relationships. The primary objective of the present paper was to provide an overview of how people process faces in diverse contexts, focusing on racial ingroup and outgroup members within one nation and across nations. To achieve this goal, we first broadly describe social cognitive research on categorization processes related to ingroups vs. outgroups. Next, we briefly examine two prominent mechanisms (experience and motivation) that have been used to explain differences in recognizing facial identities and identifying emotions when processing ingroup and outgroup racial faces within nations. Then, we explore research in this domain across nations and cultural explanations, such as norms and practices, that supplement the two proposed mechanisms. Finally, we propose future cross‐cultural research that has the potential to help us better understand the role of these key mechanisms in processing ingroup and outgroup faces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is an author response to two commentaries on 'Defining Synaesthesia' (Simner, 2012) by David M. Eagleman ('Synesthesia in its protean guises', 2012), and Roi Cohen Kadosh and Devin B. Terhune ('Redefining synaesthesia?', 2012). Together with these authors, I seek to more closely examine existing criteria on which definitions of synaesthesia have been based. In particular, I focus on the fact (a) that existing definitions paint synaesthesia as an overly homogenous condition, (b) synaesthesia may have multiple neurological causes, and (c) synaesthetes and non-synaesthetes may lie on a continuum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a thought-provoking paper, highlights and criticizes a number of assumptions concerning synaesthesia. She specifically takes issue with the following assumptions: (1) synaesthesia is strictly a sensory-perceptual phenomenon; (2) consistency of inducer-concurrent pairs is the gold standard for establishing the authenticity of an individual's synaesthesia; and (3) synaesthesia is not heterogeneous. In the wake of this critique, Simner advances a working definition of synaesthesia as a neurological hyper-association that aims to be more inclusive of its variants. We are very sympathetic to Simner's approach and believe that it raises important points that will advance our understanding of synaesthesia. Here we supplement, and sometimes challenge, some of these ideas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the authors' response concerning the criticism on their article "Cognitive Ethology: A new approach for studying human cognition." They explain that the write the paper to help stimulate a dialogue among researchers regarding what they see as a fundamental and pressing issue in the field. The authors claim that they suggested the evidence which indicates the connection that researchers claim to exist between laboratory and life. They state that the responses on their paper are representative and instructive because they can be perceived as reflecting the three forms of responses they originally identified.

This paper examines parallels between the combination of particular instances of a cue trait to make a single judgement and the combination of judgements into a compound impression. Predictions derived from a differential weighted averaging model are tested and confirmed, and the implications for theories of impression formation are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

4 As part of the more general issue of whether culture can affect perception, the present paper addresses the Whorfian question of whether the language available to describe perceptual experience can influence the experience itself. It investigated the effect of vocabulary on perceptual classification by the study of a remote culture (Himba) which possesses a poor colour vocabulary but a rich vocabulary of animal pattern terms. Thus, the present study examined Categorical Perception (CP) with a type of visual stimulus not previously used to assess the effect of labels on perceptual judgments. For the animal patterns, the Whorfian view predicted that it would only be the Himba who showed superiority for cross-category decisions as only they have the appropriate labels. The Whorfian view was upheld and confirmed previous findings that linked perceptual differences to labelling differences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background. While the cognitive theory of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is one of the most widely accepted accounts of the maintenance of the disorder in adults, no study to date has systematically evaluated the theory across children, adolescence and adults with OCD. Method. This paper investigated developmental differences in the cognitive processing of threat in a sample of children, adolescents and adults with OCD. Using an idiographic assessment approach, as well as self-report questionnaires, this study evaluated cognitive appraisals of responsibility, probability, severity, thought-action fusion (TAF), thought-suppression, self-doubt and cognitive control. It was hypothesised that there would be age related differences in reported responsibility for harm, probability of harm, severity of harm, thought suppression, TAF, self-doubt and cognitive control. Results. Results of this study demonstrated that children with OCD reported experiencing fewer intrusive thoughts, which were less distressing and less uncontrollable than those experienced by adolescents and adults with OCD. Furthermore, responsibility attitudes, probability biases and thought suppression strategies were higher in adolescents and adults with OCD. Cognitive processes of TAF, perceived severity of harm, self-doubt and cognitive control were found to be comparable across age groups. Conclusions. These results suggest that the current cognitive theory of OCD needs to address developmental differences in the cognitive processing of threat. Furthermore, for a developmentally sensitive theory of OCD, further investigation is warranted into other possible age related maintenance factors. Implications of this investigation and directions for future research are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research has shown that the beneficial effects of peer collaboration are not always apparent until some time has elapsed. Such delayed effects are not readily incorporated in current models of collaborative learning, but because they constitute incubation effects in the psychological sense of the term, they should in principle be consistent with cognitive accounts of how incubation occurs. Accordingly, the paper reports three studies which test whether, in accordance with cognitive models of incubation, the delayed effects of peer collaboration could result from: (a) the breaking over time of unhelpful mental sets, (b) the engagement in post-collaborative reflective appraisal, and (c) the experience of subsequent events that, thanks to collaboration, can be used productively. The studies involved 9- to 12-year-old children working on the factors relevant to floating and sinking. The results provide no evidence for the relevance of set breaking or reflective appraisal, but suggest strongly that peer collaboration can 'prime' children to make good use of subsequent input. It is argued that in addition to clarifying how the delayed effects occur and applying incubation models in a novel context, the results flag up issues that are common to collaborative and cognitive theory, and that neither address adequately. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Shared mental models theory normally takes the individual as its unit of analysis. This paper proposes a theoretical framework for studying shared mental models in which the model is considered to be distributed amongst the team. From this framework a cognitive process is predicted which describes how shared mental models are run. A team reasoning task requiring planning was used to illustrate this framework and test predictions derived from it. Two aspects of sharing mental models were studied; the degree of overlap between team members' mental models and the organization of the division of the model between team members. Experimental results showed that the cognitive processes used were distributed amongst the team and support was found for most, but not all, aspects of the proposed process of running a shared mental model. The organization of sharing was found to influence this process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When given experience designed to highlight the fact that the specific cardinal values of sets in one-to-one correspondence are the same (or different), three- and four-year-old children pass the standard number conservation tasks of equivalence and non-equivalence. The initial training involved set sizes of three and four items; the conservation transfer trials involved set sizes of eight and 10 items. Even where success was defined as being able to give a correct judgement and explanation on at least one task in the small-set range and one task in the large-set range, children did well. In Expt 1, 75 and 88 per cent of the three- and four-year-olds, respectively, met this criterion. In Expt 2 (run by an experimenter who was nave to the hypotheses and results of Expt 1) 58 and 75 per cent of the respective age groups met the same criterion. It is concluded that the children must have accessed an available, albeit implicit, ability to use one-to-one correspondence. Otherwise they could not have passed the large set-size tasks which are beyond the range they count accurately. The paper ends with a defence of Rozin's (1976) accessing account of cognitive development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an interpretation of inconsistent remarks which subjects made in explaining their erroneous solutions to a difficult deductive problem. Four half-masked cards of the following types were presented: (a) a number in the lower half, (b) a blank in the upper half, (c) a letter in the upper half, and (d) a blank in the lower half. The problem is to say which cards need to be unmasked to determine decisively whether a sentence like ‘A letter is above each number’ is true or false. The original aim was to determine the possible effects of varying the order of the terms in the test sentence: the results were inconclusive. However, the subjects' protocols were of much greater interest. When asked to justify their incorrect solutions, their remarks clearly revealed the operation of irreversible thought processes. Three possible hypotheses about them are considered, and it is argued that one involving dissociation of attention is most plausible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two competing theories explain the other‐'race' effect (ORE) either by greater perceptual expertise to same‐'race' (SR) faces or by social categorization of other‐'race' (OR) faces at the expense of individuation. To assess expertise and categorization contributions to the ORE, a promising—yet overlooked—approach is comparing activations for different other‐'races'. We present a label‐based systematic review of neuroimaging studies reporting increased activity in response to OR faces (African, Caucasian, or Asian) when compared with the SR of participants. Hypothetically, while common activations would reflect general aspects of OR perception, 'race'‐preferential ones would represent effects of 'race'‐specific visual appearance. We find that several studies report activation of occipito‐temporal and midcingulate areas in response to faces across different other‐'races', presumably due to high demand on the visual system and category processing. Another area reported in response to all OR faces, the caudate nucleus, suggests the involvement of socio‐affective processes and behavioural regulation. Overall, our results support hybrid models—both expertise and social categorization contribute to the ORE, but they provide little evidence for reduced motivation to process OR faces. Additionally, we identify areas preferentially responding to specific OR faces, reflecting effects of visual appearance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Integrative processing is traditionally believed to be dependent on consciousness. While earlier studies within the last decade reported many types of integration under subliminal conditions (i.e. without perceptual awareness), these findings are widely challenged recently. This review evaluates the current evidence for 10 types of subliminal integration that are widely studied: arithmetic processing, object‐context integration, multi‐word processing, same‐different processing, multisensory integration and 5 different types of associative learning. Potential methodological issues concerning awareness measures are also taken into account. It is concluded that while there is currently no reliable evidence for subliminal integration, this does not necessarily refute 'unconscious' integration defined through non‐subliminal (e.g. implicit) approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is ample evidence that multimedia learning is challenging, and learners often underutilize appropriate cognitive processes. Previous research has applied prompts to promote the use of helpful cognitive processing. However, prompts still require learners to regulate their learning, which may interfere with learning, especially in situations where cognitive demands are already high. As an alternative, implementation intentions (i.e. if‐then plans) are expected to help regulate behaviour automatically due to their specific wording, thereby offloading demands. Accordingly, this study aimed at investigating whether implementation intentions compared with prompts improve learning performance, especially under high cognitive load. Students (N = 120) learned either in a control condition without instructional support, with prompts, or with implementation intentions. Within each condition, half of the participants studied the multimedia instruction under conditions of either high or low cognitive load, which was experimentally manipulated by instructing them to perform one of two secondary tasks. In line with our hypotheses, the results showed that under low cognitive load, both prompts and implementation intentions led to better learning than the control condition. By contrast, under high cognitive load, only implementation intentions promoted learning. Thus, implementation intentions are an efficient means to promote learning even under challenging circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The way human bodies are represented is central in everyday activities. The cognitive system must combine internal, visceral, and somatosensory, signals to external, visually driven information generated from the spatial placement of others' bodies and the own body in the space. However, how different body representations covertly interact among them when observing human body parts is still unclear. Therefore, we investigated the implicit processing of body parts by manipulating either the body part stimuli' posture (conditions a and b) or the participants' response body posture (conditions c, d, and e) in healthy participants (N = 70) using a spatial compatibility task called Sidedness task. The task requires participants to judge the colour of a circle superimposed on a task‐irrelevant body part picture. Responses are facilitated when the spatial side of the responding hand corresponds to the spatial code generated by the hand stimulus's position with respect to a body of reference. Results showed that the observation of the task‐irrelevant body parts oriented participants' attention and facilitated responses that were spatial compatible with the spatial position such body parts have within a configural representation of the body structure (i.e., Body Structural Representation) in all the five experimental conditions. Notably, the body part stimuli were mentally attached to the body according to the most comfortable and less awkward postures, following the anatomo‐physiological constraints. Moreover, the pattern of the results was not influenced by manipulating the participants' response postures, suggesting that the automatic and implicit coding of the body part stimuli does not rely on proprioceptive information about one's body (i.e., Body Schema). We propose that the human body's morphometry knowledge is enriched by biomechanical and anatomo‐physiological information about the real body movement possibilities. Moreover, we discuss the importance of the automatic orienting of attention based on the sidedness within the context of imitational learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examined the relationship between metaphor comprehension and verbal analogical reasoning in young adults who were either typically developing (TD) or diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). The ASD sample was highly educated and high in verbal ability, and closely matched to a subset of TD participants on age, gender, educational background, and verbal ability. Additional TD participants with a broader range of abilities were also tested. Each participant solved sets of verbal analogies and metaphors in verification formats, allowing measurement of both accuracy and reaction times. Measures of individual differences in vocabulary, verbal working memory, and autistic traits were also obtained. Accuracy for both the verbal analogy and the metaphor task was very similar across the ASD and matched TD groups. However, reaction times on both tasks were longer for the ASD group. Additionally, stronger correlations between verbal analogical reasoning and working memory capacity in the ASD group indicated that processing verbal analogies was more effortful for them. In the case of both groups, accuracy on the metaphor and analogy tasks was correlated. A mediation analysis revealed that after controlling for working memory capacity, the inter‐task correlation could be accounted for by the mediating variable of vocabulary knowledge, suggesting that the primary common mechanisms linking the two tasks involve language skills. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We evaluated whether movement modulates the semantic processing of words. To this end, we used homograph words with two meanings, one associated with hand movements (e.g., 'abanico', 'fan' in Spanish) or foot movements ('bota', 'boot' in Spanish), and the other not associated with movement ('abanico', 'range' in Spanish; 'bota', 'wineskin' in Spanish). After the homograph, three words were presented, and participants were asked to choose the word related to one of the two homograph meanings. The words could be either related to the motor meaning of the homograph ('fan‐heat'), to the non‐motor meaning of the homograph ('range‐possibility') or unrelated ('fan‐phone'). The task was performed without movement (simple condition) or by performing hand (Experiment 1) and foot (Experiment 2) movements. Compared with the simple condition, the performance of movement oriented the preference towards the motor meaning of the homograph. This pattern of results confirms that movement modulates word comprehension. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theories of autobiographical memory distinguish between involuntary and voluntary memories. While involuntary memories are retrieved with no conscious intention and are therefore unexpected, voluntary memories are both intended and expected. Recent research has shown that participants sometimes classify their memories as either involuntary or voluntary based on retrieval effort instead of intention. These findings question whether intention really is the defining difference between these two types of retrieval or whether retrieval effort is also an important determinant. In two experimental studies, we investigated the extent to which participants rely on retrieval effort while classifying their memories as involuntary or voluntary. We created experimental conditions that maximize the probability of one type of retrieval while minimizing the probability of another type. Participants reported autobiographical memories in each condition while the programme registered their retrieval time. They then classified their memories as either voluntary or involuntary and rated all memories on perceived retrieval effort. This gave us four categories of memories: experimentally defined voluntary and involuntary memories with an objective measure of effort (retrieval time) and subjectively classified involuntary and voluntary memories with a subjective measure of effort. This allowed us to investigate the relative contribution of intention and effort to involuntary and voluntary memories. We replicated and extended previous findings by showing that the majority of memories were classified as involuntary independently of whether they were retrieved in the experimentally defined voluntary or involuntary condition. This could indicate that subjective effort is more important than intention for the involuntary–voluntary distinction in contrast with existing theories. We discuss theoretical and methodological implications of this finding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines psychological research into the development and use of information technology (IT) with the aim of underscoring the need to study cognition in organizations. Reviews of literatures on interaction between humans and computers; Study of organizational aspects of IT; Ideas on interdependencies between organizations and cognitive issues; Alternative worldviews to study the psychology of IT.

In today's globalized world, we frequently encounter unfamiliar events that we may have difficulty comprehending – and in turn remembering – due to a lack of appropriate schemata. This research investigated schema effects in a situation where participants established a complex new schema for an unfamiliar type of story through exposure to four variations. We found that immediate recall increased across subsequent stories and that distortions occurred less frequently – participants built on the emerging schema and gradually established representations of parts of the story that were initially transformed. In recall with delays increasing up to 1 month, quantitative measures indicated forgetting while distortions increased. The second focus of this research was on content and order deviation effects on recall. The content deviation, in contrast with previous repeated‐event research, was not remembered well and was associated with lower recall; the order deviation had a similar (but expected) effect. We discuss discrepancies between results of this study and previous literature, which had focused on schemata for familiar events, in relation to stages of schema development: it seems that in unfamiliar repeated events, a complex new schema is in the early stages of formation, where the lack of attentional resources limits active processing of deviations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Causal illusion has been proposed as a cognitive mediator of pseudoscientific beliefs. However, previous studies have only tested the association between this cognitive bias and a closely related but different type of unwarranted beliefs, those related to superstition and paranormal phenomena. Participants (n = 225) responded to a novel questionnaire of pseudoscientific beliefs designed for this study. They also completed a contingency learning task in which a possible cause, infusion intake, and a desired effect, headache remission, were actually non‐contingent. Volunteers with higher scores on the questionnaire also presented stronger causal illusion effects. These results support the hypothesis that causal illusions might play a fundamental role in the endorsement of pseudoscientific beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The own‐age bias (OAB) is suggested to be caused by perceptual‐expertise and/or social‐cognitive mechanisms. Bryce and Dodson (2013, Psychology and Aging, 28, 87, Exp 2) provided support for the social‐cognitive account, demonstrating an OAB for participants who encountered a mixed‐list of own‐ and other‐age faces, but not for participants who encountered a pure‐list of only own‐ or other‐age faces. They proposed that own‐age/other‐age categorization, and the resulting OAB, only emerge when age is made salient in the mixed‐list condition. Our study aimed to replicate this finding using methods typically used to investigate the OAB to examine their robustness and contribution to our understanding of how the OAB forms. Across three experiments that removed theoretically unimportant components of the original paradigm, varied face sex, and included background scenes, the OAB emerged under both mixed‐list and pure‐list conditions. These results are more consistent with a perceptual‐expertise than social‐cognitive account of the OAB, but may suggest that manipulating age salience using mixed‐list and pure‐list presentations is not sufficient to alter categorization processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With this work, we intended to draw a cognitive portrait of openness to reconciliation. No study had yet examined the potential contribution of high‐level cognitive functioning, in addition to psychological health, to explaining attitudes towards reconciliation in societies exposed to major trauma such as post‐genocide Rwanda. We measured the contribution of general cognitive capacity, analytical thinking, and subjective judgements. Our results show that higher cognitive capacity is not associated with greater openness to reconciliation. On the other hand, proneness to think analytically about the genocide predicts more favorable attitudes towards reconciliation. The latter effect is associated with more tempered judgements about retrospective facts (e.g., number of genocide perpetrators) and prospective events (e.g., risk of genocide reoccurrence). This work establishes the importance of cognitive functioning in the aftermath of political violence: A better understanding of the influence of information processing on openness to reconciliation may help improve reconciliation policies and contribute to reducing risks of conflict reoccurrence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People shape and influence others’ emotions every day. If these attempts are perceived as successful, they may have a positive effect on people's relationships and well‐being. Across two studies, targets’ perceived efficacy of regulation strategies to improve their sadness and anxiety/stress has been investigated. In Study 1, participants (n = 120) were provided with two scenarios depicting sadness and anxiety/stress and asked to imagine themselves in these situations. Afterwards, they were provided with different regulation strategies and asked to rate their perceived efficacy to downregulate their sadness and anxiety. In Study 2, participants (n = 120) were asked to describe a situation where they felt sad and another one where they felt anxious. They were then provided with strategies aimed at reducing their sadness and anxiety. Results from both studies showed that whereas for sadness higher perceived efficacy was predicted by affective engagement, for anxiety/stress was predicted by cognitive engagement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We used an identities approach to examine voting intentions in the June 2016 UK referendum on membership of the European Union ( EU). In April 2016, 303 British adults (58.7% women, age M = 34.73) indicated their voting intentions for the referendum and completed measures of identification with the national in-group, perceived threat from Muslim immigrants, belief in Islamophobic conspiracy narratives, Islamophobia, general conspiracist beliefs, ambiguity tolerance, and belief in a clash of civilizations. Path and mediation analyses indicated that greater belief in Islamophobic conspiracy theories mediated the link between Islamophobia and intention to vote to leave. Islamophobia and Islamophobic conspiracist beliefs also mediated the effects of perceived threat from Muslims on voting intentions. Other variables acted as antecedents of perceived threat or Islamophobic conspiracy narratives. These findings highlight the role that identity-based cognitions may have played in shaping voting intentions for the UK EU referendum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For face recognition, observers utilize both shape and texture information. Here, we investigated the relative diagnosticity of shape and texture for delayed matching of familiar and unfamiliar faces (Experiment 1) and identifying familiar and newly learned faces (Experiment 2). Within each familiarity condition, pairs of 3D-captured faces were morphed selectively in either shape or texture in 20% steps, holding the respective other dimension constant. We also assessed participants' individual face-processing skills via the Bielefelder Famous Faces Test ( BFFT), the Glasgow Face Matching Test, and the Cambridge Face Memory Test ( CFMT). Using multilevel model analyses, we examined probabilities of same versus different responses (Experiment 1) and of original identity versus other/unknown identity responses (Experiment 2). Overall, texture was more diagnostic than shape for both delayed matching and identification, particularly so for familiar faces. On top of these overall effects, above-average BFFT performance was associated with enhanced utilization of texture in both experiments. Furthermore, above-average CFMT performance coincided with slightly reduced texture dominance in the delayed matching task (Experiment 1) and stronger sensitivity to morph-based changes overall, that is irrespective of morph type, in the face identification task (Experiment 2). Our findings (1) show the disproportionate importance of texture information for processing familiar face identity and (2) provide further evidence that familiar and unfamiliar face identity perception are mediated by different underlying processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inhibitory control ( IC), an ability to suppress irrelevant and/or conflicting information, has been found to underlie performance on a variety of cognitive tasks, including bilingual language processing. This study examines the relationship between IC and the speech patterns of second language (L2) users from the perspective of individual differences. While the majority of studies have supported the role of IC in bilingual language processing using single-word production paradigms, this work looks at inhibitory processes in the context of extended speech, with a particular emphasis on disfluencies. We hypothesized that the speech of individuals with poorer IC would be characterized by reduced fluency. A series of regression analyses, in which we controlled for age and L2 proficiency, revealed that IC (in terms of accuracy on the Stroop task) could reliably predict the occurrence of reformulations and the frequency and duration of silent pauses in L2 speech. No statistically significant relationship was found between IC and other L2 spoken output measures, such as repetitions, filled pauses, and performance errors. Conclusions focus on IC as one out of a number of cognitive functions in the service of spoken language production. A more qualitative approach towards the question of whether L2 speakers rely on IC is advocated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rare and unexpected changes (deviants) in an otherwise repeated stream of task-irrelevant auditory distractors (standards) capture attention and impair behavioural performance in an ongoing visual task. Recent evidence indicates that this effect is increased by sadness in a task involving neutral stimuli. We tested the hypothesis that such effect may not be limited to negative emotions but reflect a general depletion of attentional resources by examining whether a positive emotion (happiness) would increase deviance distraction too. Prior to performing an auditory-visual oddball task, happiness or a neutral mood was induced in participants by means of the exposure to music and the recollection of an autobiographical event. Results from the oddball task showed significantly larger deviance distraction following the induction of happiness. Interestingly, the small amount of distraction typically observed on the standard trial following a deviant trial (post-deviance distraction) was not increased by happiness. We speculate that happiness might interfere with the disengagement of attention from the deviant sound back towards the target stimulus (through the depletion of cognitive resources and/or mind wandering) but help subsequent cognitive control to recover from distraction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the experience of insight has long been noted, the essence of the 'Aha!' experience, reflecting a sudden change in the brain that accompanies an insight solution, remains largely unknown. This work aimed to uncover the mystery of the 'Aha!' experience through three studies. In Study 1, participants were required to solve a set of verbal insight problems and then subjectively report their affective experience when solving the problem. The participants were found to have experienced many types of emotions, with happiness the most frequently reported one. Multidimensional scaling was employed in Study 2 to simplify the dimensions of these reported emotions. The results showed that these different types of emotions could be clearly placed in two-dimensional space and that components constituting the 'Aha!' experience mainly reflected positive emotion and approached cognition. To validate previous findings, in Study 3, participants were asked to select the most appropriate emotional item describing their feelings at the time the problem was solved. The results of this study replicated the multidimensional construct consisting of approached cognition and positive affect. These three studies provide the first direct evidence of the essence of the 'Aha!' experience. The potential significance of the findings was discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrary to economic theory, psychological research has demonstrated increased choice can undermine satisfaction. When and why this 'excess choice effect' ( ECE) occurs remains unclear. Building on theories of counterfactual thinking we argue the ECE is more likely to occur when people experience counterfactual thought or emotion and that a key trigger is a negative versus positive task outcome. Participants either selected a drink (Experiment 1) or chocolate (Experiment 2) from a limited (6) versus extensive (24) selection (Experiment 1) or were given no choice versus extensive (24) choice (Experiment 2). In both experiments, however, the choice was illusory: Half the participants tasted a 'good' flavour, half a 'bad' flavour. As predicted, extensive choice was only detrimental to satisfaction when participants tasted the 'bad' drink or chocolate, and this was mediated by the experience of counterfactual thought (Experiment 1) or emotion (Experiment 2). When outcomes were positive, participants were similarly satisfied with limited versus extensive and no choice versus extensive choice. Implications for our theoretical understanding of the ECE and for the construction of choice architectures aimed at promoting individual satisfaction and well-being are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on virtual reality (VR) has gained momentum over the last fifteen years or so. In their review, Pan and Hamilton (2018, British Journal of Psychology) show how the different types of VR devices have the potential to probe fundamental psychological constructs, like those underlying social interactions. Expanding on their work, we propose a research agenda to increase the sense of co‐presence and make VR more real than reality through bodily illusions, multisensory stimulation, self‐conscious emotions, and multisubject social cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Matching unfamiliar faces is known to be difficult. Here, we ask whether performance can be improved by asking viewers to work in pairs, a manipulation known to increase accuracy for low-level visual discrimination tasks. Across four experiments we consistently find that face matching accuracy is higher for pairs of viewers than for individuals. This 'pairs advantage' is generally driven by adopting the response of the higher scoring partner. However, when the task becomes difficult, both partners' performance is improved by working in a pair. In two experiments, we find evidence that working in a pair can lead to subsequent improvements in individual performance, specifically for viewers whose accuracy is initially low. The pairs' technique therefore offers the opportunity for substantial improvements in face matching performance, along with an added training benefit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The own-age bias ( OAB) in face recognition (more accurate recognition of own-age than other-age faces) is robust among young adults but not older adults. We investigated the OAB under two different task conditions. In Experiment 1 young and older adults (who reported more recent experience with own than other-age faces) completed a match-to-sample task with young and older adult faces; only young adults showed an OAB. In Experiment 2 young and older adults completed an identity detection task in which we manipulated the identity strength of target and distracter identities by morphing each face with an average face in 20% steps. Accuracy increased with identity strength and facial age influenced older adults' (but not younger adults') strategy, but there was no evidence of an OAB. Collectively, these results suggest that the OAB depends on task demands and may be absent when searching for one identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past 20 years, there has been considerable interest in the role of cognitive factors in the stress generation process. Generally, these studies find that depressed individuals, or individuals at cognitive risk for depression, are more likely to experience stressful life events that are in part influenced by their own characteristics and behaviours (i.e., negative dependent events). However, there is still much to be learnt about the mediators of these effects. For example, does the development of depression symptoms explain why individuals at cognitive risk for depression experience increased negative dependent events? Or, is it that increases in cognitive risk explain why depressed individuals experience increased negative dependent events? To explore these questions, a short-term prospective study was conducted with 209 college students who were given measures of depression, depressogenic risk factors (i.e., negative cognitive style and hopelessness), and negative dependent events at two time points 6 weeks apart. Support was found for three models: (1) depression symptoms mediated the relationship between negative cognitive style and negative dependent events; (2) depression symptoms mediated the relationship between hopelessness and negative dependent events; and (3) first hopelessness and then depression symptoms mediated the relationship between negative cognitive style and negative dependent events in a multiple-step model. In contrast, the reverse models were not confirmed, suggesting specificity in the direction of the mediational sequence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

About a decade ago, psychology of the arts started to gain momentum owing to a number of drives: technological progress improved the conditions under which art could be studied in the laboratory, neuroscience discovered the arts as an area of interest, and new theories offered a more comprehensive look at aesthetic experiences. Ten years ago, Leder, Belke, Oeberst, and Augustin (2004) proposed a descriptive information-processing model of the components that integrate an aesthetic episode. This theory offered explanations for modern art's large number of individualized styles, innovativeness, and for the diverse aesthetic experiences it can stimulate. In addition, it described how information is processed over the time course of an aesthetic episode, within and over perceptual, cognitive and emotional components. Here, we review the current state of the model, and its relation to the major topics in empirical aesthetics today, including the nature of aesthetic emotions, the role of context, and the neural and evolutionary foundations of art and aesthetics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the impact of chewing gum on a Bakan-type vigilance task that requires the continual updating of short-term order memory. Forty participants completed a 30-min auditory Bakan-task either with, or without, the requirement to chew gum. Self-rated measures of mood were taken both pre- and post-task. As expected, the vigilance task produced a time-dependent performance decrement indexed via decreases in target detections and lengthened correct reaction times (RTs), and a reduction in post-task self-rated alertness scores. The declines in both performance and subjective alertness were attenuated in the chewing-gum group. In particular, correct RTs were significantly shorter following the chewing of gum in the latter stages of the task. Additionally, the gradients of decline for target detection and incline for correct RTs were both attenuated for the chewing-gum group. These findings are consistent with the data of Tucha and Simpson (2011), Appetite, 56, 299-301, who showed beneficial effects of chewing gum in the latter stages of a 30 min visual attention task, and extend their data to a task that necessitates the continuous updating of order memory. It is noteworthy that our data contradict the claim (Kozlov, Hughes, & Jones, 2012, Q. J. Exp. Psychology, 65, 501-513) that chewing gum negatively impacts short-term memory task performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Developing brief training interventions that benefit different forms of problem solving is challenging. In earlier research, Chrysikou (2006) showed that engaging in a task requiring generation of alternative uses of common objects improved subsequent insight problem solving. These benefits were attributed to a form of implicit transfer of processing involving enhanced construction of impromptu, on-the-spot or 'ad hoc' goal-directed categorizations of the problem elements. Following this, it is predicted that the alternative uses exercise should benefit abilities that govern goal-directed behaviour, such as fluid intelligence and executive functions. Similarly, an indirect intervention - self-affirmation (SA) - that has been shown to enhance cognitive and executive performance after self-regulation challenge and when under stereotype threat, may also increase adaptive goal-directed thinking and likewise should bolster problem-solving performance. In Experiment 1, brief single-session interventions, involving either alternative uses generation or SA, significantly enhanced both subsequent insight and visual-spatial fluid reasoning problem solving. In Experiment 2, we replicated the finding of benefits of both alternative uses generation and SA on subsequent insight problem-solving performance, and demonstrated that the underlying mechanism likely involves improved executive functioning. Even brief cognitive- and social-psychological interventions may substantially bolster different types of problem solving and may exert largely similar facilitatory effects on goal-directed behaviours. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two recent reviews of the neuroimaging literature on creativity have pointed to inconsistent findings across studies, calling into question the usefulness of the theoretical constructs motivating the search for its neural bases. However, it is argued that consistent patterns of neural activation do emerge when the cognitive process and the neuroimaging method are kept uniform across studies. To demonstrate this empirically, the activation likelihood estimation (ALE) method was used to conduct quantitative meta-analyses of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiments of analogy and metaphor - two processes related to creativity and included in the recent reviews. The results demonstrated that analogy and metaphor reliably activate consistent but dissociable brain regions across fMRI studies. The implications of the findings for cognitive theories of analogy and metaphor are discussed. Furthermore, these results demonstrate that to the extent that creativity has heterogeneous sources, its neural instantiation will vary as a function of the underlying cognitive processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examined whether high- or low-performing soccer players, classified based on established measures of perceptual-cognitive expertise, differed in regard to their practice history profiles and ability to recall elements of match performance. In Study 1, we measured perceptual-cognitive expertise in elite ( n= 48) and non-elite ( n= 12) youth soccer players using empirical tests of perceptual-cognitive skill. We then used a quartile split to stratify elite players into either high-performing ( n= 12) or low-performing ( n= 12) groups based on their test scores. A group of non-elite soccer players ( n= 12) acted as controls. In Study 2, we used an established questionnaire to examine retrospectively the participation history profiles of the three groups. The high-performing group had accumulated more hours in soccer-specific play activity over the last 6 years of engagement in the sport compared to their low-performing counterparts and the non-elite controls. No differences were reported for hours accumulated in soccer-specific practice or competition between the high- and low-performing groups. In Study 3, a novel test was developed to examine episodic memory recall in soccer. Although this test successfully differentiated elite from non-elite players, no differences were evident between high- and low-performing groups, implying that episodic memory recall may not be a crucial component of perceptual-cognitive expertise in soccer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies investigating developmental synaesthesia have sought to describe a number of qualities that might capture in behavioural terms the defining characteristics of this unusual phenomenon. The task of generating a definition is made more difficult by the fact that any description of synaesthesia must be broad enough to capture the 61 different variants of the condition already reported to date. Given these difficulties, the current literature now contains a number of conflicting assumptions about the nature of this condition. Here, I attempt to address several of these divisive areas from a set of contemporary definitions. I present evidence that might argue against previous claims that synaesthesia is (a) a 'merging of the senses', which (b) gives rise to consistent synaesthetic associations over time, with (c) synaesthetic associations that are spatially extended. I then investigate the possible benefits of moving from a behavioural definition to a neurobiological one and explore the ways in which this might force a rethink about the potential outermost boundaries of this fascinating condition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigated the effect of age-related decline in executive ability on the application of emergent features to incongruent social category conjunctions (e.g., male midwife). When forming an impression of an incongruent conjunction, older adults used more emergent attributes (attributes associated exclusively with the category conjunction and not the constituents), relative to younger adults. Moreover, this relationship was mediated by a reduction in inhibitory ability (measured using a Stroop task) and processing speed (measured using a Digit Symbol Substitution Test, DSST). These findings are consistent with the notion that executive ability is pivotal in understanding social functioning in older adults. We discuss the implications of these findings for the continuing development of models outlining the processes and stages involved in perceiving social category conjunctions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although links between music training and cognitive abilities are relatively well-established, unresolved issues include the generality of the association, the direction of causation, and whether the association is mediated by executive function. Musically trained and untrained 9- to 12-year olds were compared on a measure of IQ and five measures of executive function. IQ and executive function were correlated. The musically trained group had higher IQs than their untrained counterparts and the advantage extended across the IQ subtests. The association between music training and executive function was negligible. These results provide no support for the hypothesis that the association between music training and IQ is mediated by executive function. When considered jointly with the available literature, the findings suggest that children with higher IQs are more likely than their lower-IQ counterparts to take music lessons, and to perform well on a variety of tests of cognitive ability except for those measuring executive function. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Connectionist simulation was employed to investigate processes that may underlie the relationships between prior expectancies or prejudices and the acquisition of attitudes, under conditions where learners can only discover the valence of attitude objects through directly experiencing them. We compared contexts analogous to learners holding either false negative expectancies ('prejudices') about a subclass of objects that were actually good or false positive expectancies about objects that were actually bad. We introduced expectancy-related bias either by altering the probability of approach, or by varying the rate of learning following experience with good or bad objects. Where feedback was contingent on approach, the false positive expectancies were corrected by experience, but negative prejudices resisted change, since the network avoided objects deemed to be bad, and so received less corrective feedback. These findings are discussed in relation to the effects of intergroup contact and expectancy confirmation processes in reducing or sustaining prejudice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is the sequence of eye-movements made when viewing a picture related to encoding the image into memory? The suggestion of a relationship is supported by studies that have found that scanpaths are more similar over multiple viewings of a stimulus than would be expected by chance. It has also been found that low-level visual saliency contributes to the initial formation of these scanpaths, and has lead to formation of theories such as the saliency map hypothesis. However, bottom-up processes such as these can be overridden by top-down cognitive knowledge in the form of domain proficiency. Domain specialists were asked to look at a set of photographs of real-world scenes in preparation for a memory test. Then they were given a second set of stimuli and were asked to identify the picture as old (from the previous set) or new (never seen before). Eye tracking analyses (including scanpath comparison using a string editing algorithm) revealed that saliency did influence where participants looked and in what sequence. However, this was reliably reduced when participants viewed pictures from their specialist domain. This effect is shown to be robust in a repeated viewing of the stimuli. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's comments on psychologist Frederic Bartlett's affect theory. The author comments on Barlett's view that there are hardly any reaction tendencies expressed on a psychological level which do not involve the operation of cognitive processes. The author says that Barlett's view implies that affect without simultaneous cognition is unlikely or impossible.

A great deal of recent research has focused upon the relationship between a hypothesized index of prenatal testosterone exposure, digit ratio and health, social and cognitive functioning. Many inconsistencies within the pattern of findings have been identified in the relationship between digit ratio and absolute levels of cognitive ability. Recent research has identified a relationship between digit ratio and basic numeric competency. This basic numerical competency has been argued to be influenced by biological factors. The present study extended this finding to academic assessment, namely the Standardized Assessment Tests undertaken in numeracy and literacy by children in the UK at the age of 7. The present study hypothesized that digit ratio would correlate with the relative difference between numeracy and literacy abilities. Digit ratios were calculated for 75 (mainly Caucasian) children aged between 6 and 7 attending a state funded infant school. The digit ratios were then correlated with the results from their National Standard Assessment Tests (SATs). A significant correlation was found as hypothesized. Additionally, there was a negative correlation between digit ratio and numeracy for males (indicating higher prenatal testosterone exposure related to higher numeracy SAT scores) and a positive correlation between digit ratio and literacy for females (indicating lower prenatal testosterone exposure related to higher literacy SAT scores). These effects were small and the implications for using digit ratio to facilitate understanding of hormonal influences upon academic attainment are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of intuition has, until recently, received scant scholarly attention within and beyond the psychological sciences, despite its potential to unify a number of lines of inquiry. Presently, the literature on intuition is conceptually underdeveloped and dispersed across a range of domains of application, from education, to management, to health. In this article, we clarify and distinguish intuition from related constructs, such as insight, and review a number of theoretical models that attempt to unify cognition and affect. Intuition's place within a broader conceptual framework that distinguishes between two fundamental types of human information processing is explored. We examine recent evidence from the field of social cognitive neuroscience that identifies the potential neural correlates of these separate systems and conclude by identifying a number of theoretical and methodological challenges associated with the valid and reliable assessment of intuition as a basis for future research in this burgeoning field of inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Experiment 1, 6- and 9-year-old children and adults were asked to imagine various types of objects. The experimenter then attempted to change the image of those objects in participants' minds by either suggesting that the objects may change against the participants' will, or by asking participants to change the objects as a favor to the experimenter. Two types of suggestive causation were employed: Magical-suggestion (a magic spell was cast with the aim of changing the imagined objects) and ordinary-suggestion (participants were told that the objects in their minds could alter against their will). Ordinary-suggestion was as effective as magical-suggestion in changing the participants' imagined objects. For adults, a direct request for compliance produced a stronger effect than did magical suggestion. This effect was not found in children. In Experiment 2, the two types of suggestion were tested on an alternative type of imagined objects. Adult participants were asked to imagine their futures. It was then proposed that (a) a magic spell could be cast on their futures with the aim of changing them either for the worse or for the better (magical-suggestion), or (b) changing a numerical pattern on a computer screen could change their futures (ordinary-suggestion). All participants denied that changing a numerical pattern on a computer screen could affect their lives, yet in their actions they demonstrated an element of belief in this possibility. As in Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 ordinary suggestion was as effective as magical suggestion. The hypothesis of an historic contiguity between magical causality and ordinary suggestion is discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]